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1964 DIGILAW 63 (MP)

Baluram v. State Transport Appellate Authority

1964-04-22

K.L.Pandey, P.V.Dixit

body1964
ORDER Dixit, C. J. - 1. By this application under article 220 of the constitution of India the petitioner seeks a writ of a certiorari for quashing a decision of the State Transport Appellate Authority dated 12th October 1962 whereby that authority set aside an order passed by the Regional Transport Authority, Indore, granting a permit by the petitioner for a return trip on Barwani-Sandwa-Silawad-palsud route and granted a Permit for a single trip on that route to the petitioner as well as to the respondent No.3. 2. Both the petitioner and the third respondent and other operators applied for the grant of permit to them when the Regional Transport Authority called for applications for the grnt of stage carriage permit on the route in terms of Notification No. 1197/RTA (59), published in the Madhya Pradesh Gazatte dated 23rd October, 1959, Part I, at page 1565. According to this notification the number of stage carriages in relation to the routine question was shown as one and as no stage carriage was operating, the number of vacancy was shown as one bus and the number of trips was mentioned as one return trip. The Regional Transport Authority, after considering the merits of the various applicants, selected the petitioner for the grant of a permit for one return trip daily on the route. The respondent no. 3 then preferred an appeal before the State Transport Appellate Authority. That authority considered the merits of the petitioner and the respondent no. 3 for itself and came to the conclusion that both the petitioner and the respondent were in equal position so far as their experience and operational record of running stage carriage services was concerned and there was "nothing to pick and choose between the two". On this view the appellate authority granted one single-trip permit to the petitioner as well as the third respondent. 3. Shri Sen, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, first urged that the appeal preferred by the opponent no.3 was incompetent as it was against the verbal decision pronounced by the Regional Transport Authority on 20th July 1961 and not against the written decision of the Regional Transport Authority delivered later; and that no copy of the order of the Regional Transport Authority had been filed by the respondent along with the memorandum of appeal. There is no substance in this contention. There is no substance in this contention. The said respondent has stated in his return that the Regional Transport Authority announced it, decision on 19th July 1961, the date on which the meeting of the Regional Transport Authority was held, and the resolution of the Regional Transport Authority was recorded later on the same date. The respondent applied for a copy of the order of the Regional Transport Authority on 20th July 1961 and it was delivered to him on 30th October 1961. He filed the appeal before the appellate authority on 21st July 1961 add transmitted to the appellate authority on 3rd November 1961 the copy of the Regional Transport Authority's order which he had received on 10th October 1961. These facts were not controverted by the petitioner. As held by this Court in Dhanrajmal & Co vs. State Transport Appellate Authority, 1962 JLJ 714, the limitation for appeal under Rule 80 (a) of the Madhya Bharat Vehicle Rules is to be computed from the date of the receipt of the order against which the appeal is filed. The copy of the order of the Regional Transport Authority was received by the respondent on 30th October 1961 and it was sent to the appellate authority on 3rd November 1961. It was received by that authority within 10 days of the date of the communication of the Regional Transport Authority's order to the respondent, The appeal, therefore, which the respondent had filed on 21st July 1961 without a copy of the order of the Regional Transport Authority cannot be held out of time or irregular merely because on the date of the presentation of the memorandum of appeal a copy of the order of the Regional Transport Authority was not filed, when the respondent filed a copy of the order within the prescribed period of limitation. 4. 4. It was next submitted that as according to the aforesaid notification the number of stage carriages running on the route was fixed at one and a permit was to be granted for a return trip, therefore, only one operator could be granted a permit for the return trip and that it could not be split up into two permits for single trips; and that the grant of a single-trip permit both to the petitioner as well as to the respondent made by the appellate authority was contrary to the terms of the notification and the proviso to section 48 (1) of the Motor Vehicles Act. This contention is unsubstantial. When the notification issued by the Regional Transport Authority inviting applications fixed the number of stage carriages on the route as one and invited applications for a return trip, it meant that only one service would operate each way on the route and not that the service in both the directions must be operated by one and the same person or that only on and the same vehicle should be used for running the service both ways. The order of the State Transport Appellate Authority did not result in the splitting of the rout. It only regulated the frequency of the service run on route by the petitioner and the respondent to whom the permits were granted for a single trip. What the appellate authority old was to allow both petitioner and the respondent No.3 to run the service by rotation instead of daily. The appellate authority’s order granting a single-trip permit to the petitioner as well as to the respondent No.3 did not, therefore, contravene the notification or the proviso to section 48 (1). The modification that was thus made by the appellate authority in the applications of the petitioner and the respondent No.3 was not in respect of the route, but it was only regard to frequency and timing of the service. Such a modification fell within the scope of section 48 (1). 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner also argued that the appellate authority's conclusion that both the petitioner and the respondent No.3 stood on equal footing was erroneous. Such a modification fell within the scope of section 48 (1). 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner also argued that the appellate authority's conclusion that both the petitioner and the respondent No.3 stood on equal footing was erroneous. It was said that having regard to the experience of the petitioner in the running of the stage carriages and the record of his operation of other services, his claim for the grant of a permit for permit for return trip daily on the route was superior; and that the non-applicant No.3 was not entitled even to the grant of a single-trip permit. This contention may be disposed of by saying that it is not open to us to interfere with the evaluation of the merits of the petitioner and the non-application No. 3 made by the appellate authority for the grant of permit when the decision of the appellate authority does not suffer from any infirmity justifying the issue of a writ of certiorari on the well-settled principles laid down by numerous pronouncements of the Supreme Court in that behalf. It cannot be said of the decision of the appellate authority that it is based on irrelevant considerations or on considerations which are invalid in law. In the case of Sri Rama Vilas Service (P) Ltd. vs. C. Chandrasekaran & others, CA. No. 1015 of 1963, decided on the 9th December 1963, the Supreme Court has observed:- "In dealing with applications for writs of certiorari under Art.226 in cases of this kind, it is necessary to bear in mind that the high Court is not exercising the jurisdiction of an appellate Court in the matter. There is no doubt that in granting or refusing permits to applicants, the appropriate authorities are discharging a very important and a very onerous quasi-judicial function. Large stakes are generally involved in these applications; and so, it is of almost important that the appropriate authority should consider all the relevant facts carefully and in its order should set out concisely and clearly the reasons in support of its conclusions. It is hardly necessary to emphasise that applicants for permits whose applications are rejected should be satisfied that all points urged by them in support of their respective claims have been duly considered before the matter was decided. It is hardly necessary to emphasise that applicants for permits whose applications are rejected should be satisfied that all points urged by them in support of their respective claims have been duly considered before the matter was decided. Even so, it would, we think, be inappropriate for the High Court to issue a writ of certiorari mainly or solely on the ground that all reasons have not been set out in the judgment of the appropriate authority. In entertaining writ petitions, the High Court must not also sight of the fact that decisions of questions of fact under the Motor Vehicles Act have been left to the appropriates which have been constituted into quasi-judicial Tribunals in that behalf, and so, decisions rendered by them on all questions of fact should not be interfered with under the special jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Art. 226, unless the well-recognised tests in that behalf are satisfied." To the same effect is the decision of the Supreme Court in, Syed Yakoob vs. Radhakrishnan, AIR 1964 SC 477 , where the Supreme Court has laid down that the High Court has no jurisdiction under article 226 to interfere with a finding of fact recorded by the Stat Transport Appellate Tribunal and cannot correct that finding by the issue of a writ of certiorari; and that the jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to set a, an appellate Court. 6. For all these reasons, our conclusion is that this application must be and is dismissed with costs of the respondent No. 3 Counsel's fee is fixed at Rs. 100/-. The outstanding amount of the security deposit after deduction of costs shall be refunded to the petitioner.