Ramamurti, J.— The Life Insurance Corporation of India (Unit: The Oriental Government Security Life Assurance Co., Ltd., Bombay) hereinafter called the Company, is the appellant in this appeal. The respondent, Srimathi Parvathavardhini Ammal, is the widow of one V. S. N. C. Narasimhan Chettiar (hereinafter referred to as the assured or V. S. N. C), has filed the suit O.S. No. 62 of 1958 on the file of the Sub-Court, Tiruchirappalli, to recover a sum of Rs. 20,000 due under an Insurance Policy No. 1733287, dated 22nd May, 1954 and a sum of Rs. 30,000 due under another Insurance Policy No. 1855372 dated 26th March, 1955, on the ground that the said policies were accepted at the ordinary rate by the Insurance Company certifying the life of V. S. N. C. aforesaid as a first class one by four eminent doctors of the Company, that the plaintiff (respondent) was the nominee under the aforesaid two policies, that the said assured died on 20th May, 1955, on account of coronary thrombosis which attack set in on 17th May, 1955, and that the Insurance Company had wrongfully repudiated the claim of the plaintiff on 26th November, 1957. The three grounds on which the plaintiff’s claim was resisted by Company were: (i) that V. S. N. C, the assured, was suffering from high blood pressure and diabetes with high percentage of sugar and albumen in his urine, and that he did not disclose the same to the Company at the time when the two proposals were made by him ; (ii) that V. S. N. C. did not disclose to the Company that he made a proposal in 1929 for Insurance to the branch of the Oriental Insurance Company at Tiruchirappalli, and that it was accepted with an extra amount, but that it did not materialise for that reason, and (iii) that the correct ages of the parents of V.S.N.C. at the time of their deaths were not given by him, when the proposals for the suit policies were made, but that he deliberately and fraudulently gave incorrect and false dates. As the policies were repudiated more than two years after the expiry of two years from the date on which they were effected under section 45 of the Insurance Act, the burden of proving that the policies were vitiated by any fraudulent misrepresentation or fraudulent suppression of material facts was rightly placed upon the Company. The learned Subordinate Judge, in a very carefully considered Judgment, fully analysed the oral and documentary evidence adduced on both sides and came to the conclusion that the defendant Company not only had not discharged the burden but that the plaintiff had satisfactorily proved that V. S. N. C. the deceased, was not guilty of any fraudulent misrepresentation or suppression of material and important facts when he made the proposal for Insurance which were accepted by the Company. We have ourselves carefully scrutinised the evidence, both oral and documentary, bearing upon the three relevant aspects mentioned above, and we are glad to say that the learned Subordinate’s perspective of approach and his assessment of the oral and documentary evidence are quite sound and satisfactory. We have no hesitation in accepting, completely, his reasonings and conclusions. As we will presently show this is one of those cases in which not only the defendant Company has totally failed to discharge the burden arising under section 45 of the Insurance Act, but the plaintiff has positively proved that the policy was not vitiated by any of the circumstances mentioned in section 45 of the Act. We shall first take up the question as to whether the assured was suffering from diabetes and high blood pressure, with sugar and albumen in urine and whether he fraudulently suppressed this important information when he made the proposal for insurance. The complaint of the defendant in regard to this aspect of the matter is contained mainly in paragraphs 8, 12, 13, and 18 of the written statement. The complaint of the defendant in regard to this aspect of the matter is contained mainly in paragraphs 8, 12, 13, and 18 of the written statement. The gravemen of the charge of the defendant was that for a period of about two years before the date of the proposal of the policies in question, the assured had suffered from diabetes with sugar in the urine and high blood pressure, nervous disease like tremor of the wrist and general debility, that the state of ill-health throughout persisted, that the complainant became serious from about the year 1950, October, and that the deceased has suppressed evidence of his having had treatments from various doctors in various places like, Madras, Karur, Dindigul, Madura, Salem and Vellore. The further complaint was that the assured and his helpers have practised a planned scheme of fraud and conspiracy with a view to defraud the Company. The first policy for Rs. 20,000, P. No. 1733287, Exhibit B-l was preceded by the proposal, Exhibit B-3, made by the assured and there were two medical examinations, one by Dr. Ramanujam, m.b.b.s., of Dindigul and another by Dr. Dorairaj, B.Sc, m.b.b.s. Exhibits A-39 and A-40 are the reports of Dr. Ramanujam and Dr. Dorairaj respectively and each of them had certified that the health of V.S.N.C. was a first class one. Dr. Ramanujam had attested Exhibit B-4, the personal statement of V.S.N.C, while Dr. Dorairaj had attested Exhibit B-5, another personal statement of V.S.N.C. Similarly, in regard to the second policy for Rs. 30,000, Policy No. 1855372 marked Exhibit B-2, there were medical examinations by Dr. Selvaraj, m.b.b.s., who was then Civil Assistant Surgeon in the Government Hospital at Dindigul and another by Dr. Rajagopal, m.b.b.s., and they had also similarly certified that the health of V. S. N. C. was a first class one, their respective medical reports being Exhibits A-41 and A-42. They had also attested the respective personal statements, Exhibits B-7 and B-8 made by the assured in respect of two medical examinations. One Athimoolam and Veeraraghavan, who along with one Mr. Bhat, the Secretary of the Madurai Branch during the relevant period, are the employees and representatives of the Company who represented the Company while effecting the policies aforesaid. The real evidence adduced on the side of the defendant may be conveniently grouped under the following heads: (i) the evidence of the doctors, D. Ws. Bhat, the Secretary of the Madurai Branch during the relevant period, are the employees and representatives of the Company who represented the Company while effecting the policies aforesaid. The real evidence adduced on the side of the defendant may be conveniently grouped under the following heads: (i) the evidence of the doctors, D. Ws. 7, 8 and 9 who have given evidence about the alleged ailments of the assured ; (ii) the oral evidence of D.Ws. 3, 4, 5, 11 and 12, employees of the Company who were concerned in the investigation of the case between the period when the claims on the policies were made by the plaintiff and ultimately repudiated by the Company and (iii) the evidence of the relatives of the assured. We shall now consider the oral evidence in the order mentioned above, along with the relevant documentary evidence connected with those witnesses. * * * * * [After discussing the evidence of D.Ws. 7, 8 and 9, His Lordship concluded:] We are therefore of opinion that the evidence of D.Ws. 7, 8 and 9 does not make out that the assured was suffering from diabetes or blood pressure. We shall now consider the evidence of D.Ws. 3, 4, 5, 11 and 12 who were concerned in the investigation of the case, and here again their evidence will have to be assessed in the light of the available correspondence which passed between these witnesses and the Bombay office. * * * * * [After analysing the evidence His Lordship proceeded:] The result of this analysis of the evidence of the witnesses examined on the side of the defendant is that no witness has given evidence with personal knowledge,corroborating the averments in the written statement about the alleged ailments of 1 V. S. N. C. as well as the treatments which he underwent at various places under various doctors. We are sorry to say that the several pleas in the written statement have been taken without any sense of responsibility and what is worse, witnesses have been examined by the company, who have no regard for truth and admittedly have no personal knowledge of the facts of the case, particularly the alleged ailments of the deceased. We are sorry to say that the several pleas in the written statement have been taken without any sense of responsibility and what is worse, witnesses have been examined by the company, who have no regard for truth and admittedly have no personal knowledge of the facts of the case, particularly the alleged ailments of the deceased. There is one feature of the case strongly stressed by the defendant both in the course of the evidence and arguments in the trial Court, as well as here, and it is the theory that the assured was having his treatment mainly at Dindigul which was not his place of permanent residence. It is obvious that this theory is propounded because the defendant is perfectly conscious and alive to the fact that it cannot prove from the evidence available in Karur (either through doctors or otherwise) that the assured was suffering from such ailments. We frankly confess that we are utterly unable to appreciate this theory of treatment at Dindigul and that too secretly. In our opinion it is too artificial, fantastic, and absurd on the face of it. Does it mean that the assured had already planned to effect these policies at Dindigul and the Dindigul doctors and the local agents there and the Madura Branch Manager simply connived at this scheme of the assured? When did the scheme of a fraudulent insurance originate in the mind of the assured and how long was he pursuing the secret game? It is familiar knowledge that for treatment of diabetes attention by way of insuline injections, test of sugar and albumen in urine will have to be conducted every day or at very frequent intervals. A blood pressure patient also requires careful attention from a doctor at similar frequent intervals. If the case of the defendant were true we have to assume that in the fond hope of effecting an insurance policy the assured who was admittedly a busy businessman was running between Dindigul and Karur. It is not the defendant’s case that the assured pinned his faith solely in Ayurvedic treatment and that treatment alone, and he never had any inclination for allopathic treatment. The evidence of the defendant is just the other way round. It is not the defendant’s case that the assured pinned his faith solely in Ayurvedic treatment and that treatment alone, and he never had any inclination for allopathic treatment. The evidence of the defendant is just the other way round. If therefore the assured had immense faith in allopathic treatment as well, it passes our comprehension that for a period of three years the assured should be having this treatment only in Dindigul or if he had such treatment in Karur no evidence should be forthcoming to prove such an obvious fact. We have said enough to demonstrate how this theory utterly lacks substance and how it is violently opposed to realities of life and day-to-day problems. We have so far dealt with the evidence adduced on the side of the defendant. Before we take up the evidence adduced on the side of the plaintiff, we have to advert to the serious omission on the part of the Company to examine the doctors who certified the health of the assured as a first class one, as well as the local agents, Athimoolam and Veeraraghavan, who were responsible for effecting the policy and Mr. Bhat, who was the Secretary of the Madurai Branch and who also took an important part in the matter. It is a matter of keen regret that the Company which is a responsible institution has not placed The entire correspondence touching the investigation which the Company made through its employees. * * * * * It is no use for the Company to disclaim responsibility for the non-examination of the aforesaid four doctors of the Company on the ground that these doctors, if examined, could not be expected to say anything contrary to their own reports. The reports have been proved and the statements of these doctors who are Company’s doctors should prima facie be taken to represent the truth, unless evidence is adduced to the contra. It has been held that as a general rule a medical examiner of a Life Insurance Company is an agent of the Company. Vide 44, Corpus Juris Secundum, Insurance section 144. It has been held that as a general rule a medical examiner of a Life Insurance Company is an agent of the Company. Vide 44, Corpus Juris Secundum, Insurance section 144. On the other hand, if the plaintiff had examined these doctors, and if they in their evidence corroborated their medical reports, the defendant would contend that such evidence would not be of much use to the plaintiff for the same reason that the doctors would not give evidence contrary to their reports. The burden of proof under section 45 of the Insurance Act is a very heavy one, which the Statute has squarely placed upon the Company, and how can the defendant with such a heavy burden escape the obligation of examining these doctors on such speculative theories ? The prima facie presumption is that the certificates given by these doctors of the Company are true and genuine ones. We have no hesitation in holding that the consequence of the non-examination of these four doctors must be clearly visited upon the defendant, and every adverse inference should be drawn against the defendant for the same. In passing we may also advert to the fact that it was only long after disputes arose that Dr. Ramanujam ceased to be the doctor of the company in the matter of insurance. The reason for this change is obvious. We are equally unable to understand why the Company had not examined Athimoolam and Veeraraghavan, the agents at the place where the policies were effected. Here again such correspondence as has been placed by the Company does not disclose at all that the Company had made any investigation into the conduct of these agents. They are still in the service of the Company and we see no justification as to why they were withheld from the box. The same criticism applies with even greater force in respect of the non-examination of Mr. Bhat who was not a mere agent but the Secretary of the Madurai Branch, undoubtedly a big branch of the Company. * * * * * Under these circumstances and having due regard to the specific case of the plaintiff as to the prominent part played by Mr. Bhat, there is not the slightest justification for the Company not examining such a responsible officer. It is elementary justice that every adverse inference should be drawn against the Company for such an omission. Bhat, there is not the slightest justification for the Company not examining such a responsible officer. It is elementary justice that every adverse inference should be drawn against the Company for such an omission. Even though the correspondence in the stage of the investigation and the evidence given by some of the witnesses on the side of the defendant suggest some sort of collusion and unfair conduct on the part of the Dindigul doctors, it has to be mentioned that the Company did not have the courage to put forward in the written statement such a specific case of fraud and conspiracy on the part of the doctors. Curiously enough the written statement proceeds on the footing that the doctors themselves were duped and that material facts have been suppressed from these doctors themselves at the time of the proposals: vide para. 13 of the written statement. This case of the doctors themselves being over-reached by the assured is inconsistent with the case developed by the defendant in the evidence that these doctors had treated the deceased for such ailments but yet gave false medical certificates. A careful scrutiny of the written statement shows that the Company has no definite case with reference to the part played by the doctors when they certified the health of the assured as a first class one. Why should we assume that four responsible and eminent doctors, as well as a responsible officer of the Company, the Secretary of the Madura Branch, did not scrutinise the proposals and bestow sufficient responsibility in the discharge of their duties, especially when they knew that the proposal was made at Dindigul by a person who was a permanent resident of Karur ? On the other hand, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary we must presume, in. fairness to these people, that they were fully alive to their responsibilities and duties. It passes our comprehension as to why the company did not a state in the written statement that it was Dr. Ramanujam who treated the assured for such ailments if it were true? As observed earlier, on the other hand, the written statement proceeds on the footing that Dr. Ramanujam himself was kept in ignorance and uninformed about the ailments of the deceased-assured. Ramanujam who treated the assured for such ailments if it were true? As observed earlier, on the other hand, the written statement proceeds on the footing that Dr. Ramanujam himself was kept in ignorance and uninformed about the ailments of the deceased-assured. We find that there is no cohesion or consistency between the case in the written statement and the case developed in the course of evidence of the defendant, and from such correspondence as has been produced, it is clear that this change of front and inconsistency is due to the fact that the Company was more inclined to accept irresponsible and reckless information conveyed to them by D.Ws. 3, 4, 7, 8 and 12 and that the Company clearly shirked its responsibility and duties in not trying to contact respectable persons, the four doctors and Mr. Bhat, whose evidence would have helped the Court to arrive at the truth. To sum up, we are of the opinion that every adverse inference should be drawn against the Company for the way in which they have withheld material evidence. There is one other extraordinary and important feature of the case which should be adverted to. None of the employees of the Company who claim to have investigated the case and who have been examined as witnesses for the defence, would take the responsibility for having given instructions to the Counsel for drafting or preparing the written statement. The very first witness, D.W. 3, says in cross-examination that he was not present when the written statement was filed. D.W. 4 who has written the letter Exhibit B-30 in which he has made the irresponsible statement that “ the whole thing is a pre-planned and long and well-designed plot and conspiracy among the examining doctor, Agent and the deceased’s brother-in-law to create an. estate for the deceased’s family knowing his end to come so early” , does not take the responsibility for the averments in the written statement. D.W. 5, Gupta, who is a permanent resident in Karur and who is an Insurance Agent of the Oriental Life Insurance Company since 1934, again does not say that he gave instructions for the written statement. The next important witness on the defendant’s side is D.W. 12, Mr. Mani Iyer, who speaks about various matters. He admits in cross-examination that he did not take part in giving instructions for preparing the written statement. The next important witness on the defendant’s side is D.W. 12, Mr. Mani Iyer, who speaks about various matters. He admits in cross-examination that he did not take part in giving instructions for preparing the written statement. What is worse, he states that the “ Zonal Office at Madras” has given instruction for drafting the written statement. He says that he was not consulted for the preparation of the written statement and refers to Mr. Balasubramaniam Iyer, as the Zonal Manager, evidently indicating that the latter was responsible for the drafting of the written statement. Thus, it is crystal clear, that the Company has decided to repudiate the policies only because the assured died within a short time after the policies were effected and that the Company would not make any one of its employees responsible for the averments in the written statement and tender him for cross-examination. In our opinion, this unsavoury feature of the case powerfully reacts against the defendant in the matter of its discharge of its burden arising under section 45 of the Insurance Act. Coming now to the positive evidence adduced on the side of the plaintiff, we shall first take the evidence of P.W. 1, Dr. Parameswaran, who has been the family Doctor of ‘V.S.N.C. ‘during the period 1953 to 1955. D.W. 3 has admitted that Dr. Parameswaran is a distinguished Medical Practitioner. D.W. 5 has similarly admitted that Dr. Parameswaran and Dr. V. R. Menon are eminent Doctors in Karur. He (P.W. 1) is a highly qualified person, being a B.A., M.B.B.S. of large practice, paying income-tax on an income of Rs. 35,000 a year. He says that the health of the assured was extremely good and that he had only treated the wife of the assured and his children. He has categorically denied that the assured was suffering from diabetes or blood pressure. * * * * * In our opinion, the learned Judge is perfectly right in accepting the evidence of this witness as substantially true. P.W. 2, Dr. V. R. Menon, who examined V.S.N.C. and treated him on the 17th and 18th May, 1955, during the absence of P.W. 1 has given evidence that the deceased was not suffering from diabetes or blood pressure and that during these two days, he only noticed that the deceased was suffering from an attack of thrombosis. P.W. 2, Dr. V. R. Menon, who examined V.S.N.C. and treated him on the 17th and 18th May, 1955, during the absence of P.W. 1 has given evidence that the deceased was not suffering from diabetes or blood pressure and that during these two days, he only noticed that the deceased was suffering from an attack of thrombosis. Then we have the evidence of P.W. 3, Dr. Venkatasubbu who was the family doctor of V.S.N.C. for about 10 years between 1942 to 1952. Subsequent to 1952, P.W. 1 has been the family doctor. P.W. 3 lives in Karur very near (about 20 houses off) the house of the assured. He says that he knows V.S.N.C. intimately, that the latter was a healthy person and that he had no occasion to treat the assured for diabetes or blood pressure or any other major ailment. He has produced his Account Book, Exhibit A-37 and his Prescription Book, Exhibit A-38, which will show that he has only treated and given medicines to the members of the family of the assured but never treated the assured. He denied the suggestion that he performed any operation on V.S.N.C. Nothing tangible has been made out to throw doubt upon the truth of the evidence given by this witness. Even though questions were put in cross-examination suggesting that this witness P.W. 3 never treated the deceased, the correspondence with the Company in the investigation stage, shows that the employees of the Company themselves approached P.W. 3 for information accepting the position that he was the family doctor of the assured. To sum up, therefore, we are clearly of the opinion that there is acceptable satisfactory proof on the plaintiff’s side that V.S.N.C. did not suffer from blood pressure or diabetes or from any other serious ailment. We then pass on to the next point “whether the policies were vitiated by the alleged ground that the assured did not disclose to the Company that he made a proposal in 1929 for Insurance to the Branch of the Oriental Insurance Company at Tiruchirappalli, that it was accepted with an extra amount, but that it did not materialise for that reason”. The learned Judge has discussed the evidence touching this aspect of the matter Jo great detail in paras. 34 to 36 of his Judgment. The learned Judge has discussed the evidence touching this aspect of the matter Jo great detail in paras. 34 to 36 of his Judgment. We are satisfied that the perspective of approach of the learned Subordinate Judge is correct and that the defendant has not discharged the burden. **** The learned Subordinate Judge has not accepted this explanation of D.W. 12 that the important Branch Proposal Register was in the Branch Office and in the first week of September he found it missing from his table and he was inclined to take the view that the Company has deliberately suppressed the Branch Proposal Register, as the same, if produced, would not support the case of the defendants that in respect of 1929 proposal, the Company demanded extra premium from the assured. We entirely agree with this criticism of the learned Subordinate Judge and the adverse inference drawn by him. It is obvious, that if such an important record suddenly disappeared, there will be some record to show about the loss of the Register. Nothing of that kind is forthcoming. At the time when the written statement was drafted, this loss of the Register has been noticed and there is no reference to it in the Written Statement in which there is specific reference only to General Proposal Register. There is no proof of the result of the proposal made in 1929 and the defendant on whom lay the burden of proving the result has completely failed to discharge that burden. * * * * * For all these reasons, we are of the opinion that there is no substance in this point of an alleged infructuous proposal of insurance in the year 1929. We now pass on to the last point, i.e., the assured did not give the correct ages of his parents at the time of their deaths when the proposals for policies in question were made. Here too, we are clearly of the opinion that the defendant has not discharged the burden. ***** It must first be noticed that before the assured is charged with having given false or incorrect ages, the defendant must first prove what were the true or the correct ages of the parents of the assured at the time of their deaths. Mere discrepancy about their ages in some documents does not take the case of the defendant very far. Mere discrepancy about their ages in some documents does not take the case of the defendant very far. The ages given in the different documents appear to have been given on mere suppositions or conjectures. There is no proof first of all that the ages given in Exhibit B-45 are the correct ages. Again there is no proof of the correct ages of the parents when they died, with the result that comparison of age given in one record with that given in the other record proves nothing except the existence of mere discrepancy. The important witness, the younger brother of V.S.N.C. who has been examined as D.W. 10, is unable to say how old his parents were at their deaths. To sum up, therefore, the defendant has not laid the proper foundation for their plea by proving that the ages mentioned in Exhibit B-45 are the correct ages. Under those circumstances, it is futile for the defendants to charge the assured with having given any false or incorrect answers. On this portion of the case too, we accept the reasonings and findings of the learned Judge and hold that the Policies were not vitiated for this alleged false or incorrect representation. Even though some other points were raised in the lower Court, learned Counsel for the appellant raised only the above three points and did not advance any serious arguments and we have dealt with the three aspects which were stressed by learned Counsel. In view of the findings of fact which we have arrived at, it is not really necessary to consider in great detail the case law regarding the duty of disclosure on the part of the assured and the scope of the presumption under section 45 of the Insurance Act and how it should be discharged by the Company. We may first refer to the following observations of a Bench of this Court in Kulla Ammal v. Oriental Life Assurance Co., Ltd.1, as regards the perspective of approach in such cases: “A legal principle or theory, if pushed to extreme logical conclusion may, more often than not, result in grave injustice as in the present case, if not absurdity. It is true that hard cases must not he allowed to make bad law. It is true that hard cases must not he allowed to make bad law. But on the contrary, good law should not be permitted, by misapplication, to be pushed to such literal and technical extremes, as in the defence of the present action, to degenerate into mechanical machinery which results in injustice without regard to the human background, facts, and circumstances. Judicial resource in the direction of achieving justice should foe quite equal to the task of minimising, if not eliminating, hard cases, which at first blush appear to be necessitated by settled law, called good, under which, if too many hard cases cannot be avoided there should then result a radical change in the law.” It is true that special features are attached to a contract of insurance and these contracts are uberrima fide resting upon a complete and truthful disclosure of all the facts by the insured. In such contracts the principle of caveat emptor has absolutely no application. Non-disclosure of material facts would go to the root of the matter, it being regarded as fatal to the validity of the contract. Under section 45 of the Insurance Act, as amended in 1941, the Legislature has eliminated the nice distinction of English Common Law with regard to the doctrine of warranty. The insurer, under the Indian Law, as amended, has no right to avoid the contract by merely making out some inaccuracy or falsity in respect of some of the recitals or items in the proposal for insurance, or even in the report of the Medical Officer or any other document connected with the contract of Insurance. Under the section, it is imperative that to avoid the contract the insurer must prove that material facts have been suppressed and that either the suppression of material facts or the fraudulent representation of material facts occurred with the full knowledge of the assured. Under the two years’ rule proof of material and deliberate fraud is necessary and not mere constructive fraud. Reference may be made in this connection to a Bench decision of the Punjab, High Court in Lakshmi Insurance Company v. Bibi Padma Wati2, which contains an elaborate discussion of the legal position and the relevant case law, both English and Indian. The scope of section 45 came up for detailed consideration before a Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in New India Assurance Co. The scope of section 45 came up for detailed consideration before a Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in New India Assurance Co. v. T. S. Raghava Reddi3. It was held that under section 45, the policy cannot be avoided on the ground of mis-statement or untrue answers unless the insurers establish (a) that the statements were inaccurate or false; (b) that such statements were on material facts or that material facts were suppressed and not disclosed and (c) that the assured knew at the time of making those statements that they were false to his knowledge or knew that those facts were material to disclose and deliberately suppressed. It was pointed out that all these conditions should be concurrently satisfied under section 45. The principle of this decision would apply to this case with regard to the defendant’s plea on the question of the proposal of the year 1929 and the correct ages of the parents of the insured at the time of their death. The doctors examined on the side of the plaintiff have given evidence that the longevity of the parents of the assured has no relevance on the question of insurance effected by V.S.N.C. There is no rebutting evidence. The Company has failed to establish (a) that it was a mis-statement of material facts and (b) the insured was aware of the true ages and deliberately gave false ages. There is a useful discussion of the scope of section 45 to the same effect in a Bench decision of the Assam High Court in New Indian Assurance Co. v. Sulochana1. There also it has been pointed out that section 45 of the Act has materially modified the Common Law when the policy is sought to be challenged on account of mis-statements or suppression of material facts after the expiry of two years. This decision has also held that section 45 has to a great extent mitigated the rigors of the rule that any misrepresentation within the ambit of the warranty covered by the terms of the insurance policy would be sufficient to successfully challenge the policy. Reference may also be made to the discussion of the legal principles in A. I. G. Insurance Co. Reference may also be made to the discussion of the legal principles in A. I. G. Insurance Co. v. S. P. Maheswari2, a recent Bench Judgment to which one of us was a party, for the statement of the law regarding the scope of section 45 and the measure of the burden of proof cast upon the assured. In that case the assured took a policy on 2nd January, 1948 and died on 13th June, 1948, within the two years’ period and the question arose as to how far the failure of the assured to disclose that the assured was addicted to drinking habits and was having syphilis would entitle the Insurance Company to repudiate the policy. On the facts the learned Judge took the view that there was a fraudulent and deliberate suppression of material facts and there was no question of the applicability of the rule of special burden embodied in section 45. In a recent judgment of the Supreme Court in Mithoolal v. Life Insurance Corporation of India, Ltd.3, the scope of section 45 was considered. In that case the repudiation took place after two years had expired from the date on which the policy was effected. But on the facts it was held that the assured had fraudulently suppressed the facts that he had certain serious ailments such as anaemia, shortness of breath, etc. The Supreme Court pointed out that in order to apply section 45 three conditions must be satisfied: (a) the statement of the assured must be of a material fact or he must have suppressed facts which it was material to disclose ; (b) the suppression must be fraudulently made by the policy holder and (c) the policy holder must have known at the time of making the statement that it was false or that he suppressed facts which it was material to disclose. It is unnecessary to refer to the other cases on the point. Judged from any test we are clearly of the opinion that the defendant has totally failed to discharge any of the conditions aforesaid and the heavy burden laid upon it. Before parting with this case, we would like to make an observation. The business of life insurance has been nationalised and in the matter of its business activities, the Life Insurance Corporation has a great responsibility to the public. Before parting with this case, we would like to make an observation. The business of life insurance has been nationalised and in the matter of its business activities, the Life Insurance Corporation has a great responsibility to the public. Whenever claims are repudiated and disputes come to Courts of law, the Life Insurance Corporation should not put up a fight on the pattern of ordinary litigants. But it must be on a higher plane, so as to inspire confidence in the public that claims are not resisted on frivolous pleas and reckless allegations. All the relevant materials gathered by the Corporation in the course of its investigation of a particular claim should be before the Court to enable it to adjudge the truth. There should be a frank and full disclosure of all the material evidence and no attempt should be made to suppress or withhold the same. It is familiar knowledge that decisions of Courts relating to insurance claims acquire great publicity in the area out of which the claims or such disputes arise and a big scare will be created in the minds of the public, if impression gains ground that claims are resisted without a careful scrutiny or a proper investigation of facts to support the defence. Doctors of the Company who certify to the good health of the assured and responsible Branch Managers of the Corporation under whose supervision the policies are effected must be examined so that the Courts can have the assistance of their evidence while determining the truth. In cases where the defence raises a case of fraud and conspiracy between the assured and the employees of the Company, in fairness, the Corporation should, in the first instance, take immediate and suitable action against those employees so as to satisfy themselves that there has been a fraud or conspiracy. Fair play and public interests alike demand that the Corporation should not retain such dishonest employees in its service (without taking action against them) but at the same time repudiate the claims under the policy by reason of fraud or conspiracy on the part of such employees. In this case we cannot exonerate the Corporation for its omission to examine Mr. Bhat, Madura Branch Secretary or Manager (who is still in service) who had played a prominent part in the effecting of the policy. In this case we cannot exonerate the Corporation for its omission to examine Mr. Bhat, Madura Branch Secretary or Manager (who is still in service) who had played a prominent part in the effecting of the policy. We cannot equally exonerate the Corporation for its omission to examine the employees of the Company who gathered the materials in the stage of investigation and gave instructions for the preparation of the written statement. For all these reasons we dismiss the appeal with costs. P.R.N. .................. Appeal dismissed.