ORDER Dixit, C.J. 1. This is an application under article 226 of the Constitution of India for quashing an order made by the Board of Revenue on 16th July 1963 in the following circumstances. 2. On 30th November 1959 the petitioner made an application to the Sub-Divisional Officer, Banda, for being allotted an abadi site in mouza Shahgarh of Banda tahsil for setting up a shop stating that the shop-structure which he had set up on another abadi site held by him under a registered lease was removed by him on the suggestion of the Sub-Divisional Officer that he would be allot ten another abddi site for the purpose. When the application was sent to the Tahsildar, Band for report, he recommended the allotment of a cortain site to the petitioner. On 15th February 1960 the Sub-Divisional Officer, accepting the recommendation of the Tahsildar, made an order for the allotment to the petitioner of the site indicated by the Tahsildar. On 4th March 1960 the Tahsildar issued a patta of the abadi site to the petitioner pursuant to the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer. It appears that on 15th September 1958 the opponent Rewaram had already applied for the allotment to him of the abadi site of which a grant was made to the petitioner. Apparently the Tahsildar and the Sub-Divisional Officer were not aware of this application or took no notice of it. Thereafter, Rewaam preferred an appeal before the Sub-Divisional Officer against the Tehsildar's order dated 4th March 1960 granting a patta to the petitioner The Sub-Divisional Officer held the appeal to be incompetent taking the view that the order passed by the Tahsildar on 4th March 1960 granting a patta to the petitioner was only a ministerial act done pursuant to the Sub-Divisional Officer's order and that the respondent should have filed an appeal against the order dated 15th February 1960 of the Sub-Divisional Officer. He also proceeded to express his opinion on the merits of the appeal and came to the conclusion that there was no ground for interfering, with the order of the Tahsildar. 3. Rewaram then filed a second appeal before the Commissioner, Jabalpur Division. The Commissioner agreed with the view taken by the Sub-Divisional Officer and dismissed the appeal Rewara mthen preferred a revision petition before the Board of Revenue. 3. Rewaram then filed a second appeal before the Commissioner, Jabalpur Division. The Commissioner agreed with the view taken by the Sub-Divisional Officer and dismissed the appeal Rewara mthen preferred a revision petition before the Board of Revenue. The learned Member of the Board of Revenue formed the opinion that the allotment of the abadi site to the petitioner was in contravention of the Rules framed under the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959 for the disposal of abadi sites. He also expressed the opinion that the appeals filed by Rewaram before the Sub-Divisional Officer and the Commissioner were not tenable. He however, took the view that the order dated 15th February 1960 of the Sub-Divisional Officer allotting the land to the petitioner was contrary to the Rule, framed under section 244 of the Act and was manifestly illegal and improper; and the allotment was irregular; and that the matter was such which justified disturbing the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer in the exercise of the Board's revisional powers on its own motion. Accordingly, the Board of Revenue made an order setting aside the order dated 15th February 1960 of the Sub-Divisional Officer and remanding the matter to the Tahsildar for deciding the question of the allotment of the site in conformity with Section 244 of the Code and the Rules made there under and in the light of the, observations made by the Beard in its order. It is against this order or the Board of Revenue that the present petition is directed. 4 Having heard learned counsel for the parties we have reached the conclusion that this application must be dismissed. Shri Sen, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, was no doubt right in his submission that when the Board of Revenue agreed with the view taken by the Commissioner and the Sub-Divisional Officer that no appeal lay against the ministerial act of the Tahsildar granting a Patta to the petitioner, a revision petition for disturbing these decisions of the Sub-Divisional Officer and the Commissioner could not be entertained. But by the impugned order of the Board of Revenue the decision of the Sub-Divisional Officer and the Commissioner that the order dated 4th March 1960 of the Tahsildar was not open to appeal has not been disturbed. But by the impugned order of the Board of Revenue the decision of the Sub-Divisional Officer and the Commissioner that the order dated 4th March 1960 of the Tahsildar was not open to appeal has not been disturbed. What the Board did was to strike down the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer under which the Tahsildar granted a Patta to the petitioner. This the Board did suo moto and not on the revision application filed by the opponent Rewaram. 5. The Board was competent to do this under section 50 of the Code when it was satisfied that the order made by the Sub-Divisional Officer on 15th February 1960 was illegal, improper and altogether irregular. Section 50 of the Code provides that the Board may on its own motion at any time for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of any order passed by a revenue officer, or as to the regularity of the proceedings held by him call for and examine the record of any case "pending before or disposed of by the revenue officer and may pass such order in reference to it as it thinks fit. The record of the proceedings hold by the Sub-Divisional Officer was already before the Board; and so there was no question of calling for any record. When the Board examined that record in connection with the revision application filed by Rewaram and satisfied itself that the order passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer on 15th February 1960 was neither legal nor proper, nor regular, and was contrary to section 244 of the Code and the Rules made there under, the Board was not precluded from disturbing suo moto that order merely because the revision application filed by the petitioner could not, for any reason be entertained. If the argument of the Learned counsel that the Board could not in above circumstances exercise its revisional powers under section 50 on its own motion were to be accepted, that would mean putting restrictions on the revisional powers conferred on the Board by section 50 not warranted by the language of section 50 of the Code. 6. If the argument of the Learned counsel that the Board could not in above circumstances exercise its revisional powers under section 50 on its own motion were to be accepted, that would mean putting restrictions on the revisional powers conferred on the Board by section 50 not warranted by the language of section 50 of the Code. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner said that under the third proviso to section 50 of the limitation prescribed for a revision application to the Board of Revenue was 90 days from the date of the order sought to be revised, and as the revision application before the Board of Revenue' was filed by the petitioner more than 90 days after 15th February 1960 the date on which the Sub-Divisional Officer passed the order allotting the abadi site to the petitioner, it was barred by time, and consequently the Board could not exercise on its own motion the revisional powers under sec. 50. In brief, the argument was that the limitation prescribed by the third proviso to section 50 for a revision application also applied to the suo moto exercise by the Board of its revisional powers under section 50. We are unable to accede to this contention. Under section 50 the revisional powers can be exercised by the Board on its own motion without there bring an application of any of the parties concerned. It is entirely in the discretion of the revising authority whether to exercise the revisional jurisdiction or not. A revision petition under section 50 is purely a discretionary remedy. A party cannot under that section claim as of right that the decision of a revenue officer should be revised on the ground mentioned in that section. When the revising authority dismisses a revision petition, it abstains from exercising the revisional jurisdiction and allows the inferior revenue Court's order to stand. Section 50 no doubt speaks of a revision petition being filed by a person aggrieved by an order of any revenue officer; but this only provides a procedure for invoking the revisional jurisdiction of the revising authority. The third proviso only prescribes limitation for an application by a party for invoking the revisional jurisdiction of the revising authority. It does not put any fetter on the exercise by the Board of its revisional powers. The third proviso only prescribes limitation for an application by a party for invoking the revisional jurisdiction of the revising authority. It does not put any fetter on the exercise by the Board of its revisional powers. The period of limitation laid down in the third proviso is inapplicable where the Board acts suo moto; and the mere fact that a party has made an application asking the Board to exercise its revisional power:, cannot render the action of the Board subject to the rules of limitation. This view is fortified by the decision in Dhan Singh Vs. Basant Singh ILR 8 All. 519, where it was observed by Justice Mahmood at page 533 that the rule of limitation was inapplicable to acts which the Court may, or has to, perform suo motu. It must be noted that section 50 (1) Itself says that the Board can exercise its revisional powers on its own motion or on the application by any party "at any time", and the third proviso lays down that no such application shall be entertained unless presented within tile time prescribed therein. When the proviso gives a limitation period for the making of a revision application, it cannot be construed so as to cut down the meaning of the words "at any time" in relation to the exercise of the revisional powers suo motu. The argument, therefore, of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the Board could not exercise its revisional powers on its own motion for setting aside the order dated 15th February 1960 when more than 90 day' had elapsed from that date cannot be accepted. 7. Learned counsel then urged that the allotment of the site to the petitioner was substantially in accordance with the prescribed rules. This contention is unsubstantial. 7. Learned counsel then urged that the allotment of the site to the petitioner was substantially in accordance with the prescribed rules. This contention is unsubstantial. The petitioner made an application for the grant of an abadi site after the coming into force of the M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1959, section 244 of which provides:- "Subject to rules made in this behalf the Gram Panchayat or where a Gram Panchayat has not been constituted, the Tahsildar shall dispose of sites in the abadi area." By rule 14 of the Rules framed under section 244 it is provided that every application for the grant of a site in villages having a Gram Panchyat shall be submitted to the Gram Panchayat; that in villages paving no Gram Panchayat, every application for the grant of a site shall be submitted to the patel who shall forward the same with his report to the Tahsildar that the Gram Panchayat or the Tahsildar is the case may be, shall thereupon issue a proclamation in the prescribed form and in the prescribed manner; and that on the expiry of the period mentioned in the proclamation the Gram Panchayat or the Tahsildar shall proceed to consider the disposal of the site in the manner laid down in rules 15 to 23, Rule 17 says that where there arc more than one applicant who are not entitled to a site free of land revenue or the site is more than 2,178 square feet in area the site shall be ordered to be put to auction by the Gram Panchayat or the Tahsiladar, as the case may be, unless the Gram Panchyat or the Tahsildar thinks that there are good reasons for allotting it one of the applicants, as for example where the land adjoins a plot already in such applicants possession. In the present case there were obviously two applicants for the site which the Sub-Divisional Officer allotted to the petitioner on 15th February 1960. Both the petitioner and the respondent Rewaram desired that the site should be allotted to him. No proclamation in the form prescribed by rule 14 was ever issued after the receipt of the petitioner's application. The issue of proclamation was mandatory and not an empty formality as learned counsel for the petitioner seemed to suggest. Both the petitioner and the respondent Rewaram desired that the site should be allotted to him. No proclamation in the form prescribed by rule 14 was ever issued after the receipt of the petitioner's application. The issue of proclamation was mandatory and not an empty formality as learned counsel for the petitioner seemed to suggest. As is clear from rules 14 and 15 read together, the proclamation is issued for the purposes of giving an opportunity to any person wishing to claim the site on the ground that it has already been allotted to him and is not vacant. Where the site is claimed by a third party, the application for allotment has to be rejected unless the Gram Panchayat or the Tahsildar, as the case may be is satisfied after enquiry that the site is really vacant. When both the petitioner and the respondent Rewaram wanted the site then according to rule 17 the site should have been put to auction unless the Tahsildar thought that there were good reasons for allotting it to one of the applicants. In allotting the site to the petitioner rule 17 was altogether overlooked. The application which the respondent No.5 had made on 15th September 1958 for the allotment of the site to him was not borne in mind by the Tahsildar or the Sub-Divisional officer and consequently no consideration was given to the question whether the site should be auctioned or allotted straightway to the petitioner. It was because of these irregularities and illegalities that the Board of Revenue came to the conclusion that the allotment of the abadi site to the petitioner was neither legal, nor proper nor regular. In these circumstances, the Board was justified in setting aside the order dated 15th February 1960 of the Sub-Divisional officer allotting the abadi site to the petitioner and remitting the matter to the Tahsildar for disposal according to law. 8. For the foregoing reasons, our conclusion is that there is no ground on which the decision dated 16th July 1963 of the Board of Revenue can be quashed by the issue of a writ of certiorari. The result is that this petition fails and is dismissed with costs of the respondent No.5 Rewaram, Counsel's fee is fixed at Rs.50. The outstanding amount of the security deposit, after deduction of costs, shall be refunded to the petitioner.