Judgment :- 1. This appeal is against an order of Vaidialingam, J. dismissing an application to quash the Government's order compulsorily retiring the appellant from service. 2. In 1947, K.C. Kurien, Kalarickal, Kottayam, had a contract with the Government for extraction of timber from Tract No. III of the Vandanmedu Range in Peermade Taluk. After completing the work, he petitioned before the Conservator of Forests on June 7, 1949, complaining of loss and requesting grant of a compensatory contract, without calling for tenders, for extraction of timber in a portion of the Cardamom Hill Reserve in the same Range. As that did not find favour with the then Conservator, he filed a petition on October 7, 1949, before the Minister for Forests for compensation. That application was forwarded to the Conservator for remarks and proposals. The Conservator reported on March 16, 1950, that about 1000 trees on a portion of the Cardamom Hill Reserve in the Vandanmedu Range were fit for extraction and recommended the work to be given to Kurien without calling for tenders in competition. The same day he directed the Divisional Forest Officer to mark the exploitable trees over a well-defined area in the Cardamom Hill Reserve and to submit the marking list and sketch of the area chosen. While marking trees in pursuance of the above direction the Divisional Forest Officer found that 955 trees were available for extraction in the Vandanmedu Range and that about 2000 good trees were similarly available in the adjoining Poopara Range of his Forest Division which may also be given to Kurien for extraction as the area was being surveyed for leasing out to cultivators under the Grow More Food Scheme. He described the portion of the Poopara Range thus proposed to be included in the grant of work to Kurien as bounded on the west by the Kanchiyar, on the north and east by the Kallyanapara Ridge and on the south by Ayyappancoil-Pulimala Road, it being about 8 sq. miles in extent. The Conservator recommended, and thereupon the Government sanctioned the grant of contract to Kurien for felling and collecting 955 trees marked in the Vandanmedu Range, mentioning therein that, after completion of that work, he will be given the works in the remaining portion in the Poopara Range on rates then found reasonable by the Government. miles in extent. The Conservator recommended, and thereupon the Government sanctioned the grant of contract to Kurien for felling and collecting 955 trees marked in the Vandanmedu Range, mentioning therein that, after completion of that work, he will be given the works in the remaining portion in the Poopara Range on rates then found reasonable by the Government. Accordingly an agreement was executed between K.C. Kurien and the then Divisional Forest Officer on August 8, 1950, with a plan attached thereto showing the areas concerned in both in the Vandanmedu and the Poopara Ranges. 3. In the year 1951, the Poopara Range was abolished and the area covered by it added to the neighbouring Ranges. All the land to the north of the Perinjankutty River and east of the Kallar River was added to the Devicolam Range in the Malayattoor Division and the remaining area south of the Perinjankutty River and west of the Kallar River to the Vandanmedu Range in Kottayam Division. 4. On August 11, 1953, when the work in the Vandanmedu Range was nearing completion, Kurien made an application for the grant of the work in the Poopara Range as mentioned in the agreement of August 8, 1950. At that time the appellant was the Divisional Forest Officer, Kottayam, and S. Venkiteswaran, who was charged for misconduct and compulsorily retired from service along with the appellant, was the Chief Conservator of Forests. The appellant wrote to the Chief Conservator referring to the agreement dated 8-8-1950 and stating "that about 2000 trees of about 850 tons of timber is estimated to be available in the remaining area and that the trees to be extracted are dead, uprooted, matured and over-matured etc. and hence their collection and removal to the Depot have to be taken up immediately as otherwise they are liable to be destroyed by wild fires" and recommending "early orders to be issued to entrust all the trees to the contractor." The Conservator recommended the same to the Government, who sanctioned the same on September 5,1953. On receipt of the Government's order, the Conservator communicated it to the appellant directing him to have the agreement "executed after exhaustive marking of all the available trees to be felled." The appellant, however, on January 12,1954, gave permission to Kurien to commence work of felling the trees even though the marking was not over and the agreement was not executed. The agreement came to be executed only on March 24,1954. In it the boundaries of the area involved were changed from those shown in the agreement of August 8, 1950, and the plan attached thereto. The area was described as bounded by the Perinjankutty River on the north, by the Kallar River and the Kallar Guard Station on the east, by the Ayyappancoil-Pulimala Road on the south and by the Periyar on the west. It covered the entire land that was originally in Poopara Range, and subsequently added to the Vandanmedu Range. By that change, instead of the 8 sq. miles of land sanctioned to be given for extraction of timber, about 109 sq. miles came to be granted to K.C. Kurien. The number of trees to be felled was mentioned in the agreement as 4505 while the number reported to the Conservator and through him to the Government for purpose of securing the sanction to execute the agreement was only 2000, and the number actually on the area covered by the changed description in the agreement was far above 19000. In the plan appended to the agreement of March 24,1954, the Kanchiyar and the Kallyanapara Ridge, which were the distinctive natural boundaries of the area mentioned in the agreement of August 8,1950, and to which alone the Government's sanction related were not shown. When the Government found out the fraud that thus came to be made in the agreement, they took steps to cancel the same; but ultimately compromised with K.C. Kurien on January 4,1956, the latter surrendering unconditionally all his rights under the agreement and the Government agreeing to pay the fare in regard to all the trees already felled by him. 5. On November 9,1956, charges were framed against the appellant for fraud and dishonesty committed by him in the discharge of his duties in the making of the agreement of March 24,1954, and in the marking of a larger number of trees allowed to be worked down by the contractor. (There were also other charges of misconduct; but we are not concerned with them here, as they were found not to have been proved at the enquiry). The appellant was placed under suspension on November 13, 1956. Mr. Justice Kumara Pillai was appointed Commissioner to enquire into the charges. (There were also other charges of misconduct; but we are not concerned with them here, as they were found not to have been proved at the enquiry). The appellant was placed under suspension on November 13, 1956. Mr. Justice Kumara Pillai was appointed Commissioner to enquire into the charges. With the President's sanction, his Lordship commenced enquiry on January 5,1957.38 witnesses were examined and a large number of documents were exhibited. The Commissioner submitted his report, Ext. P-6, on July 25,1957, finding the appellant guilty of the above-said charges. The Government accepted that report, found the appellant guilty and issued Ext. P-7 notice on April 17,1958, to show cause why be should not be dismissed from service with effect from the date he was placed under suspension. After considering his explanation, as also the advice given by the Public Service Commission on consultation on the matter, the Government ordered on August 1, 1961, by Ext. P-8, the compulsory retirement of the appellant from service with effect from the date of his suspension, November 13,1956. He filed O.P. No. 2458 of 1961, under Art.226 & 227 of the Constitution, to quash the said order, Ext. P-8, and for consequential reliefs. Vaidialingam, J. dismissed the same without costs. This appeal is against the learned judge. 6. The Commissioner found: "....the execution of Ext. 56 agreement (dated March 24, 1954) was contrary to the Government orders giving sanction for the same and the intendments therein regarding the area, i. e. the field of work, and the quantity of the timber to be worked down. ....As the officer who executed Ext. 56 for and on behalf of the Government Sri Narayana Moorthy (the appellant) has to bear the responsibility for the wrong inclusion of a larger number of trees than sanctioned by the Government in Ext. 38 (the Government's order dated September 5, 1953). From Ext. 38 itself it was clear that it was only an order implementing Exts.15 and 18 (the Government's order dated July 8, 1950, sanctioning contract to K. C. Kurien in respect of 955 trees, and the Agreement executed by Kurien on August 8,1950), and as has been stated already, Shri. Narayana Moorthi's report, on the basis of which the C.C.F's recommendation was made and Ext. 38 order was passed, had itself stated that Sri. 38 order was passed, had itself stated that Sri. Kurien's application for the second contract was one in pursuance of Exts.15 and 18, and he had also made the recommendation in that report on that basis alone. He knew therefore full well that Ext 38 had to be construed in the light of Exts.15 and 18; and in view of the findings already recorded as regards the meaning and intendment of Exts.15 and 38 Shri. Narayana Moorthi has no lawful excuse to offer for the wrongful inclusion of a greater extent and a larger number of trees in Ext. 56 than sanctioned by Government. There were also circumstances which had pointedly brought to his notice the question of the identity of the land included in the agreement. The draft for Ext. 56, Ext. 54, was prepared by Shri. Patchu Kurup, the section clerk in the D.F.O's office .... The draft then came before Shri. Narayana Moorthi, and on 23-3-1954, he passed the order thereon: 'The correct description may be furnished.' Thus he was told pointedly that there was no sketch with the draft, that the description of the area was vague, and that the boundaries had not been specified," and in the face of his order written against this note it cannot be contended that he had no knowledge of these deficiencies in Ext. 54. On the next day, Ext. 56 was executed by him with the same description so far as the name of the area was concerned and with Exts. 58 and 59 appended to it as the boundary description and the sketch for explaining the area included in the contract, It cannot be doubted for a moment that, if Shri Narayana Moorthi was acting regularly and in good faith, he would not have failed to check the name of the area, the boundaries and the sketch with the Government orders, Exts.15 and 38, and other connected papers when Ext. 56 was taken to him for his signature, especially after the order passed by him on Ext. 54 on the previous day on the office note referred to above .... It has not been explained why Sri. Narayana Moorthi should have signed the agreement which was taken to him in this unusual manner by-passing the regular steps for checking it. 56 was taken to him for his signature, especially after the order passed by him on Ext. 54 on the previous day on the office note referred to above .... It has not been explained why Sri. Narayana Moorthi should have signed the agreement which was taken to him in this unusual manner by-passing the regular steps for checking it. The only inference that can be drawn from these facts and circumstances is that the wrong boundary description and the wrong sketch must have been appended to Ext. 56 by Shri. K. Narayana Moorthi and Shri. K Patchu Kurup acting in league with each other. Similarly the responsibility for the wrong inclusion of the larger number of trees also has to be borne by Sri. Narayana Moorthi who is the officer responsible for the execution of the document .... Up to the time of execution of Ext. 56, 4505 trees had been marked and it was only a tiny fraction of the trees available for marking in the area included in Ext. 56.... the circumstances clearly indicate that the inclusion in Ext. 56, of a far greater area and larger number of trees than sanctioned by Government must have been due to Shri Narayana Moorthi's desire to confer a wrongful benefit on the contractor. Since great financial commitments are involved in such agreements it is but legitimate to presume that the D.F.O. will not ordinarily execute such an agreement without scrutinising it in the light of the Government sanction and other relevant papers in the file. In the present case a scrutiny of the agreement with the Government sanction and the papers in the file would undoubtedly have shown that more than twelve times the area covered by the sanction was wrongly included in Ext. 56.... Shri Narayana Moorthi was fully aware of the fact that this contract was sanctioned by Government only as a compensatory work for Shri Kurien and he could not have been unaware of the huge financial commitments involved in the inclusion of the larger area and larger quantity in Ext. 56 than sanctioned by Government. In the light of these facts the only inference which can be drawn from his act in executing Ext. 56 than sanctioned by Government. In the light of these facts the only inference which can be drawn from his act in executing Ext. 56 with an incorrect description of the area, or field of work, and including therein a larger number of trees to be worked down than sanctioned by Government is that he wanted to cause wrongful gain to the contractor at the expense of the State. His act was therefore clearly dishonest. By his failure to describe the field of work and mention the number of trees to be worked down in Ext. 56 correctly and in adherence to Exts.15 and 38 Shri Narayana Moorthi has failed to discharge his duties. (and as regards the second charge he held) ....In the circumstances I hold that the prosecution has established beyond doubt the charge for the failure to stop excess marking." 7. Those findings were accepted by the Government and a notice to show cause within one month of the receipt thereof why the appellant should not be "dismissed from service with effect from the date on which he was placed under suspension" was issued to him on April 17,1958. The appellant submitted his explanations thereto on May 16, 1953. It was after considering his explanations and the advice of the Public Service Commission that the Government had compulsorily retired him from service from the date he was placed under suspension viz., November 13,1956. 8. In State of Orissa v. Murlidhar Sena (AIR. 1963 SC. 404) Gajendragadkar, J. (as he then was) observed: "In proceedings under Art.226 and 227 the High Court cannot sit in appeal over the findings recorded by a competent tribunal in a departmental enquiry so that if we are satisfied that in the present case the High Court has purported to re-appreciate the evidence for itself that would be outside its jurisdiction." There is no complaint here of any irregularity, unfairness or impropriety in the conduct of the enquiry by Mr. Justice Kumara Pillai; nor of a denial of reasonable opportunity to the appellant at both the stages of the disciplinary proceedings to defend his case. His Lordship's findings cannot then be impugned here. 9. Justice Kumara Pillai; nor of a denial of reasonable opportunity to the appellant at both the stages of the disciplinary proceedings to defend his case. His Lordship's findings cannot then be impugned here. 9. Counsel for the appellant contended that when an Enquiry Officer, not being the Punishing Authority, has made a report that in his view the charges are made out, that can be accepted by the Authority only provisionally and that the Authority is bound to enter a final finding at the second stage after the show cause notice under Art.311(2). The argument is that in spite of all opportunity afforded by the Enquiry Commissioner, a further opportunity to show that he is not guilty of the charges must be afforded to the officer by the show cause notice under Art.311(2). We do not think that contention to be right, and give our seasons therefor hereinbelow. 10. S.240(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935, was, in its material part, identical in wording with Art.311(2) of the Constitution as it stood at the relevant time (before its amendment in 1963). It read: "No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed or reduced in rank until he has been given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him." Adverting to that section the Judicial Committee observed in High Commissioner for India v. I.M. Lall (AIR. 1948 P. C. 121,126): "In their opinion, sub-S. (3) of S.240 was not intended to be, and was not, a re-production of R.55 which was left unaffected as an administrative rule. R.55 is concerned that the civil servant shall be informed of the grounds on which it is proposed to take action,' and to afford him an adequate opportunity of defending himself against charges which have to be reduced to writing; this is in marked contrast to the statutory provision of 'a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him.' In the opinion of their Lordships, no action is proposed within the meaning of the sub-section until a definite conclusion has been come to on the charges, and the actual punishment to follow is provisionally determined on. Prior to that stage, the charges are unproved and the suggested punishments are merely hypothetical. Prior to that stage, the charges are unproved and the suggested punishments are merely hypothetical. It is on that stage being reached that the statute gives the civil servant the opportunity for which sub-S. (3) makes provision. Their Lordships would only add that they see no difficulty in the statutory opportunity being reasonably afforded at more than one stage. If the civil servant has been through an enquiry under R.55, it would not be reasonable that he should ask for a repetition of that stage, if duly carried out, but that would not exhaust his statutory right, and he would still be entitled to represent against the punishment proposed as the result of the findings of the enquiry." The above dictum was approved and followed in the Full Court ruling of the Supreme Court in Joseph John v. State of Travancore-Cochin (AIR. 1955 SC. 160): "As regards the question whether the petitioner was given reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him, the legal position in that respect and the nature of opportunity to be granted was stated by the Privy Council in the case of 'High Commissioner for India v. I.M. Lall' AIR. 1948 P. C. 121 and it was held that when a stage is reached when definite conclusions have been come to as to the charges, and the actual punishment to follow is provisionally determined on, that the statute gives the civil servant an opportunity for which sub-section (3) of S.240 of the Government of India Act, 1935 (which corresponds to Art.311) makes provision, and that at that stage a reasonable opportunity has to be afforded to the civil servant concerned." Their Lordships concluded: "....we are of opinion that all the rules of natural justice were fully observed during the enquiry in this case, and the petitioner had the fullest opportunity to put in his defence both before the Enquiry Commissioner and against the action proposed to be taken against him.... For the reasons given above this appeal fails and is dismissed " 11. "Under Art.311(2)" observed Gajendragadkar, J. (as he then was) delivering the judgment of a Constitutional Bench in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Chintaman Sadashiva Waishampayan (AIR. 1961 SC. 1623) "the respondent (public officer) is entitled to have ...a reasonable opportunity. For the reasons given above this appeal fails and is dismissed " 11. "Under Art.311(2)" observed Gajendragadkar, J. (as he then was) delivering the judgment of a Constitutional Bench in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Chintaman Sadashiva Waishampayan (AIR. 1961 SC. 1623) "the respondent (public officer) is entitled to have ...a reasonable opportunity. A proper opportunity must be afforded to him at the stage of the enquiry after the charge is supplied to him as well as at the second stage when punishment is about to be imposed on him..." Again in Bachhittar Singh v. State of Punjab (AIR. 1963 SC. 395) it is observed: "....there are two stages in it. The first is coming to 4 conclusion on the evidence as to whether the charges alleged against the Government servant axe established or not and the second is reached only if it is found that they are so established." The above observations show that at the second stage the question is only of the punishment to be imposed and not of finding as to guilt. Earlier, the matter has been fully discussed in Khemchand v. Union of India (AIR. 1958 SC. 300): "In order that the opportunity to show cause against the proposed action may be regarded as a reasonable one, it is quite obviously necessary that the government servant should have the opportunity, to say, if that be his case, that he has not been guilty of any misconduct to merit any punishment at all and also that the particular punishment proposed to be given is much more drastic and severe than he deserves. Both these pleas have a direct bearing on the question of punishment and may well be put forward in showing cause against the proposed punishment. If this is the correct meaning of the clause, as we think it is, what consequences follow? If it is open to the government servant under this provision to contend, if that be the fact, that he is not guilty of any misconduct then how can be take that plea unless he is told what misconduct is alleged against him? If this is the correct meaning of the clause, as we think it is, what consequences follow? If it is open to the government servant under this provision to contend, if that be the fact, that he is not guilty of any misconduct then how can be take that plea unless he is told what misconduct is alleged against him? If the opportunity to show cause is to be a reasonable one is clear that he should be informed about the charge or charges levelled against him and the evidence by which it is sought to be established, for it is only then that he will be able to put forward his defence. If the purpose of this provision is to give the government servant an opportunity to exonerate himself from the charge and if this opportunity is to be a reasonable one he should be allowed to show that the evidence against him is not worthy of credence or consideration and that he can only do if he is given a chance to cross-examine the witnesses called against him and to examine himself or any other witness in support of his defence. All this appears to us to be implicit in the language used in the clause, but this does not exhaust his rights. In addition to showing that he has not been guilty of any misconduct so as to merit any punishment, it is reasonable that he should also have an opportunity to contend that the charges proved against him do not necessarily require the particular punishment proposed to be, meted out to him. He may say, for instance, that although he has been guilty of some misconduct it is not of such a character as to merit the extreme punishment of dismissal or even of removal or reduction in rank and that any of the lesser punishments ought to be sufficient in his case. He may say, for instance, that although he has been guilty of some misconduct it is not of such a character as to merit the extreme punishment of dismissal or even of removal or reduction in rank and that any of the lesser punishments ought to be sufficient in his case. To summarise: the reasonable opportunity envisaged by the provision under consideration includes: (a) An opportunity to deny his guilt and establish his innocence, which he can only do if he is told what the charges levelled against him are and the allegations on which such charges are based; (b) an opportunity to defend himself by cross-examining the witnesses produced against him and by examining himself or any other witnesses in support of his defence; and finally (c) an opportunity to make his representation as to why the proposed punishment should not be inflicted on him, which he can only do if the competent authority, after the enquiry is over and after applying his mind to the gravity or otherwise of the charges proved against the government servant tentatively proposes to inflict one of the three punishments and communicates the same to the government servant.... We find support for our above-mentioned conclusion in the judgment of. the Judicial Committee in 75 Ind. App. 225: (AIR. 1948 P.C.121.) (After referring to the passage in the judgment of the Judicial Committee quoted hereinabove, their Lordships continued) The above passage quite clearly explains that the point on which their Lordships of the Judicial Committee agreed with the majority of the Federal Court is that a further opportunity is to be given to the government servant after the charges have been established against him and a particular punishment is proposed to be meted out to him. The opening sentence in the above passage, namely, that S.240(3) was not a reproduction of R.55 and that R.55 was left unaffected as an administrative rule does seem to suggest that S.240(3) is not at all concerned with the enquiry into the charges which comes at the earlier stage, but a close reading of the rest of that passage will indicate that in their Lordships' view the substance of the protection of R.55 is also included in S.240(3) and to that is superadded, by way of further protection, the necessity of giving yet another opportunity to the government servant at a stage where the charges are proved against him and a particular punishment is tentatively proposed to be inflicted on him. Their Lordships referred to 'statutory opportunity being reasonably afforded at more than one stage', that is to say, that the opportunities at more stages than one are comprised within the opportunity contemplated by the statute itself. Of course if the government servant his been through the enquiry under R.55, it would not be reasonable that he should ask for a repetition of that stage, if duly carried out, which implies that if no enquiry has been held under R.55 or any analogous rule applicable to the particular servant then it will be quite reasonable for him to ask for an enquiry. Therefore, in a case where there is no rule like R.55 the necessity of an enquiry was implicit in S.240(3) and is so in Art.311(2) itself. Further their Lordships say that an enquiry under R.55 'would not exhaust his statutory right and he would still be entitled to make a representation against the punishment proposed as the result of the findings of the enquiry'. This clearly proceeds on the basis that the right to defend himself in the enquiry and the right to make representation against the proposed punishment are all parts of his 'statutory right' and are implicit in the reasonable opportunity provided by the statute itself for the protection of the government servant. This clearly proceeds on the basis that the right to defend himself in the enquiry and the right to make representation against the proposed punishment are all parts of his 'statutory right' and are implicit in the reasonable opportunity provided by the statute itself for the protection of the government servant. ....A close perusal of the judgment of the Judicial Committee in I. M. Lall's case, will, however, show that the decision in that case did not proceed on the ground that an opportunity had not been given to I. M. Lall against the proposed punishment merely because in the notice several punishments were included, but the decision proceeded really on the ground that this opportunity should have been given after a stage had been reached where the charges had been established and the competent authority had applied its mind to the gravity or otherwise of the proved charge tentatively and proposed a particular punishment. There is as the Solicitor General fairly concedes, no practical difficulty in following this procedure of giving two notices at the two stages. This procedure also has the merit of giving some assurance to the officer concerned that the competent authority maintains an open mind with regard to him. If the competent authority were to determine, before the charges were proved, that a particular punishment would be meted out to the government servant concerned, the latter may well feel that the competent authority had formed an opinion against him, generally on the subject-matter of the charge or, at any rate, as regards the punishment itself. Considered from this aspect also the construction adopted by us appears to be consonant with the fundamental principle of jurisprudence that justice must not only be done but must also be seen to have been done. It is on the facts quite clear that when Shri. J. B. Tandon concluded his enquiry and definitely found the appellant guilty of practically all the charges he for the first time suggested that the punishment of dismissal should be the proper form of punishment in this case. Shri J. B. Tandon was not, however, the competent authority to dismiss the appellant and, therefore, he could only make a report to the Deputy Commissioner who was the person competent to dismiss the appellant. Shri J. B. Tandon was not, however, the competent authority to dismiss the appellant and, therefore, he could only make a report to the Deputy Commissioner who was the person competent to dismiss the appellant. When the Deputy Commissioner accepted the report and confirmed the opinion that the punishment of dismissal should be inflicted on the appellant, it was on that stage being reached that the appellant was entitled to have a further opportunity given to him to show cause why that particular punishment should not be inflicted on him." (The italics are put by us) Though the observations at the beginning of this quotation would seem to lend some support to the contention of counsel for the appellant, the later expositions make it clear that the show cause notice is to be issued only after the charges are proved and definite findings are entered thereon. The Judicial Committee in Lall's case and the Supreme Court in Khem Chand's case have made it clear that, if the civil servant had an opportunity of meeting the charges at the stage of the enquiry, "it would not be reasonable that he should ask for a repetition of that stage." Once definite findings have been recorded after an enquiry with reasonable opportunity given to the civil servant to vindicate his innocence, there is no scope for his canvassing the correctness of the findings in the second stage of the proceedings, when the question is only of the proper punishment to be imposed on the basis of such findings of guilt. 12. The contention that when the Government accepts the report of the Enquiry Commissioner, its finding of guilt based on such report can only be provisional and that a final finding as to guilt has to be entered by the Government after the show cause notice has therefore to be overruled. As has been observed by the Supreme Court in the rulings cited above, it is when definite conclusions have been come to as to the charges, and a provisional decision is taken as to the punishment to be imposed on the civil servant that the show cause notice is given to him to explain why the proposed punishment should not be imposed on him. Further, it is stated that the appellant has, in his reply to the show cause notice, explained why he should not be found guilty by the Government. Further, it is stated that the appellant has, in his reply to the show cause notice, explained why he should not be found guilty by the Government. It is also stated at the Bar by the learned Government Pleader, unchallenged by counsel for the appellant, that, after receipt of the reply to the show cause notice, the Minister for Forests has heard the appellant at length through counsel before the impugned order was passed. In the circumstances, even if a second finding as to guilt is necessary, we hold that it is implied in the order of punishment passed by the Government. 13. Counsel contended that a removal with retrospective effect as has been done in the appellant's case is not warranted in law. No law, nor decision to support that proposition has been cited before us. Hemanta Kumar Bhattacharjee v. S.N. Mukherjee (AIR. 1954 Cal. 340) cited at the Bar relates to suspension of a suspected officer. No analogy can be drawn between that and the case of removal of a proved delinquent. The caution administered by Sinha, J. (as he then was in AIR. 1956 SC. 559 "arguments by analogy may be misleading" seems to us to be very apt here. It is then contended that a removal with retrospective effect implies a 'legal fiction' that none but the :Legislature can make. We need only point out that the legal fiction in adoption prevalent in Hindu Law had no legislative origin. In Joseph John's case (AIR. 1955 SC. 160) the officer was suspended on December 22,1949 pending enquiry into the charges against him; and was removed from service by an order dated October 1/1951, with effect from the date of his suspension. The Supreme Court, by a Full Court judgment, has upheld that order. Though the decision may not be a precedent as such, it is an indication that in their Lordships view there was no patent irregularity in the order. Cases of dismissal of officers, suspended pending enquiry and subsequently found delinquent, with retrospective effect from the date of their suspension are so numerous that it is now assumed as implied in an order of suspension that in case the charges are found true the officer is likely to be dismissed as from the date of his suspension. In the show cause notice. Ext. In the show cause notice. Ext. P-7, the appellant has been expressly told of the Government's proposal to dismiss him with effect from the date he was placed under suspension. He took no exception to the order being made retrospective. In strictness, an order consequential on a misconduct may relate to the time when the misconduct was committed. There is no illegality in the order of compulsory retirement of the appellant from the date he was placed under suspension pending enquiry into his misconduct, which came to be proved against him. 14. We do not find any illegality or failure of justice in the order impugned before us here. The dismissal by Vaidialingam, J. of the appellant's petition to quash that order is therefore right. The appeal lacks force and is dismissed with costs. Dismissed.