ORDER:- The short question that arises in this Writ Petition is whether by reason of section 3(10) of Madras Act (XVIII of 1960) the proceedings taken by the Accommodation Controller for requisitioning a portion of the building of the petitioner are valid. The admitted facts are that the petitioner is occupying a portion of the building, which belongs to her, and other portions of this building have been let out to tenants. One portion on the first floor fell vacant and the Accommodation Controller purported to exercise his powers under section 3(3) of the Act and allot that portion to a tenant nominated by him. The petitioner brought to the notice of the respondent, that, since a part of the building is in her occupation, the building stands exempted by reason of section 3 (10) of the Act. But this objection of the petitioner was not heeded. Hence this petition. On behalf of the respondent it is stated that the petitioner did intimate the respondent that she was staying in the premises with her daughter for several days in the month. But the respondent took the view that, since the petitioner was not permanently residing in the premises and as she was residing at premises No. 2, Kondalier Street, George Town, Madras, with her husband, the case would not come within section 3(10) of the Act, and it is for that reason that the respondent claims that the order allotting the portion to a tenant is within his jurisdiction. On a consideration of the matter I am satisfied that the contention of the petitioner has to prevail. Section 3(10) states that nothing contained, in this section shall apply (c) to a residential building, a part only of which is occupied by the full owner and the whole or any portion of the remaining part of such building is left to any tenant. It is not denied by the respondent that the petitioner is in occupation of a part of the building. That she is not continually and permanently in such occupation for all the 30 days in the month is certainly of no consequence. On behalf of the petitioner learned Counsel urges, that, even if the petitioner should only lock up one room in the premises and keep it under her control, that would amount to her occupation of that’ portion of the building. On behalf of the petitioner learned Counsel urges, that, even if the petitioner should only lock up one room in the premises and keep it under her control, that would amount to her occupation of that’ portion of the building. I am inclined to agree with this argument. The section does not require that the owner should be in actual residence of the portion. It may be that a person who does not choose to reside permanently in one place may keep a part of his premises always available for his occupation and occupy it from time to time. That will be just as much occupation as occupation for all the time permanently by the owner. This provision is a new one, which did not find place in the old Act. If one can imagine the reasons which led to the introduction of this clause, it may well be that the Legislature intended that when the owner is himself in occupation of a part of the building, the choice of a tenant in respect of the other part of the building should be left to him. Cases have not infrequently arisen under the old Act where the Accommodation Controller has thrust upon a landlord a tenant of a religious persuasion and practices different from that of the owner, who was also occupying the building. This undoubtedly led to considerable hardship on the part of the landlords and it is presumably to avoid such situations that a provision of this kind has been enacted. Whatever that may be I am satisfied that even if the petitioner occupies the building only for a few days in the month it is nevertheless occupation within the meaning of the section. It should follow that the residential building stands exempted from the operation of the provisions of the Act. The petition is allowed. The rule is made absolute. There will, however, be no order as to costs. V.K. ------------ Petition allowed.