JUDGMENT W. Broome, J. - This writ petition filed by Mewa Lal challenges an order passed by Sri Rajendra Kumar, S. D. O. Akbarpur (district Kanpur) on 14-5-1962, allowing a review application and dismissing the election petition under Section 12-C of the Panchayat Raj Act filed by him against the election of Hori Lal (0. P. 2) as Pradlian of a certain Gaon Sabha, which had been allowed by Sri Rajendra Kumar's predecessor Sri A. N. Singh on 25-11-1961. 2. The contention of the petitioner is two-fold : firstly that no power of review could be exercised by the S. D. O. when deciding an election petition under Section 12-C of the Panchayat Raj Act, despite the proviso (viii) to rule 25(l) of the Panchayat Raj Rules; and secondly that even if the power of review existed, it could not be exercised in the circumstances of the present case. The relevant portion of Rule 25 runs as follows: "25 (1). Subject to the provisions of the Act and the rules contained in this chapter, every election petition shall be tried by the Sub Divisional Officer, as nearly as may be, in accordance with the procedure applicable under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, to the trial of suits: Provided that- ................................................ (viii) the Sub-Divisional Officer may, on an application of either party made within five days after the date of his decision, review his order." 3. Counsel for the petitioner contends that since the proviso conferring the power of review is appended to Cl. (1) of Rule 25, it should be deemed to be applicable only to cases in which election petitions have been dismissed on preliminary grounds or in a summary fashion and should not be deemed to apply to final orders, which the S. D. O. has been empowered to pass under the subsequent clauses (2) and (3) of the rule. I see no reason, however, to restrict proviso (viii) in this manner. No doubt, it would have been more elegant and artistic to place the provision for review in a separate clause following the clauses prescribing the final orders that may be passed; but the mere fact that this provision has been appended to Cl.(1) by no means leads to the inference that it cannot apply to orders passed under Cls. (2) and (3). (2) and (3). Clause (1) lays down that the normal procedure to be followed in the disposal of election petitions should be in accordance with the Code of Civil Procedure; and there after provisos have been appended indicating those matters in which some kind of special procedure is to be followed that is not in accordance with the Civil Procedure Code and the normal law governing the disposal of suits. Review has been mentioned among the provisos because the State Government thought fit to introduce a special provision restricting the time for filing a review application to five days only; and that appears to be the only reason why review has been mentioned in the proviso to Cl. (1) instead of later on in a separate clause following Cls. (2) and (3). 4. Another argument advanced is that a proviso can only limit the main clause to which it is appended an cannot go beyond its scope. Review it is urged, is a substantive power not a mere procedural matter; and since Cl. (1) merely prescribes procedure, the provisos to Cl. (1) should be restricted to procedural mattes and should not be deemed to confer additional rights or powers. In this connection reliance is placed on certain observations of the Supreme Court in the Commissioner of Income-tax, Mysore Travancore-Cochin and Coorg, Bangalore v. The Indo Mercantile Bank Ltd., A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 713, in which it has been laid down that "the proper function of a proviso is that it qualifies the generality of the main enactment by providing an exception and taking out as it were, from the main enactment, a portion which, but for the proviso, would fall within the main enactment. Ordinarily it is foreign to the proper function of a proviso to read it as providing something by way of k an addendum or dealing with a subject which is foreign to the main enactment." 5. In this passage, however the use off the word "ordinarily" is significant; and it is clear from the subsequent observations in the same judgment that provisos can in some cases intro. duce amplifications as well as restrictions. In this passage, however the use off the word "ordinarily" is significant; and it is clear from the subsequent observations in the same judgment that provisos can in some cases intro. duce amplifications as well as restrictions. In the present case the plain wording of proviso (viii) shows that the State Government intended the S. D. O. to exercise the power of review; and the mere fact that this intention is expressed in a form of proviso will not prevent it from taking effect. 6. Great stress is laid by counsel for the petitioner on the fact that the Panchayat Raj Act itself contains no specific provision for review of judgment; and the argument is advanced that if the Act confers no power of review, such a power cannot be conferred by the rules framed under the Act. This argument, however, appears to be fallacious. In Raja Himanshu Dhar Singh v. Additional Registrar, Cooperative Societies, U.P., AIR 1962 Allahabad 439, a similar contention advanced in respect of the Cooperative Societies Act and its Rules was repelled. Moreover, Cl. (4) of Section 12-C of the Panchayat Raj Act specifically lays down that- "the authority to whom the application under sub-Sec. (1) is made shall, in the matter of- .............................................. (ii) setting aside the election of declaring the election to be void or declaring the applicant to be duly elected or any other relief that may be granted to the petitioner, have such powers and authority as may be prescribed." 7. And 'prescribed' has been defined in Section 2(p) as meaning prescribed by the Act or by the rules made there under. The Legislature has thus laid down that the S.D.O. deciding an election petition under Section 12-C shall have whatever powers may be prescribed for him under the rules as well as under the Act. 8. An attempt has been made to argue that the conferment of the power to review runs counter to the provisions of Cl. (6) of Section 12-C, inasmuch as that clause lays down that "The order passed by the prescribed authority upon an application under sub-Sec. (1) shall be final and conclusive and shall not be questioned in any Civil Court." 9. (6) of Section 12-C, inasmuch as that clause lays down that "The order passed by the prescribed authority upon an application under sub-Sec. (1) shall be final and conclusive and shall not be questioned in any Civil Court." 9. It seems to me, however, that if this clause is read as a whole, it means that the order passed by the S.D.O. shall be final and conclusive as regards the civil courts; and I see nothing in the wording of this clause to bar reconsideration or review by the prescribed authority itself. 10. I am satisfied therefore that proviso (viii) to rule 25(l) of the Panchayat Raj Rules is in no way ultra vires and that it confers a valid power of review of judgment on the S.D.O., by virtue of which he can for sufficient cause reconsider and modify orders passed by him, disposing of an election petition under Cl. (2) or (3) of the rule. 11. It now remains to be seen whether this power can be validly exercised in the circumstances of the present case. The impugned order of the S.D.O. sets forth a number of errors detected by him in. the judgment of his predecessor dated 25-11-1961, which he has reviewed. The earlier judgment accepted Asharfi Lal (P.W. 1) as a truthful witness on the basis of a misreading of the word 'dwara' as 'dubara'. When this error is rectified, the conclusion is inescapable that Asharfi Lal stands contradicted by his own written statement and is thus not worthy of credit. Another of the many defects noted by the S.D.O. in the earlier judgment of 25-11-1961 is that it held that there was no proof that Dalai (P. W. 4) was the uncle of the petitioner, whereas as a matter of fact this relationship had been admitted by the petitioner himself and required no proof. It is unnecessary to multiply instances, for even one error. apparent on the face of the record in relation to a cardinal witness or fundamental question of fact or law will be sufficient to justify review. Having perused both the earlier judgment of 25-11-1961 (Annexure A) and the impugned latter judgment of 14-5-1962 (Annexuie B), I see no reason to hold that the power of review has been improperly exercised in the present. case. 12. The petition accordingly fails and is dismissed with costs.