Judgement ORDER : This is a writ petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution directed against the levy of additional Surcharge. According to the petitioner the additional Surcharge is hit by Arts. 14 and 271 of the Constitution of India. It is, also, according to him hit by Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. 2. Elaborating these grounds. Mr. Gopal Behari referred to Art. 271, which contemplates according to him, additional Income-tax in the shape of additional surcharge, which can be levied only once and not time find again calling it at one time "Special Surcharge" and at another "additional Surcharge" in the present case, the Income-tax Officer determined the tax payable under S. 210 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) for the payment of Rs. 608.64 nP as Income-tax, Rs. 264.32 nP Additional Surcharge, Rs. 30.77 nP Surcharge and Rs. 2.13 Special Surcharge totalling Rs. 905.87 nP. 3. The first question to be examined, therefore, is whether Surcharge can be levied only once or it can be levied any number of times under Art. 271 of the Constitution ? 4. The relevant portion of Art. 271 reads : "Notwithstanding anything in Arts. 269 and 270 Parliament may at any time increase any of the duties or taxes referred to in those Articles by ft surcharge for purposes of the Union . . . . . . The words 'at any time' are significant. Article 271, undoubtedly gave Parliament the right to levy a surcharge from time to time and merely because Parliament had imposed surcharge in one shape, it is not prevented from imposing surcharge in another form to cope with varying circumstances. 5. Article 269, provides for taxes to be levied by Government, inter alia, in respect of Estate Duty and Art. 270, inter alia, for the levy of taxes by Government of India on income other than Agricultural income. The surcharge, as provider in Art. 271 is nothing but additional tax or duty which Articles 269 and 270 empower Parliament to impose. Article 271, therefore, gave the Parliament power to levy additional tax as it deems fit to be known is "Surcharge" and not Income-tax. The surcharge, as provider in Art. 271 is nothing but additional tax or duty which Articles 269 and 270 empower Parliament to impose. Article 271, therefore, gave the Parliament power to levy additional tax as it deems fit to be known is "Surcharge" and not Income-tax. If under Article 271, Parliament can "at any time" increase the tax already levied, it necessarily follows that in the same Finance Act Surcharge designated as "Special" and "additional" could also be levied Parliament in this respect is paramount and the Finance Act is passed by Parliament and, therefore, surcharge whether it takes the shape of "additional surcharge" or "Special Surcharge" on income cannot be said to be violative of Art. 271 of the Constitution. 6. The next question to be considered as whether Additional Surcharge or additional tax which could have been levied under Art. 271 can be levied only on a particular class and not on the public in general. The argument is that in the Finance Act of 1963, which is the, impugned provision, the salaried class of persons has been excluded from the application of the provisions for the levy of Surcharge. The relevant portion at S. 2 sub-clause (2) of the Finance Act 1963, reads; "(2) in making any assessment for the assessment rear commencing on the 1st day of April, 1963. (a) where the total income of an assessee, not being; a company, includes any income chargeable under the head "Salaries", the income-tax payable by the assessee on that part of his total income which consists of such inclusion shall be an amount bearing to the total amount of income-tax payable according to the rates applicable under the operation of the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1962 (20 of 1964), on his total income the same proportion as the amount of such inclusion bears to his total income. Therefore, income chargeable under the head Salaries' by implication will not be subjected to additional Surcharge which came to be levied under the Finance Act of 1963 under S. 2(a)(i) and (ii) for the first time. It is contended that this classification is discriminatory and violative of Art. 14 it the Constitution which provides for equality before the law. Therefore, income chargeable under the head Salaries' by implication will not be subjected to additional Surcharge which came to be levied under the Finance Act of 1963 under S. 2(a)(i) and (ii) for the first time. It is contended that this classification is discriminatory and violative of Art. 14 it the Constitution which provides for equality before the law. Several decisions were relied upon, but it is unnecessary to deal with them as the prim-frills by now are well settled and are summarised by the Supreme Court in The State of Bombay v. F.M. Balsara, AIR 1951 SC 318 as follows : (1) There is always a presumption in the favour of the constitutionality of an enactment; (2) The presumption is rebuttable in certain cases. (3) The principle of equality does not mean that every law must have universal application for all persons. (4) The principle does not take away from the State the power of classifying persons for legitimate purposes. (5) Every classification is in some degree likely to produce some inequality and mere production of inequality is not enough. (6) If a law deals equally with members of a well-defined class, it is not obnoxious and it is not open to the charge of denial of equal protection on the ground that it has no application to other persons; (7) While reasonable classification is permissible such classification must be based upon some real and substantial distinction bearing a reasonable and just relation to the object sought to be attained. 7. The principles being well established, the only difficulty that can arise is in their application to the facts of a particular case. In the present case, however, no such difficulty arises as the salaried class of employees, undoubtedly, is a well defined class and has been so treated for decades by the various Finance Acts. The Finance Act of 1963 deals equally with all persons within the salaried class. The classification is also reasonable as it is based upon a real and substantial distinction between salaried employees and others. Salaried employees have always, at least since the Income-tax Act of 1922, been taxed on the basis of the Finance Act current during the year when the salary is received and not on the basis of the Finance Act enacted after the year has come to a close. Salaried employees have always, at least since the Income-tax Act of 1922, been taxed on the basis of the Finance Act current during the year when the salary is received and not on the basis of the Finance Act enacted after the year has come to a close. This is for the very good reason that a salaried employee has to balance his budget his income from that source being precise, predetermined and limited, it is but fair that he shall know what his tax liability is likely to be for the particular year beforehand, so that he can cut his coat according to his cloth. It also enables Revenue to enforce effectively and with certainty the provisions of the Income-tax Act against employees and in the matter of the deduction of tax at source The charge of discrimination, therefore, cannot legitimately be levied against the Finance Act of 1963 in the matter of "addition Surcharge" as the classification is neither arbitrary nor capricious; it is a perfectly understandable, intelligible and reasonable classification. 8. Lastly, it was contended that the Compulsory Deposit Scheme Act, 1963 which was, so to speak, in lieu of Additional Surcharge was violative of the principles laid down in Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. There is no force a this contention either as the Compulsory Deposit Scheme now applies to those who are subject to additional Surcharge and if an inducement is held our to them to make deposits regularly for which a corresponding rebate from additional Surcharge as to be given, it cannot per se infringe any Article of the Constitution. The argument is that by such inducement in making the compulsory deposit Government was discriminating between persons other than salaried employees from carrying on freely their profession, occupation or trade. The Compulsory Deposit Scheme applies to a well defined class and the Finance Act of 1963 cannot be said to place any restriction on the free exercise of any profession, trade or occupation. 9. For the reasons given above this writ petition is without merit and is dismissed in limine. Petition dismissed.