Order.- This Revision Petition is preferred by the tenant against an order passed by the District Judge, Chingleput, reversing the order of the Subordinate judge and restoring the order of eviction passed by the Rent Controller, on a petition filed by the respondent herein that she required the suit premises for her own use and occupation. The suit premises originally belonged to the respondent’s father, Gengadhara Mudaliar. He purchased the house on 10th July, 1958, for the benefit of his daughter. Soon after he purchased the property, he executed a will on 30th July, 1958, bequeathing this property to his daughter. After some years, he conveyed this property by a settlement deed dated 27th January, 1962, to his daughter. Now the daughter filed the present petition before the Rent Controller for eviction on the ground that she required the house for her own use and occupation The tenant contended that the application was not a bona fide one, the reason being that her lather originally called upon the tenant to pay enhanced rent of Rs. 60 and Rs. 75 and that when the tenant refused to pay the enhanced rent, the father of the landlady executed a settlement deed in favour of his daughter, with a view to enable her to file an application, as he himself could not file an application, since he possessed a building of his own. The Rent Controller gave a finding that the landlady’s application was a bona fide one. But on appeal, the learned Subordinate judge of Chingleput reversed that finding and held that the claim for owner’s occupation was not a bona fide one. On revision to the District Judge, he agreed with the finding of the Rent Controller and therefore restored the order of eviction passed by the Rent Controller. Now the tenant has filed this Revision Petition. Learned Counsel for the tenant contends that the District Judge ought not to have interfered with the finding of the learned Subordinate Judge that the respondent’s application was not a bona fide one. The learned Subordinate Judge, according to him, after considering all the surrounding circumstances attending at the tune of the petition, came to the conclusion that the claim of the respondent for her own occupation was not a bona fide one. Now, the question that arises for consideration is, how far a District Judge can interfere in revisional jurisdiction. The learned Subordinate Judge, according to him, after considering all the surrounding circumstances attending at the tune of the petition, came to the conclusion that the claim of the respondent for her own occupation was not a bona fide one. Now, the question that arises for consideration is, how far a District Judge can interfere in revisional jurisdiction. The relevant provision under the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, is section 25. Under that section, a District Judge, may, at any time, call for and examine the records relating to any order passed for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality, regularity or propriety of such order. I have also to consider whether the scope of revision under this Act is wider than that in section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code. The Supreme Court had to consider from time to time the scope of revisional jurisdiction arising under the House Rent Control Acts from the various States. In Moti Ram v.Suraj Bhan1 , the landlord filed an ejection petition on the ground that the tenant was a habitual defaulter and was in arrears of rent. The Rent Controller dismissed the petition, rejecting the pleas of the landlord. On appeal, the District Judge confirmed the finding of the Rent Controller. But on Revision to the High Court, the same was allowed and the claim for evicting the tenant was decreed. The question arose in the Supreme Court whether the High Court had jurisdiction to interfere in Revision with the findings of the Courts below. The revisional jurisdiction conferred under section 15 (5) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act is analogous to the revisional jurisdiction conferred on a District Judge under our Act. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed: " The revisional power conferred upon the High Court under section 15 (5) is wider than that conferred by section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed: " The revisional power conferred upon the High Court under section 15 (5) is wider than that conferred by section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code. Under section 15 (5), the High Court has jurisdiction to examine the legality of propriety or the order under revision and that would clearly justify the examination of the propriety or the legality of the finding made by the authorities in the present case about the requirement of the landlord under section 13 (3) (c) (iii)." In Hari Shankar v. Girdhari Lal1, the landlord filed an eviction petition on the ground that the tenant sublet a portion of the building. The trial Judge decreed the suit. The decision of the trial Judge was confirmed on appeal by the District Judge. A revision was filed to the High Court under section 35 (1) of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act. That section reads: " The High Court may, at any time, call for the record of any case......for the purpose of satisfying itself that a decision made therein is according to law." Their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed at page 701: " The power to hear a revision is generally given to a superior Court so that it may satisfy itself that a particular case has been decided according to law. Under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the High Court’s powers are limited to see, whether in a case decided, there has been, an assumption of jurisdiction where it did, or there has been material irregularity, or illegality in the exercise of that jurisdiction. The right there is confined to jurisdiction and jurisdiction alone. In other Acts, the power is not so limited and the High Court is enabled to call for the record of a case to satisfy itself that the decision therein is according to law. The phrase ‘according to law ‘refers to the decision as a whole and is not to be equated to error of law or of fact simpliciter." The Supreme Court had to consider section 35 (1) of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act in Pooran Chand v. Motilal2. The phrase ‘according to law ‘refers to the decision as a whole and is not to be equated to error of law or of fact simpliciter." The Supreme Court had to consider section 35 (1) of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act in Pooran Chand v. Motilal2. Subba Rao, J., while following the decision in the above case, observed as follows at page 462: " It is clear........that the power of the High Court under section 35 of the Act is wider than that under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, though it cannot be equated to that of its jurisdiction in an appeal. It is neither possible nor advisable to define with precision the scope and ambit of section 35 of the Act, but it should be left to the High Court to consider in each case whether the impugned judgment is according to law or not, as explained by this Court in the said decision." In the above two cases, their Lordships of the Supreme Court had to consider the phrase ‘according to law ‘occurring in section 35 of the Act in question. In Karam Singh v. Pratan Chand3, the landlord filed a suit for ejectment of the tenant on the ground that he sublet the premises without the consent of the landlords The defence to the petition was that the landlord had acquiesced in the subletting and therefore he was not liable to be evicted. The trial Judge gave a finding that the landlord had not acquiesced in the sub-letting. But on appeal, the Senior Judge found that the landlord continued to receive the rent with the full knowledge of sub-letting. He therefore held that the landlord was not entitled to a decree for possession and set aside the order of eviction. The landlord moved the High Court of Punjab in Revision. When the Revision was pending in the High Court the Delhi Rent Control Act of 1958 came into force. It repealed the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952. The High Court held that there was no evidence to justify the finding of the learned Subordinate Judge that the landlord had acquiesced in the sub-letting. Accordingly the High Court allowed the petition. Now the tenant filed an appeal to the Supreme Court. It repealed the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952. The High Court held that there was no evidence to justify the finding of the learned Subordinate Judge that the landlord had acquiesced in the sub-letting. Accordingly the High Court allowed the petition. Now the tenant filed an appeal to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the High Court was competent in Revision to set aside the finding of the lower appellate Court on the question of acquiescence. Bearing these principles in mind and especially what the Supreme Court observed in Moti Ram v. Suraj Bhan4, where the Court had to consider section 15 (5) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, a provision analogous to section 25 of Madras Act XVIII of 1960, I have to consider the scope of jurisdiction conferred under section 25 on the District Judges, who have been conferred with similar powers as the High Courts in the various similar Acts referred to herein. From what has been stated above, it is clear that the revisional jurisdiction conferred on the District Judge under the provisions of the Rent Control Act is wider than that conferred under section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code. Now, under section 25 of the Act, a District Judge can call for and examine the records for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality, regularity or propriety of such order. The only question now for consideration is whether the order passed by the District Judge can be sustained on the facts and circumstances of the present case. The Rent Controller found that the application was a bona fide one and ordered eviction. On appeal, the learned Subordinate Judge held that the application was not a bona fide one, on the surrounding circumstances attending at the time of the petition, namely that the father of the landlady was demanding enhanced rent from time to time and when he was not able to get enhanced rent from the tenant, he executed a settlement deed conveying the suit property in favour of the daughter, so as to enable her to file an application that she required the building for her own occupation. The Subordinate Judge considered various circumstances in regard to the conduct of the father and the daughter in not occupying the building soon after the purchase of the property. The Subordinate Judge considered various circumstances in regard to the conduct of the father and the daughter in not occupying the building soon after the purchase of the property. But the District Judge reversed the finding of the learned Subordinate Judge, after examining the legality and propriety of that finding. According to the District Judge, when the father purchased the property, it was his intention to give it to his daughter. Accordingly he executed a will bequeathing the property to his daughter. After some years, he executed the settlement deed in favour of his daughter so as to enable her to set up separate residence of her own. Soon after the execution of the settlement deed, the landlady sent notice to the tenant and also requested him to vacate the house. The father also requested the tenant to pay the rent to his daughter. On these facts and circumstances the District Judge found the application of the landlady a bona fide one and therefore restored the order of eviction passed by the Rent Controller. Sitting in Revision, I cannot say that the finding of the District Judge is erroneous, In this connection, it is useful to refer to what Rajamannar, Chief Justice, had laid down to be the circumstances in which a revisional authority would be entitled to interfere with the findings of fact of a subordinate authority. Sitting in Revision, I cannot say that the finding of the District Judge is erroneous, In this connection, it is useful to refer to what Rajamannar, Chief Justice, had laid down to be the circumstances in which a revisional authority would be entitled to interfere with the findings of fact of a subordinate authority. The learned Chief Justice has extracted in Sasivana Thenar v. Ponnu1, what Rajagopala Ayyangar, J., has laid down in C.R.P. No. 1420 of 1954: “ White an appellate authority is entitled to examine every question of fact and law........a revisional authority cannot normally interfere with findings of fact unless (a) there were no other materials on which such a finding could be based ; or (6) the finding has been reached by a consideration of irrelevant or inadmissible matter; or (c) it is so preverse that no reasonable person could have reached that conclusion ; or (d) the finding had been reached by an erroneous understanding of the law applicable to the matter.........” In the instant case, the District Judge had enough material before him, and in exercise of his revisional authority, he set aside the finding of the Subordinate Judge; I do not think that the matter calls for any interference in Revision, under section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code, especially when the District Judge has not exceeded the limits of his jurisdiction in setting aside the finding of fact arrived at by the learned Subordinate Judge. The Civil Revision Petition is dismissed, but, in the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs. It is represented to me by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that it is not possible for him to vacate the house immediately as he has got school-going children and in the Ordinary course of events the schools will be closed by the end of April. In these circumstances I think it is justifiable to give him some time to enable him to get alternative accommodation and also see that his children are not put to inconvenience. Therefore, I give him time till 30th April, 1965, for vacating the premises and hand Oyer possession. V.K. --------------- Petition dismissed.