Judgment Kamla Sahai, J. 1. This application by the defendant is directed against a decree passed in a Small Cause Court suit by the Small Cause Court Judge of Monghyr. 2. It is stated that one case of lead pencils valued at Rs. 228.05 was consigned on the 4th February, 1961, from Wadibandar Station of Bombay to Monghyr, the plaintiff opposite partys firm being the consignee. The consignment was never delivered to the plaintiffs firm. The opposite party, therefore, sent, on behalf of his firm, a combined notice under Section 77 of the Railways Act and Section 80 of the Civil Procedure Cede through Mr. Baleshwar Prasad. Pleader Monghyr, to the Union of India as owner of the Central Railways and the Eastern Railway. It was stated in that notice that the consignment was booked by Messrs. Bholaram Ranglal Jain from Bombay to Monghyf. The railway authorities could not trace the consignment. A letter (exhibit 4(a)), dated the 4th August, 1961, was sent on behalf of the Chief Commercial Superintendent of the Eastern Railway to the plaintiffs firm stating that the consignment in question was not traceable and asking it to send a copy of the railway receipt. Subsequently, another letter, dated the 22nd November, 1961, was sent on behalf of the Chief Commercial Superintendent to the same firm, asking it to send the original railway receipt so that the claim might be disposed of. It appears that the plaintiffs firm sent the original railway receipt to the railway authorities along with a letter dated the 14th December, 1961. I have seen the receipt. The name of the station from which the consignment was booked does not seem to have been mentioned in this receipt. In, any case, the railway did not take any action thereafter. On the 23rd June, 1962, the plaintiff instituted the present Small Cause Court suit, praying for a decree for Rs. 27395 against the defendant on account of the price of the case of lead pencils, which was not delivered, along with some other items. The suit has been decreed, and hence the defendant has filed the present application. 3. Appearing on behalf of the petitioner, Mr. P.K. Bose has raised two points. His first point is that the suit is barred by limitation. The suit has been decreed, and hence the defendant has filed the present application. 3. Appearing on behalf of the petitioner, Mr. P.K. Bose has raised two points. His first point is that the suit is barred by limitation. His second point is that the notice given by the petitioner on behalf of his firm under Section 77 of the Railways Act and Section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code is not valid because the correct name of the station" from which the consignment was booked has not been mentioned in it. He has submitted that there are a large number of railway stations in Bombay, including one called Bombay only, and, from the fact that the opposite party mentioned in the notice that the consignment was booked from Bombay, it could not possibly be deduced that it was booked from Wadibandar. I propose to consider both these points in the order in which I have mentioned them. 4. So far as the question of limitation is concerned, the admitted position is that Article 3i of the Limitation Act governs this case. That Article reads as follows: Description of suit. Period of limitation. Time from which period begins to run. 31. Against a carrier for compensation for non-delivery of or delay indelivering, goods. One year When the goods ought to be delivered. 5. Mr. Parmanand Sharan Sinha has submitted that limitation under Art. 31 wolud run from the 14th December, 1961, because correspondence between the Eastern Railway and the opposite party was going on until the opposite party sent a letter to the Chief Commercial Superintendent on that date. I am unable to accept this submission. The words when the goods ought to be delivered cannot be interpreted to mean date of last letter if there is correspondence between the railway authorities and the claimant about the consignment. It is true that, if an appropriate railway authority makes an acknowledgment of liability in respect of a claimants claim within the meaning of Sec.19 of the Limitation Act, that will have the effect of giving a fresh start to limitation. In the absence of any such acknowledgment, limitation in the case of non-delivery, would start running from the date on which the consignment could reasonably be expected to have been delivered. In the absence of any such acknowledgment, limitation in the case of non-delivery, would start running from the date on which the consignment could reasonably be expected to have been delivered. Reliance can be placed, in this connection, upon Boota Mal V/s. Union of India, AIR 1962 SC 1716 , Wanchoo L, who has delivered the judgment of the Court in that case, has observed: "The very fact that Article 31 deals with both cases of non-delivery of goods and delay in delivering the goods shows that in either case the starting point of limitation is after reasonable time has elapsed for the carriage of goods from the place of despatch to the place of destination... .....Nor do we think that there could be generally speaking any question of estoppel in the matter of the starting point of limitation because of any correspondence carried on between the carrier and the person whose goods are carried. But, undoubtedly, if the correspondence discloses anything which may amount to an acknowledgment of liability of the carrier that will give a fresh starting point of limitation. As we have said already, the words in the third column refer to reasonable time taken for the carriage of goods from the place of despatch to the place of destination and this reasonable time generally speaking cannot be affected by the subsequent conduct of the parties." 6. As for what is reasonable time, his Lordship has stated: "This will show that reasonable time will depend upon the facts of each case and that in the absence of any special circumstances the reasonable time would practically be the same between two stations as would normally or usually or ordinarily be taken for the carriage of goods from the one station to the other. Further there may be no difficulty in finding out the reasonable time". 7. The consignment in question in that case was in transit at the time of partition of India in August. 1947, and, therefore, the conditions were extraordinary. In this view of the matter, their Lordships thought that the consignment ought to have been delivered at the most in five and a half months from the date on which it was booked, i. e., the 5th August, 1947, to the date on which the plaintiff despatched the notice to the railway authorities, i. e., the 22nd January, 1948. In this view of the matter, their Lordships thought that the consignment ought to have been delivered at the most in five and a half months from the date on which it was booked, i. e., the 5th August, 1947, to the date on which the plaintiff despatched the notice to the railway authorities, i. e., the 22nd January, 1948. In so far as the instant case is concerned, no extraordinary conditions or circumstances exist. A consignment cannot be expected normally, usually or ordinarily to take more than fifteen days to reach from Bombay to Monghyr. Even if the period is taken to be thirty days, the limitation must be held to have started from the 7th March, 1961. As the suit was filed on 23rd June, 1962, several months more than one year after the date on which the limitation started, it must be held to be barred by limitation. 7a. Mr. Parmanand Sharan Sinha has argued that the onus of proof of facts which would show that the suit was barred by limitation on the defendant-petitioner, and that, having adduced no evidence, it cannot be said to have discharged its onus. In support of this argument, he has referred to Union of India V/s. Amar Singh, AIR 1960 S C 233. The Article in question in that case was Article 30 of the Limitation Act. As I have said, Article 31 is in question in the present case. All that is required to find in this case is when the goods ought to have been delivered. As I have already said, this can only be answered on the basis of the reasonable time which the consignment must take in proceeding from the booking station to the station to which the goods are consigned. The reasonable time can be fixed on the basis of what is the normal, usual or ordinary time taken in the transit. There is, therefore, no question of onus in this case. 8. In my judgment the second point taken by Mr. Bose must also prevail. In the notice, the booking station was mentioned as Bombay station. The same place was mentioned as the booking station in the plaint. Subsequently, the plaint was amended and Wadibandar station was introduced in it on such amendment. The notice, naturally, remained as it was. 8. In my judgment the second point taken by Mr. Bose must also prevail. In the notice, the booking station was mentioned as Bombay station. The same place was mentioned as the booking station in the plaint. Subsequently, the plaint was amended and Wadibandar station was introduced in it on such amendment. The notice, naturally, remained as it was. It is unnecessary to discuss the legal position in this judgment because a Division Bench of this Court has, in Chaturbhai Bahilalbhai Patel V/s. Union of India, AIR 1961 Pat 334 , laid down that failure to state correctly the name of the railway station from which the consignment is booked is a fatal defect. In that case, the railway station mentioned in the notice was Bochason and the station subsequently named as the station from which the consignment was booked was Bhaili. 9. For the reasons given above, this application is allowed the judgment and decree of the Court below are set aside, and the suit is dismissed. In the circumstances of this case, there will be no order for costs.