M. U. SHAH, J. M. SHELAT, J. ( 1 ) THIS is a petition for a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ quashing the reference dated July 29 1961 made under sec. 73a of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act of 1946 by the second Respondent Association to the Industrial Court and the order made by the Industrial Court negativing certain preliminary issues raised by the petitioner Association and for restraining the Industrial Court from proceeding further with the reference. The reference was made in the following circumstances:- ( 2 ) UNDER the standing orders settled under the Bombay Industrial Relations Act 1946 which are determinative under section 40 (1) of the Act in respect of matters enumerated in Schedule I thereto including Conditions procedure and Authority to grant Leave and in particular standing orders 11 and 12 and binding on the petitioners and the 2nd Respondent Association it was provided that service for a total period of 12 months in a textile mill should qualify an operative for a total period of one months leave with or without pay according to the terms of the contract custom or usage of the mill and grant of such leave should depend on the exigencies of the mill and should be at the discretion of the company. These standing orders also provided that an operative may be granted casual leave of absence with or without pay not exceeding 10 days in the aggregate in a calendar year. Such leave however should not be for more than 3 days at a time except in case of sickness and was intended to meet special circumstances which could not be foreseen. On April 21 1961 the 2nd respondent Association gave a notice of change to the petitioners desiring that the employees employed in the member mills of the petitioner-Association excluding the clerical technical and supervisory staff be granted benefits of different types of leave with wages such as casual privilege and sick leave. Since the parties could not arrive at any agreement the matter was taken in conciliation. The 2nd respondent Association obtained a certificate of failure of conciliation and thereafter made a reference of the dispute to the Industrial Court under section 73a of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act 1946 ( 3 ) BEFORE the Industrial Court the petitioner-Association raised certain preliminary issues. The 2nd respondent Association obtained a certificate of failure of conciliation and thereafter made a reference of the dispute to the Industrial Court under section 73a of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act 1946 ( 3 ) BEFORE the Industrial Court the petitioner-Association raised certain preliminary issues. These were;1 Whether the Bombay Industrial Relations Act 1946 was validly in force in the cotton textile industry in Ahmedabad area in view of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 and its subsequent amendments ?2 (a) Whether the amendments made in Schedules I and II of the Act in the matter of leave by notifications of the State Government were illegal ultra vires and unconstitutional ? (B) If so whether the reference was legally competent ?3 Whether sec. 73a of the Act is illegal ultra vires and unconstitutional ?4 Whether the provisions of leave with wages in the Factories Act 1948 operated as a bar to this reference ?5 Whether this reference was premature and incompetent in view of the five years period having not expired as per the Wage Board recommendations implemented by a consent award between the parties ?since these issues raised constitutional questions as regards the validity of the reference under sec. 73a of the Act notice was issued to the State Government and the Government was heard. The Industrial Court repelled the contentions raised by the petitioner-Association and held inter alia that the reference to it was a valid one and it had jurisdiction to decide it. The present petition disputes the correctness of that order on various contentions raised therein Before we proceed to deal with those contentions it is necessary to bear in mind a few dates. ( 4 ) THE Bombay Industrial Disputes Act XXV of 1938 was enacted in 1938 and received the assent of the Governor-General on February 24 1939 Sec. 2 (1) provides that sections 1 and 2 shall extend to the whole of the Province of Bombay. It also provides that the Provincial Government may by notification extend all or any of the remaining provisions of the Act to such areas as may be specified in such notification. Subsec. (2) empowered the Provincial Government to direct by notification that all or any of the remaining provisions extend or may be extended under sub-sec. (1) on such dates as may therein be specified and sub-sec. Subsec. (2) empowered the Provincial Government to direct by notification that all or any of the remaining provisions extend or may be extended under sub-sec. (1) on such dates as may therein be specified and sub-sec. (3) provided that the Provincial Government may direct by notification that all or any of the provisions of the Act shall apply to such industry as may therein be specified. In exercise of the powers under sec. 2 the then Government of Bombay by notifications dated March 14 1939 May 30 1939 as amended on June 10 1939 July 21 1939 and January 11 1940 and notification dated August 20 1939 brought into force the remaining provisions of the Act on the respective dates of these notifications and applied them to the cotton textile industry throughout the Province as specified therein. The Industrial Disputes Act XIV of 1947 was thereafter enacted and received the assent of the Governor General on March 17 1947 Under section 1 (2) as originally enacted it extended to the whole of British India and was brought into force under sec 1 (2) as from April 1 1947 In the meantime the Provincial Legislature of Bombay passed the Bombay Industrial Relations Act 1946 which received the assent of the Governor-General on April 15 1947 and was brought in force on September 29 1947 Sec. 2 (3) provided that in the areas in which the Bombay Industrial Disputes Act 193 was in force immediately before the commencement of this Act this Act shall apply to the industries to which the said Act applied and sec. 24 provided that the State Government may by notification in the Official Gazette apply all or any of the provisions of this Act to all or any other industries whether generally or in any local area as may be specified in such notification. Entry 6 in Schedule I to the Act as originally passed was as follows: Conditions Procedure and Authority to grant leave. This entry was amended by notification No. 1237/46 dated October 23 1952 and so amended it ran as follows: Entry 6. Procedure and Authority to grant leave. By a notification No. 1237/46 dated February 28 1953 entry 11 in Schedule 11 was added and the entry so added was as follows:all matters pertaining to leave and holidays other than those specified in items 6 and 7 in Schedule 1. Procedure and Authority to grant leave. By a notification No. 1237/46 dated February 28 1953 entry 11 in Schedule 11 was added and the entry so added was as follows:all matters pertaining to leave and holidays other than those specified in items 6 and 7 in Schedule 1. It is an admitted position that neither the Bombay Government nor the Government of Gujarat State has so far issued any notification under section 2 (4)of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act 1946 applying the Act to cotton textile industry in Ahmedabad. But the position taken up by the learned Advocate General for the State of Gujarat was that section 2 (3) and not sec. 2 (4) applied to the facts of the present case and that since the Bombay Industrial Disputes Act 1938 was in force immediately before the commencement of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act 1946 i. e. till its repeal by sec. 122 of the Act and as the aforesaid notifications issued under the Bombay Industrial Disputes Act 1938 applied to the cotton textile industry there was no necessity to issue any notification under section 2 (4) of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act and the provisions of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act therefore applied to the cotton textile industry in Ahmedabad and therefore the reference made by the 2nd respondent Association under sec. 73a of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act was a valid reference. ( 5 ) THE contentions on the other hand urged by Mr. Patwari for the petitioner-Association contesting the position taken up by the respondents were as follows:- (1) That the Bombay Industrial Disputes Act 1938 and the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Central Act) covered the same field and therefore under section 107 (2) of the Government of India Act 1935 the former Act became void as from April 1 1947 when the Central Act applying to the whole of British India was brought into force. (2) That the Bombay Industrial Disputes Act 1938 having been rendered void as aforesaid the notifications issued thereunder were of no effect. (2) That the Bombay Industrial Disputes Act 1938 having been rendered void as aforesaid the notifications issued thereunder were of no effect. The Bombay Industrial Disputes Act having become void as from April 1 1947 it could not be said to be in force immediately before the commencement of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act 1946 and therefore section 2 (3) of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act would not apply and no notification having admittedly been issued under sec. 2 (4) thereof the Bombay Industrial Relations Act would not apply to the cotton textile industry in Ahmedabad. (3) And consequently section 73a thereof would not apply and any reference thereunder made would be without jurisdiction and could not be entertained for that reason by the Industrial Court. (4) That the Bombay Industrial Relations Act 1946 was rendered void by reason of the Central Act having been amended from time to time and in particular by the Amendment Acts passed in 1951 and 1956 and the failure to obtain fresh assent of the President in respect of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act. (5) That the amendment in Schedules I and II of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act regarding the item of leave are unconstitutional and ultra vires the Act. (6) That section 73a is unconstitutional and invalid (a) being discriminatory and therefore violative of Article 14 and (b) being void as being repugnant to the provisions of the Central Act as amended in 1951 and 1956 (7) That the provisions of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act 1946 to the extent to which they deal with leave with pay are void being repugnant to the Factories Act 1948 and therefore the reference under section 73a relating to leave with pay is barred. (8) That the reference is incompetent and premature by reason of its being contrary to the recommendations made by the Central Wage Board appointed for the Cotton Textile Industry in its report dated November 27 1959 and duly implemented by the petitioner-Association. ( 6 ) AS regards the first question the contention urged by Mr. Patwari was that the two Acts the Bombay Industrial Disputes Act 1938 and the Central Act occupied the same field that though the Central Act does not expressly repeal the Bombay Industrial Disputes Act the latter Act was repugnant to the former Act and therefore the resultant effect was that under the provisions of sec. Patwari was that the two Acts the Bombay Industrial Disputes Act 1938 and the Central Act occupied the same field that though the Central Act does not expressly repeal the Bombay Industrial Disputes Act the latter Act was repugnant to the former Act and therefore the resultant effect was that under the provisions of sec. 107 of the Government of India Act 1935 the Bombay Industrial Disputes Act stood impliedly repealed. Mr. Patwarisubmitted that the subject matter of the two legislations and the period of their operation were so identical that both cannot stand side by side and therefore the Provincial legislation was totally repugnant to the Central Act and must be held to have been impliedly repealed in its entirety. He pointed out the preambles of the two statutes and contended that looking to the pith and substance of the subject matters dealt with by them the object of the two Acts was the same viz. . the settlement of industrial disputes between the employers and the employees the harmony of relations between the two and industrial peace. In a detailed examination of the sections of the two Acts he endeavoured to point out that besides the identity of the subject matter and the objects of the two statutes the two Acts established similar authorities for achieving those objects. Under the Bombay Industrial Disputes Act these authorities were the Conciliator the Board of Conciliation and the Court of Industrial Arbitration under sections 20 23 and 24. Chapters VI and VII of the Act dealt with conciliation and voluntary arbitration and secs. 62 and 63 dealt with illegal strikes and lock-outs and Chapter X dealt with penalties for infractions of the several provisions of the Act. Sections 74 and 75 of the Act dealt with the representative character of unions of workmen intended for the preservation of the right of collective bargaining by the employees. Mr. Patwari argued that a similar scheme was followed in the Industrial Disputes Act which provides for Conciliators (section 4) a Board of Conciliation (section 5) Labour Courts (section 7) Tribunals (section 7a) and National Tribunals (section 7b ). Sections 26 to 31 deal with illegal strike and lock-outs and penalties and just as the Bombay Industrial Disputes Act provides for representation of employees so does section 36 of the Central Act. Sections 26 to 31 deal with illegal strike and lock-outs and penalties and just as the Bombay Industrial Disputes Act provides for representation of employees so does section 36 of the Central Act. Both the Legislatures had no doubt jurisdiction to pass the two Acts as they fell under item 29 of part 11 of List 111 of the Concurrent Legislative List in the 1935 Act viz. Trade Unions Industrial and Labour Disputes but as the two Acts deal with the same subject matter the Bombay Act must give way to the Central Act and became void as from April 1 1947 when the latter Act was brought into force under sub-section (1) of section 107 of the Government of India Act 1935 Mr. Patwari relied on Zaverbhai v. State of Bombay (1955) 1 S. C. R. 799 where the Supreme Court had to deal with a similar situation though the Constitutional provision there concerned was Article 254 of the Constitution and not section 107 of the Government of India Act 1935 But that would make no significant difference as Article 254 is in substance a repetition of section 107 of the Government of India Act 1935 and the principle embodied in both is that when there is legislation covering the same ground both by the Centre and the province or the State both being competent to enact the same the law of the Centre must prevail over that of the province or the State. The facts in that case were that the Central Legislature first enacted the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act XXIV of 1946 which was made applicable to the whole of British India. Section 3 of that Act empowered the Central Government to issue orders for regulating the production supply and distribution of essential commodities and under section 4 this power could be delegated to the Provincial Government. Section 7 (1) provides for punishment for contravention of orders issued under the Act. The Province of Bombay felt that the punishment provided under section 7 (1) was not adequate and therefore enacted Act XXXVI of 1947 wherein the maximum punishment for breach of any order made or deemed to be made under section 3 was seven years. Section 7 (1) provides for punishment for contravention of orders issued under the Act. The Province of Bombay felt that the punishment provided under section 7 (1) was not adequate and therefore enacted Act XXXVI of 1947 wherein the maximum punishment for breach of any order made or deemed to be made under section 3 was seven years. This section was avowedly repugnant to section 7 (1) of the Central Act but on the footing that the subject matter of the Bombay Act XXXVI of 1947 fell within the concurrent List the Bombay Government obtained the assent of the Governor-General and brought that Act into force as from November 25 1947 The position therefore was that under sec. 107 (2) of the Government of India Act 1935 the Bombay Act prevailed in Bombay over the Central Act though it was at the same time subject to any further legislation with respect to the same matter that might be enacted by the Central Legislature. There was thereafter such further legislation by the Central Legislature first in 1948 then in 1949 and finally in 1950 the last being after the Constitution came into force and therefore Article 254 instead of section 107 of the Government of India Act applied. The Supreme Court held that Act LII of 1950 passed by the Central Legislature was legislation in respect of the same matter as the Bombay Act XXXVI of 1947 within the meaning of Article 254 of the Constitution and therefore section 2 of the Bombay Act could not prevail as against section 7 of the Central Act as amended by Act LII of 1950. At page 806 of the report the Supreme Court considered the provisions of sec. 101 (2) of the Government of India Act and Article 254 (2) of the Constitution and observed that whereas under sec 107 the Parliament had no power to repeal a Provincial law directly the proviso to Article 254 (2) of the Constitution has enlarged the powers of Parliament and therefore it can enact a law adding to amending varying or repealing a law of the State when it relates to an item in the Concurrent List. Where it does not expressly do so even then the State law would be void if it conflicts with a latter law with respect to the same matter that may be enacted by Parliament. Where it does not expressly do so even then the State law would be void if it conflicts with a latter law with respect to the same matter that may be enacted by Parliament. At page 109 the Supreme Court repeated the same principle and stated:"it is true as already pointed out that on a question under Article 254 (1) where an Act of Parliament prevails against a law of the State no question of repeal arises but the principle on which the rule of implied repeal rests mainly that if the subject matter of the latter legislation is identical with that of the earlier so that they cannot both stand together then the earlier is repealed by the later enactment will be equally applicable to a question under Article 254 (2) where the further legislation by Parliament is in respect of the same matter as that of the State law. "it is thus clear that under section 107 of the Government of India Act if a Provincial law is repugnant to any Federal Law which the Central Legislature is competent to enact or to any existing Indian Law with respect to the matters in the Concurrent Legislative List the Federal Law whenever passed before or after the Provincial law or as the case may be the existing Indian law would prevail and the Provincial law to the extent of repugnance would be void. But this rule is subject to subsection (2) of section 107 which provides that where a Provincial law with respect to one of the matters in the Concurrent List contains any provision repugnant to the provisions of an earlier Federal Law or an existing Indian law with respect to one matter then if the provincial law has received the assent of the Governor-General or of His Majesty the Provincial law shall in the Province prevail unless the Federal Legislature may at any time enact further legislation with respect to the same matter. Under the proviso to sub-section (2) no Bill or Amendment for making any provision repugnant to any Provincial law which has received the assent of the Governor-General or His Majesty can be introduced or moved in the Central Legislature without the previous sanction of the Governor-General in his discretion. Except for the additional power of directly repealing the State law to the Parliament the position under Article 254 is the same. Except for the additional power of directly repealing the State law to the Parliament the position under Article 254 is the same. Therefore under sub-section (1) of section 107 of the Government of India Act which applies to the case before us it would be the Central Act that would prevail wherever the two Acts deal with the same matter and the Provincial law would be void to the extent of the repugnancy. Mr. Patwari however argued that though the provincial law would be void under section 107 (1) of the Government of India Act 1935 to the extent of its repugnancy and therefore what would be void would not be the entire Act but only that part which is repugnant in the present case the identity of the field occupied by both the Acts when considered from the pith and substance of the subject matter of the two statutes and also the period of their operation so completely coincided that the repugnancy is complete and consequently the whole of the Bombay Act of 1938 has become void. Based on this reasoning his submission was that the subject matter of both the Acts was the same viz. the settlement of industrial disputes that both set up authorities and machinery to deal with such disputes that therefore they occupy the same field and operate during the same period. Consequently the whole of the Bombay Act became void as from April 1 1947 when the Central Act came into force as if from that day the Bombay Act ceased to be on the statute book and the notifications issued thereunder by the Bombay Government applying that Act to the cotton textile industry also became void and of no effect. Following this reasoning Mr. Patwari argued that there was an interregnum between April 1 1947 and September 29 1947 when the Bombay Industrial Relations Act 1946 was brought in force the Bombay Act of 1938 having become void as from April 1 1947 Therefore the argument ran sec. Following this reasoning Mr. Patwari argued that there was an interregnum between April 1 1947 and September 29 1947 when the Bombay Industrial Relations Act 1946 was brought in force the Bombay Act of 1938 having become void as from April 1 1947 Therefore the argument ran sec. 2 (3) of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act would not apply as the Bombay Act of 1938 cannot be said to be in force immediately before the commencement of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act 1946 and therefore unless that Act was made applicable to the cotton textile industry by a notification under section 2 (4) of that Act the Act would not apply and any reference made under section 73a would be unauthorised and bad in law. In support of his contention Mr. Patwari drew our attention to an unreported decision of the Supreme Court in The State of Orissa and another v. M. A. Tulloch and Co. Civil Appeals Nos. 561 and 562 of 1962 decided on August 16 1963 At the material time the respondent company was working a manganese mine in the State of Orissa under a lease granted by that State under the provisions of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulations) Act 1948 and the rules made thereunder. While the company was thus working the mines the State Legislature passed an Act called the Orissa Mining Areas Development Fund Act 1952 and under powers conferred under that Act the State Government was empowered to levy a fee on a percentage of the value of the mined ore at the pits mouth the collections being intended for the development of the mining areas in the State. The State Government thereafter made demands on the respondent company for the payment of the fees. Thereupon the respondent company filed a writ petition before the High Court of Orissa impugning the legality of the demand. The High Court allowed the writ petition and issued directions to the second appellant in terms of the prayers in the petition. The State Government thereafter made demands on the respondent company for the payment of the fees. Thereupon the respondent company filed a writ petition before the High Court of Orissa impugning the legality of the demand. The High Court allowed the writ petition and issued directions to the second appellant in terms of the prayers in the petition. The contention which the High Court accepted was that the Orissa Act had been rendered ineffective or suppressed by a Central enactment namely the Mines and Minerals ( Regulation and Development) Act 67 of 1957 which came into force from June 1 1958 The Orissa Act was enacted by the State Legislature under entry 23 of the State Legislative List which was in the following terms:- :-"regulation of mines and mineral development subject to the provisions of List I with reference to regulation and development under the control of the Union". The legislative entry under which the Central Act 67 of 1957 was enacted was item 54 of the Union List which was Regulation of mines and mineral development to the extent to which such regulation and development under the control of the Union is declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the public interest. Section 2 of the Central Act contained a declaration in terms of the last words of the entry. On these facts the High Court accepted the contention that on the coming into force of the Central Act the Orissa Act ceased to be operative by reason of the withdrawal of the legislative competence by force of the entry in the State List being subject to the Parliamentary declaration and the law enacted by Parliament and held that the Orissa Act should be deemed to be non-existent as and from June 1 1958 with the result that there was lack of power to enforce and realise the demands for the payment of the fees at the time when the notices for the demand were issued and were sought to be enforced. The Supreme Court examined entry 23 of the State List which vests in the State Legislature power to enact laws on the subject of regulation of mines and mineral development subject to the provisions of List I with respect to regulation and development under the control of the Union and entry 54 in the Union List and held that the Central Act having been enacted by Parliament in exercise of the legislative power contained in entry 54 and containing a declaration in terms of what is required under that entry there could be no argument that to the extent to which the Union Government had taken under its control the regulation and development of minerals so much was withdrawn from the ambit of power of the State Legislature under entry 23 of the State List. This decision cannot help Mr. Patwari because the question there involved was not so much of repugnancy between the provisions of the two enactments but of a denudation or deprivation of State legislative power by the declaration which Parliament was entitled to make and had made. Repugnancy as stated in this decision arises when two enactments both within the competence of the two legislatures collide and when the Constitution expressly or by necessary implication provides that the enactment of one legislature has superiority over the other then to the extent of the repugnancy the one supersedes the other. Two enactments may be repugnant to each other even though obedience to each of them is possible without disobeying the other. The existence of two legislations containing contradictory provisions is however not the only criterion of repugnancy for if a competent legislature with a superior efficacy expressly or impliedly evinces by its legislation an intention to cover the whole field the enactment of the other legislature whether passed before or after would be over borne on the ground of repugnance Where such is the position the inconsistency is demonstrated not by a detailed comparison of the provisions of the two statutes but by the mere existence of the two powers of legislation. In the case before it the Supreme Court held that having regard to section 18 (1) of the Central Act the intention of Parliament was to cover the entire field and therefore the State Act stood superseded as from the date when the Central Act of 1957 came into force. In the case before it the Supreme Court held that having regard to section 18 (1) of the Central Act the intention of Parliament was to cover the entire field and therefore the State Act stood superseded as from the date when the Central Act of 1957 came into force. This supersession of the State legislation had the effect of an implied repeal and the Court on the reasoning to be found in the latter part of the judgment held that the effect was the same as that of an express repeal and in such cases sec. 6 of the General Clauses Act would apply. The Supreme Court therefore held that the liability to pay the fee having accrued before June 1 1958 i. e. before the Central Act LXVII of 1957 had come into force that liability was saved that the notices of demand were valid and the State Government was entitled to recover the fees due under those notices. The decision far from being one on the question of repugnancy helps in one way the Advocate General rather than Mr. Patwari in view of the observations quoted above on the effect of repugnancy as we shall presently point out. But before we do that it is better to ascertain what exactly is the principle of repugnancy and bow it has to be ascertained. ( 7 ) IN Tika Ramji v. State of U. P. A. I. R. 1956 S. C 676 one of the contentions raised before the Supreme Court was that the U. P. Sugar Cane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase ) Act XXIV of 1963 was repugnant to the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act LXV of 1951 as amended by Act XXVI of 1953 and to the Essential Commodities Act X of 1955 the latter two being the Central Acts that the latter two Acts should prevail and the impugned Act should to the extent of repugnancy be void. Defining the connotation of the term repugnancy Bhagwati J. who spoke for the Bench stated-"repugnancy falls to be considered when the law made by Parliament and the law made by the State Legislature occupy the same field because if both these pieces of legislation deal with separate and distinct matters though of a cognate and allied character repugnancy does not arise. "after citing Nicholas on Australian Constitution 2nd edition page 303 and other authorities he adopted three tests formulated by Nicholas viz (1) Inconsistency in the actual terms of the compelling statutes (2) the Central Act being intended to be a complete exhaustive Code and (3) when even in the absence of such intention. a conflict may arise when both the statutes seek to exercise their power over the same subject matter. In case where there is no question of inconsistency it would become necessary to compare the two statutes to discover whether the two legislatures sought to exercise their powers over the same subject matter or whether the law enacted by the Parliament was intended to be a complete exhaustive Code or in other words evinced expressly or impliedly an intention to cover the whole field. In Ex-parte Mclean (1930) 43 C. L. R. 472 the question was as to the interpretation of sec. 109 of the Australian Constitution which is to the same effect as sec. 107 (1) of the Government of India Act and Article 254 (1) of the Constitution except that there the word inconsistency instead of repugnancy is used. On an information for an offence under sec. 4 of the Masters and Servants Act 1902 (N. S. W.) the defendant was convicted and fined for neglecting to fulfil the contract made between the informant ( his employer ) and himself in pursuance of an award made by the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration which bound both parties and required them to perform the contract. The very same conduct by the same persons was punishable but somewhat differently under the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act. It was held that the State Act was invalid protanto by virtue of sec. 109 of the Constitution and that the conviction was therefore bad. Dixon J. at page 453 of the report observed that when the Parliament of Commonwealth and the Parliament of a State each legislate upon the same subject and prescribe what the rule of conduct shall be they make laws which are inconsistent notwithstanding that the rule of conduct is identical which each prescribes and sec. 109 applies. That this is so is settled at least when the sanctions they impose are diverse. ( Humme v. Palmer 1926 38 C. L. R. 441 ). 109 applies. That this is so is settled at least when the sanctions they impose are diverse. ( Humme v. Palmer 1926 38 C. L. R. 441 ). But the reason is that by prescribing the rule to be observed the Federal statute shows an intention to cover the subject matter and provide what the law upon it shall be. If it appeared that the Federal law was intended to be supplementary to or cumulative upon the State law then no inconsistency would be exhibited in imposing the same duties or inflicting different penalties. Inconsistency does not lie in the mere co-existence of the two laws which are susceptible of simultaneous obedience. It depends upon the intention of the paramount Legislature to express by its enactment completely exhaustively or exclusively what shall be the law governing a particular conduct or matter to which its attention is directed. When a Federal statute discloses such an intention it is inconsistent with it for the law of a State to govern the same conduct or matter. Similarly in The State of Victoria v. Commonwealth of Australia (1937) 58 C. L. R. 6189 the question was as to the inconsistency between sec. 13 of the Marine Act 1928 passed by the State of Victoria and the Navigation Act 1912 passed by the Commonwealth Parliament. Evatt J. at page 634 drew a distinction between two Acts passed by one and the same Legislature when even overlapping would be enough to cause inconsistency and Acts passed by different legislatures under a Constitution which distributes powers between the two. In the latter case he observed more direct proof of conflict must be established before the Court can conclude that the legislation by one is to be treated as void. He added that this view is reinforced by remembering that where invalidity or repugnancy causes avoidance of legislation it is only to the precise extent of such invalidity or repugnancy. The inconsistency stressed in these decisions is dependent upon the intention of the paramount legislature and not merely in the fact of two co-existent statutes. He added that this view is reinforced by remembering that where invalidity or repugnancy causes avoidance of legislation it is only to the precise extent of such invalidity or repugnancy. The inconsistency stressed in these decisions is dependent upon the intention of the paramount legislature and not merely in the fact of two co-existent statutes. ( 8 ) IN R. M. D. C. (Mysore) Private Ltd. V. State of Mysore A. I. R. 1962 S. C. 594 the question was with regard to the inconsistency between the Prize Competitions Act 1955 a Central Act and the Mysore Lotteries and Prize Competitions Control and the Tax Act XXXII of 1951 passed by the Mysore Legislature. The Supreme Court there held that the inconsistency between the two Acts would operate on that part of the Mysore Act which became repugnant to sections 4 and 5 of the Central Act as to promotion of prize competitions and licensing of prize completions and consequently a portion of sec. 12 (1) (b) of the State Act which deals with taxes in respect of prize competitions for which a licence had to be obtained became void but not the rest. The Supreme Court further held that when the words for which a licence has been obtained under sec. 8 were removed by the Mysore Amending Act XXVI of 1957 the rest of the clause (b) in sec 12 (1) of the State Act could no longer be said to be repugnant to any of the provisions of the Central Act. At pages 600-601 the Supreme Court clarified the position by observing that sec. 12 (1) (b) of the State law did not become wholly void by reason of Article 254 (1) but that all that could be said was that that part of it which referred to licensing became repugnant. At the time when the Mysore Act was passed it was within the legislative power of the State legislature and it may be that it was rendered unconstitutional by reason of sections 4 and 5 of the Central Act but that portion which dealt with taxation could not be held void because as a result of the Amending Act the words which were with retrospective effect were deleted and the doctrine of eclipse could be invoked in the case of a law which was valid when made but was rendered invalid by a supervening constitutional inconsistency. The effect of repugnancy is thus not to render the whole of the statute void but only that part of it which is inconsistent with the Central statute. The remaining statute still remains in force and even that part of it which is void can be remedied if that which is inconsistent or repugnant in it is done away with by an Amending Act deleting it. ( 9 ) THE question of repugnancy and its effect was again considered by the Supreme Court in Deepchand v. The State of U. P. and others 1959 Supp. 2 S. C. R. 8. In order to appreciate the true result of that decision it is necessary to relate a few facts leading to the petitions disposed of thereby and the contentions raised therein so far as they are relevant for our purposes. The appellants there were carrying on business as Stage Carriage Operators on different routes in U. P. under permits issued to them under the Motor Vehicles Act 1939 along with buses owned by Government. The State Legislature after obtaining the assent of the President on April 23 1955 passed U. P. Transport Service (Development) Act IX of 1955 and published it on April 24 1955 Under section 3 of this Act the Government issued a notification dated May 17 1955 where under it was directed that the aforesaid routes should be exclusively served by Government Vehicles and private stage carriages should be excluded from those routes. On November 12 1955 the State Government published another notification under section 4 formulating a scheme for those routes along with other routes. The appellants received notices requiring them to file their objections and after objections of certain appellants were heard the Government issued a notification under section 8 of the Act and thereafter the Secretary to the Regional Transport Authority sent an order prohibiting the appellants from plying their carriages on the routes and informing them that their permits would be transferred to alternative routes. The appellants filed writ petitions in the High Court challenging the validity of the U. P. Act but they were rejected. While their appeals were pending before the Supreme Court Parliament passed the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act 100 of 1956 which was published on December 31 1956 Thereupon the appellants applied for leave to urge new grounds which the Supreme Court granted. While their appeals were pending before the Supreme Court Parliament passed the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act 100 of 1956 which was published on December 31 1956 Thereupon the appellants applied for leave to urge new grounds which the Supreme Court granted. On these facts it was contended on behalf of the appellants. (I) that Central Act 100 of 1956 was wholly repugnant to the provisions of the U. P. Act and therefore by reason of Article 254 (1) the State Act became void and there was no valid law where under the Government could prohibit the appellant from exercising their right to ply their stage carriages; and (II) that the scheme framed under the State Act being one made to operate in future and from day to day was an instrument within the meaning of section 68b of the Central Act and therefore sec. 68b would prevail over the scheme and the scheme would have no force. In addition to these contentions a further contention on behalf of certain appellants was raised based on the proviso to Article 254 (2) and that was that by reason of the Amending Act 100 of 1956 the U. P. Act was repealed in toto and because of section 68b of the Amending Act the operation of the provisions of the General Clauses Act was excluded. The State of U. P. met these contentions by arguing that there was no repugnancy between the two Acts and therefore the U. P. Act was neither void nor was it repealed by necessary implication. It will be seen that contentions (i) and (ii) above were similar in nature to those taken before us by Mr. Patwari. ( 10 ) THE Supreme Court first laid down three principles adopted by it earlier in Zaverbhai v. Stage of Bombay (1955) 1 S. C. R. 799 on which repugnancy can be ascertained viz. (I) where there is direct conflict between the two provisions; (II) where Parliament intended to lay down an exhaustive code in respect of the subject matter replacing the Act of the State Legislature; and (III) where the Central and State laws occupy the same field. (I) where there is direct conflict between the two provisions; (II) where Parliament intended to lay down an exhaustive code in respect of the subject matter replacing the Act of the State Legislature; and (III) where the Central and State laws occupy the same field. Examining the two statutes from the point of view of these principles the Supreme Court held that both the Acts were intended to operate in respect of the same subject matter in the same field but that the provisions of the scheme the principles of compensation and the manner of its payment differed in the two Acts. Therefore the Amending Act 100 of 1956 occupied the same field in respect of the schemes but the learned Judges made a distinction between the schemes framed before the coming into force of the Amending Act and those that were initiated thereafter. Negativing the contention based on the ground accepted by the Supreme Court that the two Acts occupied the same field and that the Central Act intended to lay down an uniform code on the subject matter of nationalisation of transport services that the U. P. Act became wholly void under Article 254 (1) Subba Rao J. speaking for the majority observed that that contention ignored the crucial words to the extent of the repugnancy in Article 254 (1) and that therefore what would become void was not the entire Act but only to the extent of its repugnancy with the law made by Parliament. He also observed that when the subject matter and the period of operation coincide in the two Acts there would be complete repugnancy and the whole of the State law would become void. But the operation of the Central Act may be entirely prospective leaving the State law to be effective in regard to things already done under the State Act. On this principle he held that sections 68c 68 and 68e inserted by the Amending Act were concerned with a scheme initiated after the Amending Act came into force. None of these sections expressly or by necessary implication indicated that the schemes already finalised should be reopened and fresh schemes should be framed pursuant to the procedure prescribed thereunder. On this principle he held that sections 68c 68 and 68e inserted by the Amending Act were concerned with a scheme initiated after the Amending Act came into force. None of these sections expressly or by necessary implication indicated that the schemes already finalised should be reopened and fresh schemes should be framed pursuant to the procedure prescribed thereunder. Therefore under Article 254 (1) the law framed under the U. P. Act subsisted to support the schemes framed thereunder and it became void only in respect of schemes framed after the Central Act came into force. For this result he relied on Keshavan Madhava Menons case 1951 S. C. R. 228 where on the question that the Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act 1931 was void as infringing Article 13 (1) of the Constitution the Supreme Court had held such Laws exist for all past transactions and for enforcing all rights and liabilities accrued before the date of the Constitution and that so far as the past acts are concerned the Law exists notwithstanding that it does not exist with respect to the future exercise of fundamental rights and held that Article 13 (1) was pari materia with the provisions of Article 254 (1) in that while under Article 13 (1) all pre-Constitution laws to the extent of their inconsistency with Part 111 are void under Article 254 (1) the State law to the extent of its repugnancy to the Central Act is void He added that if the pre-Constitution law exists for the post-Constitution period for all the past transactions by the same parity of reasoning the State law subsists after the making of the law by Parliament for past transactions. In this view both the laws can co-exist to operate during different periods. In this view both the laws can co-exist to operate during different periods. This result comes about as a consequence of an Act which becomes void on the ground of repugnancy without having to resort to a saving clause as regards past transactions or to provisions such as those in the Interpretation Act 1839 of England or the General Clauses Act 1887 The principle is that a provision in a Statute that with effect from a particular date an existing law would be void to the extent of the repugnancy has no retrospective effect as in the case of repeal where there is no saving clause or a provision as in the General Clauses Act and therefore does not affect pending prosecutions or actions taken under such law. There is in such a situation no necessity of introducing a saving clause and it does not need the aid of a legislative provision of the nature contained in the Interpretation Act or the General Clauses Act. To hold that a prospective declaration that a statute is void affects pending cases or finished transactions is to give it indirectly retrospective operation. Dealing with the contention under the proviso to Article 254 His Lordship observed that Parliament can repeal a State law under that proviso and can also repeal a State law which is repugnant whether directly or by necessary implication. Assuming that Parliament by enacting the Amending Act 100 of 1956 impliedly repealed the U. P. Act that would not have the effect of effacing the scheme already framed before the Amending Act came into force and such a scheme would be saved under sec. 6 of the General Clauses Act. In either way whether the Act is viewed as having become void as a result of repugnancy or as impliedly repealed the result would be the same and the scheme already framed would not be effaced but would be valid and binding and the Act would subsist for all the past transactions and for enforcing all rights and liabilities accrued before the Central Act came into force. ( 11 ) IN cases where the jurisdiction of the State Legislature under List 11 of the 7th Schedule is subject to the jurisdiction of Parliament as in Entries 17 23 24 33 and 54 in List II if Parliament has passed an Act which covers the field occupied by the impugned State Act the State Act would be ultra vires not on the ground of repugnance between the two Acts but because the State Legislature had lost the jurisdiction to pass such an Act. The limitation imposed in such entires by the use of the expression subject to is a limitation on the very legislative competence of the State Legislature itself and a law made under such an entry would be beyond such limitation. Decisions illustrative of this category of cases are to be found in Hingir-Rampur Coal Co v. State of Orissa A I. R. 1961 S. C. 459 and the unreported decision in Civil Appeals 561 and 562 of 1962 decided on August 16 1963 of Orissa v. M. A. Tulloch and Co. already referred to earlier. These are cases where there is failure of legislative jurisdiction resulting in repeal by implication attracting the application of sec. 6 of the General Clauses Act as distinguished from a case of repugnancy though in both past transactions are saved but for different reasons. The present case is not like the one in Hingir-Rampur Coal Companys case or the State of Orissas case for it is a case where the contest is with regard to two statutes which are passed by two legislatures with jurisdiction and therefore cases such as Deepchands case and Keshav Menons case would more aptly apply than the two Orissa cases. ( 12 ) HAVING examined the principles by which repugnancy between two statutes is to be ascertained and the resultant effect of such repugnancy we now turn to ascertain whether the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 covers the entire field occupied by the Bombay Industrial Disputes Act 1938 No doubt the preamble of the Bombay Act states that the reason for enacting it was to promote peaceful and amicable settlement of industrial disputes by conciliation and arbitration and for certain other purposes while the preamble of the Industrial Disputes Act also states that it was enacted to make provision for the investigation and settlement of industrial disputes. But the objects of the two statutes may be similar and yet there would be no repugnancy if they supplement each other and can co-exist if the paramount legislation does not cover the entire field occupied by the State law and is not inconsistent with the latter. ( 13 ) AN examination of the two Acts from this point of view without going into a detailed comparison of the provisions of the two would prove useful. Chapter V of the Bombay Act deals with changes and sec. 26 therein makes it obligatory on every employer to submit standing orders to the Commissioner for Labour for approval within the time prescribed therein regulating the relations between him and his employees in regard to all industrial matters enumerated in Schedule 1. Such standing orders when settled by the Commissioner or by the Industrial Court are determinative of the relations between the employees and the employer. Then follow sections 27 to 33 which contain a scheme for making changes in such standing orders and the manner in which such changes can be effected Such provisions it will be noticed are not to be found in the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 the reason being that the General Legislature had before passing the Industrial Disputes Act already enacted The Industrial Employment (Standing) Order Act XX of 1946 which was brought into force on April 23 1946 and which required employers in industrial establishments to define conditions of employment under them. Under sub-sec. (3) of sec. 10 of the Act the Act was made applicable to every industrial establishment wherein one hundred or more workmen are employed or were employed on any day of the preceding twelve months and to such class or classes of other industrial establishments as the appropriate Government may from time to time by notification specify in this behalf. Though this sub-section applied to all industrial establishments with one hundred or more workmen and to others notified by the appropriate Government the proviso to this sub-section expressly excepted from the application of the Act industries to which Chapter V of the Bombay Industrial Disputes Act 1938 had been applied. The proviso thus is a clear indication that the intention of the Central Legislature was not to affect the industrial concerns which were subject to the Bombay Act and the standing orders settled thereunder. The proviso thus is a clear indication that the intention of the Central Legislature was not to affect the industrial concerns which were subject to the Bombay Act and the standing orders settled thereunder. The Industrial Disputes Act 1947 was then enacted and brought into force from April 1 1947 but it did not deal with or provide for standing orders presumably for the reason that Act XX of 1946 had already provided for them. Therefore the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 does not cover at any rate the field occupied by Chapter V of the Bombay Industrial Disputes Act 1938 and does not contain any provisions inconsistent with those in Chapter V of the Bombay Act and therefore the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be said to be repugnant to the provisions of Chapter V of the Bombay Act. The provisions of Act XX of 1946 though they deal with standing orders a subject covered by the Bombay Act are also not repugnant because the proviso to section 1 (3) in clear terms saves and excepts from the application of the Act industries to which the Bombay Act of 1938 had been applied and the standing orders which were made and settled thereunder. Furthermore sec. 14 of Act XX of 1946 empowered the appropriate Government to exempt any industrial establishment or class of industrial establishments from all or any of the provisions of the Act another indication that the Central Legislature did not desire to have this Act an over-riding effect on State Acts in force in the States. Sec. 73 of the Bombay Industrial Disputes Act 1938 deals with illegal changes and prohibits an employer from making any change in any industrial matter in regard to which a standing order has been settled under sec. 26 or which is set out in Schedule 11 before an agreement as contemplated by sec. 30 (1) is arrived at or where no such agreement is arrived at before the conciliation proceedings are completed or in cases where there is a registered submission before the arbitration proceedings relating thereto are completed or in cases where any dispute relating to such industrial matter has been referred to the Industrial Court for its decision before such decision is given. It also prohibits an employer from making any change made in contravention of a registered agreement a settlement or an award and provides that any change made in contravention of these provisions shall be illegal. No such provisions were made in the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 until 1956 when by Act XXXVI of 1956 Chapter II-A dealing with Notice of Change was inserted for the first time in the Act. It may also be noticed that the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 does not contain provisions providing for representative character to unions of workmen an instrument well-recognised in industrial matters for collective bargaining as the Bombay Industrial Disputes Act 1938 does by Chapter II therein. In 1949 the Central Legislature passed the Industrial Disputes ( Banking and Insurance Companies ) Act which was published on December 14 1949 The object of the Act was to provide for adjudication of industrial disputes concerning banking and insurance companies having branches or other establishments in more than one State. Section 4 of the Act prohibited references by State Government of disputes concerning any banking or insurance company or any matter relating to such disputes to any tribunal or authority for adjudication inquiry or settlement and section 5 provided for withdrawal and abatement of proceedings relating to such disputes pending before State Tribunals on references of such disputes to a Tribunal constituted by the Central Government. These provisions clearly show that the Central Legislature was conscious that there were in force State laws such as the Bombay Industrial Disputes Act 1938 under which the State Governments were competent to deal with disputes concerning banking and insurance companies and which required to be withdrawn from the jurisdiction of the States presumably on the ground of their all-India character which required uniform decisions all throughout the country. However the fact that only the disputes relating to banking and insurance companies were withdrawn from the jurisdiction of State Governments and the Tribunals appointed under the State laws shows that so far as the rest of the disputes were concerned the State laws were to operate and remain in force. Thereafter the Central Legislature enacted the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act 48 of 1950 for the establishment of an Appellate Tribunal in relation to industrial disputes and for certain matters incidental thereto. Under sec. Thereafter the Central Legislature enacted the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act 48 of 1950 for the establishment of an Appellate Tribunal in relation to industrial disputes and for certain matters incidental thereto. Under sec. 2 (c) Industrial Tribunal was defined as meaning any tribunal constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 or in relation to cases where an appeal lay to any Court wage board or authority set up in any State under any law relating to the adjudication of industrial disputes made whether before or after the commencement of this Act by the legislative authority of the State to any other Court Board or Authority set up in the State under such law that Court Board or Authority exercising appellate jurisdiction within that State or in relation to other cases where no appeal lay under law referred to above any Court Board or Authority set up in any State under such law. The definition thus in express terms saved the Court Board or Authority constituted under the existing State laws and its jurisdiction under such State law. Chapter III of the Act made certain provisions relating to Industrial Tribunals set up under other laws. Sec. 18 provided for the period for the commencement of an award or decision of an Industrial Tribunal which under the aforesaid definition included a Court Board or Authority constituted under State law and sec. 20 made provision for recovery of money due from an employer under such award or decision. These provisions far from being inconsistent with State laws such as the Bombay Industrial Disputes Act 1938 were complimentary to and supplemented the provisions of such laws for sections 18 and 29 of the Act provided for the period and the machinery for recovery of dues payable under an award or decision of the Court Board and Authority. These amendments have not been shown by Mr. Patwari as being inconsistent to or in conflict with the Bombay Industrial Disputes Act 1938 nor did he advance any argument that they were so. These amendments have not been shown by Mr. Patwari as being inconsistent to or in conflict with the Bombay Industrial Disputes Act 1938 nor did he advance any argument that they were so. The Industrial Disputes ( Amendment and Temporary Provisions ) Act 40 of 1951 which received the assent of the President on June 26 1951 dealt with Banking Companies only and would at the most be repugnant to the extent of such of the provisions of the State laws which deal with or affect industrial matters concerning such companies but not the rest of the provisions of State laws. The Industrial Disputes Act 1947 has since then been amended from time to time by Act 18 of 1952 43 of 1953 48 of 1954 36 of 1956 41 of 1956 and 12 of 1957 and though extensive additions are made in the principal Act none has been shown to be repugnant to the Bombay Industrial Disputes Act 1938 On the contrary as shown earlier some of them have saved the provisions of the State Act and the jurisdiction and powers of the Court Board or Authority constituted thereunder. ( 14 ) IT is clear from the language used both in sec. 107 of the Government of India Act 1935 and Article 254 of the Constitution that in the case of legislation on the items in the Concurrent List the State law would become void only to the extent of repugnancy but it is not as if the entire law is effaced or obliterated from the Statute Book as would be the case where such law is ultra vires because of failure or absence or deprivation of jurisdiction of the Legislature concerned In any event provisions such as those in Chapter II Chapter V and sec. 73 of the Bombay Industrial Disputes Act 1938 which are not covered by the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 and those which are expressly saved by the Central Acts referred to above cannot be held to be void on the ground of repugnancy even if the rest may be so treated and therefore to the extent of those provisions at least the Bombay Act can be regarded as being in force immediately before the commencement of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act 1946 i. e. September 29 1947 Even assuming that the whole of the Bombay Industrial Disputes Act 1938 were held to have become void as from April 1 1947 when the Industrial Disputes Act came into force the Supreme Courts pronouncement in Keshav Menons case and Deepchands case make the position clear that the past transactions already completed would not be affected and the entire machinery provided in the Act would be available to enforce the rights and liabilities which accrued or arose under and in respect of such transactions. Even if the repugnancy were held to result in repeal by implication sec. 6 of the General Clauses Act would apply to such past transactions and again the provisions of the repealed Act would be available for the enforcement of rights and liabilities arising from such transactions. In any view of the matter therefore the 1938 Act must be held to be in force immediately before the commencement of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act 1946 and therefore it would be sec. 2 (3) and not sec. 2 (4) of the latter Act which would apply and therefore no notification under sec. 2 (4) would be necessary for the application of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act to the cotton textile industry. We are supported in this conclusion by the very enactment of sec. 2 (3) and sec. 122 of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act. The State Legislature surely would not have considered it necessary to include sub-sec. (3) in sec. 2 if it had thought that the Bombay Industrial Disputes Act had become void and could no longer be said to be in force immediately before the commencement of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act. 122 of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act. The State Legislature surely would not have considered it necessary to include sub-sec. (3) in sec. 2 if it had thought that the Bombay Industrial Disputes Act had become void and could no longer be said to be in force immediately before the commencement of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act. A comparison of the two Acts clearly points out that the intention of the Legislature was to leave it to the State Government to decide as to when and to what industries and in which areas the provisions of the two Acts should be brought in force and made applicable. The Legislature thought that the State Government would be the better authority rather than itself to decide these questions and therefore it left the decision on these matters to the Government. But when the Bombay Industrial Relations Act was passed the Bombay Industrial Disputes Act had already been in force for a fairly long period and by notifications had been applied to several areas and industries including the cotton textile industry. There was therefore no question for the State Legislature having then to decide whether the new Act should be applied or not to such industries to which the Bombay Industrial Disputes Act had already been applied and it was therefore that it provided under sec. 2 (3) that the new Act would automatically apply to those areas and industries to which immediately before its commencement the Bombay Industrial Disputes Act was applied and was in force. For the rest of the industries or areas as there was no such experience the Legislature again left it to the discretion of the Government to apply by means of a notification the new Act as and when the Government thought fit. Similarly sec. 122 became necessary because the Bombay Industrial Disputes Act was as aforesaid still in force and since the new Act was intended to substitute the old Act its repeal had to be provided for. Both these provisions therefore show the intent of the State Legislature and its awareness that the Bombay Industrial Disputes Act was in force immediately before the commencement of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act. Mr. Patwari however argued that sec. 2 (3) and sec. Both these provisions therefore show the intent of the State Legislature and its awareness that the Bombay Industrial Disputes Act was in force immediately before the commencement of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act. Mr. Patwari however argued that sec. 2 (3) and sec. 122 were enacted because the State Legislature erroneously believed that the Bombay Industrial Disputes Act was in force though in fact it had already become void as from April 1 1947 and there was a vaccum during the period from April 1 1947 to september 29 1947 to accept that contention would be tantamount to accept a facile argument that the Legislature had erred and was not conscious of the enactment of the Industrial Disputes Act and its effect on its own statute a thing quite contrary to well-established canons of construction. In our view for the reasons aforesaid we cannot sustain the contentions of Mr. Patwari that (1) the Bombay Industrial Disputes Act became void and ceased to be in force as from April 1 1947 and (2) that the Bombay Industrial Relations Act did not apply to cotton textile industry by reason of a notification under section 2 (4) applying the Act to this industry not having been issued by the State Government. ( 15 ) THE contention next urged on behalf of the petitioners was that section 73a of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act under which the impugned reference has been made did not apply as neither the Bombay nor the Gujarat Government ever issued a notification bringing the section into force and consequently no valid reference could be made thereunder. Section 73a was first introduced in the Act by Bombay Act 43 of 1948 and that section was later on substituted by the present section by Bombay Act 63 of 1953 published in the Gazette on November 27 1953 The argument was that under section 2 of the Bombay Industrial Disputes Act 1936 only sections I and 2 of that Act were brought into force at one and the same time but so far as the remaining sections of that Act were concerned they were to come in force and apply to such areas and such industries and from such time as the Provincial Government may notify. Accordingly the Provincial Government had issued several notifications from time to time bringing into force and applying the provisions of the Act to different areas and different industries. It was also pointed out that when section 49a was added in the Act by Bombay Act X of 1941 a notification bearing No. 4589/34 and dated June 14 1941 had to be issued and it was under that notification that the new section was brought into force. According to Mr. Patwari this scheme is followed by the Legislature in the Bombay Industrial Relations Act also for under section 2 (1) though the Act extended to the whole of the State under sub-sec (2) it was to come into force from such date as the State Government may by notification specify and under sub-sec. (4) all or any of the provisions of the Act were to apply to all or any other industries except those to which sub-sec. (3) applied whether generally or in any local area as may be specified in such notification. No such notification having been issued sec. 73a was not brought into force and therefore the present reference could not be made thereunder. In support of his contention Mr. Patwari relied upon a decisio n of the Bombay High Court in Central Spinning and Weaving Company Limited v. Rashtriya Mill Mazdo or Sangh reported in 1958 Industrial Court Reporter 938 where the High Court held that a reference regarding bonus made under section 38 of the Central Province and Berar Disputes Settlement Act 1947 was not maintainable as the State Government had failed to bring that section into force by its omission to issue the required notification. When the Act was originally passed in 1947 it contained 61 sections Section 1 (3) of the Act provided that sec. I was to come into force at once and the Government may by notification bring the remaining sections or any of them into force in such area or industry and on such date as may be specified in the notification. Accordingly the State Government issued a notification on November 20 1947 by which secs. 2 to 61 were brought into force in all the industries except cotton textile industry and certain other industries mentioned therein. On February 22 1951 another notification was issued amending the earlier one by which secs. Accordingly the State Government issued a notification on November 20 1947 by which secs. 2 to 61 were brought into force in all the industries except cotton textile industry and certain other industries mentioned therein. On February 22 1951 another notification was issued amending the earlier one by which secs. 2 to 61 were applied to cotton textile industry also Section 38a was inserted in the Act in 1955 and the result of the amendment made in the Act in 1955 was that that section became part of the Act and therefore had to be read along with sec. 1. The High Court held that therefore under sec. 1 (3) a notification became necessary before the new section could be applied it not being a separate enactment and consequently could not be deemed to have come into force as soon as the amending Act of 1955 was passed. The High Court observed that the fact that the Government had made secs. 2 to 61 applicable to the tax the industry showed that the intention was to make the provisions of the Act applicable to that industry as they stood at the time of the notification. Section 38a having been passed subsequently it could not be said that the Government then intended that even the amendments which might be passed in the Act thereafter should also automatically apply to the textile industry Besides the Government had no power on February 22 1951 to apply to textile industry provisions which were not in existence and were not part of the Act then. Reliance was also placed on the State of Bombay v. Salat Pragji Karamsi (1957) S. C. R. 745. By clause 3 of the Kutch (Application of Laws) Order 1949 the Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act IV of 1887 was made applicable to Kutch. Clause 4 of the Order provided that the Act applied by the Order shall be construed as if references thereunder to the authorities and territories were references to the authorities and territories of Kutch as set out in that clause. The Supreme Court held that the words shall be construed as meant shall be read as and consequently wherever in the Bombay Act the words Provincial Government or Government were used they bad to be read as Chief Commissioner of Kutch and the words Province or Presidency of Bombay as Kutch or any part thereof. The Supreme Court held that the words shall be construed as meant shall be read as and consequently wherever in the Bombay Act the words Provincial Government or Government were used they bad to be read as Chief Commissioner of Kutch and the words Province or Presidency of Bombay as Kutch or any part thereof. So understood sec. I of the Bombay Act as applied to Kutch provided that all or any of the provisions of that Act may be extended from time to time by the Chief Commissioner of Kutch by an order published in the Official gazette to any local area in Kutch or any part thereof. The Court also held that the contention that the Bombay Act had been validly extended to and was in force in the whole of Kutch because of the Kutch ( Application of Laws ) Order 1949 was not sound. But the true position was that the whole of the Act including the amended section 1 became applicable to Kutch and therefore a notification was necessary before it could be brought into force in any part of Kutch. The Chief Commissioner issued a notification on November 28 1950 bringing all the provisions of the Bombay Act into force throughout the whole of Kutch with immediate effect. The Chief Commissioner of Kutch under sec. I of the Bombay Act had power to issue the notification making that Act operative in Kutch or in any part of Kutch and those powers were not affected by Article 239 of the Constitution. The notification was valid and the Act came into force in parts of the State to which the notification made it applicable. ( 16 ) THE simple answer to this contention is that it proceeds on a fallacious assumption that the scheme of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act in so far as its provisions as to its applicability are concerned is the same as that of the Bombay Industrial Disputes Act. ( 16 ) THE simple answer to this contention is that it proceeds on a fallacious assumption that the scheme of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act in so far as its provisions as to its applicability are concerned is the same as that of the Bombay Industrial Disputes Act. As already pointed out under section 2 (1) of the Bombay Industrial Disputes Act sections 1 and 2 only were extended to the Province of Bombay while the rest of the provisions of the Act could be made applicable and brought into force as and when the Provincial Government issued a notification applying all or any of the provisions of the Act to such areas and to such industries as specified in such notification. This was deliberately done for the reasons already set out and because this was the very first measure of its kind in this country and therefore the Legislature thought it expedient to leave the question of application of the Act to the Government as to when and where the provisions of the Act should be applied and brought into force. That was not the position in 1946 when the Bombay Industrial Relations Act was enacted as nearly eight years had gone by since industrial legislation was undertaken and experience had been gained. Therefore when the Legislature enacted section 2 it introduced sub-sections (3) and (4) therein making a distinction between industries to and the areas in which the Bombay Industrial Disputes Act was in force and all or any other industries and areas. So far as the former were concerned the Act was made automatically applicable on the Government specifying the date by a notification and as regards the rest the Act was to become applicable on the Government issuing a notification under section 2 (4 ). But relying on the Bombay decision referred to above Mr. Patwari argued that as sec. 73a was enacted in 1953 it could come into force only after a notification to that purpose was issued. But that again would be misreading sec. 2 of the Act because sec. 73a though passed in 1953 has to be read as part of the main Act and since the entire Act came into force on September 29 1947 when the notification under sec. 2 (1) was issued and under sec. But that again would be misreading sec. 2 of the Act because sec. 73a though passed in 1953 has to be read as part of the main Act and since the entire Act came into force on September 29 1947 when the notification under sec. 2 (1) was issued and under sec. 2 it applied automatically to areas and industries to which the Bombay Industrial Disputes Act was operative there was no need of a notification bringing into force sec. 73a. The two decisions cited by Mr. Patwari are not applicable because the schemes of the two enactments were akin to the Bombay Industrial Disputes Act 1938 and not to the Bombay Industrial Relations Act 1946 Section 38a of the C. P. and Berar Industrial Disputes and Settlements Act could not come into force as under section 1 (3) it required a notification. The same was the position in the Kutch case reported in 1957 S. C. R. 745. That is not so in the case of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act by reason of sec. 2 (1) and sec. 2 (3 ). We may also point out that in Rashtriya Mill Mazdoor Sangh v. Industrial Court (1959) 2 L. L. J. 737 a Division Bench of the High Court of Bombay while dealing with sec. 7a inserted in that same Act by Madhya Pradesh Industrial Disputes Settlement (Amendment) Act 1955 questioned the correctness of the reasoning in the case reported in 1958 Industrial Court Reporter 939 on the ground that the learned Judges there had not considered two aspects viz. (1) that the Amending Act 1955 did not specify the date on which it was to come into force and (2) that the provisions enacting the Amending Act could not become part of the parent Act till the Amending Act came into force. The learned Judges who decided the case of Rashtriya Mill Mazdoor Sangh v. Industrial Court held that since the Amending Act which inserted section 7a in the Act did not provide for the date when it was to come into force under sec. 3 (1) of the C. P. and Berar General Clauses Act it would come into force on November 25 1955 when after it received the Presidents assent it was published. Since it came into force on that date there was no need whatever to issue a notification under section 1 (3 ). 3 (1) of the C. P. and Berar General Clauses Act it would come into force on November 25 1955 when after it received the Presidents assent it was published. Since it came into force on that date there was no need whatever to issue a notification under section 1 (3 ). The restraints imposed by sec. 1 (3) were intended to apply to the provisions of the main Act enacted in 1947. It was open to the Legislature to extend those restrictions even to the provisions of the Amending Act but the Legislature did not do so and therefore there was no necessity of a notification to bring into force section 7a. The learned Judges there observed that where an Act is amended by another Act the provisions of the Amending Act no doubt become part of the parent Act but that would not mean that the Amending Act does not come into force except by following the procedure laid down in the parent Act for bringing it into force. The Amending Act cannot become part of the parent Act without the Amending Act coming into operation but once it comes into operation the issue of a notification would become in any event redundant. ( 17 ) WITH respect we agree with the reasoning in this decision and we may also add that as laid down in Shamrao v. District Magistrate Thana A. I. R. 1952 S. C. 324 the rule of construction is that when a subsequent Act amends an earlier one in such a way as to incorporate itself into the earlier Act then the earlier Act must be read and construed as if the altered words had been written in the earlier Act with pen and ink and the old words scored out so that thereafter there is no need to refer to the Amending Act at all but that does not mean that the Amending Act becomes part and parcel of the earlier Act so that it is deemed to be in force at the date when the earlier Act came into force. It comes into force when it is enacted for otherwise it would be giving to it indirectly retrospective effect though not intended by the legislature. This position was made clear in Shri Ram Narain v. The Simla Banking and Industrial Co. Ltd. A. I. R. 1956 S. C. 614. It comes into force when it is enacted for otherwise it would be giving to it indirectly retrospective effect though not intended by the legislature. This position was made clear in Shri Ram Narain v. The Simla Banking and Industrial Co. Ltd. A. I. R. 1956 S. C. 614. It is true that whenever an amended Act has to be applied subsequent to the date of the amendment various unamended provisions of the Act have to be read along with the amended provisions as though they are part of it. This is for the purpose of determining what the meaning of any particular provision of the Act is whether it is in the unamended part or in the amended part. But this is not the same thing as saying that the amendment itself must be taken to have been in existence as from the date of the earlier Act. That would be imputing to the amendment retrospective operation which can only be done if such retrospective operation is given by the amending Act either expressly or by necessary implication Where one is not concerned with the meaning of any particular phrase or provision of the Act after the amendment but the effect of the amending provisions in their relation to the other statutory provisions outside the Act the amendment cannot obviously be treated as having been part of the original Act itself so as to enable the doctrine to be called in aid that a later Act overrides an earlier Act. ( 18 ) THE result of this discussion therefore is that though section 73a became part and parcel of the parent Act it was not as if it could not and did not come into force without a notification. Since the Amending Act which inserted it in the parent Act did not require any such notification and further since it did not specify the date when it would come into force the Amending Act came into operation as from the date it was gazetted and from that date has to be read as part of the Act. The reference therefore has to be held as maintainable. ( 19 ) MR. The reference therefore has to be held as maintainable. ( 19 ) MR. Patwari then argued that even if it is held that the Bombay Industrial Relations Act applied to the cotton textile industry by reason of section 2 (3) thereof that Act itself became void in the absence of a fresh assent of the President for it in view of the amendments made from time to time in the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 and in particular those in 1951 and 1956. The argument was that both the Acts were enacted under item 29 of part 11 in list 3 of the Constitution Act of 1935 that both of them dealt with Trade Unions and industrial and labour disputes as is clear from the preambles of the two Acts which state that they were enacted for the regulation of relations between the employers and the employees and the settlement of industrial disputes. He relied on the latter part of section 107 (2) of the Constitution Act of 1935 and argued that though the Bombay Industrial Relations Act was reserved for assent and had received the assent of the Governor General and would therefore prevail in the Province of Bombay as against the Central Act the Central Legislature having passed several Amending Acts amending that Act the Central Act would prevail as from the dates when the Amending Acts came into force and the Bombay Industrial Relations Act therefore would be void unless every time the Acts amending the Industrial Disputes Act were enacted a fresh assent was obtained. As an additional argument Mr. Patwari pointed out that when Act 48 of 1950 was enacted the original section 1 (2) was substituted and the amended sub-section (2) was made applicable to the whole of India except Jammu and Kashmir and later on by Act XXXVI of 1956 that sub-section was again substituted by the present sub-section 2 under which the Act would extend to the whole of India. He even went to the length of contending that when section 1 (2) was thus substituted by the new sub-section first in 1950 and again in 1956 since the sub-section dealt with the applicability of the Act the Act must be deemed to have been impliedly repealed and re-enacted in its entirety and that being so it would prevail over the Bombay Industrial Relations Act and the latter Act must therefore be held to be void. For this conclusion he relied on the decision in Zaverbhais case in (1955) S. C. R. 799 and the observations made at page 809 viz. "that on a question under Article 254 (1) where an Act of Parliament prevails against a law of the state no question of repeal arises but the principle on which the rule of implied repeal rests namely that if the subject-matter of the later legislation is identical with that of the earlier so that they cannot both stand together then the earlier is repealed by the later enactment will be equally applicable to a question under Article 254 (2) where the further legislation taken by Parliament is in respect of the same matter as that of the state law". Therefore it was argued the Bombay Industrial Relations Act though an Act later than the Industrial Disputes Act the Amending Acts were further legislation by Parliament and therefore the Bombay Industrial Relations Act which would otherwise have prevailed became void by reason of the aforesaid further legislation on the principle in Zaverbhais case. The argument however assumes that the Amending Acts dealt with the same subject-matter covered by the Bombay Industrial Relations Act. As earlier explained the Amending Acts provided for the constitution of an Appellate Tribunal but recognised at the same time the Court Board or Authority constituted under the State laws and provided in addition methods and periods by and during which payments to be made by an employer under an award or decision could be recovered. In other words far from being in conflict with the Bombay Industrial Relations Act or covering the field occupied by the State Act the provisions of these Amending Acts seem to compliment and supplement the provisions of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act. That being so it is difficult to appreciate how Mr. Patwari can bring to his aid the decision in Zaverbhais case. That being so it is difficult to appreciate how Mr. Patwari can bring to his aid the decision in Zaverbhais case. Secondly there is nothing in section 107 (2) of the Government of India Act 1935 or Article 254 of the Constitution which would justify the contention that though a State law may have been competently passed the enactment of an Amending Act amending a Central Act passed earlier than the State law would necessitate for the validity of such a State Act a fresh assent. Thirdly there is no warrant for Mr. Patwaris contention that when section 1 of the Industrial Disputes Act was amended first in 1950 and then in 1956 substituting the original sub-section by a new one the sub-section being one dealing with the applicability of the Act the whole of the Act must be deemed to have been re-enacted and therefore became an Act later in point of time than the Bombay Industrial Relations Act and therefore must be deemed to have impliedly repealed the Bombay Industrial Relations Act. When a Legislature amends an Act it may follow any one of the numerous methods of amendment. Sometimes it may adopt the method of deletion of certain words or sentences or it may add to or alter the words which it wants to amend. Sometimes when it thinks expedient it may substitute one provision by a new one where it feels expedient to do so. But these are different methods of amendment and substitution of one provision by another does not mean that the whole of the Act is re-enacted impliedly repealing the original Act. Section 34 of the Amending Act of 1950 itself states that sub-sec. (2) of sec. I of the original Act was amended by substituting the original provision for the new one. What the Amending Acts in 1950 and 1956 did was simply to extend the territorial limits of the application of the Act without touching the other provisions of the Act. There is therefore no justification in the contention that because that sub-section dealt with the extension of the Act the Act must be deemed to have been re-enacted and that for that reason a fresh assent for the Bombay Industrial Relations Act was necessary or that without which the Act would be void. There is therefore no justification in the contention that because that sub-section dealt with the extension of the Act the Act must be deemed to have been re-enacted and that for that reason a fresh assent for the Bombay Industrial Relations Act was necessary or that without which the Act would be void. ( 20 ) THE next contention that the amendments in the items as to leave in Schedule 11 of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act are unconstitutional and void on the ground of excessive delegation of legislative power does not survive in view of this Courts decision in Special Civil Application No. 948 of 1960 decided on February 5 1964 . ( 21 ) A further contention raised on behalf of the petitioners was that sec. 73a of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act is unconstitutional by reason of (a) its being discriminatory and violative of Article 14 and (b) being repugnant to the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 It was argued that the section is discriminatory because it confers a right to refer to the Industrial Court an industrial dispute to a registered union and confers no such right to an employer or an association of employers. Such a right given to a union only is in breach of the right of equal protection of law. In order to reinforce his argument Mr. Patwari drew our attention to sec. 38a of the Central Provinces and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act 1947 where under such a right of reference is granted to both the employers and the employees. It will be seen from the terms of sec. 73a that though the right of reference is given to a union it is only that union which is registered under chapter III of the Act and which is also an approved union under Chapter IV which is given this right. The right further more is hedged round with certain conditions viz. that no such dispute can be referred after two months from the date of completion of proceedings before the Conciliator or where the employer has offered in writing before the Conciliator to submit the dispute to arbitration under this Act and the union has not agreed to do so or unless the dispute is first submitted to the Conciliator and the conciliation proceedings are completed or the Conciliator has certified that the dispute is not capable of being settled by conciliation. Such a dispute also cannot be referred to the Industrial Court where it is required by the Act to be referred to the Labour Court for its decision. We fail also to appreciate how the section can be said to be discriminatory because an employer and an employee cannot be said to be similarly situated and Article 14 can only apply to classification in the case of persons similarly situated. That the employers and employees are not similarly situated is a fact which is so well-recognised that both the Central and the State Legislatures had to enact various provisions recognising thereunder the necessity of preserving the right of collective bargaining of employees through registered unions as a protective measure. Even assuming that the section results in discrimination the classification must be held to be based on a rational basis and having reasonable nexus with the object for which the Act is passed such object being the regulation of relations between employers and employees and the settlement of industrial disputes between them. Under the Act various industrial matters are classified in Schedules I II and III of the Act. Chapter VIII deals with changes in these industrial matters and section 46 though dealing with illegal changes recognises the right of unilaterally making a change even in standing orders settled under Chapter VII by an employer provided that he follows the procedure prescribed therefore in the Act. Sub-sec. (2) of sec. 46 lays down that no employer shall make any change in any matter set out in Schedule II before giving notice under section 42 (1) or within the period provided for in sec. 44 (1) unless an agreement is arrived at or where no such agreement is arrived at before the completion of conciliation proceedings and during ten days thereafter or where no such settlement is arrived at after two months from the date of completion of proceedings before the Conciliator etc. Under clauses (ii) and (iii) of sub-sec. (2) of this section therefore an employer can make a change provided that it is not made contrary to the provisions there under i. e. where no agreement is arrived at after the completion of conciliation proceedings and ten days thereafter and under clause (iii) where no settlement is arrived at within two months from the date of completion of the proceedings before the Conciliator. An employer can effect changes under this section unilaterally so long as they are not illegal changes under sec. 46. It would seem that sec. 73a was inserted in the Act with the object of providing a machinery to resolve a dispute that may arise in case of such change or arising there from instead of driving the employees to such a drastic step as a strike. It is true that sec. 38a of the C. P. Act relied on by Mr. Patwari gives a right of reference to both the employers and employees but the scheme of that Act is somewhat different from the Act before us for under sec. 37 (10) of that Act an employer cannot effect unilaterally a change which he can make under the Bombay Industrial Relations Act under the circumstances set out above. In any event in view of the fact that the employers and employees are not persons similarly situated and in view of the fact that the right to refer is conferred on a union clearly with the object of avoiding such calamities as a strike and to prevent bitterness between the two classes it is difficult to hold that the section is violative of Article 14. As regards repugnancy Mr. Patwari was not able to point out any provision in the Industrial Disputes Act which can be said to be in conflict or inconsistent with the provisions of section 73a so that sec. 73a and any such provision in the Central Act cannot co-exist. ( 22 ) PERHAPS the weakest argument advanced by Mr. Patwari was the one regarding the repugnancy of the provisions as to leave with wages in the Bombay Industrial Relations Act and those in the Factories ACts 1948. The Factories Act came in force on April 1 1949 Chapter VIII of that Act deals with annual leave with wages. Section 79 in that Chapter provides that every worker who has worked for a period of 240 days or more in a factory during a calendar year shall be allowed during the subsequent calendar year leave with wages for the number of days to be calculated at the rate provided therein. Section 80 provides for payment of wages to the workers during leave period at the rates provided therein and sec. 81 provides for payments in advance in certain cases. Section 80 provides for payment of wages to the workers during leave period at the rates provided therein and sec. 81 provides for payments in advance in certain cases. The argument was that since the Factories Act and the Bombay Industrial Relations Act both have provisions with regard to leave they cannot co-exist without a conflict arising between them and as the Factories Act is a Central Act and applies to all the factories in the country it must prevail over the State law to the extent that the latter makes provision on the subject of leave. Mr. Patwari pointed out that as Chapter VIII in the Factories Act substituted the original Chapter VIII by sec. 20 of the Factories (Amendment) Act 1954 it would be Article 254 (2) of the Constitution and not sec. 107 (2) of the Constitution Act 1935 which would apply and the provisions relating to leave in the Bombay Industrial Relations Act would be repugnant and therefore void. This contention cannot be sustained for a number of reasons. In the first place the objects of the two Acts are different The object of the Factories. Act is to regulate labour in factories while the object of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act is to regulate relations between the employers and the employees and to make provisions for the settlement of industrial disputes between them. Secondly the expression worker in the Factories Act has a limited meaning in the sense that a worker thereunder means a person employed in any manufacturing process or in cleaning any part of the machinery or premises used for manufacturing process or in any other work incidental to or connected with the manufacturing process or the subject of the manufacturing process. An employee on the other hand under the Bombay Industrial Relations Act means any person employed to do any settled or unsettled work in any industry and includes a person employed by a contractor to do any work for him in execution of a contract with an employer and a person who has been discharged or dismissed from employment on account of any dispute relating to a change in respect of which a notice is given or an application is made under section 42. Similarly the word factory under the Factories Act carries a limited meaning as compared to an industry within the meaning of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act for whereas a factory means premises where ten or more workers are working and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on or where twenty or more workers are working or were working on any day of the preceding twelve months and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on industry means any business trade manufacture or undertaking or calling of employers and any calling service employment handicraft or industrial occupation or a vocation of employees. Obviously an industry and an employee under the Bombay Industrial Relations Act have wider connotation than a factory and a worker under the Factories Act. Thirdly the two Acts are enacted under different entries the Factories Act under entry 26 and the Bombay Industrial Relations Act under entry 29 29 Part II of List III in the 7th Schedule of the Constitution Act 1935 Fourthly the schemes of the two Acts clearly show that whereas the Factories Act was enacted to ensure the health and the basic conditions in which workers have to work such as provisions as to their health safety welfare working hours etc. the Bombay Industrial Relations Act does not deal with these matters but deals with those matters which are conducive to bringing about harmony in relations between the employees and the employers and was enacted primarily to set up machinery to bring about settlement of industrial disputes. It is also clear from section 78 of the Factories Act that though Chapter VIII deals with the subject of leave there is no conflict between those provisions and those in the Bombay Industrial Relations Act for section 78 itself provides that the provisions of Chapter VIII are not to operate to the prejudice of any right to which a worker may be entitled to under any other law or under the terms of any award agreement or contract of service. This provision clearly contemplates another law including a State law where under a worker might have obtained a right as to leave wider than the one provided in this Chapter and expressly saves such a right. This provision clearly contemplates another law including a State law where under a worker might have obtained a right as to leave wider than the one provided in this Chapter and expressly saves such a right. Section 79 of the Factories Act provides for a minimum leave and not a maximum or standardised leave as construed in Alembic Chemical Works v. Workmen A. I. R. 1961 S. C. 647 leaving scope for workers to demand a change in respect thereof under the provisions of Acts such as the Bombay Industrial Relations Act. For these reasons it is clear that there is no repugnancy between the two Acts as they occupy different fields and deal with different and separate subjects. ( 23 ) THE last contention urged on behalf of the petitioners was that the Reference under sec. 73a was barred by reason of certain recommendations made by the Wage Board appointed by the Central Government for the cotton textile industry in its report dated November 27 1959 The contention arises in the following manner: In Reference No. 18 of 1947 between the present petitioner Association and the third respondent Association reported in 1948 Industrial Court Reporter 147 which arose as 8 result of a notice of change dated December 27 1946 where under a demand inter alia was made for the fixation of minimum wages the Industrial Court held after taking into consideration the average cost of living and other relevant factors Rs. 28/per month with 26 working days in a month of 30 days as minimum wages for employees in the textile industry in Ahmedabad. Mr. Patwari drew our attention to pages 152 of the report where certain figures of estimated gross profits inclusive of depreciation figures of cost of holidays with pay sickness insurance agents commission and dividend at six per cent with the net balance of profits left to the industry were given by both sides presumably to assist the Court to arrive at the figures of minimum wages after taking into account the total financial burden which the industry would have to bear. The cost of holidays with pay was Rs. 0. 20 crores according to the Textile Labour Association while the figure estimated by the Mill Industries Association for that item was Rs. 0. 35 crores. These figures were relied on by Mr. The cost of holidays with pay was Rs. 0. 20 crores according to the Textile Labour Association while the figure estimated by the Mill Industries Association for that item was Rs. 0. 35 crores. These figures were relied on by Mr. Patwari to show that the cost of holidays with pay were taken into account by the Industrial Court while fixing the minimum wages for the industry. His contention therefore was that if the demand for leave with wages were to be granted the industry would obviously have to bear a larger burden and the structure of minimum wages founded on the extent of burden the industry could bear would be radically altered. He then pointed out that the Government had thereafter appointed a Wage Board which recommended an ad hoc increase of Rs. 8/per month to every employee in the industry in Ahmedabad out of which Rs. 6/were payable in 1960 and the balance of Rs. 2/as from January 1 1962 While recommending these figures the Board in para 101 of its report suggested that for a period of five years from January 1 1960 no claim for further revision of minimum wages should be made by either the employers or the workmen. On May 24 1960 the two Associations entered into an agreement implementing thereby the recommendations of the Wage Board and it is important to note that they endorsed in para 4 of the agreement the suggestion of the Board contained in paras 100 to 103 of its report. An application was thereafter made to the Industrial Court by the Textile Labour Association for modification of the aforesaid award dated April 21 1948 for increasing the minimum wages in consonance with the Wage Boards recommendations. The award was accordingly modified and to the award so modified on June 8 1960 was annexed the said agreement. The contention of Mr. Patwari was that the minimum wages having been increased by adding to them the ad hoc increase of Rs. 8/per employee per month the respondent Association was barred from making a demand for a change therein for a period of five years from January 1 1960 and therefore the reference was premature and barred by the said agreement and the award which modified the original award. 8/per employee per month the respondent Association was barred from making a demand for a change therein for a period of five years from January 1 1960 and therefore the reference was premature and barred by the said agreement and the award which modified the original award. He argued that if leave with wages were allowed it would mean an increase not only in the burden on the industry but would also mean indirectly an increase in the minimum wages payable at present for instead of the present minimum wages based on the footing of 26 working days in a month an employee would get the same minimum wages for a lesser number of working days in a month. ( 24 ) HE relied particularly on the annexure to the 1948 award reported in 1948 Industrial Court Reporter 147 at page 167 where a hope is expressed that The wages and earnings in this list for 26 working days and proportionate increase or decrease should be made if the working days in a calendar month are more or less than 26. He also relied on Gajanand v. David Mills (1955) 58 B. L. R. 320 but that decision deals with an entirely different question and has nothing to do with the question arising before us. It would be needless to emphasize that the award of 1948 and its modification dealt with the question of fixation of minimum wages. The only thing that the Wage Board recommended was that in order to stabilise industrial harmony neither party should make a demand to revise the minimum wages for a period of five years. The question that arises therefore is whether the present reference is for a revision of minimum wages as fixed by the Industrial Court and modified by its aforesaid order in 1960. It may perhaps be true that if the demand made in the reference were to be accepted an additional burden will have to be borne by the textile industry and an employee would get the same wages though by being entitled to obtain leave with wages he would be working for a lesser number of days than 26 working days in a calendar month. But can this demand be said to be one relating to a revision of minimum wages ? But can this demand be said to be one relating to a revision of minimum wages ? It is only if it is so that the respondent Association would be precluded from giving a notice of change under the award as modified in 1960. The first thing that we have got to observe is that in Schedule 11 in the Bombay Industrial Relations Act there are two separate and distinct items No. 9 dealing with wages including the period and mode of payment and item 11 dealing with all matters pertaining to leave and holidays other than those specified in items 6 and 7 in Schedule 1 Items 6 and 7 in Schedule I relate to the procedure and authority to grant leave and the procedure and authority to grant holidays. Prima facie therefore it would seem that the two items of minimum wages and leave though the latter might affect the former are two separate items and should not be mixed up. As stated earlier grant of the present demand might affect the structure of minimum wages fixed as they are on the basis of 26 working days in a month and might throw an additional burden on the industry. But that would mean that a demand for leave with wages would be the same as a demand for increase in the minimum wages. It is too clear that the demand is for leave with wages and not for an increase of the minimum wages though it would result in an extra burden on the industry. That being so the Industrial Court could not have rejected the reference in limine on the ground that it was premature or barred by the recommendations of the Wage Board or by the award as modified in 1960. It will be a question for the Industrial Court while hearing the reference on merits to decide whether in view of the award of 1948 and the hope expressed in the aforesaid annexure the demand for a change should be granted or not and if granted to what extent. In the second place can this demand be called a demand for an increase in the wages as defined by the Act for if it is so then only Mr. Patwaris contention can be said to have any merit. In the second place can this demand be called a demand for an increase in the wages as defined by the Act for if it is so then only Mr. Patwaris contention can be said to have any merit. Wages as defined in section 3 (39) of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act means remuneration of all kinds capable of being expressed in terms of money and payable to an employee in respect of his employment or work done in such employment and includes (i) any bonus allowance (including dearness allowance) reward or additional remuneration (ii) value of any house accommodation light water medical attendance or other amenity or service (iii) any contribution by the employer to any pension or provident fund; (iv) any travelling allowance or the value of any travelling concession (v) any sum paid or payable to or on behalf of an employee to defray special expenses entailed on him by the nature of his employment and (vi) any gratuity payable on discharge. Grant of leave with wages would mean that if an employee is given leave there should be no deduction for the leave period from the wages packet he would be entitled to on the basis of minimum wages payable to him. Such a demand that there should not be a cut from his wages is not a demand in any event for an increase in the minimum wages. At best it would mean that the employer would get less work than he would otherwise obtain as there would be lesser number of working days in that particular calendar month. such a demand would also not be a demand for remuneration or bonus or allowance or reward or additional remuneration. Nor would it fall under any of the remaining sub-clauses of clause (39) of sec. 3. It may perhaps be an amenity but not the amenity mentioned in sub-clause (2) for the word amenity there must be construed ejusdemgeneris and if so construed the present demand would not fall in the class of amenities set out in that sub-clause. The reference is for leave with wages a concession which cannot be treated as a demand for revision of the minimum wages fixed by the award as modified in 1960. That being so Mr. Patwaris argument cannot be acceded to. The reference is for leave with wages a concession which cannot be treated as a demand for revision of the minimum wages fixed by the award as modified in 1960. That being so Mr. Patwaris argument cannot be acceded to. ( 25 ) FOR the reasons stated hereinabove none of the contentions raised by the petitioners can be sustained and the order passed by the Industrial Court rejecting the petitioners preliminary pleas was correct. The petition therefore has to be rejected. Rule discharged with cost. Costs fixed at Rs. 2000. 00. ( 26 ) MR. Patwari at this stage applies for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. The learned Advocate General states that he has no objection to the leave being granted. Leave granted under Article 133 (1) (c) of the Constitution. ( 27 ) THE order not to be executed for a fortnight from today. Petition dismissed. .