JUDGMENT:- This Second Appeal has been preferred by the plaintiffs whose suit for partition and separate possession of their 2/3rd share in the suit properties has been dismissed by the lower appellate Court on the ground of limitation, reversing the decree in their favour by the trial Court. The suit properties, about 3 acres 75 cents of agricultural lands, admittedly belonged to their father, Kailas a Kandar who died in April, 1948. The plaintiffs and the 3rd defendant are his sons, the 4th defendant being the widow of Kailasa Kandar. Kailasa Kandar executed a deed of sale of the suit properties in favour of the 2nd defendant in the suit, the sale purporting to be for himself and as guardian of his minor sons, the plaintiffs and 3rd defendant. This sale was on the 10th of February, 1940 and is evidenced by a registration copy of the sale deed (Exhibit B. 1). The second defendant, in his turn, sold the properties to the first defendant in the suit under Exhibit B-2 on 17th August, 1942, and it is now the concluded finding of fact that possession passed from the father to the alienee (1st defendant) on 17th August, 1942. Both the Courts, below have concurrently found that the alienations by the father to the 2nd defendant under the original of Exhibit B-1 and by the second defendant to the first defendant, Exhibit B-2 are not valid and binding on the plaintiffs. While on this finding the trial Court decreed the suit and granted a preliminary decree for partition, negativing the plea of limitation, the appellate Court has upheld the contention of the contesting defendant that the suit is barred by limitation. There is no dispute that the Article of the Limitation Act which is applicable is Article 126. Article 126 provides for a period of 12 years from the time when the alienee takes possession of the property. The cause of action arises with the passing of possession. In this case the 1st plaintiff was born in 1928, the second plaintiff in 1931, and the 3rd defendant on 13th August, 1937. Reliance is placed by the plaintiffs on sections 6 and 7 of the Limitation Act. The cause of action arises with the passing of possession. In this case the 1st plaintiff was born in 1928, the second plaintiff in 1931, and the 3rd defendant on 13th August, 1937. Reliance is placed by the plaintiffs on sections 6 and 7 of the Limitation Act. The suit was filed on 9th January, 1958, and it is contended that the 12 years period, in view of the minority of the sons, should be counted from the date when the youngest of the sons, that is, the 3rd defendant became major. Alternatively it is contended that the first plaintiff became manager of his family only in April, 1948, on the death of his father, when only he was competent to give discharge on behalf of his brothers also, that, therefore, the time would commence to run against all of them only from April, 1948, that the plaintiffs are entitled to the period of 12 years from April, 1948. This contention ignores section 8 of the Limitation Act. Section 8 provides: “Nothing in section 6 or in section 7 applies to suits to enforce rights of pre-emption, or shall be deemed to extend, for more than three years from the cessation of the disability or the death of the person affected thereby, the period within which any suit must be instituted or application made.” Learned Counsel for the appellants contend that section 8 provides a limitation in cases of cessation of the disability, and that incapacity to give discharge is not disability contemplated under section 8. But this interpretation overlooks that section 7 only lays down conditions under which the disability of one of the joint plaintiffs or applicants shall or shall not entitle any of them to the exemption to which the former, if he were a sole plaintiff or sole applicant, would be entitled. Section 7 only supplements section 6 of the Act, and the three sections should be read together. As summarised in Mitra’s Law of Limitation and Prescription, Volume I, 7th Edition at page 101: “The law allows the maximum period of 3 years from the statutable cause of action or the full period from the ordinary starting point of limitation, whichever is more advantageous to the plaintiff. As summarised in Mitra’s Law of Limitation and Prescription, Volume I, 7th Edition at page 101: “The law allows the maximum period of 3 years from the statutable cause of action or the full period from the ordinary starting point of limitation, whichever is more advantageous to the plaintiff. A person under disability may institute a suit within the same period after the disability has ceased as he would otherwise have been allowed under the first Schedule, but subject to the proviso that the time shall not in any case be extended for more than three years from the cessation of the disability.” It is plain, on a reading of sections 6, 7 and 8, that section 8 imposes a limitation on. the concession provided under sections 6 and 7 to a maximum of three years after cessation of the disability. In this case, the first plaintiff became manager of the family in April, 1948 on the death of his father. He had become major in 1946, and the second plaintiff was a major in 1949. The first plaintiff as manager was even in 1948 competent under the personal law to give a valid discharge on behalf of his brothers without their concurrence as required under section 7 of the Limitation Act. He should, therefore, in any event, have filed the suit within three years from the death of his father, when he became manager. It is in evidence in this case that, so far as the third defendant is concerned, he has relinquished his interest in favour of the first and second defendants ; but that does not affect the position. In Doraiswami Serumadan v. Nondisami Saluvan1, it was held that, under sections 7 and 8 and Article 44 of the Limitation Act (XV of 1877), a suit brought by two brothers of an Undivided Hindu Family to set aside an alienation by their mother more than three years after the elder of the two sons became a major, was barred by limitation not only as regards the elder brother’s share but also in respect of the younger brother’s, even though the younger brother had attained majority within three years prior to the institution of the suit. In Karan Singh v. Mt. In Karan Singh v. Mt. Tetar Kuer1, the plaintiffs, two brothers Karan Singh and Charan Singh, claimed relief with reference to the property alienated by their mother on the ground that the alienation was not for any legal necessity and consequently not binding on them. At page 439 it is observed: “Section 7 clearly governs, the case of persons jointly entitled to institute a suit; and it provides that if any one of such persons is under a disability and none of the other persons could give a discharge without the concurrence of the person under disability, time will not run as against any of them until the disability of the one has ceased or any one of them becomes capable of giving a discharge. If the position is that any one of such persons is capable of giving a discharge then time will run against them all. In the case before us, Karan Singh (plaintiff 1) attained majority more than three years before the institution of the suit, and it has also been found that he was the karta of the plaintiffs’ family.” The plaintiffs’ action in the present case will be governed by the provisions of section 7 of the Limitation Act. The question whether Karan Singh could or could not give a valid discharge will depend upon the law which governs him and his brother. “ In Narasimha Deo Gam v. Krishnachendra Rao2, the suit was to enforce a partition of partible Zamindari by the plaintiffs who were found to have been excluded from possession. ‘The Article of the Limitation Act applicable to the case was Article 127. The exclusion was even in 1898. The first plaintiff had attained majority in 1909. It is observed at page 265: "I am also of opinion that section 7 of the Limitation Act applies to this case. The 1st plaintiff attained majority in 1909, and as the eldest member of the family, supposing he was a member of a Joint Hindu Family as claimed, he could give a discharge on behalf of himself and his younger brother, the 2nd plaintiff.. I do not think that the application of section 7 is excluded because in this suit the plaintiffs have asked for partition. I do not think that the application of section 7 is excluded because in this suit the plaintiffs have asked for partition. They had been excluded from their family property, and it was open to the 1st plaintiff to have instituted a suit to recover the property for himself and his younger brother, the 2nd plaintiff. A Full Bench ruling of this Court has held that section 7 is applicable to such cases and therefore the non-failure of the 1st plaintiff to sue within three years after attaining majority would be sufficient in itself to bar the suit (Doraisami Serumadan v. Nondisami Suluvan3, and Soun dararajan v. Saravana Pillai,4. In Natarajan v. Karumana Goundar5, where it was found on the facts that the father was no longer the managing member and the next senior adult member was in fact in management it was held that the failure of such next senior adult member to set aside the alienation within three years of his attaining majority operated as a bar against the other junior members of the family. The entire case-law on the subject has been reviewed therein. The appellants sought, to get assistance for their contention, on the decision of the Privy Council in Jawahir Singh v. Udai Parkash6. The sons of one Harbans Singh filed the suit which went up to the Judicial Committee, to recover possession of their share in the village sold by their father. By the time the suit was brought, one of the sons was a major and one of the questions mooted and considered in the Courts in India was whether the suit was barred by reason of the elder of the two sons, Fateh Singh, having attained majority more than three years prior to the institution of the suit. The High Court had negatived the plea of limitation and the Judicial Committee passed over the question of limitation with the observations: “On the question of limitation their Lordships concur with the High Court.” A reference to the argument of Counsel before the Judicial Committee would show that teamed Counsel, Mr. Dube, had conceded that the father, Harbans Singh, was alive when the suit was brought, that Fateh Singh had not been the managing member, and that, therefore, the failure of Fetch Singh to institute a suit did not bar the suit in question. The distinction is clear. Dube, had conceded that the father, Harbans Singh, was alive when the suit was brought, that Fateh Singh had not been the managing member, and that, therefore, the failure of Fetch Singh to institute a suit did not bar the suit in question. The distinction is clear. The father who made the alienation and who was the manager of the joint family was alive and had been impleaded as a defendant in the suit. In the circumstances, the elder of the three sons who had been impleaded as a defendant could not give a valid discharge. The case before the Privy Council and the entire case-law has been reviewed in the Division Bench of this Court in Periakaruppan Chettiar v. Alagappa Chettiar7. In that case Satyanarayana Rao, J., has extracted the relevant portion of the judgment of the Allahabad High Court which went up in appeal to the Judicial Committee and it is as follows: “The next question is that of limitation. The Court below relying on, a certain decision of the Madras High Court has found that because Fateh Singh, the elder brother of the present plaintiffs, could have instituted a suit contesting the whole of this alienation, and did not do so within three years of his attaining majority, time had begun to run as against all the plaintiffs from the date of Fateh Singh’s attaining majority, and the suit when brought was statute barred. The attention of the learned Subordinate Judge was not drawn to the decisions of this Court in Ganga Dayal v. Nani Ram1, in which case a Bench of this Court refused to accept the view taken by the learned Judges in Madras and virtually held that in a case closely analogous to the present and really not so strong as the present case is it could not be said that one brother could give a discharge of the liability without the concurrence of the other brothers, in the sense in which that expression is used in section 7 of the Indian Limitation Act IX of 1908. This Bench has very recently held in another suit in which an alienation by the father of a joint Hindu family was in question, that even the ratification of the alienation in question by one of the sons after he had attained majority would not bar the right of a younger son to challenge the same. This Bench has very recently held in another suit in which an alienation by the father of a joint Hindu family was in question, that even the ratification of the alienation in question by one of the sons after he had attained majority would not bar the right of a younger son to challenge the same. We quoted good authority for that opinion. It is clear therefore that mere inaction on the part of Fateh Singh could not have an effect greater than the actual ratification on his part of the transfer made by his father. It could not, as a matter of law, extinguish the right of his younger brothers to challenge this alienation, provided they did so within the period of limitation applicable to them indivi4ually ; that is to say, either within 12 years of the alienation itself, or within three years of their attaining majority. The present suit has been brought while one of the plaintiffs is still a minor and within three years of the attainment of the majority by the older of the two plaintiffs. It is therefore within limitation.” As observed by Satyanarayana Rao, J., if there is a manager capable of giving a discharge and if he did not institute a suit within the time allowed by law, the suit instituted by the minor members within three years after their attaining majority would be barred. * * * * * The present case is an a fortiori case where the youngest of the sons whose minority could be relied upon has, in fact, released his interest in favour of the alienees. The two plaintiff’s who have filed the suit became majors more than three years prior to the suit, and on a reading of sections 6, 7 and 8 together, there is no room for doubt that the suit is barred by limitation. In the result the Second Appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. No leave. V.K. ------------ Appeal dismissed.