Order: This Writ Petition is filed under Article 226 of the Constitution to quash an order of the Labour Court, Coimbatore in I.D. No. 8 of 1961. The petitioner is the workmen of R. P. David &38. Co., Salem, represented by the National Motor Workers Union. One Sriramulu was a bus driver under the first respondent-company, R. P. David &38; Co. Two charges were framed against him by the management. One is that, on 11th May, 1959, he was noticed by the District Medical Officer, Salem, over-speeding the bus that he was driving at the time. The second is that, on 10th September, 1959, he reached the Namakkal Bus Stand 30 minutes beyond the schedule time. There is a history behind these two charges. Initially, the Regional Transport Authority took note of these allegations against the driver and suspended his driving licence for 15 days under each of the charges. The permit of the management was also suspended for three days. Thereafter, the management conducted a domestic enquiry into the charges. They appointed one Chelliah, the manager of the Company, as the Enquiry Officer. He submitted separate findings that the two charges were proved. The management also seems to have passed separate orders of dismissal on the two charges, directing them to take effect simultaneously. The Labour Court found that the enquiry by the Domestic Tribunal was not vitiated and confirmed its decision when an industrial dispute arising out of the dismissal of the worker, came up for adjudication before it. The worker’s case was taken up by the Union both before the Labour Court, and also before me in this Writ Petition. It is contended by the petitioner herein that, without examining the District Medical Officer who actually detected the overspeeding of the bus the Domestic Tribunal was not entitled to rely upon the finding of the Regional Transport Authority on the basis of the District Medical Officer’s report alleging overspeed. Before the Enquiry Officer the driver gave an explanation to the effect that there was no overspeeding at all and that the District Medical Officer had arrived at a wrong conclusion about overspeeding. It was therefore urged that there was a violation of the principles of natural justice in that the Domestic Tribunal did not give an opportunity to the worker to rebut the report of the District Medical Officer that there was overspeeding. It was therefore urged that there was a violation of the principles of natural justice in that the Domestic Tribunal did not give an opportunity to the worker to rebut the report of the District Medical Officer that there was overspeeding. But, as against this contention, it is submitted by learned Counsel appearing for the management that, the Regional Transport Authority had the duty to hold an enquiry of a quasi-judicial nature, and that it was only upon the basis of that enquiry, that it came to the decision to suspend the driver’s licence under section 16 (1) of the Motor Vehicles Act for the offence of over-speeding. It has to give reasons for its conclusion. Its decision is subject to appeal by the aggrieved person to a prescribed Authority, namely, the State Transport Appellate Tribunal. It was therefore urged by the respondent that though at first glimpse it would appear as if the Domestic Tribunal acted on the finding of a different tribunal for holding the driver guilty under the first charge, weight had to be given to the fact that the tribunal in this case was one which exercised quasi-judicial powers, to adjudicate on the very same matter, namely, whether the driver was guilty of overspeeding or not. In Jerome D’ Silva v. Regional Transport Authority1it was held that a quasi-judicial Tribunal like the Regional Transport Authority could not ignore the findings and orders of competent Criminal Courts in respect of an offence when the Tribunal proceeds to take any action on the basis of the commission of that offence. What is now claimed by the first respondent’s learned Counsel is to extend this privilege granted in respect of the finding of a Criminal Court, to the finding of a quasi-judicial Tribunal for treating it as binding determination of a fact in issue, when the matter is brought subsequently before a Domestic Tribunal for enquiry. It has to be borne in mind that when the order suspending the driver’s licence for over-speeding was passed by the Regional Transport Authority, it was exercising quasi-judicial powers, and it was also an appealable order. There is no evidence in this case that the driver appealed against the order of the Regional Transport Authority suspending his licence. It has to be borne in mind that when the order suspending the driver’s licence for over-speeding was passed by the Regional Transport Authority, it was exercising quasi-judicial powers, and it was also an appealable order. There is no evidence in this case that the driver appealed against the order of the Regional Transport Authority suspending his licence. Therefore the position of the driver is that his driving licence had been suspended by a quasijudicial Authority on a finding which had become concluded against him, that he had over-speeded the bus which he was driving at that time. The substance of the first charge is really that he had been guilty of over-speeding and to prove this charge, the fact of his being punished by a quasi-judicial Authority which had the duty to determine the very same issue will be a relevant piece of evidence. From this point of view, it is not possible to hold that the finding of the Domestic Tribunal on the 1st charge is vitiated by violation of the principles of natural justice. Taking the second point for consideration, the objection of the petitioner is to the effect that the Domestic Tribunal examined as Court witness, a conductor of the bus which the petitioner was driving at the relevant period. Reference is made to the record of the findings of the Domestic Tribunal where mention was made of the fact that the management did not seek to adduce oral evidence in the first instance. Thus the driver gave evidence and examined a witness on his behalf. At that stage, the Enquiry Officer made a note that he considered it necessary to summon the conductor who was examined as a Court witness, and he gave evidence in support of the charge that the bus driver, due to negligent driving, had reached the destination late. Learned Counsel for the petitioner urges that the manner in which this Court witness was examined after examination of the driver’s witness is violative of the principles of natural justice. As against this, it is pointed out that the Enquiry Officer has mentioned the fact that the driver at the enquiry did not demur to the course thus followed. Learned Counsel for the petitioner urges that the manner in which this Court witness was examined after examination of the driver’s witness is violative of the principles of natural justice. As against this, it is pointed out that the Enquiry Officer has mentioned the fact that the driver at the enquiry did not demur to the course thus followed. Learned Counsel for the first respondent submits that, neither before the Tribunal nor in the affidavit to the petition in this Court, did the petitioner raise an objection that the statement of the Tribunal in this respect is erroneous. This apart, there is no rule, prescribing the order in which witnesses should be examined in a domestic enquiry. All that is necessary is that the Domestic Tribunal should consider only relevant evidence, and give an opportunity to the person proceeded against, for rebutting it. This has been clearly done in this case. There are also other requirements for the domestic enquiry bona fides in holding the enquiry, the absence of victimisation, of unfair labour practice, etc. but with these we are not now concerned. I do not think that in the circumstances, any violation of principles of natural justice took place when the management decided to examine the conductor after the examination of the driver and his witness. Learned Counsel for the first respondent also refers to a circumstance in regard to the explanation of the driver. The driver has explained that, because the management has not fixed any rules as to the place of taking in passengers at the starting point, he had necessarily to make several halts for the purpose and by the time he left the municipal limits of Salem, the starting station it was already late. The finding of the Tribunal is that Rasipuram a place en-route was reached by the bus on that date at the due time and this was borne out by the entries of the time in the trip sheet. This was relied on by the management as a circumstance which would rebut the plea of the driver regarding excessive halts at the place of starting. This aspect of the matter appears to have weighed with the Domestic Tribunal, for its decision on the second charge relating to late arrival. This was relied on by the management as a circumstance which would rebut the plea of the driver regarding excessive halts at the place of starting. This aspect of the matter appears to have weighed with the Domestic Tribunal, for its decision on the second charge relating to late arrival. The decision of the Supreme Court in State of Orissa v. Bidyabhushan1is to the effect that, even if one or more out of several charges framed against an individual in a departmental enquiry is found not substantiated the order of punishment misht be supportable on the finding on the rest of the charges which were held to be proved. In such a case it will not open to the High Court in a writ proceeding to quash the order of punishment. Learned Counsel for the first respondent urged that the same rule would apply to this case, even if one were to hold that the finding on the first charge is vitiated for any reason, and if the finding on the second charge is upheld. But, as I have already mentioned, in my view there are no substantial reasons even for interfering with the finding on the first charge. There is also the special feature in this case, namely, that the management passed two distinct orders of punishment on the findings in respect of each of the two charges and directed that they would be effective simultaneously. This would show that it was the intention of the management to award the punishment of dismissal even on the second charge standing by itself. I, therefore, see no grounds to allow the Writ Petition which is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. R.M. ----- Petition dismissed.