ORDER.- The petitioners in these cases are the owners of two different premises. In the case of the first petitioner, a part of his premises was taken over by the Government under the provisions of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1949, for the purpose of providing accommodation to an officer of the Government. This was in 1952. In the case of the other petitioner, part of his premises was so taken over in 1954. The Act referred to was repealed and a new Act was passed in 1960. After the passing of the new Act, the Government purported to allot those portions of the two houses to some other officers, the earlier occupants having vacated. The petitioners contend that by virtue of a particular provision in the new Act, it is not open to the Government to continue to be in possession of the premises and that the premises should therefore be handed back to them. They seek the issue of writs of certiorari to quash the orders of allotment that have been made by the Accommodation Controller in this regard. The facts are not in dispute. That portions of these buildings were taken by the Government for the occupation of the officers and those portions have been allotted to Government officers in succession is admitted. But the contention that has been taken by the respondent, the Accommodation Controller, is that the premises so taken over continue to be subject to the provisions of the Act and that the new Act does not contain any provision which releases the premises from the tenancy created under the old Act. In order to appreciate the contentions, a brief reference has to be made to the provisions of the two Acts. Under section 3 (5) of the old Act, where any vacancy occurred, notice of such vacancy had to be given to the Accommodation Controller. Under section 3 sub-section (3), if the building was required for the purposes of the State or for the occupation of any officer of the State Government, the Accommodation Controller could within ten days of the receipt of the notice of vacancy intimate the landlord accordingly. Under section 3 sub-section (3), if the building was required for the purposes of the State or for the occupation of any officer of the State Government, the Accommodation Controller could within ten days of the receipt of the notice of vacancy intimate the landlord accordingly. On his doing so, sub-section (5) provided " The State Government shall be deemed to be the tenant of the landlord with retrospective effect from the date on which the authorised officer received notice........" By this provision, the Government became the tenant of the premises, and since the premises were taken over for the occupation of its officers, the Government became entitled to allot the premises to any officer in its employ. If any such officer so placed in occupation of the premises ceased to require it, since the Government was the tenant, the tenancy did not cease when the officer vacated it. The Government could allot it to another officer in need of the rental accommodation. It is not in dispute that the premises were being so allotted from officer to officer as and when occasion arose. When the 1949 Act was repealed and replaced by Madras Act XVIII of 1960 a new sub-section was introduced. The several sub-sections of section 3. of the new Act which are almost identical with those of the old Act also deal with the notice of vacancy and the taking over of the building by the Accommodation Controller for the purpose of Government or any of its officers and other like purposes. Sub-section (10) was newly introduced which reads thus in so far as it is material to the present case: " Nothing contained in this section shall apply- .............................................................. (c) to a residential building, a part only of which is occupied by the full owner and the whole or any portion of the remaining part of such building is let to any tenant. " What this sub-section provides for is that in a case where a part of a building which had been in the occupation of a tenant fell vacant, the remaining portion, the Whole or part of it being under the occupation of the owner himself, it was not necessary for the landlord to give a notice of vacancy as required by section 3 (3) of the Act. Obviously, if no notice of the vacancy was required to be given in such a case it followed that the Accommodation Controller could not take any steps in regard to that part of the building for the purposes of the State Government or for the occupation of any of the officers of the State Government. This is apparently some relief that was given to the landlords who were in occupation of a part of their own houses and who had let out other parts of their houses, and was presumably intended to avoid the creation of statutory tenancies over parts of such buildings. It is the contention of Mr. M. A. Srinivasan, learned Counsel for the petitioners, that the right of the Government to continue as a tenant after the repeal of the 1949 Act and the re-enacting of Act XVIII of 1960 has not been saved. It is also claimed that the Government was only deemed to be the tenant of the premises and such a deemed tenancy cannot survive the repeal of the Act. The real purport of the contention of the petitioner is that the Act itself is no longer applicable , for what is demanded by the petitioners is that on the repeal, of the old Act, the statutory tenancy created by section 3 (5) of the old Act came to an end and that the Government is no longer entitled to be in occupation of the premises. But that is not the real effect of the provision. Looking at the scheme of the Act, it is easy to see that the protection that had been given to the tenants of premises by various other sections of the old Act are undoubtedly maintained intact under the new Act. For instance, section 10, which provides for eviction of tenants prohibits the eviction of a"tenant except in accordance with the provisions of the Act and a tenant as defined in the Act does not exclude a deemed tenant, such as the Government in the present instance. What section 3 (10) provides for is only to relax the requirement of giving notice of vacancy in certain classes of cases. It is true that section 35 which contains the saving provision does not in terms deal with the rights created under the old Act. What section 3 (10) provides for is only to relax the requirement of giving notice of vacancy in certain classes of cases. It is true that section 35 which contains the saving provision does not in terms deal with the rights created under the old Act. Section 35 (2) (a) only provides that all orders made or deemed to have been made under the old Act shall be deemed to have been made under the corresponding provision of the new Act and shall have effect accordingly. But in order to understand whether the rights created under the old Act are maintained or not, it is not this saving provision alone that should be looked into but the scheme of the entire Act. In a decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in State of Andhra v. Ramaswami1the learned Judges observe that when an Act is repealed, the provisions of the new law should be examined to see whether they “ disclose the legislative intent to destroy the rights that have accrued or the liabilities that were incurred under the old Act or to terminate the proceedings that were initiated before the law was altered or to take away all its precedent effects.” In The State of Punjab v. Mohar Singh,2their Lordships observe that when a repeal is followed by fresh legislation on the same subject, the Court will have to look to the provisions of the new Act for the purpose of determining whether they disclose a different intention, for, normally, on the repeal of an enactment, the consequences laid down in section 6 of the General Clauses Act would follow. They also say that the line of enquiry should not be whether the new Act expressly keeps alive old rights and liabilities but whether it manifests an intention to destroy them, and this will have to be ascertained from a consideration of all the provisions of the new law and the absence of a saving clause in the Act would not by itself be material. Assuming therefore that there is no express saving of any rights that accrued under the old Act, it does not follow according to the decision that those rights are deemed to have been destroyed. Assuming therefore that there is no express saving of any rights that accrued under the old Act, it does not follow according to the decision that those rights are deemed to have been destroyed. The provisions of the Act have to be examined in that regard and the one instance, that I have referred to, namely, the protection against eviction of tenants in whatsoever manner they may have come into possession of the premises is sufficient to show that a tenancy, which was created through the machinery of the old Act, continues to be a valid tenancy under the new Act, which cannot be terminated except in accordance with the provisions of the new Act. It obviously follows that the rights created under the old Act are not intended to be destroyed by the new Act solely by reason of the introduction of section 3 (10). To all intents and purposes, the operation of section 3 (10) of the Act can thus be only prospective and it cannot affect lawfully created tenancies under the old Act. I am accordingly satisfied that the petitioner’s contention that the continuance of the occupation of these premises by the Government is opposed to section 3 (10) (c) of the Act and that they are entitled to be replaced in possession of their premises must fail. The Government continue to be the tenant and are entitled to the protection of the various provisions of the Act. There is no question of the occurrence of any vacancy, that is to say, the termination of the tenancy which alone may perhaps give rise to the new right created by section 3 (10) (c). The petitions accordingly fail and are dismissed. There will however be no order as to costs. V.K. ----------- Petitions dismissed.