Veeraswami, J.:- The question that arises in this case is, whether, where a workman approached the Labour Court under section 33-C (2) of the industrial Disputes Act for computation of retrenchment compensation and arrears of wages and the Labour Court found that this was not a case of retrenchment, the Labour Court would be competent to go into the question of arrears of wages and make a direction for payment of the arrears if found to be due. This precise question does not appear to have been decided either in Central Bank of India v Rajagopalan, (1964) 2 S.C.J. 170: (1964) 3 S.C.R. 140 or in Daniel Dorairaj v. B. &38; C. Co., (1964) 1 L. L. J. 207. In both these cases, sub-section (2) of section 33-C has been viewed to be wider than she ambit of sub-section (1) of, that section. But the question is whether the ambit of sub-section (2) is so wide as to cover a case of a workman who claims arrears of salary and wants the Labour Court to compute quantum of arrears and make a direction for payment. The question is an important one, and I think it desirable that it is decided by a Division Bench. The Petition then came on for hearing in pursuance of the above order before a Division Bench (Veeraswami and Kunharmd Kutti, JJ.). A. Sundaram, for Petitioner. B. Lakshminarayana Reddi, for Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Veeraswami, J.- This petition is to quash an order of the Labour Court, Madurai,. made on an application filed by the Respondent under section 33-C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, for computation of retrenchment benefits and arrears of salary. The respondent claimed a total sum of Rs. 637.50 comprised of notice pay at Rs. 85, retrenchment compensation at Rs. 127.50 and arrears of salary at Rs. 425 for the period from 1st February, 1961 to 30th June, 1961. The petitioner contended that the respondent had voluntarily stopped from service and that therefore he would not be entitled to retrenchment compensation. The Labuor Court found this point in favour of the petitioner. But as regards the arrears of the salary the Labour Court found that the respondent would be entitled to arrears for the period from 1st February, 1961 to 5th June, 1961, and that the petitioner was also entitled to a deduction of Rs. The Labuor Court found this point in favour of the petitioner. But as regards the arrears of the salary the Labour Court found that the respondent would be entitled to arrears for the period from 1st February, 1961 to 5th June, 1961, and that the petitioner was also entitled to a deduction of Rs. 30 from the arrears of salary for that period. On that basis, the Labour Court directed the petitioner to pay a sum of Rs. 321.33. The ground on which the petitioner impugns the order of the Labour Court is that it had no jurisdiction to make it. The argument is that the petitioner having raised a plea of discharge of the arrears of salary and thus disputed the claim thereto, the determination of this question would be outside the purview of section 33-C. It is also said that a claim like arrears of salary which does not call for computation in terms of money value, will not be within the purview of section 33-C (2). On the first point, the Labour Court, as a matter of fact, found that the plea of discharge was not established. No ground has been taken in the Writ Petition against this finding. We should therefore proceed on the basis that the petitioner was in arrears of salary which the Labour Court has ordered payment of. Alternatively, in our view, section 33-C (2) is also wide enough to enable the Labour Court to decide the plea of discharge as a jurisdictional question. It is well-settled that where the jurisdiction of a Court is questioned, that Court will be competent to decide that question and for that purpose also to determine the relative facts bearing on the question. No doubt, one of us in Management of Lakshmi Mills v. Presiding Officer1, took the view that the scope of sub-section (2) of section 33-C was co-extensive with that of section 33 (1). But that view can no longer prevail in view of Central Bank of India v. Rajagopalan2. No doubt, one of us in Management of Lakshmi Mills v. Presiding Officer1, took the view that the scope of sub-section (2) of section 33-C was co-extensive with that of section 33 (1). But that view can no longer prevail in view of Central Bank of India v. Rajagopalan2. In that case, the Supreme Court, on a consideration of the scope of section 33-C, expressed the view that sub-section (2) of that section takes within its purview cases of workmen who claimed that the benefit to which they are entitled should be computed in terms of money, even though the right to the benefit on which their claim is based is disputed by the employers. Learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that in this case it is not the right to arrears of salary that is in dispute, but what is in dispute is whether the arrears claimed by the Respondent had been discharged, and this question was not competent for the Labour Court to decide. We are unable to accept this contention. The right or claim to the arrears which the respondent asked the Labour Court to compute, would necessarily depend on a decision whether the plea of discharge was well founded, and, in order to decide the application of the respondent, it was, as an incidental question, necessary to decide it. We hold therefore that the Labour Court acted within its jurisdiction in deciding the question relating to the plea of discharge of the arrears. On the other question, the contention for the petitioner is that the word ‘benefit ‘in section 33-G (2) should be confined to non-monetary benefit which is required to be converted into terms of money. It is true that this specific question was not expressly decided by Central Bank of India v. Rajagopalan1. In fact, as we find from the judgment, no dispute in that regard was raised before the Supreme Court. But it may be seen from the facts of that case, the claim on behalf on the workmen was to extra remuneration for additional work done and it was the additional remuneration for additional work done that the workman asked to be computed in terms of money. It was therefore not a case of non-monetary benefit. Apart from that, in our view, there is no reason to limit the scope of the word ‘benefit’ in section 33-C (2). It was therefore not a case of non-monetary benefit. Apart from that, in our view, there is no reason to limit the scope of the word ‘benefit’ in section 33-C (2). If sub-section (2) is, as has been held by the Supreme Court, of a wider scope than sub-section (1) of section 33-C, the words “ benefit” as it seems to us, would include also benefits, expressed or otherwise, in terms of money but required computation. The word ‘Computed ‘is not to be understood only as involving a complex process of arithmetic or calculation. If, for instance, a workman claims salary at a particular rate per month and on that basis makes a claim for arrears of salary, we do not see why it is not a benefit which can be computed in terms of money. The word ‘computed ‘merely means, as we think, calculation, whether simple or otherwise. The petition is dismissed with costs. Counsels fee Rs. 100. V.K. ------------- Petition dismissed.