B. J. DIVAN, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner in this Civil Revision Application is the original defendant and the opponent is the original plaintiff. The plaintiff is the landlady i. e. the owner of the building in which the premises in suit are situated at Baroda and the defendant is her tenant. The plaintiff landlady filed a suit for possession of the premises in suit on the ground that she required the suit premises reasonably and bona fide for her own use. The trial Court found that the plaintiff had failed to prove that she required the suit premises reasonably and bona fide for her own use and thereupon the learned trial Judge dismissed the plaintiffs suit. Thereafter the plaintiff landlady filed an appeal before the District Judge at Baroda and according to the plaintiff-landlady during the pendency of the appeal the tenant had been allotted residential accommodation by the University at Baroda where he had been working as a Reader. According to the contention of the plaintiff-landlady the tenant was serving as a Reader in the M. S. University at Baroda and in that capacity he had been appointed a warden to be in charge of Dr. Gajjar Hall and had been assigned rent free residential quarters by the University. The judgment of the trial Court dismissing the suit of the plaintiff was delivered on April 21 1962 and the appointment of the tenant as the warden and the consequent allotment of resident premises to him occurred in the month of February 1963 when the appeal was pending before the District Court. Thereafter an application was made for recording additional evidence regarding the new ground for eviction which would arise under sec. 13 (1) (1) of the Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act (Bombay Act No. LVII of 1947) ( herein after referred to as the Act ). Thereupon the learned District Judge formulated two issues viz:- (1) Whether the plaintiff proves that the defendant has acquired vacant possession of or been allotted a suitable residence ? (2) Whether the defendant proves that the suit is liable to be dismissed for want of notice for filing the suit for possession under sec. 13 (1) (1) of the Bombay Rent Act ? (2) Whether the defendant proves that the suit is liable to be dismissed for want of notice for filing the suit for possession under sec. 13 (1) (1) of the Bombay Rent Act ? the learned District Judge after the additional evidence had been recorded by the trial Court on these two issues and the findings had been certified to the District Judge heard the arguments of the parties and came to the conclusion that a ground for eviction under sec. 13 (1) (1) of the Act had been made out and he passed the decree for possession in favour of the plaintiff-landlady. The present Revision Application has been filed against the judgment and decree of the learned District Judge passed in a ppeal. ( 2 ) MR. J. B. Patel appearing on behalf of the petitioner wanted to urge various points before me but his principal point was that the learned District Judge had exercised his jurisdiction illegally and for this purpose he relied upon the provisions of clause (c) of sec. 115 of Code of Civil Procedure. This point has been considered in various authoritative pronouncements both of the Privy Council and of the Supreme Court and it is necessary for the purposes of this judgment to refer to only a few of them. ( 3 ) IN the case of N. S. Venkatagiri Ayyangar v. Hindu Religious Endowments Board Madras. 76 I. A. 67 Sir John Beaumont delivering the judgment of Their Lordships of the Privy Council held as follows:- section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure applies to jurisdiction alone and empowers the High Court to satisfy itself on three matters (a) that the order of the subordinate court is within its jurisdiction (b) that the case is one in which the subordinate court ought to exercise jurisdiction and (c) that in exercising jurisdiction the court has not acted illegally that is in breach of some provision of law or with material irregularity that is by committing some error of procedure in the course of the trial which is material in that it may have affected the ultimate decision. So far as the words material irregularity are concerned by this judgment of the Privy Council it has been clearly indicated that material irregularity must be by committing some error of procedure in the course of the trial but in this judgment the Privy Council has not explained elaborately what was meant by breach of some provision of law in the passage cited above. This decision of the Privy Council was delivered on January 24 1949 But in the Pull Bench case of Narayan Sonaji V. Sheshrao Vithoba A. I. R. 1948 Nagpur 258 the Nagpur High Court had taken the view that there must be an error of procedure and not merely of law to justify interference under cl. (c) of sec. 115 C. F. C. It must be something independent of the decision itself an irregularity or illegality in the manner of arriving at it and not in the conclusion reached. Vivian Bose J. of the Nagpur High Court ( as he then was ) had made this Reference to the Full Bench and in the order of Reference it has been pointed out in paras 30 and 31 as follows:- this analysis reveals to my mind that cases like the present can in no event fall within clauses (a) and (b) of sec. 115. I turn now to clause (c):- to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. I am clear that the words illegally and material irregularity do not cover either errors of fact or of law. They do not refer to the decision arrived at but to the manner in which it is reached. The errors contemplated relate to material defects of procedure and not to errors either of law or fact after the formalities which the law prescribes have been duly complied with both in letter and in spirit. As I have said in I. L. R. (1938) Nag. 73 at p. 77- it must be something independent of the decision itself an irregularity or illegality in the manner of arriving at it not in the conclusion reached. Pollock J. at page 271 para 99 of the report. agreed with the dictum of Sir Lawrence Jenkins C. J. in 41 Cal. 73 at p. 77- it must be something independent of the decision itself an irregularity or illegality in the manner of arriving at it not in the conclusion reached. Pollock J. at page 271 para 99 of the report. agreed with the dictum of Sir Lawrence Jenkins C. J. in 41 Cal. 323 that there must be an error of procedure and not merely of law to justify interference under clause (c) and he also agreed with the observations of Bose J. in I. L. R. (1936) Nag. 73 that it must be something independent of the decision itself an irregularity or illegality in the manner of arriving at it not in the conclusion reached. I have extensively quoted from this decision of the Pull Bench of the Nagpur High Court because in the subsequent decision of the Supreme Court this decision of the Nagpur High Court has been app roved. ( 4 ) IN the case of Keshardeo v. Radha Kishen A. I. R. 1453 S. C. 23mahajan J. who delivered the judgment of the Supreme Court considered various decisions of the Supreme Court Privy Council and various other High Courts. In para 19 at page 28 Mahajan J. cited the above quoted passage from Venkatagiris case (supra) and he also cited a passage from the case of Joy Chand Lal Babu v. Kamalaksha Chaudhury 76 I. A. 131 and in that case the Privy Council has pointed out as follows:-- there have been a very large number of decisions of Indian High Courts on sec. 115 to many of which their Lordships have been referred. Some of such decisions prompt the observation that High Courts have not always appreciated that although error in a decision of a subordinate Court does not by itself involve that the subordinate Court has acted illegally or with material irregularity so as to justify interference revision under sub-sec. (c) nevertheless if the erroneous decision results in the subordinate Court exercising a jurisdiction not vested in it by law or failing to exercise a jurisdiction so vested a case for revision arises under sub-sec. (a) or sub-sec. (b) and sub-sec. (c) can be ignored. Then Mahajan J. has observed as follows:- reference may also be made to the observations of Bose J. in his order of reference in Narayan Somaji v. Sheshrao Vithoba A. I. R. 1948 Nag. (a) or sub-sec. (b) and sub-sec. (c) can be ignored. Then Mahajan J. has observed as follows:- reference may also be made to the observations of Bose J. in his order of reference in Narayan Somaji v. Sheshrao Vithoba A. I. R. 1948 Nag. 258 wherein it was said that the words illegality and material irregularity do not cover either errors of fact or law. They do not refer to the decision arrived at but to the manner in which it is reached. The errors contemplated relate to material defects of procedure and not to errors of either law or fact after the formalities which the law prescribes have been complied with. It is important to note that in dealing with the facts of the case before it the Supreme Court in Keshardeos case applied the test laid down by Bose J. and so far as clause (c) of section 115 C. P. C. was concerned it observed as follows:-- it could not be said that in the exercise of the jurisdiction the learned trial Judge had acted with material irregularity or committed any breach of the procedure laid down for reaching the result. Thereby Mahajan J. indicated that he was adopting the principles laid down by Bose J. and also by the Full Bench decision in A. I. R. 1948 Nag. 258. Under these circumstances it is clear that unless the illegality amounts to a breach of the procedure laid down for arriving at the result it is not an illegality within the meaning of section 115 clause (c) of the Code of Civil Procedure. ( 5 ) EVEN apart from the authorities one would have thought that on a pure grammatical construction of the wording of clause (c) section 115 the same result can be arrived at. It is important to bear in mind that clause (c) of section 115 C. P. C. runs as follows:-- the High Court may call for the record of any case which has been decided by any Court subordinate to such High Court and in which no appeal lies thereto and if such subordinate Court appears -. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (d) to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity the High Court may make such order in the case as it thinks fit. The word illegally is used as an adverb in this particular sentence to qualify the verb acted and therefore the Court must have acted illegally i. e. must have acted in the manner of procedure in an illegal manner or as the authorities would have it in breach of any provision of law laid down for arriving at the result or with material irregularity though that irregularity may not amount to a clear breach of the procedure laid down by law for arriving at the result. Under these circumstances it is clear that illegality contemplated by section 115 (c) is a procedural illegality and so far as the material irregularity is concerned it must also be a material irregularity relating to procedure and as has been pointed by the Supreme Court in A. I. R. 1953 S. C. 23 clause (c) of sec 115 C. P. C. cannot be invoked by the High Court if the procedure laid down by the law has been followed by the subordinate Courts without committing a breach of the procedural provision or without committing any material irregularity in those procedural provisions. ( 6 ) AS observed by the Supreme Court in the case of Vora Abbasbhai Alimahomed v. Haji Gulamnabi V. G. L. R. (S. C.) 55 jurisdiction to try the suit was conferred upon the Subordinate Judge by section 28 (1) (b) of the Bombay Rent Control Act and the decree or order passed by the Subordinate Judge was by sec. 29 (1) (b) subject to appeal to the District Court but all further appeals were by sub-sec. (2) of sec. 29 prohibited. The power of the High Court under section 115 Code of Civil procedure was not thereby excluded but the exercise of that power is by the terms of the statute investing it severely restricted. 29 (1) (b) subject to appeal to the District Court but all further appeals were by sub-sec. (2) of sec. 29 prohibited. The power of the High Court under section 115 Code of Civil procedure was not thereby excluded but the exercise of that power is by the terms of the statute investing it severely restricted. The High Court may exercise its powers in revision only if it appears that in a case decided by a subordinate Court in which no appeal lies thereto the Subordinate Court has exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested or has acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. ( 7 ) IN the instant case the learned District Judge had the jurisdiction under sec. 29 (1) (b) of the Rent Act to hear the appeal on facts as well as on law and to dispose of it in accordance with the procedure laid down by the Civil Procedure Code. Nothing has been pointed out to me to indicate that the learned D5strict Judge has committed any breach of the procedural provisions or has committed any material irregularity so far as the procedure is concerned while hearing or disposing of the appeal. Under these circumstances the learned District Judge was exercising jurisdiction vested in him by law and the case does not fall under sec. 115 (c)C. P. C. So far as the question of failure to exercise jurisdiction is concerned the learned District Judge has acted within the jurisdiction conferred upon him by sec. 29 (1) (b) of the Rent Act and has disposed of the appeal in accordance with the procedure particularly laid down under O. 41r. 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure. ( 8 ) MR. J. B. Patel wanted to urge before me that in the notice of eviction which was served by the landlady on the tenant who is the petitioner before me it was indicated that the landlady wanted to convert the premises in suit which are residential premises to a non-residential use after the vacant possession of the premises had been secured from the tenant. Mr. Patel therefore wanted to urge before me that breach of section 25 of the Rent Act was likely to occur. Mr. Patel therefore wanted to urge before me that breach of section 25 of the Rent Act was likely to occur. It is possible to argue that while considering the various materials regarding reasonable and bona fide requirement of the landlady a possibility that the provisions of section 25 of the Act may be violated is one of the grounds on which the Court can rely in arriving at its conclusion but here the ground of eviction under section 13 (1) (1) is made out as has been found by the learned District Judge and in the instant case it cannot be urged that section 25 of the Act might possibly be violated. In my opinion once it has been shown to the satisfaction of the Courts invested with powers under secs. 28 and 29 of the Rent Act for arriving at the final conclusions of fact as well as law that the ingredients of section 13 (1) (1) have been established nothing more is required to be done and the decree in eviction has to be passed by the learned Judge. Under these circumstances it cannot be said that the learned District Judge has exceeded his jurisdiction or has failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in him by law while disposing of that particular appeal befor e him. ( 9 ) MR. Patel wanted to rely upon certain facts which have been set out in para 14 of the affidavit dated June 20 1964 filed by the present petitioner in this Civil Revision Application. According to para 14 of the said affidavit the petitioner is a member of the joint Hindu Family. His cousin brother Hasmukhbhai S. Patel aged about 30 years and his family were staying together in the suit premises. This Hasmukhbhai is a coparcener of the joint family. He completed his studies in Baroda while residing in the suit premises. He obtained the degree of B. E. from the M. S. University of Baroda in 1958. His brother and sister also educated themselves while staying in the suit premises. Hasmukhbhai secured a job in British East Africa and left India after his graduation as an Engineer. He has gone there with his family. According to para 15 of the said affidavit there is great unrest since long in all parts of East Africa. Person and property of all Indian residents in east Africa are unsafe. Hasmukhbhai secured a job in British East Africa and left India after his graduation as an Engineer. He has gone there with his family. According to para 15 of the said affidavit there is great unrest since long in all parts of East Africa. Person and property of all Indian residents in east Africa are unsafe. The policy of the National Government there is to impart education in regional languages. Everything is being Africanised. The political and social situation is deteriorating and it is difficult to stay there. Under such circumstances Hasmukhbhais wife and three school-going daughters have returned to India by the end of May 1964 with a view to stay at Baroda in the suit premises and to educate the children at Baroda. Mr. Patel on behalf of the petitioner wanted me to remand this matter back to the subordinate Court for the purpose of finding out whether these facts were true or not and if true what effect they would have on the decision which may be reached in this case. The petitioner is the tenant of the landlady and Hasmukhbhai is not the tenant though as a member of the Hindu Undivided Family of which the petitioner is also a member Hasmukhbhai his wife and children may come and stay with the petitioner wherever the petitioner is residing but at the same time it must be borne in mind that the joint family is not the tenant and in view of the definition of tenant in sec. 5 (11) of the Bombay Rent Act the person who is liable to pay the rent is the tenant and it is not in dispute that the liability to pay rent is that of the petitioner. Under these circumstances even assuming that everything that has been stated in paras 14 and 15 as well as in para 16 of the affidavit dated June 20 1964 filed by the petitioner in these proceedings is true the conclusion arrived at by the learned trial Judge in the light of the provisions of sec. 13 (1) (1) of the Bombay Rent Act would not be affected in the least. Hence I have not considered it necessary to remand the case back to the subordinate Court for arriving at any finding regarding the facts set out in the said affidavit. 13 (1) (1) of the Bombay Rent Act would not be affected in the least. Hence I have not considered it necessary to remand the case back to the subordinate Court for arriving at any finding regarding the facts set out in the said affidavit. I must make it clear that I am not holding that the facts as narrated in paras 14 15 and 16 of the affidavit are true but even if they were true the result of this Civil Revision Application would not be affected in the least. ( 10 ) THE result therefore is that this Civil Revision Application fails and is dismissed. Rule discharged. The petitioner must pay the opponents costs of this Civil revision Application. .