JUDGMENT C.A. Vaidialingam, J. 1. In this second appeal, Mr. A. S. Krishna Iyer, learned counsel for the appellant decree-holder auction purchaser, challenges the judgment of the learned Additional District Judge, Ernakulam, in A.S. No. 321/61 on his file, remanding to the lower Court C.M.P. No. 4715/54 for adjudging the amount of compensation that may be due to the respondent under Kerala Act 29 of 1958. In all other respects, the order of the first court, in favour of the appellant has been confirmed by the learned District Judge; and it is only that part of the order of the appellate court, remanding the petition in the manner indicated above, that is the subject of attack in this second appeal. 2. The appellant claims to be an assignee of a mortgage dated 13th Meenam 1094; and on basis of that mortgage, a suit was instituted for recovery of the mortgage amount. It will be seen that a decree was passed in the suit itself, somewhere about 1108; and the present contesting respondent in this second appeal has obtained the right, title and interest of the 2nd defendant, by a document Ex. X-1 dated 11th Kanni 1119. The appellant brought the properties to sale, and ultimately became the court auction-purchaser of the properties in or about 1120 M.E. 3. There appears to have been some controversy regarding the identity of the properties, which were the subject of the mortgage, as well as the court action. Ultimately it is now found by both the subordinate courts that the properties that were the subject of the mortgage, the decree, the sale and purchase by the appellant decree-holder, are S. No. 690/4 (c) and (d) when the appellant attempted to take delivery of the properties, there was obstruction by the contesting respondent, who, as I mentioned earlier, claims under the 2nd defendant in the suit. No doubt it is stated that on a prior occasion, objections filed by the obstructor appear to have been accepted, in view of the fact that there was some discrepancy in the survey number of the properties mentioned in the suit and also in the other proceedings ; and therefore the application filed by the decree-holder for removal of obstruction was rejected. The appellant appears to have filed applications for amending the decree as well as the other papers connected with the sale proceedings, and it is seen that all those proceedings were ordered in favour of the appellant. Ultimately it is seen that the properties that have been actually purchased by the decree-holder appellant are S. No.690/4 (c) and (d). 4. But when the appellant attempted to take delivery of the properties, there was obstruction by the respondent caused to such delivery being effected. The court originally, by its order dated 2nd February 1957 directed the obstruction to be removed and allowed the petition of the decree-holder for possession. That order was challenged by the obstructor in A.S. No. 98/1957 on the file of the District Court of Kottayam. The learned District Judge allowed that appeal of the obstructor, and directed remand of the case to the lower court for fresh disposal, after allowing the parties to adduce fresh evidence regarding the identity of the properties comprised in the decree-schedule. It was the case of the obstructor that the properties purchased by him under Ex. X-1 were not the subject of either the mortgage, the suit or the sale proceedings. That is why the learned District Judge permitted the parties to adduce fresh evidence, so that the actual identity of the properties comprised in the decree schedule may be fixed. It is also seen that ultimately a commission was taken out to measure, demarcate and fix up the properties in dispute. 5. After the matter came back to the executing court over again, it will be seen that after a fairly elaborate consideration of the various aspects that were presented to it, both on behalf of the decree-holder, as well as the obstructor, the learned Munsiff, by his order dated 9th November 1961, has ultimately recorded the finding to the effect that the properties purchased by the obstructor under Ex. X-1, are the same properties that are included in the original decree schedule and other proceedings and that the purchase by the obstructor under Ex. X-1 is vitiated by lis pendens and the court sale and decree proceedings are binding on the obstructor. In this view, the learned Munsiff has held that the obstructor is not entitled to obstruct delivery of possession of the properties asked for by the decree-holder. X-1 is vitiated by lis pendens and the court sale and decree proceedings are binding on the obstructor. In this view, the learned Munsiff has held that the obstructor is not entitled to obstruct delivery of possession of the properties asked for by the decree-holder. But the learned Munsiff was of the view that inasmuch as there are certain buildings in the disputed properties and as those buildings have not been sold in court auction, the decree-holder cannot take delivery of possession of those buildings situated in the properties. The learned Munsiff also took notice of the fact that inasmuch as the sale itself took place in or about 1120 and as certain improvements have been effected by the obstructor after the sale deed obtained by him under Ex. X-1 and as obstructor will not be entitled to get any value of improvements, it is but equitable that he should be allowed to remove those improvements without causing any loss to the properties themselves; and this direction related to the improvements, if any, effected by the obstructor after the date of the court sale, namely 1120. Ultimately, the learned Munsiff allowed the application filed by the decree-holder for removal of obstruction, and directed the decree-holder to recover possession of the properties comprised in S. No. 690/4 (c) and (d) as demarcated in the plan Ex. P-2 (a). He also gave the direction to the effect that the decree-holder will not be entitled to delivery of possession of the buildings situated on the properties. Quite naturally, there was also a consequential direction, permitting the obstructor to remove the improvements effected by him after the date of the court sale, without causing damage to the properties. Subject to these directions, the appellant decree-holder was allowed to take delivery of possession of the properties concerned. 6. The obstructor, being aggrieved by the order of the learned Munsiff, challenged the same in A.S. No.321 / 1961 before the lower appellate court. The learned District Judge has also ultimately recorded a finding, agreeing with the Munsiff to the effect that the properties, which were the subject of the suit and the sales proceedings and purchased by the appellant decree-holder, are the properties taken in by S. No. 690/4 (c) and (d). It is also the view of the learned District Judge that the purchase by the obstructor under Ex. It is also the view of the learned District Judge that the purchase by the obstructor under Ex. X-1, if really the disputed properties were comprised in the decree, should be considered to be affected by lis pendens, as the decree was passed long prior to the sale deed Ex. X-l. And in view of the finding recorded by the appellate court, agreeing with the findings of the trial court, that the properties purchased by the obstructor under Ex. X-1 are the identical properties which were the subject of the decree and the execution proceedings, it is held that the purchase by the obstructor under Ex. X-1 is certainly affected by the rule of lis pendens as provided in section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. Having accepted the contention of the decree-holder so far, the learned District Judge considered an alternative claim that appears to have been made on behalf of the obstructor, namely that he, being a bonafide assignee for consideration, is entitled to be paid the value of improvements effected by him on the properties subsequent to his purchase, namely the date of Ex. X-l. And the learned Judge, notwithstanding the fact that the trial court has negatived the claim, takes the view that inasmuch as there is no evidence in this case going to prove that Ex. X-1 was brought about collusively or fraudulently by the parties thereto, and inasmuch as it is not shown that the obstructor was not paid consideration or that he was not given possession of the properties, he will come within the definition of the expression ' tenant' as defined in section 2 (d) (iii) of Kerala Act 29 of 1958. In this connection, the learned District Judge also relies upon the Division Bench judgment of this Court, reported in Veerasikku Gounder v. Kurian 1960 K.L.T. 213, in support of his conclusion that a person like the obstructor in this case, will be a tenant within the meaning of section 2 (d) (iii) of the Act. The learned Judge, in consequence, comes to the conclusion that the obstructor will be entitled to claim compensation for the improvements effected by him on the properties subsequent to the date of his assignment deed, Ex. The learned Judge, in consequence, comes to the conclusion that the obstructor will be entitled to claim compensation for the improvements effected by him on the properties subsequent to the date of his assignment deed, Ex. X-l. Ultimately, the learned Judge dismissed the appeal of the obstructor, in all other respects, but directed that the order for immediate possession, passed by the learned Munsiff in favour of the decree-holder, will be set aside, and the petition filed by the decree-holder for removal of the obstruction will be remanded to the trial court for adjudging the amount of compensation due to the obstructor. It is this part of the order of the learned appellate Judge that is under severe attack , before me in this second appeal, by Mr. A. S. Krishna Iyer learned counsel for the decree-holder appellant. 7. Mr. Krishna Iyer, learned counsel for the appellant, urged that the view of the appellate court that the obstructor in this case will be a ' tenant' coming within the definition of section 2 (d) (iii) of Kerala Act 29 of 1958, and the further view of the learned Judge that he should be considered to be a tenant under that clause on the basis of the judgment of this Court in Veerasikku Gounder v. Kurien are both erroneous. In fact, according to the learned counsel, a person in the position of the obstructor in this case, who has purchased, admittedly properties, which have been concurrently held by both, the lower courts as being the subject of the litigation and therefore hit by the doctrine of lis pendens, will hold the properties only subject to the rights of the decree-holder purchaser. The learned counsel also urged that under no circumstances can it be held that the 2nd defendant himself can claim any right for compensation as a tenant under the provisions of Act 29 of 1958; and if so, a person purchasing properties and whose rights are hit by section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, cannot by any stretch of imagination be called a tenant under section 2 (d) (iii) of Kerala Act 29 of 1958. Therefore, the learned counsel urged that no question of any claim for compensation for improvements, on the basis of Kerala Act 29 of 1958, arises for investigation, and therefore, having accepted the contentions urged by the decree-holder that the properties purchased by him are the identical properties which are the subject of sale under Ex. X-l, the only result should have been to confirm the order of the trial court, subject, no doubt, to the directions contained in the order of the first court. 8. No doubt, this stand taken by the learned counsel for the appellant, is very strenuously controverted by Mr. P. N. Sankaranarayana Pillai, learned counsel for the respondent obstructor. The learned counsel urged that even according to the findings, which the appellant has not attacked, the obstructor in this case has been found to be a person who has purchased the properties without any fraud or collusion, and it has been further found that he is a person who has parted with consideration and also obtained possession of the properties. The learned counsel urged that there was absolutely nothing in any of the prior proceedings, at the time when his client purchased the properties under Ex. X-l, to indicate that the properties that were being purchased by him from the 2nd defendant were properties which were the subject of any mortgage, or any decree based upon that mortgage, or sale proceedings. It was only at a later and subsequent stage, the learned counsel urged, that the appellant had all the proceedings corrected, by incorporating the survey number as 690/4 (c) and (d), which were the properties purchased by his client under Ex. X-l. Therefore the learned counsel urged that persons in the position of his client, on the basis of the findings which are not attacked by the appellant, cannot but be considered to be "persons coming into possession of land belonging to another person and making improvements thereon, in the bona fide belief that he-is entitled to make such improvements." The learned counsel also urged an alternative contention that in any event, after the date of purchase, evidenced by Ex. X-l, certainly his client must be considered to be a person in possession of land belonging to another person, namely in this case, a person who can enforce his right by virtue of section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act and that therefore his client will certainly satisfy one of the essential conditions, namely his right to make improvements after having come into possession of land belonging to another person. The learned counsel urged that if this premises is established, and, according to the learned counsel, that is well established in this case”the second requisite to make him eligible to claim value of improvements, is that he has made the improvements in the bona fide belief that he is entitled to make such improvements. The learned counsel asks, how can there be any mala fides on the part of his client, when at the date of Ex. X-1 the properties that were described in the document executed in his client's favour did not contain the survey numbers that originally were contained in the mortgage of 1094 as well as the decree and other proceedings following that mortgage ? Therefore the learned counsel urged that his client must be held to be a person who has effected improvements on the properties in the bonafide belief that he is entitled to make such improvements. The learned counsel also urged that in this case, recognising the right which is given to the decree-holder, under section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, it follows that the obstructor must be considered to be a person in possession of the properties belonging to another person, namely the appellant; and, if that is so, the learned counsel urged that apart from equity, the obstructor is entitled to claim compensation for the improvements under the provisions of Act 29 of 1958. Quite naturally the learned counsel placed considerable reliance upon the Division Bench judgment of this court by Sankaran, C. J., and Govinda Menon, J., reported in Veerasikku Gounder v. Kurien, which is a decision, as I have already stated, that has been relied upon by the learned District Judge himself. Quite naturally the learned counsel placed considerable reliance upon the Division Bench judgment of this court by Sankaran, C. J., and Govinda Menon, J., reported in Veerasikku Gounder v. Kurien, which is a decision, as I have already stated, that has been relied upon by the learned District Judge himself. The learned counsel urged that there can be absolutely no distinction between the position occupied by his client in this case and the parties in whose favour a claim for compensation has been recognised by the learned Judges in the decision referred to above under section 2 (d) (iii) of Kerala Act 29 of 1958. 9.The short question that arises for consideration in this appeal is whether the obstructor in this case, namely the contesting respondent, can be considered to be a 'tenant' coming under sub-clause (iii) of clause (d) of section 2 of Kerala Act 29 of 1958. Unfortunately, on this aspect the learned District Judge has not given much of an assistance, because having come to the conclusion that there is no evidence of fraud or collusion in the transaction evidenced by Ex. X-1, and having also come to the conclusion that the obstructor must have paid consideration for the transaction, he has jumped to the conclusion that these circumstances will make a person come within the definition of 'tenant' under sub-clause (iii) of clause (d) of section 2 of the Act. Unfortunately, the learned Judge has not gone further, as he should have done, to find out the ingredients or the essential requisites which are necessary for a person to claim the rights of a tenant under sub-clause (iii) of clause (d) of section 2. But the learned Judge evidently thought that the circumstances pointed out by him will make a person a tenant and that that position is established by the decision of this court in Veerasikku Gounder v. Kurian(1) . 10. I have very carefully considered the decision rendered by the learned Judges in Veerasikku Gounder v. Kurian . Having due regard to the definition of the expression 'tenant' contained in section 2 (d) of Kerala Act 29 of 1958, and, in particular, in sub-clause (iii) of that section, and having due regard also to the contentions raised by Mr. 10. I have very carefully considered the decision rendered by the learned Judges in Veerasikku Gounder v. Kurian . Having due regard to the definition of the expression 'tenant' contained in section 2 (d) of Kerala Act 29 of 1958, and, in particular, in sub-clause (iii) of that section, and having due regard also to the contentions raised by Mr. P. N. Sankaranarayana Pillai, learned counsel for the respondent obstructor, I am not inclined to sustain the view of the learned appellate Judge that the obstructor, in this case, can be considered to be a tenant within sub-clause (iii) of clause (d) of section 2. It is necessary to appreciate the scope of Kerala Act 29 of 1958 before I advert to the decision of the learned Judges in Veerasikku Gounder v. Kurian . In fact, I am also of the view that that decision does not support the proposition for which the lower court has placed reliance. 11. Kerala Act 29 of 1958, namely the Kerala Compensation for Tenants Improvements Act, 1958, purports to be an Act to make provision for the payment of compensation for improvements made by tenants in the Kerala State. The preamble itself states that " It is necessary to make provision for the payment of compensation for improvements made by tenants in the State of Kerala;..." Therefore, the sole object of the legislation is to safeguard the interests of the tenants in the State. Section 2 (a) defines the expression ' eviction' as meaning " the recovery of possession of land from a tenant''. Section 2 (a) defines the expression ' eviction' as meaning " the recovery of possession of land from a tenant''. Then the expression ' tenant' itself is defined in section 2 (d) as follows: "2(d) "Tenant" with its grammatical variations and cognate expressions includes” (i) a person who, as lessee, sub-lessee mortgagee or sub-mortgagee or in good faith believing himself for be lessee, sub-lessee, mortgagee, or sub-mortgagee of land, is in possession thereof; (ii) a person who with the bonafide intention of attorning and paying a reasonable rent to the person entitled to cultivate or let waste-land, but without the permission of such person, brings such land, under cultivation and is in occupation thereof as cultivator; and (iii) a person who comes into possession of land belonging to another person and makes improvements thereon in the bonafide belief that he is entitled to make such improvements." The definition of 'tenant' extracted above, takes in three categories of persons under sub-clauses (i), (ii) and (iii) respectively. Admittedly the learned Judge has not held that the obstructor in this case will be a tenant either under sub-clause (i) or sub-clause (ii) of clause (d); nor has Mr. Sankaranarayana Pillai, learned counsel for the obstructor taken the position that his client will be a tenant under either of those sub-clauses. Therefore, I do not think it necessary to consider either sub-clause (i) or sub-clause (ii) of clause (d). 12. Then the only question is as to whether the obstructor in this case can be considered to be a tenant under sub-clause (iii) of clause (d),as "a person who comes into possession of land belonging to another person and makes improvements thereon in the bonafide belief that he is entitled to make such improvements". In my view, two essential conditions have to be satisfied before a person can be considered to be a tenant under this sub-clause, namely (a) he must have come into possession of land belonging to another person and (6) makes improvements thereon in the bona fide belief that he is entitled to make such improvements. The question does arise quite naturally as to whether both these tests have been satisfied in this case so far as the obstructor is concerned. I will revert to this aspect a little later after considering the scope of the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Veerasikku Gounder v. Kurian . The question does arise quite naturally as to whether both these tests have been satisfied in this case so far as the obstructor is concerned. I will revert to this aspect a little later after considering the scope of the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Veerasikku Gounder v. Kurian . That appears to be a decision arising out of a suit filed by some members of a tarwad whose properties had been sold by the karnavan and who sought to set aside the transactions. It will be seen that the transactions effected by the karnavan were set aside and the defendants in whose favour the documents had been executed and which sale deeds where set aside, claimed the value of improvements under Act 29 of 1958. It is also seen that that claim was accepted by the trial court. The decree-holder quite naturally challenged the claim that had been recognised in favour of those persons. It is in the course of the discussion regarding this aspect that the learned Chief Justice, who spoke on behalf of the court has considered the scope of the expression ' tenant' as defined in section 2 (d) (iii) of Act 29 of 1958. In particular, in considering sub-clause (iii) of clause (a) of section 2, the learned Chief Justice states that one of the conditions to be satisfied for invoking the aid of sub-clause (iii) is that the person concerned must have come into possession of land belonging to another person. The learned Chief Justice also states that the other condition is that he must have made improvements on the land in the bona fide belief that he is entitled to make such improvements. If I may say so with respect, the two tests laid down by the learned Chief Justice are more or less identical with the two essential requirements that I have indicated in the earlier part of this judgment to make a person entitled to claim rights of a tenant under sub-clause (iii) of clause (d) of section 2. Then the learned Chief Justice considers the question as to whether a person is taking possession of land belonging to himself or to another person, will necessarily depend upon the nature of the sale in question. Then the learned Chief Justice considers the question as to whether a person is taking possession of land belonging to himself or to another person, will necessarily depend upon the nature of the sale in question. It is also the further view of the learned Chief Justice that the sale may be a valid sale, or it may be a void or voidable sale. And, if it is a valid sale, if I may say so with respect, the learned Chief Justice is very emphatic that the vendee will be taking possession of the property belonging to him by virtue of the sale. The learned Chief Justice considers the other aspect also, namely that if the sale is a void sale, then the vendee does not become the owner of the property and it cannot be said that he will be taking possession of the property belonging to himself, and under those circumstances the property will still belong to the real owner inspite of the void sale. 13. The question is as to whether in the present case, when the obstructor purchased the properties from the 2nd defendant, who had absolute rights, under Ex. X-1, he can be considered to be a person who has taken a valid sale. In which case, even according to the decision relied upon by the learned District Judge, it is clear that the obstructor will be a person who is taking possession of property belonging to him by virtue of the said valid sale. In my view, that principle enunciated by the learned Judges, if I may say so with respect, will have to be applied on all fours, to find out whether, one of the essential requisites, which go to make the obstructor a tenant, namely his being a person who comes into possession of land belonging to another person, as required under sub-clause (m) of clause (d) of section 2, is satisfied. I am not impressed with the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent that simply because the purchase made by his client is lis pendens and it will be subject to the rights of the decree-holder appellant, as provided in section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, the position of his client must be correlated to the alternative position envisaged by the learned Judges in the decision referred to above, namely that the transaction is a void sale and liable to be set aside by the party entitled to ask for the same. In such a case, it must be held, the learned counsel urged, that possession has been taken of the land by the obstructor not in his own right, but really of land belonging to another person. I have no hesitation in rejecting this contention of the learned counsel for the respondent. 14. In view of the concurrent findings of both the subordinate courts that the obstructor occupies a position of a person who is hit by section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, it is quite clear that the sale deed Ex. X-1 is not ab initio void. It is also clear that the rights of a purchaser pendente lite will be subordinated to the rights of the decree-holder which may be adjudicated in the final decree itself. Therefore, the rights of the obstructor in this case cannot certainly be correlated to the rights of a person who has purchased properties from a karnavan or joint family manager, which transaction is likely to be attacked on grounds available to other members. That certainly is not the case here. His vendor, D-2 was the absolute owner of the property. Therefore, when the obstructor purchased the properties, he purchased them from a full owner in his own right; and when he entered into possession of the properties on the basis of the transaction evidenced by Ex. X-1, he is a person who has come into possession, not of land belonging to another person, as is now claimed, but of land belonging to himself. No doubt under section 52 of T.P. Act, he will hold it subject to the rights of the decree-holder to be adjudicated in the suit itself. X-1, he is a person who has come into possession, not of land belonging to another person, as is now claimed, but of land belonging to himself. No doubt under section 52 of T.P. Act, he will hold it subject to the rights of the decree-holder to be adjudicated in the suit itself. Therefore one of the essential conditions that is absolutely necessary under sub-clause (iii) of clause (d) of section 2 of Kerala Act 29 of 1958, to make the obstructor a tenant, is totally absent in this case. 15. It will not be really necessary for me to be considered the second contention that has been urged by the learned counsel for the respondent obstructor, namely that his client must be considered to be a person who has made improvements in the bona fide belief that he is entitled to make such improvements. That question will arise, in my view, only if the first condition under sub-clause (iii) is satisfied. Because it is not as if the existence one or other of the conditions in sub-clause (iii) will make a person eligible to claim to be a tenant under section 2 (d). But any how, as that contention has been urged by the learned counsel for the respondent, in fairness to the learned counsel, I will deal with that contention also. 16. I am not inclined to accept the contention of Mr. Sankaranarayana Pillai that when his client has purchased the properties, pending litigation and which transaction is hit by the provisions of section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act and which his client knows he holds subject to the rights of the decree-holder that may be adjudicated upon by the court, his client must be considered to be a person who " makes the improvements thereon in the bona fide belief that he is entitled to make such improvements ". The vendee, in my view, does not at all come into the picture in the circumstances of the case when the 2nd defendant himself is a person admittedly not entitled to claim any protection on the basis of the provisions of Act 29 of 1958. No doubt, I am aware of the contention of Mr. The vendee, in my view, does not at all come into the picture in the circumstances of the case when the 2nd defendant himself is a person admittedly not entitled to claim any protection on the basis of the provisions of Act 29 of 1958. No doubt, I am aware of the contention of Mr. Sankaranarayana Pillai that the 2nd defendant, namely the mortgagor, may not be eligible to make a claim for compensation for improvements, but according to the law as applied in the Travancore area and as decided in Kunjan v. Subramania Iyer 1946 T.L.R. 518 F.B. a transferee from such a person can claim the right to compensation. I am not concerned with the general law pertaining to any part of the, State. I am concerned only to find out whether the respondent will be a person who can be considered to be a ' tenant' who comes within the four corners of sub-clause (iii) of clause (d) of section 2 of Kerala Act 29 of 1958. If a person does not satisfy those requirements, in my view, whatever may be the law or whatever may have been the law, will not assist him at all. In my view, the conclusion arrived at by the learned appellate Judge that because the obstructor in this case has purchased the properties bona fide and must have paid consideration for it and because there is no fraud or collusion in the purchase made by him and therefore he is a tenant under sub-clause (iii) of clause (d) of section 2 of the Act, is absolutely erroneous. Apart from the fact that such a person will not satisfy the essential conditions referred to therein, there is the Division Bench decision of this court in Veerasikku Gounder v. Kurian , which, so far as I could see, and, if I may say so with respect, does not recognise any such rights as tenants in persons like the obstructor respondent in this appeal. Therefore the order of remand passed by the lower appellate court will be set aside and the order of the trial court restored. The parties will bear their costs throughout. 17. The Second Appeal will stand allowed in the manner indicated above. 18. Leave to appeal asked for, but refused.