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1964 DIGILAW 45 (GAU)

Hrishikesh Nag Iswar Chandra Nag v. State on behalf of K. M. Ghosh

1964-08-03

RAJVI ROOP SINGH

body1964
This is a reference made by the learned Sessions Judge of Tripura under Sec. 438 Cr. P. C. re­commending that the proceedings against the petitioner in C. R. Case No. 137 of 1961 of the Court of 'S. D. M., Sabroom, be quashed. (2) The facts of the case are as follows: On 13-5-61 the petitioner Hrishikesh Nag lodged an F. I. R. at 'Sabroom P. S. under Sec. 394 I. 'P. C. against 3 persons named Debendra Lai Roy, Nutan Chandra Ghosh and Shyamagada Ghosh to the effect that on that very day these persons entered his hut, and after voluntarily causing hurt took away a sum of Rs. 1957- from him without his con­sent. Thereafter on 15-5-61 the accused Debendra Lal Roy was produced under arrest before Bimal Dev, Magis­trate 1st Class, Sabroom, by the Police with a prayer for remanding him to hajat for 14 days. The accused Nutan Chandra Ghosh also surrendered in Court on that day. Bail petitions having been moved on behalf of both the accused, the learned Magistrate after hearing the Lawyer for the accused persons as also the Court Sub-Inspector passed an order allowing them to be enlarged on bail if they could furnish bail for Rs. 200/- with one surety each failing which they were ordered to be remanded to Hajat. The I. 0. was ordered to expedite investigation and to submit report by 29-5-61. Thereafter on the prayer of the Investigating Officer for time the case was adjourned on four occasions i.e. on 29-5-61, 16-6-61, 30-6.61 and 137.61. On 13.7.61 the case was adjourned to 4-8-61. But on 4-8-61 although the accused persons were present, there was no report from the I. 0. and the case was adjourned to 23-8-61. On 24-8-61 the learned Magistrate A. Bhattacharjee, who dealt with the matter discharged the accused persons attar recording an order to the following effect: "The case is disposed of as false under Sec. 394 I. P. C. I. 0. to submit prosecution report under Sec. 211 I. P. C. Accused discharged." This order was passed presumably on the basis of a final report dated 28-7-61, submitted by the 0. C., Sab­room P. S., although the order itself does not show it. Thereafter on 28-11-61 a prosecution report against the petitioner was filed under Sec. 211 I. P. C. by Shri K. M. Ghosh, 0. C., Sab­room P. S., although the order itself does not show it. Thereafter on 28-11-61 a prosecution report against the petitioner was filed under Sec. 211 I. P. C. by Shri K. M. Ghosh, 0. C., Sabroom P. S. before Shri A. Bhattacharjee, Magistrate, 1st Class who took cognizance and passed an order for issue of summons on the petitioner. (3) Being aggrieved by this order of learned S. D. M., the petitioner filed a revision petition to the court of Cessions Judge, Tripura. The learned Sessions Judge after hearing both the parties has made the reference to this Court for quashing the proceedings against the petitioner. (4) After hearing the Govt. Advocate and the counsel for the petitioner, I am of opinion that the order of the Magistrate is illegal and cannot therefore be maintained. (5) The relevant portion of Section 195 Cr. P. C. reads as follows: "(1) No Court shall take cognizance (a) of any offence punishable under Sees. 172 to 183 of the Indian Penal Code, except on the complaint in writing of the public servant concerned, or of some other public servant to whom he is subordinate; (b) of any offence punishable under any of the fol­lowing sections of the same Code, namely, Sees. 193, 194, 195, 196, 199, 200, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211 and 228, when such offence is alleged to have been com­mitted in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any Court, except on the complaint in writing of such Court or of some other Court to which such Court is subordinate; or ' xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx". It may be noted that under cl. (b) of Sec. 195(1) Cr. P. C. no Court is competent or has any jurisdiction to taka cognizance of the offence under Sec. 211 I. P. C. when the offence is alleged to have been committed in relation to any proceeding in the Court except on the complaint in writing of such Court or some other Court referred to in that clause. The word "Proceeding" is not defined in the Code. But the word "Proceeding" in Sec. 195 (1) (b) is used in a wider sense than "judicial proceeding". The word "Proceeding" is not defined in the Code. But the word "Proceeding" in Sec. 195 (1) (b) is used in a wider sense than "judicial proceeding". It will appear from the order-sheet of the learned Magis­trate that Shri Bimal Dev, Magistrate 1st Class, had to deal with the bail applications of the accused Debendra Lai Roy and Nutan Chandra Ghosh as also the prayer for remanding the first named accused at the instance of the Police and that he passed order for enlargement of the accused persons on bail if they could furnish bail for Rs. 200/- each with one surety in default for their remand to Hajat. It is, therefore, clear that on 15-5-61 the learned Magistrate had dealt with a bail proceeding and a remand proceeding arising out of the F. I. R. forwarded before him by the Police. Moreover, Sec. 195 (1) (b) simply re­quires that there should be some relationship between the offence alleged to have been committed and the proceed­ing. No particular kind of relationship is required. The words "in relation to" do not mean that the offence must have been committed after the proceeding had started. Even if the offence was committed prior to the pro­ceeding, it can be said to be in relation to the proceeding if the proceeding is undertaken in consequence of it. If a proceeding is related to an offence, the offence itself is related to the proceeding. In the present case the F. I. R. lodged by the petitioner had resulted in one of the accused being brought under arrest and led to the applications for bail made by two of the accused persons. If the F. I. R. is false, the remand proceeding and the bail proceeding which were connected with the false F. I. R. lodged by the petitioner and the offence under Sec. 211 I. P. C. committed by him by lodging the same must be held to be an offence related to the proceeding. As the proceedings were related to the offence in the above manner, the offence must be held to have been; committed in relation to them;. Section 195 (1) (b), was therefore, applicable and no cognizance could be taken without a complaint by the Magistrate. This view finds support from the recent decision of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Badri v. State, 1963 (2) Cr. LJ 64 (All). Section 195 (1) (b), was therefore, applicable and no cognizance could be taken without a complaint by the Magistrate. This view finds support from the recent decision of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Badri v. State, 1963 (2) Cr. LJ 64 (All). In this case Hon'ble M. C. Desai, C. J. observed as follows: "Where a person makes a false report to the Police against certain persons resulting in their being arrested and being remanded to custody and leading to an applica­tion for bail being made by them, the remand proceedings and the bail proceedings are connected with the false re­port made by the person and the offence committed by him by making it must be held to be an offence com­mitted in relation to those proceedings. As the proceed­ings are related to the offence in the manner mentioned above, the offence must be said to have been committed in relation to them. Section 195 (1) (b) is therefore ap­plicable and no cognizance of the offence can be taken without a complaint by the Magistrate and on a complaint by a private person." The Saurashtra High Court, in the 'case State v. Vipra 'Khimji, AIR 1952 Sau 67, also took the same view. (6) I, therefore, having regard to the provisions of Sec. 195(l)(b> of the Code of Criminal Procedure, hold that the learned Magistrate had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence under Sec. 211 I. P. C. which is alleged to have been committed by the petitioner on the basis of the prosecution report submitted by the 0. C., Sabroom, P. S. Under these circumstances, I, have no option but to accept the reference and set aside the order of the Magis­trate. Hence, the reference is accepted and the proceeding against the petitioner is quashed. Reference accepted: