JUDGMENT T.C. Raghavan, J. 1. In the light of the two recent decisions of the Supreme Court in H. Venkatachala Iyengar v B. N. Thimmajamma (AIR 1959 Supreme Court 443) and Rani Purnima Debi v Kumar Khagendra Narayan Deb (AIR 1962 Supreme Court 567) the question for decision in this case boils down to quite narrow confines. Those two decisions lay down that the propounder of a will would be called upon to show by satisfactory evidence that the will was signed by the testator; that the testator at the relevant time was in a sound disposing state of mind; and that he understood the nature and effect of the dispositions and put his signature to the document of his own free will. They also lay down that there may be cases in which the execution of the will is surrounded by suspicious circumstances; that the presence of such suspicious circumstances will tend to make the initial onus of the propounder very heavy; and that unless it is satisfactorily discharged, courts should be reluctant to treat the document as the last will of the testator. It is further laid down that if a caveat is filed alleging the exercise of undue influence, fraud or coercion in the execution of the will, such pleas may have to be proved by the caveator; but even without such pleas, circumstances may raise a doubt as to whether the testator was acting of his own free will; and in such circumstances, it would be part of the initial onus to remove any such legitimate doubt. What further has been laid down in these cases is that the mere fact that a will is registered will not by itself be sufficient to dispel all suspicion where suspicion exists; and in such cases if the evidence as to registration reveals that the registration was made in such a manner that it was brought home to the testator that the document of which he was admitting execution was a will and thereafter he admitted execution, the registration will dispel the doubt as to the genuineness of the will; but if the evidence as to registration shows that the officer registering the will did not read it over to the testator or did not bring home to him that he was admitting the execution of a will or did not satisfy himself in some other way that the testator knew that it was a will, the fact that the will was registered would not be of much value. 2. In this case there are suspicious circumstances, as pointed out by the learned Subordinate Judge, surrounding the execution of the will. The 1st defendant appellant to whom the entire property is bequeathed is a brother's son of the testatrix ; and the testatrix had several other relations equally related or nearer in relation. The 5th defendant is the elder brother of the testatrix and the testatrix purchased the suit property from him. Even after the purchase the 5th defendant continued to live in the house thereon; and the testatrix also lived there with him for some time. She then built another house nearby and moved into that house. Subsequently, when she wanted to sell away that house, she built yet another house and moved into it selling away the house built earlier. Even then the 5th defendant was not disturbed and he was allowed to continue in the house. It also appears from the evidence that the 5th defendant was very old and was in very poor circumstances. He used to come to the house of the testatrix, have his coffee there twice every day and also used to take food there occasionally. For such a person as this no provision is made in the will and the recital regarding the house is that the 5th defendant should be evicted therefrom on the death of; the testatrix. 3. He used to come to the house of the testatrix, have his coffee there twice every day and also used to take food there occasionally. For such a person as this no provision is made in the will and the recital regarding the house is that the 5th defendant should be evicted therefrom on the death of; the testatrix. 3. It has again come out in evidence that the testatrix was ailing at least from January 1951, the will having been executed on 20th April 1951 and registered on the next day. What appears further is that even after that date the testatrix had been ailing and ultimately she died on 18th June 1951. She was aged 72 at the time of her death. From these circumstances what appears is that she was old and was debilitated by fairly long ailment. 4. Though the 1st defendant tries to dissociate himself completely from the preparation and execution of the will, what really emerges from the evidence is that he actually accompanied the testatrix in the car and he knew all about the execution of the will. It is difficult to resist the conclusion that the preparation of the will was made at the instance of the 1st defendant. Thus the evidence discloses that he took part in the preparation and execution of the will. It also appears that he was living farther away from the house of the testatrix than the 5th defendant. 5. The two witnesses who attested the will were the scribe and the driver of the taxi in which the testatrix went to the Registration Office. On the way, the evidence discloses, they went to the house of one of the doctors who treated the testatrix, namely, D. W. 3. The defendant, who was also in the car, did not disclose to the doctor that they were proceeding to the Sub Registrar's Office for executing a will, though he told him that they were going there to register a document. No attempt was made to make the doctor an attesting witness, or to get anybody who knows the testatrix well. As a matter of fact, the attempt appears to be to keep the execution of the will away from the doctor. Thus, the attestation of the will also gives room for grave suspicion. 6. No attempt was made to make the doctor an attesting witness, or to get anybody who knows the testatrix well. As a matter of fact, the attempt appears to be to keep the execution of the will away from the doctor. Thus, the attestation of the will also gives room for grave suspicion. 6. These are some of the circumstances, which have engendered strong suspicion in the judicial conscience of the court; and the question is whether the 1st defendant appellant has been successful in dispelling the suspicion with the evidence on record. I accept the finding of the lower court that the testatrix signed the will and got it registered. But, as pointed out by the Supreme Court, registration by itself is not sufficient to dispel the suspicion, because the Sub Registrar, D. W. 7, does not say that he read out the will to the testatrix and made her understand that she was subscribing to a will. They only evidence on which strong reliance is placed by the appellant is the evidence of D. W. 3, the doctor who admittedly treated the testatrix during some time and who saw her on the date of execution of the will. On his evidence it is difficult to conclude safely that the testatrix had proper testamentary capacity on the day in question. What he says is that the testatrix was brought in a car to his house on the day and he did not even allow her to get out of the car and walk up to his room. On the other hand, he says, he went down to the car and just talked to the testatrix for less than five minutes asking her some usual and normal questions. From this it is unsafe to hold that the doctor was satisfied with the testamentary capacity of the testatrix, because the doctor himself was not told that the testatrix was going to the Sub Registrar's Office for executing a will. Therefore, I am not satisfied that the evidence of D. W. 3 alone is sufficient to dispel the suspicion arising out of the circumstances surrounding the execution of the will. The result is the decision of the lower court is confirmed and the appeal is dismissed with costs of the plaintiff respondent.