MEHROTRA, C. J.: This is a .petition by Akhil Ranjan Dasgupta, one of the employees of the Management of the Assam Trittune, Gauhati, for a writ of mandamus directing the Labour Commissioner not to give effect to the standing orders which have been certified by the Certifying Officer and to modify them. A writ of certiorari has also been pray­ed for quashing the order passed by the Labour Com­missioner and the .Presiding Officer of the Labour Court, Gauhati. (2) The admitted facts are that certain standing orders were framed by the management. They were sent to the Certifying Office, who has been impleaded as Opposite Party No. 2 to this petition, for certification under Sec. 4 of the Industrial Employment Standing Orders Act, 1946. Notices were issued. Objections were filed by the workman that certain provisions of the draft standing orders are not in conformity with the provisions of the .model standing orders and thus under Sec. 4 the Certifying Officer had no jurisdiction to certify them. Under Sec. 6 of' the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, hereinafter called 'the Act', an appeal is provided against the order of the Certifying Officer to the Labour Court. The Certifying Officer rejected the' objections filed by the workman and certified the draft standing orders. An appeal was filed before the Labour Court. The Labour Court affirmed the order of the Certifying Officer. It is against this order of the Labour Court that the present petition has been filed by one of the employees. (3) Mr. Goswami, who appears for the management, has taken a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the petition. His contention is that the present peti­tioner has no locus standi to come to this Court-under Art. 226 of the Constitution, and thus the petition on his behalf is not maintainable. The Industrial Employ­ment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, to which we have already referred, has nowhere provided that union is to> be represented as such nor does the Act provide that the right to challenge the draft standing order only vests in the union as such and not an individual employee. Any* person whose right has been affected by a particular order can come to this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution for the enforcement of his right by means., of any direction or writ, in the nature of certiorari or mandamus. Any* person whose right has been affected by a particular order can come to this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution for the enforcement of his right by means., of any direction or writ, in the nature of certiorari or mandamus. The petitioner contends that his right also has been affected by the draft standing orders and to that extent he is the person aggrieved and his interest has been affected and he can approach this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution for enforcement of his right by issue of a writ of mandamus or certiorari. We, therefore, do not find much substance in the preliminary objection raised by the opposite party. (4) On the merits of the case, the contention of the petitioner is that as the model standing orders have provided for the maximum period of suspension to be four days, the Certifying Officer or the Labour Court cannot under Sac. 4 of the Act modify them and cannot give a 4raft which is not in conformity with the provisions of the model standing orders, particularly the provisions of the draft standing orders which deal with suspension .pending enquiry and the right of the employee to get one-third of his pay by way of subsistence allowance -during the pendency of the enquiry has been chal­lenged. It is not necessary for us to deal with the cases which were decided by the Supreme Court or other High Courts prior to the amend­ment of S. 4 of the Act. Prior to the amendment the Certifying Officer was not competent lo adjudicate about the fairness or otherwise of the draft standing orders. After the amendment such a power has teen conferred both on the Certifying Officer as well as on the Labour Court when sitting in appeal. The cases .prior to the amendment have laid down that although Sec. 4 debars the Certifying Officer to adjudicate upon the fairness 'or otherwise of the draft standing orders, there is no bar to the Certifying Officer to examine the ques­tion as to whether it will be practicable to adopt the model standing orders or to modify them according to circumstances of the case. Reading Sec. 3 (2), Sec. 4 and Section 15 of the Act together, it is clear that even before the amendment the Certifying Officer had power to modify the model standing orders if he found that it was not practicable to adopt wholly the model -standing orders having regard to the circumstan­ces of the concern. We are, however, in the present case not concerned with that question. At this stage reference had been made to the case of Jiwan Mai and Co. v. Secretary, Kanpur Loha Mills Karamchari Union, AIR 1955 All 581 ; Commissioner of labour v. Associated Cement Companies Ltd., AIR 1955 Bom 363 ; and the Associated Cement Co. Ltd. v. P. D. Vyas, A.I.R. 1960 SC 665. The present case is, however, after the amendment of Sec. 4 of the Act. It is also not contended by the petitioner that there is no power in the Certifying Officer to accept the draft standing orders if it provides for something which is not provided for specifically in the model standing orders. If it provides for something which is not to be found in the model standing orders, it is always open to the Certifying Officer and the appellate authority to examine the fairness or otherwise of that modification. But the main contention of the petitioner is that in the model standing orders there is an express provision for suspension even pending the enquiry and the model standing orders have limited the period of such a suspension to four days. If that contention is accepted in that event if the period of suspension has teen enlarged and extended for more than four days, It will be Unfair on the very face of it. Therefore, the question which we have to decide is whether the model standing orders provided for the period of suspen­sion during the pendency of the enquiry or not. (5) The clauses of the draft standing order which are challenged are 16 (1) (f) and 16(3). Clause 16 of the draft standing orders provides for disciplinary action against the employee and Cl. (1) (f) provides for suspension not exceeding seven days. (5) The clauses of the draft standing order which are challenged are 16 (1) (f) and 16(3). Clause 16 of the draft standing orders provides for disciplinary action against the employee and Cl. (1) (f) provides for suspension not exceeding seven days. Sub-clause (3) (a) of Clause 16 provides as follows: "An employee may be suspended during the period of an enquiry against him which will be completed as expeditiously as possible and the payment of subsistence allowance not exceeding one-third the wages last drawn by him while on duty will be paid to him during the period of enquiry." It is, therefore, clear that sub clause (3) provides for suspension pending the enquiry. So far as the suspen­sion by Way of punishment is concerned, no doubt the draft has raised the period from four days to seven days, but so far as sub-clause (3) is concerned, it provides for the suspension during the pendency of the enquiry for which there is no clear provision in the model standing orders. As we have already indicated earlier, the con­tention of the petitioner is that the model standing orders do provide for suspension for four days even pending the enquiry. Reliance is placed on Cl. (2) of Rule 14 of the Act which reads as follows: "A workman may be suspended for s period not ex­ceeding four days at a time, or dismissed without notice or any compensation in lieu of notice, if he is found to be guilty of misconduct." The contention is that these two parts in cl. (2) should be read conjointly. There is a maximum period provided for suspension of an employee and the words 'if he is found to be guilty of misconduct' only governed dismissal and not the suspension which occurs in the first part of cl. (2). In support of this contention further relianca is placed on sub-cl. (5) of R. 14-, which reads as follows : "An order of suspension shall be in writing and may take effect immediately on delivery to the workman. Such order shall set out in detail the alleged misconduct and the workman shall be given an opportunity of explaining in circumstances alleged1 against him. If on enquiry the order is confirmed, the workman shall be deemed to have been absent from duty for the period of suspension and shall not be entitled to any remuneration for such period. Such order shall set out in detail the alleged misconduct and the workman shall be given an opportunity of explaining in circumstances alleged1 against him. If on enquiry the order is confirmed, the workman shall be deemed to have been absent from duty for the period of suspension and shall not be entitled to any remuneration for such period. If, however, the order is rescinded, the workman shall be deemed to have been on duty during the period of suspension and shall be entitled to the same wages as he would have received if he had not been sus­pended." r Clause (4) of Rule 14 provides as follows: "No order of dismissal shall be made unless the workman concerned is informed in writing of the alleged misconduct and is given an opportunity to explain circumstances alleged against him. The approval of the manager of the establishment or where there is no manager, of the employer is required in every case of dismissal and, when circumstances appear to warrant It, the manager or the employer may institute Independent enquiries before dealing with charges against a work­man: Reading clauses (2), (4) and (5) of Rule 14 together will show that the scheme of the standing orders is that if a person is to be punished by dismissal, then previous enquiry is necessary. No order of dismissal can be passed without first giving an opportunity to the person concerned to substantiate his case. But in the case of punishment of suspension, the suspension is to take effect immediately and thereafter an opportunity is given to the employee to meet the charges. If ultimately in en­quiry it is found that the misconduct has been proved, in that event the order of suspension will be affirmed otherwise it will be set aside. But these clauses clearly show that the suspension contemplated in clause (2) is by way of punishment and not during the pendency of the enquiry. It is also clear that if clause (2) had put the limit of four days for suspension during the pendency of the enquiry, it would necessarily follow that the en­quiry is to be completed within a period of four days. That could not have been contemplated by the framers of the model standing orders. It is also clear that if clause (2) had put the limit of four days for suspension during the pendency of the enquiry, it would necessarily follow that the en­quiry is to be completed within a period of four days. That could not have been contemplated by the framers of the model standing orders. In case of the four days suspension of a person by way of punishment if the en­quiry reveals that the misconduct has not been proved against him, he will be entitled to his salary for those four days. In the event of the enquiry being against him, the order of suspension will be confirmed, that means that he will be out of employment for four days and will not be entitled to any wages for that period. This also shows that the suspension provided for under Clause (2) of Rule 14 is by way of punishment. It can­not be doubted that the employer has an inherent right to suspend a person from duty during the pendency of the enquiry. There is a good reason for that. If there is an enquiry going on against an employee, in order that the employee may not interfere with the working of the administration or in order that the enquiry should De conducted in a peaceful atmosphere, it is necessary that the employee should not be assigned any work during this period. The question Is what amount is he entitled to get during the pendency of the enquiry. The amount is to be regulated either by rules or by conduct between the parties. In the absence of any contract to that effect, the employee during the enquiry may be suspended from work, but he will be entitled to his full remuneration, and it is in order to make the payment of subsistence allowance a part of the contract that this standing order has been amended and a provision has been made clearly that the employee during the pendency of the enquiry will be entitled to one-third of his salary. The purpose of the standing order is to clarify the conditions of the ser­vice and they are in the nature of the contract on which openly the employee enters into the service, and thus any provision made for payment of the compensate allowance during the pendency of the enquiry is in the nature of the contract. The purpose of the standing order is to clarify the conditions of the ser­vice and they are in the nature of the contract on which openly the employee enters into the service, and thus any provision made for payment of the compensate allowance during the pendency of the enquiry is in the nature of the contract. The employee will thus be en­titled to the contractual amount under the standing orders. It cannot, therefore, be said that the draft standing orders have provided anything which is not in conformity with the provisions of the model standing orders. If there is any deviation in the matters which are provided for in the model standing orders, in the draft proposals, In that event it may be open to the Certifying! Officer to enquire into the reasonableness or otherwise of he proposed departure from the model rules. But if the draft standing orders provide for something which is not in the model standing orders at all, t cannot be said that the draft is not in confor­mity with the provisions of the model standing orders. The only point which can be raised is that the period of four days provided for in the model standing orders by way of punishment has been Increased to seven days. The reasonableness of the change has been considered by the Labour Court and the Certifying Officer and thus it cannot be said that on the face of It this is so unreasonable that this Court will interfere with the exercise of power by the Certifying Officer or the Labour Court on appeal. The main grievance of the petitioner was that under the garb of providing for sus­pension during the pendency of the enquiry, the emp­loyer has assumed a larger power and there Is ample opportunity of victimising an employee, he may drag on the enquiry for a pretty long time so as to deprive the employee of his wages for that period and thus the provi­sions in the draft standing orders for suspension during the pendency of the enquiry cannot be said to be fair. Sub-clause (3) of Clause 16 of the draft standing orders has expressly provided that the enquiry will be completed expeditiously. Sub-clause (3) of Clause 16 of the draft standing orders has expressly provided that the enquiry will be completed expeditiously. If in any particular case the employer in order to victimise the employee adopts delaying tactics, it is always open to an employee to approach this Court for a proper remedy, but merely the supposition that in some cases this power will be abused is no ground for us to interfere with the order of the Certifying Officer. We, therefore, see no reason to interfere with the order complained against. (6) The petition is accordingly rejected but we make no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.