JUDGMENT V. Bhargava, J. - This special appeal is directed against a judgment of a learned single Judge of this Court dismissing a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution which was filed by the appellant. 2. The appellant is the owner of a building which included within it a shop which was on rent with Messrs. Bata Shoe Company as tenants. The appellant himself is residing in a portion of the same building which is used for residential purposes. On the ground floor there are two shops and it was one of these shops which was in the occupation of Messrs Bata Shoe Company. In 1961 the applicant came to know that Messrs Bata Shoe Company were going to vacate the shop and he therefore applied to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Kanpur, for an order of release in his favour under rule 6 of the Rules framed under the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act). Subsequently a number of other persons appeared and they also applied that the shop be allotted to them under Section 7(2) of the Act. One of them was the respondent, Raghunath Prasad Mehrotra. The shop was actually vacated by Messrs. Bata Shoe Company on August 15, 1962. The case relating to the release of the shop and its allotment was dealt with for sometime by an officer at Kanpur designated as the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. But in September 1962 the case was taken up by the Additional District Magistrate, Kanpur, who was also authorised to exercise the powers of a District Magistrate under the Act just as the other officer designated as the Rent Control and Eviction Officer had been authorised. The actual vacancy of the shop had been communicated to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer by a letter dated the 16th August 1962. On the 17th September 1962 the Additional District Magistrate passed an order rejecting the appellant's application for release of the shop in his favour and then gave a direction to the effect that he would therefore "order that this accommodation be allotted to Raghunath Prasad Mehrotra". On the next day, i.e. the 18th September 1962, a formal order of allotment was issued under the signature of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer directing the appellant to let out his shop to Raghunath Prasad Mehrotra. 3. On the next day, i.e. the 18th September 1962, a formal order of allotment was issued under the signature of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer directing the appellant to let out his shop to Raghunath Prasad Mehrotra. 3. The appellant, being dissatisfied with these proceedings, filed a suit in the court of the First Civil Judge, Kanpur challenging the allotment proceedings. In that suit the District Magistrate, the Additional District Magistrate or the Rent Control and Eviction Officer was not made a party. While that suit was pending, a compromise was entered into between the appellant and Raghunath Prasad Mehrotra. That compromise was filed and verified in court and the court passed a decree in the suit in terms of the compromise. The most important term in the compromise was that Raghunath Prasad Mehrotra was not to take possession of the shop in case and as long as the appellant wanted to use the shop for his own purpose; and it was further agreed that, if the appellant at any time wanted that the shop be let out, it would first be offered to Raghunath Prasad Mehrotra who would have the first refusal after being informed of the reasonable amount of rent which the appellant could claim for the shop. After this compromise, it appears that the appellant entered into actual occupation of the shop and started using it for his own purposes. 4. In November 1962 Raghunath Prasad Mehrotra gave an application to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer praying that he be given possession of the shop which had been allotted to him. There was also another application, presented on behalf of the firm Messrs. Pioneer Durg Stores of which Raghunath Prasad Mehrotra was one of the proprietors as a partner. These two applications were accompanied by a letter issued by Air Vice-Marshal Harjinder Singh directing this firm to make proper arrangements for 24 hour supply of medicines to the Indian Air Force Personnel at Chakeri as this firm was their regular supplier. A copy of that letter was also endorsed to the District Magistrate, Kanpur. These two applications were accompanied by a letter issued by Air Vice-Marshal Harjinder Singh directing this firm to make proper arrangements for 24 hour supply of medicines to the Indian Air Force Personnel at Chakeri as this firm was their regular supplier. A copy of that letter was also endorsed to the District Magistrate, Kanpur. Thereupon, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer decided to take action under Section 7-A of the Act and a notice was issued under sub-Section(1) of Section 7-A. Since no objection was filed another notice was issued under sub-Section (2) of Section 7-A and thereafter on the 15th November 1962 the Rent Control and Eviction Officer passed an order directing the police to deliver possession of the shop to Raghunath Prasad Mehrotra. In pursuance of that order the appellant was dispossessed and Raghunath Prasad Mehrotra was put in actual possession of the shop on the 16th November, 1962. Thereupon, a writ petition was filed by the appellant. That petition was dismissed by the learned single Judge and hence the appellant has come up in this special appeal. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant has raised five points before us in support of his petition for the issue of a writ quashing the proceedings taken for the dispossession of the appellant and for restoring him to the possession of the shop. The first point urged by the learned counsel is that the order of allotment which was made on the 17th September, 1962 was incompetent because it was passed more than 30 days after the vacancy of the shop had been communicated to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. It is true that, under rule 3 of the Rules framed under the Act, there is a direction that the District Magistrate shall make an allotment order within 30 days of the receipt of the intimation sent by the landlord under Section 7(1)(a) of the Act and shall give notice thereof to the landlord, but we do not consider that this rule is necessarily mandatory so as to take away the power of the District Magistrate to make an order of allotment after the expiry of 30 days. The power of making an order of allotment directing the landlord to let out the accommodation to a particular person is conferred on the District Magistrate by Section 7(2) of the Act without any limitation as to the period within which the order must be made by him and we do not think that the rules framed under the Act can curtail this power conferred on the District Magistrate. Rule 3 should, therefore, in our opinion be interpreted as being directory and not mandatory. Further rule 4 make it clear that rule 3 is in fact directory and not mandatory. Rule 4 deals with that has to be done in case the District Magistrate fails to make an allotment order within 30 days of the receipt of the intimation of vacancy. It lays down that, if the landlord receives no notice from the District Magistrate within 30 days, he can nominate a tenant and thereupon the District Magistrate shall allot the accommodation to his nominee unless for reasons to be recorded in writing he forthwith allots the accommodation to any other person. It is to be noticed that rule 4 itself direct the District Magistrate to make an order of allotment after the expiry of 30 days from the receipt of notice under Section 7(1) of the Act and only lays down in whose favour that order is to be made. Rule 4 requires the District Magistrate after the expiry of that period of 30 days to make the allotment in favour of the nominee of the landlord though he is given the discretion to make an order of allotment in favour of some other person forthwith for reasons to be recorded in writing. Rule 4, therefore, clearly indicates that even after the expiry of the period of 30 days the District Magistrate is to continue to exercise his power under Section 7(2) of the Act and merely contains the direction as to the manner in which that power is to be exercised. Rule 4, therefore, clearly indicates that even after the expiry of the period of 30 days the District Magistrate is to continue to exercise his power under Section 7(2) of the Act and merely contains the direction as to the manner in which that power is to be exercised. Rules 3 and 4 read together therefore make it clear that the power of the District Magistrate to make an order under Section 7(2) of the Act continues even after the period of 30 days from the date of intimation of vacancy has expired and consequently it is not possible to hold that in this case the order of the allotment which was made after the expiry of 30 days from the 16th August 1962, the date of intimation of vacancy was invalid. 6. There is, in our opinion, in this case one more important feature which is relevant to this question. Admittedly, the appellant, who was the landlord, had himself already made applications that the shop be released in his favour under rule 6 framed under the Act. Those applications were finally decided by the Additional District Magistrate on the 17th September 1962 and we consider that rule 3 in these circumstances was attracted only after the Additional District Magistrate had given his decision on the applications of the appellant made under rule 6. Until the date when the Additional District Magistrate decided the appellant's application under rule 6, he could not possibly proceed to make an order of allotment under rule 3. It was necessary for him first to decide the application of the appellant under rule 6 and that decision had to be given after going through a quasi-judicial procedure. If the Additional District Magistrate had made any order of allotment under rule 3 before completing those quasi-judicial proceedings, that order would have been invalid as has already been held in a number of cases by this Court. The power of the District Magistrate under rule 3 could therefore be exercised until the 17th September, 1962 when he recorded his order rejecting the appellant's application for release made under rule 6. We are of the opinion that in these circumstances in computing the period of 30 days for purposes of rule 3 we should exclude the period during which the quasi-judicial proceedings for deciding the application under rule 6 were pending. We are of the opinion that in these circumstances in computing the period of 30 days for purposes of rule 3 we should exclude the period during which the quasi-judicial proceedings for deciding the application under rule 6 were pending. It is only after the District Magistrate has decided not to release the accommodation in favour of the landlord that it really becomes available for allotment. If this construction is not adopted and the period of 30 days is computed from the date of intimation of vacancy irrespective of the quasi-judicial proceedings having been started under rule 6, the result would be that the purpose of the Act might be frustrated and the powers conferred on the District Magistrate or the Rent Control and Eviction Officer might be defeated by a landlord deliberately delaying the proceedings under rule 6 and extending them for more than 30 days. A similar situation might arise when proceedings are to be taken under rule 7 where the landlord happens to be occupying another portion of the accommodation which has fallen vacant. Here, again the District Magistrate is enjoined to consult the landlord before making any order of allotment and the landlord may easily manipulate that the proceedings for consultation do not end within 30 days and, therefore, claim that the District Magistrate could no longer exercise his power to allot the accommodation to any tenant because of the provisions of rule 3. In these circumstances, we hold that in this case the District Magistrate or the Additional District Magistrate or the Rent Control and Eviction Officer was not debarred from making an order of allotment in favour of any tenant on the 17th or the 18th September 1962 simply because the vacancy had been intimated on the 16th August, 1962. On application for release under rule 6 had already been presented by the appellant on the 16th August 1962 simultaneously with the limitation of vacancy and consequently the period of 30 days for purposes of applying the provisions of rule 3 must be held not to have started to run until the 17th September 1962 when that application of the appellant under rule 6 was finally disposed of. Since the orders were made admittedly within 30 days from that date, there was no invalidity on the ground urged by the learned counsel for the appellant. 7. Since the orders were made admittedly within 30 days from that date, there was no invalidity on the ground urged by the learned counsel for the appellant. 7. The second point urged by the learned counsel is that in this case no valid order of allotment was in fact made by any competent authority. This ground is urged on the basis that on the 17th September 1962 the order that the Additional District Magistrate passed was merely to the effect that he would order that the accommodation may be allotted to Raghunath Prasad Mehrotra and this did not amount to an order under Section 7(2) of the Act directing the landlord to let out this shop to Raghunath Prasad Mehrotra. So far as the subsequent order issued on the 18th September 1962 by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer is concerned, it is urged that order should be treated as invalid on the ground that it was made by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer under the direction of the Additional District Magistrate and not be exercising his own discretion under Section 7(2) of the Act of choosing the particular individual in whose favour the order should be made. The learned single Judge in dealing with this point has held that the two orders, of the Additional District Magistrate dated the 17th September 1962 and of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer dated the 18th September, 1962 should be read together and be treated as one single order complying with the requirements of Section 7(2) of the Act. It appears to us that there is another way of looking at these orders. The order of the 17th September 1962, passed by the Additional District Magistrate, was a composite order on the two different points. First, there was his order rejecting the application of the appellant for release of the shop in his favour under rule 6. That order terminated a quasi-judicial proceeding and had to be made by the very officer who heard the parties in those quasi-judicial proceedings. This is precisely what the Additional District Magistrate did. Thereafter, the Additional District Magistrate proceeded to consider the question of choosing the individual in whose favour the order of allotment should be made under rule 3 read with Section 7(2) of the Act. This is precisely what the Additional District Magistrate did. Thereafter, the Additional District Magistrate proceeded to consider the question of choosing the individual in whose favour the order of allotment should be made under rule 3 read with Section 7(2) of the Act. He considered the merits of the various applications and held that he accommodation should be allotted to Raghunath Prasad Mehrotra. That is why in his order he gave direction that the accommodation be allotted to him. At this stage, there was no question of exercising any judicial or quasi-judicial powers. The powers to be exercised under rule 3 read with Section 7(2) of the Act were executive and administrative powers and it was in that capacity that the Additional District Magistrate formed his opinion. Thereupon, he could himself have issued the formal order under Section 7(2) of the Act directing the appellant to let out the accommodation to Raghunath Prasad Mehrotra; but it seems that he preferred to leave the issue of that order to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. The Additional District Magistrate and the Rent Control and Eviction Officer were exercising concurrent powers as officers empowered to perform the functions of the District Magistrate under the Act; and when a mere administrative or executive order had to be passed, one officer exercising the functions of the District Magistrate under the Act could easily do part of the work and direct his colleague exercising the same powers to do the remaining part of the work. It is only when the proceedings are in the nature of judicial or quasi judicial proceedings that it is necessary that the same persons must form his opinion and arrive at a decision as well as pass the final consequential order. In this case, therefore, we see no illegality in the procedure which was adopted by these two officers resulting in the opinion being formed by the Additional District Magistrate that Raghunath Prasad Mehrotra was the most suitable person in whose favour the order under Section 7(2) of the Act should be made and that order under Section 7(2) being actually issued by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. 8. In this connection learned counsel for the appellants drew our attention to a decision of a learned single Judge of this Court in Krishna Chandra Jain v. The District Magistrate 1956 A.L.J. 809. 8. In this connection learned counsel for the appellants drew our attention to a decision of a learned single Judge of this Court in Krishna Chandra Jain v. The District Magistrate 1956 A.L.J. 809. In that case the learned single Judge was dealing with a case which was very similar to the case before us inasmuch as, in that case, the District Magistrate had given some advice to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to make an order of allotment in favour of a particular person and the Rent Control and Eviction Officer had in pursuance of that advice, treating it as a direction, made the order of allotment in favour of that person. The learned single Judge was of the view that, in these circumstances, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer had not exercised his discretion to choose the allottee for purposes of his order under Section 7(2) of the act and consequently that order made by him was invalid. We have not found any reason given by the learned single Judge for his view that the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer must be held to be invalid simply because he had not exercised his own discretion and had been guided by the directions of the District Magistrate. When any executive or administrative function is to be discharged by any public servant we do not think that in the absence of any statutory provision to that effect it is essential that he must do so only after exercising his own discretion in the matter. No invalidity can arise in the order made by an officer when exercising his executive or administrative function simply because some senior Officer may have given a direction to him to exercise that power in a particular manner or because he may have taken the advice of some subordinate or of some other officer exercising the same powers as he himself might be doing. The principle which the learned single Judge relied upon might be applicable where the discretion is to be exercised in a judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings and consequently we hold that principle was not correctly enunciated so that we are not prepared to give effect to it in the case before us. 9. The principle which the learned single Judge relied upon might be applicable where the discretion is to be exercised in a judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings and consequently we hold that principle was not correctly enunciated so that we are not prepared to give effect to it in the case before us. 9. The third point urged by the learned counsel is that the claim of the appellant for release of this shop in his favour had been wrongly rejected by the Additional District Magistrate under rule 6 without giving any relevant reasons. We have looked at the order of the Additional District Magistrate and we find that he has given four reasons for arriving at the conclusion that this shop was not bona fide needed by the appellant for his own use. All the four reasons given in the order are relevant to the question of forming an opinion on this point. It is not for us to sit in appeal over the order of the Additional District Magistrate to see whether on the basis of those four reasons the opinion was rightly or wrongly formed by him. It was within his competence to form an opinion and as long as he did it material before him which was relevant to the point on which the opinion had to be formed, this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction cannot interference with the order made by him. 10. The fourth point urged by learned counsel is that, in making the order of allotment in favour of Raghunath Prasad Mehrotra, there had been a failure to comply with the requirements of rule 7 because the appellant was not consulted even though he was occupying part of the accommodation. First, we do not agree that his shop was a part of one single accommodation a part of which was actually used for residential purpose by the appellant landlord. The object of the rule 7 itself shows that a case of the present type will not be covered by that rule. That appellant was living on the first floor of the house and was using it for residential accommodation while the shop on the ground floor was an entirely separate accommodation which was being used for quite a different purpose. Rule 7, in our opinion, is not meant to cover such a case. That appellant was living on the first floor of the house and was using it for residential accommodation while the shop on the ground floor was an entirely separate accommodation which was being used for quite a different purpose. Rule 7, in our opinion, is not meant to cover such a case. The shop is not to be treated as part of the same accommodation which was also being partly occupied by the appellant. Secondly, in this case we think that no question arose of consulting the appellant in choosing the person in whose favour the allotment order should be made because the appellant was already aware of the fact that, apart from his application for release of the premises in his favour, there were a number of other applicants asking for allotment in their favour. All those applicants were heard on the 17th September 1962 when the landlord was also heard by the Officer. The landlord, in these circumstances, knew that an order of allotment of this shop altogether. When the order was made in these circumstances, we do not think that there was any need for the Additional District Magistrate to adjourn the proceedings so as to go through the formality of another consultation with the appellant, even if it be held that the shop and the portion of the building occupied by the appellant were parts of the same accommodation. We therefore hold that the order which was made by the Additional District Magistrate was not vitiated by non-compliance with the requirements of rule 7. 11. The fifth and the last point urged by the learned counsel is that the proceedings taken under Section 7-A of the Act should be quashed by this Court on the ground that orders for those proceedings were obtained by Raghunath Prasad Mehrotra by misrepresentation and fraud inasmuch as he did not bring to the notice of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer the fact that there had been a compromise between him and the appellant on the basis of which a civil court had already decreed his suit. It appears to us that it hardly lies in the mouth of the appellant to charge Raghunath Prasad Mehrotra with committing a fraud when he is relying on a compromise which was itself a fraud on the statute as well as on the officers empowered to act under the statute. It appears to us that it hardly lies in the mouth of the appellant to charge Raghunath Prasad Mehrotra with committing a fraud when he is relying on a compromise which was itself a fraud on the statute as well as on the officers empowered to act under the statute. Under Section 7 of the Act, the power had been conferred on the District Magistrate to direct a landlord to let out his accommodation to the person choosen by the officer. In the suit which was filed by the appellant, he did not implead the District Magistrate, the Additional District Magistrate or the Rent Control and Eviction Officer as a party and yet he entered into a compromise with Raghunath Prasad Mehrotra which had the effect of nullifying the orders passed by the Additional District Magistrate and the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. The appellant's application for release of the accommodation in his favour under rule 6 had already been rejected, but by the compromise he entered into an arrangement with Raghunath Prasad Mehrotra which, according to him, entitled him to actually occupy the shop in flagrant disregard of the order of the Additional District Magistrate refusing to release the shop in his favour. The compromise was thus intended to nullify the order which had been made by the Additional District Magistrate. It has to be remembered that when powers were conferred under Section 7 of the Act on the District Magistrate to direct a landlord to let out his accommodation to the person chosen by the District Magistrate,the purpose of the legislature was to give powers to an independent officer to ensure that needy persons actually got accommodations in respect of such accommodation. This purpose would be completely defeated if the landlord is permitted to enter into an arrangement with any existing tenant or proposed tenant and either occupies the accommodation himself in spite of his request to that effect having been refused or ensures that it is occupied by a person of his choice. If any such order was bona fide sought from the civil court, the appellant should have impleaded the Additional District Magistrate as a party. This compromise which was entered into by the appellant was a device to get round the order which had been made against him by the Additional District Magistrate and this device was adopted in the absence of that officer. This compromise which was entered into by the appellant was a device to get round the order which had been made against him by the Additional District Magistrate and this device was adopted in the absence of that officer. There is the further circumstance that, even after this compromise and the decree in that suit, the appellant did not himself approach the Additional District Magistrate or the Rent Control and Eviction Officer for a fresh order permitting him to occupy this shop and in fact kept them in ignorance of the compromise. On the other hand he assumed that the powers of the Additional District Magistrate and the Rent Control and Eviction Officer under the Act had ceased to be effective and he himself on his own initiative occupied the shop. Having acted in his manner, he can hardly come and complaint that Raghunath Prasad Mehrotra committed a fraud in obtaining an order for proceedings under Section 7-A of the Act without informing the authorities of the compromise and the decree. In fact, it was more the duty of the appellant than that of Raghunath Prasad Mehrotra to bring to the notice of the appropriate authorities the compromise and the decree passed on its basis. We are unable to hold that the proceedings which were taken under Section 7-A of the Act by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer were in any way vitiated by any fraud. 12. The result is that this appeal has no force and is dismissed with costs.