JUDGMENT V.G. Oak, J. - The main point for consideration in this second appeal is whether in a notice issued under Section 3(1) (a) of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 (hereafter referred to as the Act) a landlord is entitled to include arrears of rent, which can not be recovered through Court. 2. The plaintiff-appellant is the owner of a certain house situate at Ghaziabad, District Meerut. The two defendants-respondents occupied the house as his tenants on a monthly rent of Rs. 7/12/6. Rent remained unpaid from 1-6-1955. Arrears from 1-6-1955 to 30.4.1960 came to Rs. 459/1/6. In June 1960 the plaintiff served upon the defendants a notice under Section 106, Transfer of Property Act. In the same notice the landlord demanded payment of rent from 1-6-1955. On the receipt of the notice, the defendants offered rent for three years. But the landlord refused to accept the money. The tenants sent the money by money order. The money order was also refused by the plaintiff. He filed against the defendants a suit for their ejectment. He claimed arrears of rent for three years. He also claimed pendente lite and future mesne profits at the rate of Rs. 20/- per month. The plaintiff claimed a sum of Rs. 305.62. 3. The defence was that rent for three years had been offered by the tenants, to the landlord on the receipt of the notice. In view of the landlord's refusal to accept the payment, the defendants were not liable to ejectment. This plea was not accepted by the learned Additional Munsif, Ghaziabad. He held that defendants made default in paying rent. The trial court therefore passed in plaintiff's favour a decree for ejectment of the defendants. The court also passed a decree for Rs. 280.12 on account of arrears of rent along with pendente lite and future damages for use and occupation at the rate of Rs. 7/1216. The defendants went up in appeal. The learned Second Civil Judge, Meerut held that, the landlord was not justified in including in the notice issued by him arrears of rent for more than three years. The court held that, in view of that defect in the notice, the defendants were not liable to ejectment. The learned Civil Judge therefore refused the relief for ejectment and mesne profits. The decree in plaintiffs favour was confined to a sum of Rs. The court held that, in view of that defect in the notice, the defendants were not liable to ejectment. The learned Civil Judge therefore refused the relief for ejectment and mesne profits. The decree in plaintiffs favour was confined to a sum of Rs. 272/3/6 on account of arrears of rent. The plaintiff has come up in second appeal. 4. When this second appeal came up before a learned Single Judge of this Court, he considered that the question whether rent for more than three years can be legitimately claimed in a notice under Section 3(1) (a) of the Act raised some difficulty. He therefore referred the second appeal to a larger Bench. 4-A The plaintiff-appellant was aware that, in a suit for arrears of rent, he could not get a decree for rent for more than three years. He therefore confined the claim in the plaint to arrears of rent for three years. But in the notice issued in June 1960 he claimed the entire rent from 1-6-1955. The question therefore arises whether in a notice under Section 3(1) (a) of the Act the plaintiff can properly demand payment of rent for nearly five years. 5. That point came up for consideration before a Division Bench of this Court in Sohan Lal Kharbanda v. Dr. Sri Ram Sinha, 1957 ALJ 503. It was held in that case that, the words 'any arrears' occurring in.C1. (1) of Section 3 of the Act include even those arrears the recovery of which has become barred under the law of limitation. If a tenant knowingly refuses to pay time barred arrears, he makes a wilful default within the meaning of Section 3. Similarly in Shafta Ullah v. Mohammad Husain, 1963 AWR 480 it was held by Dhavan, J. that, the expression 'arrears of rent' means that the rent for a certain period which should have been paid when it became due was not paid and the fact that the unpaid rent had become irrecoverable under the law of limitation is not relevant to the question whether the tenant deserves to be deprived of the protection under Section 3. In Mahipal Singh v. Ram Chand, 1963 ALJ 496 it was held by S. D. Singh, J. that, even though the word `any' which was used prior to 1954 is not used in the present Clause (a), the intention behind the use of words "arrears of rent" has been to include any arrears recovery of which may be within or beyond time. 6. Mr, K. C. Agarwal appearing for the defendants-respondents relied upon a decision by Upadhya, J. in Chhangur Sahu v. Ratna Sugar Mills Ltd., 1958 A.W.R. 486 : 1958 ALJ 311 (314). On page 489, the learned Judge observed thus:- "A pertinent question arises as to whether the statute purported to recognise the demand by a landlord of arrears of rent which he could not recover having regard to the provisions of the law of limitation. If the statute of Limitation laid down that no court shall recognise or enforce a claim that was barred by time, can this provision of the ....... Act be said to require a notice of demand being sent by a landlord about such arrears of rent which he could not claim to recover in court at all. A wilful default by a tenant which puts him out of the protection afforded by the Act is one not due to the arrears by themselves but due to his failure to comply with the notice of demand served upon him. The demand therefore is a very essential part of his provision of the Statute and it is possible to say that it affects and controls the meaning of the words 'any arrears'." It will be noticed that the learned Judge merely expressed doubt as to whether the landlord would be justified in demanding in such a notice arrears of rent which cannot be recovered through Court. He made it clear that his observations were obiter dicta. 7. Section 114 Transfer of Property Act deals with relief against forfeiture for non-payment of rent. In Vasudeva Udpa v. Krishna Udpa, A.I.R. 1921 Mad, 418, it was held that, relief against forfeiture can be granted only on the tenant paying the full arrears although as to a portion thereof, if the landlord brought a suit, it might be barred by limitation. The same view as taken in Gurpur Vamana Pai v. Venkatu Naika, A.I.R. 1936 Mad. 116. 8. Mr. The same view as taken in Gurpur Vamana Pai v. Venkatu Naika, A.I.R. 1936 Mad. 116. 8. Mr. K.C. Agarwal contended that, after three years the tenant's liability to pay rent is extinguished so, a landlord is wholly unjustified in demanding from the tenant tent prior to a period of three years. Section 28, Indian Limitation Act deals with extinguishment of the right to property. That section states :- "At the determination of the period hereby limited to any person for instituting a suit for possession of any property, his right to such property shall be extinguished." 9. The operation of Section 28, Indian Limitation Act is confined to suits for possession of property. That provision does not apply to debts. It is a well established principle that in cases which are not governed by Section 28, Indian Limitation Act, limitation merely bars the remedy, but does not extinguish title. Even if a creditor is unable to enforce his claim through Court, that circumstance is not sufficient to extinguish the debt. According to Section 25, Indian Contract Act, a written promise to pay a debt which the creditor is unable to enforce due to the law of limitation can be a good consideration to support a contract. 10. The learned Civil Judge thought that, in view of the amendment of Section 3 (1) (a) of the Act, the principle laid down by this Court in Sohan Lal's case, 1957 A.L.J. 503 is no longer applicable. Before 1954, Section 3 (1) (a) stood thus:- "That the tenant has wilfully failed to make payment to the landlord of any arrears of rent within a month of the service upon him of the notice of demand from the landlord." In Sohan Lal's case, 1957 A.L.J. 503 the learned Judges observed on page 504 thus :- "By the use of word `any' the legislature wanted to emphasise that if a tenant is desirous of preventing the landlord from exercising his right of forfeiture by reason of the default made by the tenant in the payment of rent, then irrespective of the fact whether arrears due were time-barred, the tenant should put the landlord in the same position as if no default in payment was made ...... the word 'any arrears' occurring in clause (1) of Section 3 include even those arrears the recovery of which has become barred under the law of limitation." Cl. the word 'any arrears' occurring in clause (1) of Section 3 include even those arrears the recovery of which has become barred under the law of limitation." Cl. (a) was amended by U.P. Act No. XVII of 1954, Section 3(1) (a) now reads thus:- "That the tenant is in arrears of rent for more than three months and has failed to pay the same to the landlord within one month of the service upon him of a notice of demand." 11. It is true that Clause (a) has been amended in 1954. But it does not follow that the principle laid down in Sohan Lal's Case, 1957 A.L.J. 507 cannot be applied under the present Clause (a). The word `wilfully' appearing previously has now been omitted. Formerly, Clause (a) contained the expression "any arrears of rent." The expression used in Clause (a) now is "arrears of rent for more than three months." Previously, arrears of rent for even a month rendered a tenant liable to ejectment. Now a landlord has to prove arrears of rent for more than three months. This is the main effect of the amendment of Clause (a). The amendment has no bearing on the question whether in a notice under Section 3(1) (a) of the Act a landlord may properly include arrears of rent, which cannot be recovered by him by filing against a tenant a suit for that recovery. 12. All that clause (a) requires is that, the tenant should be in arrears of rent for more than three months. Such arrears can be the subject-matter of a notice of demand to be served upon the tenant. There is no indication in Clause (a) that, such arrears must be recoverable through court. As explained above, a tenant's liability to pay arrears of rent is not extinguished, even if the landlord is not able to enforce payment through Court due to the law of limitation. In the instant case rent remained unpaid from 1-6-1955. In a suit filed in the year 1960 the Court would not pass in the landlord's favour a decree for arrears of rent for 1955. The fact, however, remained that rent from 1-6-1955 remained unpaid. The plaintiff was therefore justified in including in the notice of demand rent from 1-6-1955. Admittedly, the tenant did not pay the rent for 1955 even on receipt of a notice in 1960. The fact, however, remained that rent from 1-6-1955 remained unpaid. The plaintiff was therefore justified in including in the notice of demand rent from 1-6-1955. Admittedly, the tenant did not pay the rent for 1955 even on receipt of a notice in 1960. The notice issued by the plaintiff was lawful. The tenants did not comply with that notice. The defendants were therefore liable to ejectment under Section 3 (1) (a) of the Act. The learned Munsif was right in decreeing the plaintiff's claim for defendants' ejectment, for arrears of rent and mesne profits. 13. In my opinion, the second appeal should be allowed, the decree of the lower appellate court should be set aside, and the decree passed by the trial court should be restored. 14. Satish Chandra, J. - I have read the judgment of Oak, J. and agree with it. The principal question raised is whether a notice under Section 3 (1) (a), Rent Control Act, containing a demand for payment of rent, a suit for recovery of a part whereof is barred by time, is valid. 15. The Transfer of Property Act is the general law of the land governing the rights of the landlord and the tenant. Under it, a landlord after serving a notice to quit under Section 106, Transfer of Property Act has an unfettered right to sue for the eviction of the tenant. The U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act is a special and local enactment. It amends and supersedes in some matters the general law. It is a temporary Act and as its preamble shows, it was enacted to prevent the eviction of tenants. Section 3 of the Act prescribes certain conditions precedent to the landlords' right to sue for the tenants' eviction. The Rent Control Act is a remedial statute intended for the benefit of tenants and its provisions ought to be liberally Interpreted. 16. In Manohar Lal v. Bimal Kumar, 1955 ALJ 435 (440) Raghubar Dayal, J. while dealing with Section 3(1) (a) of the Act observed:- "Under the general law the landlord is free to terminate the tenancy of his tenant by a notice conforming to the requirements of Section 106 of the Transfer of property Act. 16. In Manohar Lal v. Bimal Kumar, 1955 ALJ 435 (440) Raghubar Dayal, J. while dealing with Section 3(1) (a) of the Act observed:- "Under the general law the landlord is free to terminate the tenancy of his tenant by a notice conforming to the requirements of Section 106 of the Transfer of property Act. His general right was restricted for a limited period by this Act, and there is no reason why the restriction placed should be interpreted in favour of the tenant even if the language has to be stretched. The restrictions have to be interpreted in a normal manner." 17. The provisions of Section 3 can be looked from another view; that they provide a protection to the tenant, but the protection is conditional. The conditions which the tenant has to fulfil in order to retain the protection from eviction are mentioned in the various clauses of sub-Section (1) of Section 3. Clause (a) prescribes that the tenant must not fail to pay the arrears of rent within a month of the landlord's notice of demand. The section recognises that the right of a tenant to continue is related to his liability to pay the rent. 18. The object and intent of this provision is not to provide the foundation for the landlord's right to recover the arrears of rent. It provides basis for preventing the tenant's eviction. Under this clause the tenant has to be in arrears of rent for more than three months. There is no outside limit. Cl. (a) requires the landlord to serve a notice of demand on the tenant. The demand has to be for the rent in arrear. It has been held that the notice of demand need not mention any specific amount: Bishan Chandra Saxena v. Sushil Chandra Vermas, 1960 ALJ 70, and that a notice will not be invalid if it demands an inaccurate or an excessive amount of arrears of rent: Lala Manohar Lal v. Bimal Kumar, 1955 ALJ 435. Cl. (a) uses the phrase "arrears of rent." There is nothing either in the object or in the language of this provision to indicate that this phrase is meant to convey anything different than what is generally understood. In Chhotey Lal v. Chhakki Lal, 1952 ALJ 70 Desai J., (as he then was) held:- "The words `arrears of rent' have no technical meaning. In Chhotey Lal v. Chhakki Lal, 1952 ALJ 70 Desai J., (as he then was) held:- "The words `arrears of rent' have no technical meaning. Rent that is not paid on the date on which it falls due becomes an arrear of rent and it remains so even though a suit is brought for its recovery and decreed. The only effect of the passing of the decree is that the cause of action is merged in the decree and that the landlord can realise the decreed amount in a certain manner; it has not the effect of changing the arrear of rent into something other than arrear of rent. So long as the rent has not been paid, whether a decree has been passed for the same or not it is rent in arrear. It remains `rent' even if a decree is passed, and so long as it is not paid it is in arrear. There is no reason for thinking that the words `arrears of rent' in section 3(a) means only undecreed arrears of rent." In Chunni Lal v. Banaspat Singh a Bench of this Court held that when a decree for rent becomes time barred, the only effect is that the debt was not recoverable in execution; but the debt continued to exist nevertheless. 19. It is thus clear that the passing of a decree does not extinguish the debt. The passing of a decree and its execution becoming barred by time is no discharge of the tenant's liability to pay the debt, which a rent an arrear is. In view of Section 4, Transfer of Property Act, the provisions of the Indian Contract Act are applicable supplementary to transfers based on contracts like sales, mortgages, leases. Under Section 108 (e), Transfer of Property Act, a tenant is bound to pay the rent to the lesser. Section 37, Contract Act, says that a party to a contract must perform his promise unless the performance is excused or dispensed with "under the provisions of this Act, or of any other law." An obligation created by contract subsists until discharged. The discharge can be by satisfaction, rescission (S. 64, Contract Act), novation (S. 62) or assignment (Sec. 40). It can under the Contract Act also be effected by the promises disposing with or remitting its performance (S. 63 Contract Act) or the contract becoming void (S. 66, Contract Act). The discharge can be by satisfaction, rescission (S. 64, Contract Act), novation (S. 62) or assignment (Sec. 40). It can under the Contract Act also be effected by the promises disposing with or remitting its performance (S. 63 Contract Act) or the contract becoming void (S. 66, Contract Act). The "other law" must be such as to nullify the obligation itself, e.g. the Insolvency Acts or the Rule Damdupat under the Hindu Law (see A.I.R. 1946 Nag. 210). The Limitation Act is not such a law. It bars only the remedy of suit. 20. The Supreme Court in Bombay Dying and Manufacturing Co., Ltd. v. The State of Bombay, has pronounced on the effect of the Limitation Act and of its Section 28 on debts as follows:- "It is the settled law of this country that the statute of limitation only bars the remedy, but does not extinguish the debt. Section 28 of the Limitation Act provides that when the period limited to a person for instituting a suit for possession of any property has expired, his right to such property is extinguished. And the authorities have held-and rightly, that when the property is incapable of possession, as for example, a debt, the section has no application, and lapse of time does not extinguish the right of a person thereto. Under '.Sec. 25(3) of the Contract Act, a barred debt is good consideration for a fresh promise to pay the amount. When a debtor makes a payment without any direction as to how it is to be appropriated, the creditor, has the right to appropriate it towards a barred debt. (Vide Section 60 of the Contract Act). It has also been held that a creditor is entitled to recover the debt from the surety, even though a suit on it is barred against the principal debtor. Vide Mahant Singh v. U. Ba Yi, 66 Ind. App. 198 : AIR 1939 PC 110 Subramania Aiyar v. Gopala Aiyar, ILR 33 Mad. 30, and Dil Muhammad v. Sain Das. And when a creditor has a lien over goods by way of security for a loan, he can enforce the lien for obtaining satisfaction of the debt, even though an action thereon would be time barred. Vide Narendra Lal Khan v. Tarubala Dasi. That is also the law in England. Vide Hasbury's Laws of England (Hailshams Edn.), Vol. And when a creditor has a lien over goods by way of security for a loan, he can enforce the lien for obtaining satisfaction of the debt, even though an action thereon would be time barred. Vide Narendra Lal Khan v. Tarubala Dasi. That is also the law in England. Vide Hasbury's Laws of England (Hailshams Edn.), Vol. 20, page 602, para 756 and the observations of Lindley L. J. in Carter v. White and of Cotton L. J. in Curwen v. Milburn's . In American Jurisprudence, Vol. 34, page 314, the law is thus stated. "A majority of the Courts adhere to the view that a statute of limitations as distinguished from a statute which prescribes conditions precedent to a right of action, does not go to the substance of a right, but only to the remedy. It does not extinguish the debt or preclude its enforcement, unless the debtor chooses to avail himself of the defence and specially pleads it. An indebtedness does not lose its character as such merely because it is barred; it still affords sufficient consideration to support a promise to pay, and gives creditor an insurable interest." In Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 53, page 922, we have the following statement of the law: "The general rule, at least with respect to debts or money demands, is that a statute of limitation bars, or runs "against, the remedy and does not discharge the debt or extinguish or impair the right, obligation, or cause of action." 21. The notice of demand under Section 3(1) (a) of the Act is for the rent in arrear. Either on principle or authority, it cannot be confined to such arrears as can be recovered by a suit. The landlord can legitimately demand whatever is due. If the tenant wishes to have the protection of Section 3 (1) (a) of the Act, he must pay the arrears due irrespective of the operation of the Limitation Act. I agree that this appeal should be allowed. By the Court-The Second Appeal is allowed. We set aside the decree passed by the lower appellate court, and restore the decree passed by the trial Court. The plaintiff-appellant shall get his costs in this Court and the lower appellate court from the defendants-respondents.