JUDGMENT : This appeal is on behalf of the judgment-debtor and is directed against the order of the learned! Additional District Judge of Imphal, dated 11th September, 1962. 1962, by which the decree-holders application for execution of a decree has been held to be within limitation. 2. The relevant facts are as follows : The decree-holder applied to the Court of Munsiff, Imphal, on 23rd June 1955 for execution of a decree against the judgment-debtor. This application for execution was numbered as Execution Case No. 69 of 1955. Therein the decree-holder had applied for sale of a house belonging to the judgment-debtor and in due course the said house was attached. On 22nd August 1955 Hijam Mani Singh the judgment-debtor filed a Declaratory Suit No. 3/36/55 in the Court of Subordinate Judge for declaration that the decree obtained in the Money Suit No. 85 o1 1953 was illegal being tainted with fraud, and obtained an order on 3rd September 1955, from the Court staying the execution of the decree pending the result of his suit. The Court stayed the proceedings under O. 21, R. 29 C.P.C., "till the dispsoal of the suit." This stay order was communicated to the learned Munsiff in whose Court the Execution Case No. 69 of 1955 was pending. On receipt of the order the learned Munsiff stayed the Execution Proceedings till the disposal of the suit. Shri H. Mani Singhs suit was dismissed on 22nd March 1955. An appeal against the order dismissing the suit was dismissed on 12th November 1959. The second appeal preferred by the judgment-debtor against the judgment and decree of learned District Judge was dismissed on 10th March 1961. On 22nd June 1961, that is more than three years after the dismissal of H. Mani Singhs suit on 22nd March 1956, the respondent, the decree-holder, presented 2n application with a prayer to execute the decree by selling the mortgaged property. As the earlier Execution Case No. 69 of 1955 was consigned to the record room 6y the learned Munsif, vide his order dated 24th November 1958, on the report of the clerk that the decree-holder did not take any step-in-aid, to the execution, so this execution application was registered as Execution Case No. 37 of 1961. The judgment-debtor took the objection that this application was barred by time and the execution Court overruled the objection. The judgment-debtor took the objection that this application was barred by time and the execution Court overruled the objection. The Munsiffs order has been upheld in the lower Appellate Court. The judgment-debtor has preferred a second appeal in this Court. 3. The learned counsel for the appellant vehemently urged that the Execution Case No. 69 of 1955 was stayed on 3-9-1955, till the disposal of the Civil Suit No. 36 of 1955, under O. 21 Rule 29 of C.P.C. The stay order therefore remained in force only while Shri H. Mani Singhs suit was pending in the trial Court, and ceased to be operative after the suit was dismissed by the learned Subordinate Judge on the 22nd March 1956. The learned Advocate further averred by relying on Ramanathan v. Kasi Chettiar, AIR 1944 Mad 73 that the word "suit" in R. 29 means the suit and not the appeal or appeals therefrom to the appellate Court. In the instant case the suit was decided on 22-3-1956 and the Execution Case No. 37 of 1961 was not brought within 3 years after the disposal of the suit, as such the execution is barred under Article 182 of the Limitation Act. 4. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent contended that the words "until the pending suit has been decided" in O. 21, R. 29 C.P.C. really mean until not merely this suit is decided also until the remedies of the appellant are exhausted by appeals preferred against the decision of the suit. In support of the argument he placed reliance on a decision of the 1965 Calcutta High Court in Mahesh Chandra v. Jogendra Lal, AIR 1928 cal 222 where the words "until the pending suit has been decided" has been interpreted to mean "until the pending suit has been finally decided" the appeal being apparently regarded as a continuation of the suit. According to the learned Judges, the word "suit" here includes an appeal or appeals from the decision until a finality is reached. The learned counsel relying on this ruling pointed out that the Civil Suit No. 80 of 1955, was dismissed on 22-3-1956 and the First Appeal No. 80 of 1956, against that judgment and decree was dismissed on 12-11-1959 and the 2nd Appeal No. 13 of 1960 was dismissed on 10-3-1961, as such, the execution petition is within time. 5. The learned counsel relying on this ruling pointed out that the Civil Suit No. 80 of 1955, was dismissed on 22-3-1956 and the First Appeal No. 80 of 1956, against that judgment and decree was dismissed on 12-11-1959 and the 2nd Appeal No. 13 of 1960 was dismissed on 10-3-1961, as such, the execution petition is within time. 5. In view of the facts of the case and the arguments advanced by the, Advocates on both sides, the sole question involved in the appeal is whether the application for execution was time barred or not, and the answer turns upon the proper construction of O. 21 R. 29 C.P.C., and in particular upon the meaning of the words "pending suit has been decided", which occur therein. Do these words merely refer to the suit or do they include an appeal, if any, and mean "finally decided", that is to say, after all rights of appeal have been exhausted. If the former is the case then the plea of Limitation must prevail, while if the later view is correct, then that plea fails. 6. The above two views on the point are conflicting. The Calcutta High Court has held in AIR 1928 Cal 222 that these words "until the pending suit has been decided" occurring in O. 21 R. 29 C.P.C. should be Interpreted to mean until the claim in pending suit has been finally decided after an exhaustion of all rights of appeal and not merely after a decree has been passed by the Court in which the suit is pending. The Rangoon High Court has also held a similar view in U Aung Din v. B.K. Haiadar, AIR 1935 Rang 389, But the above view of the Calcutta High Court has been dissented from in. a latter Calcutta case as reported in Rasitaballav Khan v. Pyarilal Ghosh, AIR 1932 Cal 19, approving an earlier view of the Punjab Chief Court in Bhagvan Kailas v. Harnam Kaur, 7 Ind Cas 1017 (Lah) wherein it was held that the Court may stay execution, pending appeal, under its inherent powers though not under Rule 29 of Order 21, C.P.C. The Madras High Court in AIR 1944 Mad 73, has also held that the word "suit" in his rule does not include an appeal from the suit. These conflicting views are not yet at rest. 7. These conflicting views are not yet at rest. 7. Now in the circumstances of the present case, it is to be seen which of the above views is more appropriately applicable to the present case. 8. In the Execution Case No. 69 of 1955, the appellant applied on 3-9-1955, for stay of the execution till the decision of the Civil Suit No. 33 of 1955, and the execution was stayed as agreed upon by respondent till the decision of the above suit. The suit was dismissed on 22-3-1956 and the dismissal order dated 22-3-1955, was confirmed on 12-11-1959 by the District Judge on 10-3-1961, by this Court. It appears that the Civil Suit No. 36 of 1955, continued up to the appellate stage on the mutual consent of the parties though meanwhile, the Execution Case No. 69 of 1955 was ordered on 24-11-1958 to be filed without going into the merits for the purpose of consigning to the record room. In view of these facts if may be taken that the execution was suspended till 10-3-1961 when the Civil Suit No. 36 of 1955, was finally decided in 2nd C.A. No. 13 of 1960. 9. Further in a case coming under O. 21 Rule 29 C.P.C. under which the execution be stayed pending a cross suit by the judgment-debtor against the decrees holder, the view taken, by the Calcutta High Court in the circumstances of the present case is more appropriate and acceptable as it is not in conflict with the principle laid down in Rule 29. In a very recent case, Smt. Akani Das v. Muhiram Bhareli, AIR 1964 Assam 64, the Assam High Court has taken a similar view. In that case the decree-holder filed an application in 1947 for the execution of a decree. The execution case was stayed on, 2nd December, 1949 in view of a suit filed by a third party claiming title over the property under execution. The title suit was dismissed on 16th January 1951 and an appeal was filed which was finally disposed of on 11th April 1955. On 7th November 1955, the decree-holder filed an application pointing out to the Court that the stay order no longer existed and thus he should proceed with the execution. G. Mehrotra, C.J. relying on Brian Datta Upadhia v. Mt. On 7th November 1955, the decree-holder filed an application pointing out to the Court that the stay order no longer existed and thus he should proceed with the execution. G. Mehrotra, C.J. relying on Brian Datta Upadhia v. Mt. Tulsha Kuer, AIR 1940 All 151 (FB) held that the application was not barred by limitation. 10. The view taken by Madras High Court is not applicable in view of the facts of this case. Besides that the adoption of the view of Madras High Court would entail multiplicity of proceedings which it has always been the object of the Legislature to avoid. Further, when the interpretation of the law or rule is conflicting, I am of the opinion that a liberal construction in favour of the decree-holder would be a better interpretation as it would be too harsh to let the decree-holder go without taking any steps for realisation of the decree. 11. In view of these facts, I hold that the application is not barred by limitation. There is no force in this appeal and it is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.