JUDGMENT : KHAN J. ( 1. ) - Petitioner Giyasilal (after his death, Harnarain and Santoshilal were placed on the record as legal representatives) filed the suit against defendant Kanhaiyalal, his tenant seeking eviction from the rented premises (a shop) on the ground that the shop was genuinely required by him to set up his son in business as a cloth merchant. The defence was that the notice served by the plaintiff is invalid, and, that the plaintiff does not genuinely require the accommodation. The trial Court decreed the suit. On appeal the learned District Judge, Gwalior, recorded a curious finding to the effect that because the plaintiff had inherited a flourishing money lending business from their deceased father, and, was already running a grocery business, therefore, it does not stand to reason why he wants to start a new cloth business. The plea of genuine necessity has been negatived on the ground that if a man is doing one business, then he is not supposed to start or do another business. There is neither rhyme nor reason in the assumption and I regard the finding as perverse. The first appellate Court also held that the notice to quit given by the plaintiff was invalid and in result dismissed the suit. This is plaintiffs second appeal. ( 2. ) I shall first take up the question whether the notice is valid or not. The tenancy in the instant case was created by virtue of a rent-note dated 26-2-1944, and was for a period of one year. In 1944, the Gwalior Letting of Residential Accommodation Control Order (No. 107 of 26th January 1944) was in force and according to section 12 (A) (1), "a tena.nt in possession of a house shall not be evicted therefrom, whether in execution of a decree or otherwise and whether before or after the termination of the tenancy, except in accordance with the provisions of this clause." It will thus appear that after the efflux of the period of his tenancy, the tenant became a statutory tenant, because there is nothing on record to incline me to hold that the "landlord entered into any fresh contract of tenancy." ( 3. ) Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Ganga Dutt Murarka v. Kartik Chandra Das and others(AIR1961 SC 1067), have held that where a tenant has acquired the status of statutory tenant, notice prescribed by section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was not necessary. In this view of the matter, following this Supreme Court ruling, I hold that no notice was necessary and therefore the question of invalidity does not at all arise. ( 4. ) Regarding the other question "whether the landlord genuinely requires accommodation for continuing or starting business", occurring in Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Order of 1955, the first appellate Court has held that because the landlord is already doing some other business which he had inherited from his forefathers he was not therefore prepared to believe that the landlord would start another business, I am of the opinion that this finding is perverse. Mr. Mungre, learned counsel for the appellants, submits that the determination of the question "landlord genuinely requires accommodation" occurring in section 4 (h) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act of 1955, is not a question of fact, but is a mixed question of fact and law. He relies upon a decision of the Supreme Court reported in Sree Meenakshi Mills Ltd., Madurai v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras( AIR 1957 SC 49 =1956SCR 69), in para. 11 of which their Lordships have observed that "the result of the authorities then is that inference from facts would be a question of fact or of law accordingly as the point for determination is one of pure fact or mixed question of law and fact." ( 5. ) In para. 12 of this judgment, their Lordships have said:- "In Edwards (Inspector of Taxes) v. Bairstow and another(1955 28 ITR 579= 1955 3 WLR 410 HL), the point for determination was whether the transaction entered into by the assessee was an adventure in the nature of trade. The finding of the Commissioner was that it was not. But that was reversed by the House of Lords, who held that on the facts found it was an adventure in the nature of trade. The very expression "in the nature of trade" requires that the adventure should possess certain elements which in law would invest it with the characteristics of a trade. The question is, therefore, one of a mixed law and fact. The very expression "in the nature of trade" requires that the adventure should possess certain elements which in law would invest it with the characteristics of a trade. The question is, therefore, one of a mixed law and fact. That is precisely how the matter is dealt with by Lord Radcliffe." He observes at page 589:- "My Lords, I think that it is a question of law what meaning is to be given to the words of the Income-tax Act "trade, manufacture, adventure or concern in the nature of the trade," and for that matter what constitutes profits or gains arising from it. Here we have a statutory phrase involving a charge of tax and it is for the Courts to interpret its meaning having regard to the context in which it occurs and to the principles which they bring to bear upon the meaning of "income". On the basis of the observations of Lord Radcliffe, Mr. Mungre, learned counsel for the appellants, contends that it is a question of law as to what meaning is to be given to the expression "landlord genuinely requires" occurring in the said Accommodation Act. ( 6. ) I have myself been holding that the question for determination of genuine necessity is a question of fact, but in view of the authority cited before me, I feel diffident and I am of the opinion that Mr. Mungres argument is not without force and that this question which frequently comes up should be decided once for all by a larger Bench. ( 7. ) Mr. Bhagwandas Gupta, learned counsel for the respondent, submits that the determination of the question of genuine necessity is a pure question of fact. He relies upon Raruha Singh v. Achalsingh and others( AIR 1961 SC 1097 ), Sri Sinha Ramanuja Jeer alias Sri Vanamamalai Ramanuja Jeer Swamigal v. Sri Ranga Ramanuja Jeer alias Emberumanar Jeer and others( AIR 1961 SC 1720 ) and Sree Meenakshi Mills Ltd.,Madurai v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras( AIR 1957 SC 49 = 1956 SCR 691 ), in which it is observed that it is not open to an appellate Court (High Court) to attempt to reappreciate the evidence. But the application of these rulings depends upon whether the expression "Landlord genuinely requires" is a question of law or a question of fact, or, a mixed question of fact and law. ( 8. But the application of these rulings depends upon whether the expression "Landlord genuinely requires" is a question of law or a question of fact, or, a mixed question of fact and law. ( 8. ) For reasons stated above, I would refer the following question for decision by a larger Bench. "Whether the determination of the question that landlord genuinely requires accommodation for continuing or starting his own business or that of any person of his family and is not in occupation of any other accommodation in the city or town for that purpose" is a question of fact, or, a question of law, or, a mixed question of fact and law." ( 9. ) The record of the case be placed before my Lord the Chief Justice for referring the question to a larger Bench because it is one which frequently comes up. OPINION ( 10. ) PANDEY J.- This case comes before us on a reference made by our brother Khan J. who has found it necessary to obtain the opinion of a larger Bench on the following question: "Whether the determination of the question that landlord genuinely requires accommodation for continuing or starting his own business or that of any person of his family and is not in occupation of any other accommodation in the city or town for that purpose is a question of fact, or, a question of law, or, a mixed question of fact and law." ( 11. ) The facts of the case so far as they are relevant for this reference may be shortly stated. Giyasilal (deceased father of the present appellants) initiated the action, out of which this appeal arises, for eviction of the respondent, his tenant, on the ground that he genuinely required the accommodation in dispute for starting therein for his son the business of a draper. The respondent resisted the claim inter alia on the ground that Giyasilal did not genuinely require the accommodation for that purpose. The Court of first instance found upon evidence that the accommodation was genuinely required for starting, as pleaded, cloth business and passed a decree for eviction. The lower appeal Court, however, held that the appellants did not genuinely require the accommodation for their own business inter alia on the ground that they had already inherited a flourishing money lending business and that they were also carrying on business as grocers. The lower appeal Court, however, held that the appellants did not genuinely require the accommodation for their own business inter alia on the ground that they had already inherited a flourishing money lending business and that they were also carrying on business as grocers. Although the learned single Judge was inclined to think that this finding was perverse, he made this reference mainly because he thought the question involved was the meaning that had to be given to the expression "genuinely requires" occurring in section 4 (h) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1955 and, in view of certain observations made by the Supreme Court in Meenakshi Mills, Madurai v. The Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras( AIR 1967 SC. 49 = 1956 SCR 691 ), he was not certain whether it was a question of fact or a question of law or a mixed question of fact and law. ( 12. ) Speaking generally, while a question of law relates to the law of the land or the general principles or law of which the Courts will take cognizance, a question of fact is one which is the subject-matter of testimony. Section 3 of the Evidence Act defines fact as follows: " Fact means and includes- (1) anything, state of things, or relation of things capable of being perceived by the senses; (2) any mental condition of which any person is conscious." Questions of fact and law are not always easy to disentangle but it may be stated broadly that a question whether a fact, as above defined, exists or does not exist is a question of fact. It will be readily seen from the definition that facts fall into two classes, those which can, and those which cannot, be perceived by senses. It is needless to give examples of fact which can be perceived by senses. Of facts which cannot be so perceived but which have to be inferred by a process of reasoning, intention, fraud, good faith and knowledge may be given as examples. Benthatm calls them psychological facts to distinguish them from physical facts. As the Judicial Committee observed in Sabhapati v. Huntley(AIR 1938 PC 91), the state of mind of a person is as much a fact as the state of his digestion. ( 13. Benthatm calls them psychological facts to distinguish them from physical facts. As the Judicial Committee observed in Sabhapati v. Huntley(AIR 1938 PC 91), the state of mind of a person is as much a fact as the state of his digestion. ( 13. ) In Damodar Haridas Sharma v. Nandram Deviram MPLJ 925 FB), we considered the meaning of the words "genuinely requires" which occur in section 4 (h) of the Act. We pointed out that the words "genuine" means that which proceeds from its reputed source, sincere and not false, fictitious, simulated or spurious. We further stated as follows: "The Legislature appears to have borrowed the word genuinely from the judgment in Motilal v. Badrilal(1954 MBLJ 274), and should, in the absence of any indication to the contrary, be regarded as having used it in the.sense in which it was interpreted in that case. It is clear from that case itself that the word genuinely was construed as equivalent to the word bona fide and distinguished from the word reasonable. The following observations are significant: It is wrong to say that genuinely requires is the same as reasonably requires. There is a distinction between the two phrases. The former phrase refers to a state of mind; the latter to an objective standard-genuine requirement would vary according to the idiosyncrasy of the individual and the time and circumstances in which he lives and thinks. Reasonable requirement belongs to the knowledge of the law end means reasonable not in mind of the person requiring the accommodation but reasonable according to the actual facts. In this background, the word genuinely, which speaks of a state of mind, means honestly or in good faith." Since, in the context, the word, genuinely means honestly or in good faith, it is clearly a question of fact. So, in dealing with a similar question arising under the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1948, P.B. Mukharji stated in Basanta Lal Shaha v. P.C. Chakrabarti(ILR 1951 Cal. 25 at31) as follows: "As to what is bona fide under the statute, it is always, in my opinion, a question of fact. The Court in this context and, with a view to find out whether the requirement of the landlord is bona fide, is entitled to a look to every relevant fact or circumstance affecting the landlord and his position. The Court in this context and, with a view to find out whether the requirement of the landlord is bona fide, is entitled to a look to every relevant fact or circumstance affecting the landlord and his position. The nature and character of the landlords temporary accommodation at the time when he is asking for the decree for possession the insecurity or otherwise of the tenure that he might be holding at the time the fact that he himself is under a notice to quit, the scope, size and character of his requirement are all relevant factors that the Court might consider in this context." Since this aspect of the question is obvious and is also not disputed, we do not consider it necessary to refer to other authorities bearing thereon. ( 14. ) Khan J. thinks that, as in the case of Edwards (Inspector of Taxes) v. Bairstow(1955 28 ITR 579=1955 3 WLR 410 H.L), the question here becomes invested with the character of a mixed question of law and fact because it has to be determined that meaning should be given to the words "genuinely requires" occurring in the enactment. In our opinion, a question of law arises only when words having a technical or scientific or other special legal significance require interpretation. Not so when what has to be considered is the ordinary grammatical meaning of words employed in any enactment having no special legal significance. In this view, the question arising in this ease is not a mixed question of law and fact. ( 15. ) We may add that finding of fact is open to attack in second appeal as erroneous in law when there is no evidence to support it or it proceeds upon a view of facts which could not reasonably be entertained by any one properly informed about the law bearing on the point or which, in other words, is perverse: Meenakshi Mills, Madurai v. The Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras( AIR 1957 SC 49 = 1956 SCR 691 ). ( 16. ) The question referred to us is really made up of two parts: (1) Whether the landlord genuinely requires the accommodation for continuing or starting his own business or that of any other person of his family? (2) Whether he is not in occupation of any other accommodation in the city or town for that purpose ? ( 16. ) The question referred to us is really made up of two parts: (1) Whether the landlord genuinely requires the accommodation for continuing or starting his own business or that of any other person of his family? (2) Whether he is not in occupation of any other accommodation in the city or town for that purpose ? The second question, which was not argued before us, is obviously a question of fact. In regard to the first one, we are of opinion that it is a question of fact unless, as stated earlier, there is no evidence to support it or it is perverse. Reference answered accordingly.