JUDGMENT -This revisional application raises a question of inadmissibility of certain statements made by the petitioner -accused to the Central Excise Officers, on the ground of immunity claimed under sub -cl. (3) of art. 20 of the Constitution of India. The relevant facts giving rise to the objection taken by the petitioner -accused to the admissibility of his certain statements under art. 20 (3) of the Constitution may be stated: The petitioner Ambalal Chimanlal Chokshi is being prosecuted, on a complaint being filed on December 19,1963, by the respondent (Shri H. R. Jokhi, Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Marine and Preventive Division, Collectorate of Central Excise, Bombay), for an offence under Rule 126P of Part XII -A of the Defence of India Rules, 1962 (which Part contains "Gold Control Rules") and s. 135 (b) of the Customs Act, 1962 (Act LII of 1962). Tile allegation made against the petitioner is that he had acquired possession and was concerned in carrying, re -moving, harbouring, keeping, concealing and otherwise dealing with smuggled gold and that he had not made any declaration about the said gold and had no permit as required under the Gold Control Rules. Before the complaint was filed on December 19,1963, by the respondent for the alleged offence said to have been committed by the petitioner, on April 5, 1963, a written Search Authorization (exh. A) under Rule 126 L (2) of the Gold Control Rules was issued by Superintendent Wagh of the Central Excise, Central Intelligence Unit, Bombay, in favour of Shri V. B. Rane, Deputy Superintendent of Central Excise (Preventive and Marine Division, Bombay), authorising the latter officer to enter and search certain premises being the flat of the petitioner in building called Neeta at 90, Marine Lines, behind Marine Lines Railway Station, Bombay, for the said gold and if found, to seize and produce the same before the Superintendent and in pursuance of this Search Authorization, the aforesaid premises of the petitioner were raided and during the course of such raid some gold was found on a ledge outside the balcony of one Kotak on the first floor and a bag containing currency notes and some other documents was found from the balcony of one Modi by the side of the balcony of the petitioner on the second floor. A search of the petitioners flat was also conducted and some documents and other property along with the aforesaid gold and the bag of currency notes were seized under a Panchnama (exh.O), which was made at the spot. It appears that the petitioner was interrogated by Shri Rane, Deputy Superintendent in respect of the said gold as also the bag of currency notes at the time of making of the Panchnama and the statements made by the petitioner were incorporated in the Panchnama. It may be stated at this stage that as regards the gold (12 slabs) found outside the balcony of Kotak on the first floor, the petitioner stated that the same did not belong to him or anybody in his house or family and that he did not know anything about it; while regarding the currency notes found in a bag, which was recovered from the balcony of Modi, which was by the side of the balcony of the petitioner, the petitioner claimed that the money belonged to him together with the other contents of the bag and he further stated that the cloth bag had been put by him in his neighbours flat across the balcony and without the knowledge of Mr .Modi when the officers went for search. Later on the Central Excise Officers summoned the petitioner and detailed statement of his was recorded by Deputy Superintendent Parekh under instructions of Superintendent Wagh, who interrogated the petitioner under the powers vested in them by law. With regard to the gold and the bag containing currency notes, the petitioner gave his version, in his detailed statement recorded on this occasion, which was almost similar to that which he had given at the time of making of the Panchnama. 2. After completing the investigation, the respondent filed a complaint on December 19,1963, against the petitioner for the alleged offences mentioned above, being Case No. 62/W of 1964, the trial whereof is being conducted by the learned Additional Chief Presideney Magistrate, 8th Court, Esplanade, Bombay. 2. After completing the investigation, the respondent filed a complaint on December 19,1963, against the petitioner for the alleged offences mentioned above, being Case No. 62/W of 1964, the trial whereof is being conducted by the learned Additional Chief Presideney Magistrate, 8th Court, Esplanade, Bombay. After fully setting out the manner in which the search of the petitioners premises was carried out as also the circumstances in which the gold and the bag containing the currency notes were recovered during the raid and the statements made by the petitioner in connection therewith; the respondent categorically averred in his complaint as follows: "In view of all the premises aforesaid the complainant says that it was the accused who threw or caused to be thrown the said gold in the two bags into the said shaft with a view to avoid the finding and seizure of the said gold in his flat by the Central Excise Officers just as he admittedly threw the theli (Bag) containing the currency notes into the flat of Shri C. U. Mody with a view to avoiding the finding and seizure of the said currency notes in his flat by the said officers, and the complainant accordingly prays that the necessary process be issued against the accused and that the accused be dealt with according to law." It may be stated that the raid was not for the purpose of seizing the currency notes but admittedly was for the purpose of seizing gold in respect whereof contravention of Gold Control Rules and Customs Act was apprehended and it will appear clear from the aforesaid averments made in the complaint that though the petitioner -accused had disowned any connection with the gold that was found on a ledge outside the balcony of Shri Kotakthe respond end sought to establish petitioners connection with that gold or rather his possession there" of in contravention of Gold Control Rules, by relying upon the admitted con• duct on the part of the petitioner of throwing the bag containing currency notes into the fiat of Shri Modi (which currency notes were claimed by him as his), thus rendering highly probable a similar conduct on his part in connection with the gold which he disowned. At the trial, therefore, the statement made by the petitioner and recorded in the Panchnama (exh.O) as well as the portions of his detailed statement recorded by Deputy Superintendent Parekh, were sought to be proved by tendering the same in evidence and the petitioner objected to the admissibility of these statements. A three fold objection was raised by counsel on behalf of the petitioner before the learned Magistrate. In the first, place, it was contended that these statements, which had been obtained from the petitioner under compulsion at a time when he was accused of offences under the Gold Control Rules and Customs Act, could not be used in evidence against him and were barred under art. 20 (3) of the Constitution of India and the petitioner was entitled to claim immunity under the said provisions of the Constitution in respect of those statements and in this behalf reliance was placed upon the recitals and the operative part of the Search Authorization dated April 5, 1963, as well as the recitals in the Panchnama to show that at the material time the petitioner was accused of commission of offences under the Gold Control Rules and Customs Act. Secondly, it was contended that the Central Excise Officers, who recorded these statements were police officers, within the meaning of s. 25 of the Evidence Act and the statements made to them, therefore, would not be admissible and in that behalf reliance was placed upon a decision of the Supreme Court reported in Raja Ram V. State of Bihar1 in which an - Excise Officer under the Bihar and Orissa Excise Act, was held to be a police officer within the meaning of s. 25 of the Evidence Act. Thirdly, it was urged that the statements in question would be hit by the provisions of s. 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code, because they were recorded by officers who were in the position of a police officer and had powers of investigation analogous to those in Chapter 14 of the Criminal Procedure Code. These objections were heard by the learned Magistrate in great detail and by his order dated July 24, 1964 he overruled the objections and ordered the statements to be admited in evidence. These objections were heard by the learned Magistrate in great detail and by his order dated July 24, 1964 he overruled the objections and ordered the statements to be admited in evidence. Regarding the first contention he took the view that at the time when the Panchnama was drawn which incorporated certain statements of the petitioner as well as at the time when the detailed 8tatement of the petitioner was recorded, the petitioner was not formally accused of any offence and that the petitioner had a formal accusation made against him for the first time when the complaint was filed against him by the respondent on December 19, 1963, which resulted in process being issued against him by the Court. and that, there. fore, the privilege contained in art. 20 (3) of the Constitution could not be claimed by him. With regard to the argument under s. 25 of the Evidence Act, he held that the statements of the petitioner in question did not amount to a confession and at the highest the petitioner could be said to have made an admission of a gravely incriminating fact and, therefore, the statements were not hit by s. 25 of the Evidence Act. As regards the bar of s. 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code, he took the view that the Central Excise Officers, who had recorded the statements of the petitioner were not in the position of police officers, nor was investigation carried out by them under Chapter 14 of the Criminal Procedure Code and in that view of the matter, he held that the statements in question were not hit or rendered inadmissible under s. 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Consequently, he ordered that the statements objected to should be admitted in evidence. It is against this order of the learned Magistrate that the present revisional application has been preferred by the petitioner -accused to this Court. 3. At the outset Mr. Gumaste, the learned Additional Government Pleader, raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the revisional application on the ground that the order complained of merely decides the question of admissibility or otherwise of certain evidence at a trial which is still pending before the learned Magistrate and he, therefore, urged that at such interlocutory stage this Court should not interfere with the order in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. He further pointed out that the order of the learned Magistrate dealt with procedural points by overruling the objections raised by the petitioner to the admissibility of certain statements and it would not only be open to the petitioner but would be proper for him to raise these points in appeal after the trial before the learned Magistrate is concluded. On the other hand Mr. Porus Mehta contended that one of the objections raised to the admissibility of the evidence pertained to the fundamental right guaranteed to a citizen under art. 20 (3) of the Constitution and, therefore, it was but proper for the petitioner to approach this Court at the earliest possible opportunity for vindicating his said right. Mr. Mehta fairly conceded that the objections to the admissibility of the evidence and the statements. in question under s. 25 of the Evidence Act and s. 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code, may be regarded as procedural and he would not be in a position to ask this Court to interfere with the trial Courts order on those grounds, but since the objection to the admissibility of the statements under art. 20 (3) of the Constitution had been raised before the Court and had been decided against his client by the trial Court, he should be permitted to argue that point and this Court would be perfectly justified in deciding that point in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. I accepted the contention of Mr. Mehta in this behalf and I allowed him to argue the point in so far alii the objection to the admissibility of evidence was based upon the provisions of all. 20 (3) of the Constitution only. I must mention here that Mr. Mehta was not allowed by me to raise objections to the admissibility of evidence in question under s. 25 of the Evidence Act and s. 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code. 4. In order to substantiate his contention that at the material time, that is to say, when the statements of the petitioner were recorded, the petitioner had been accused with the commission of an offence, Mr. Mehta strongly relied upon the recitals as well as the operative part of the Search Authorisation (exh. A) issued on April 5, 1963, pursuant to which the premises of the petitioner were raided by the Central Excise Officers. Mehta strongly relied upon the recitals as well as the operative part of the Search Authorisation (exh. A) issued on April 5, 1963, pursuant to which the premises of the petitioner were raided by the Central Excise Officers. He a180 relied upon certain recitals which are to be found in the Panchnama (exh. 0) itself, but before I discuss the contents of these documents, it would be convenient to set out the provisions of art. 20 of the Constitution and then to refer to the three decisions of the Supreme Court, which are of importance and have a bearing on the correct interpretation of c1. (3) of art. 20 and which decisions also set out the conditions which must be fulfilled before the immunity or privilege contained in that article could be invoked. Turning to the article itself, the marginal note is "Protection in respect of conviction for offences" and the three clauses run as follows: "(I) No person shall be convicted of any offence except for violation of a law in force at the time of the commission of the act charged as an offence, nor be subjected to 8 penalty greater than that which might have been inflicted under the law in force at the time of the commission of the offence. (2) No person shall be prosecuted and punished for the same offence more than once (3) No person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself." 5. Reading the aforesaid art. 20 as a whole, it is clear that it deals with and confers various privileges upon a person either in the conduct of a criminal proceeding itself or in respect of a criminal proceeding and c1. (3) of the article clearly confers a privilege upon an accused person that he shall not be compelled to be a witness against himself. In other words, it confers an immunity upon an accused person against testimonial compulsion. 6. Turning to the decisions of the Supreme Court, which have a bearing on the interpretation of c1. (3) of art. 20, there are three decisions which were cited before me. The first one is in M. P. Sharma V. Satish Chandra. 2 In this case Mr. Justice Jagannadhadas, while dealing with the provisions of c1. (3) of art. 6. Turning to the decisions of the Supreme Court, which have a bearing on the interpretation of c1. (3) of art. 20, there are three decisions which were cited before me. The first one is in M. P. Sharma V. Satish Chandra. 2 In this case Mr. Justice Jagannadhadas, while dealing with the provisions of c1. (3) of art. 20 of the Constitution has made the following observations (p. 303): "Analysing the terms in which this right has been declared in our Constitution, it may be said to consist of the following components. (I) It is a right pertaining to a person accused of an offence; (2) It is a protection against compulsion to be a witness; and (3) It is a protection against such compulsion resulting in his giving evidence against himself •••• Broadly stated the guarantee in Art. 20 (3) is against testimonial compulsion. It is suggested that this is confined to the oral evidence of a person standing his trial for an offience when oalled to the witness -stand. We can see no reason to confine the content of the con - stitutional guarantee to this barely literal import. So to limit it would be to rob the guarantee of its substantial purpose and to miss the substance for the sound as stated in certain American decisions .... A person can be a witness not merely by giving oral evidence but also by producing documents or making intelligible gestures as ill the case of a dumb witness •.• or the like. To be a witness is nothing more than to furnish evidence, and such evidence can be furnished through the lips or by production of a thing or of a document or in other modes …. The phrase used in Art. 20 (3) is to be a witness and not to appear as a witness. It follows that the protection afforded to an accused in so far as it is related to the phrase to be a witness is not merely in respect of testimonial compulsion in the Court room but may well extend to compelled testimony previously obtained from him. It follows that the protection afforded to an accused in so far as it is related to the phrase to be a witness is not merely in respect of testimonial compulsion in the Court room but may well extend to compelled testimony previously obtained from him. It is available therefore to a 1Jerson~against whom a formal accusation relating to the commission of an offence has been levelled which in the normal course may result in prosecution." It is true that in the above case the question which directly arose for consideration was whether search and seizure of documents upon a search warrant having been issued was unconstitutional and the Supreme Court held that the same was not unconstitutional as,that would not amount to compulsory production of incriminating evidence. It may also be pointed out that in this case a regular first information report had already been lodged with the Inspector. General, Delhi, Special Police Establishment by the Registrar of the Joint Stock Companies, Delhi, that Messers. Dalmia Jain Airways Ltd. had committed various offences and then after obtaining permission from the District Magistrate, Delhi, for investigation in respect of some of the non -cognizable offences mentioned in the First Information Report, an application for issue of search warrant was made on the basis of the First Information Report and pursuant to the search warrant issued, a search had been made and documents seized and on those facts the Court held that such search and seizure of documents was not unconstitutional as being hit by the constitutional guarantee contained in art. 20 (3) of the Constitution, and in that sense the observations which I have quoted above were really not necessary for the decision of the case. But, as I shall point out presently, in its two subsequent decisions the Supreme Court quoted the above observations with approval though they were regarded as unnecessary for the decision of the case. 7. 20 (3) of the Constitution, and in that sense the observations which I have quoted above were really not necessary for the decision of the case. But, as I shall point out presently, in its two subsequent decisions the Supreme Court quoted the above observations with approval though they were regarded as unnecessary for the decision of the case. 7. The second decision of the Superme Court, cited was in Mohamed Dastagir V. The State of Madras.3 In this case the facts were that the appellant went to the bungalow of a Deputy Superintendent of Police and offered him a bribe in a -closed envelope with a request that he might drop action registered against him but the police officer threw the envelope at the appellant; the envelope fell down and was picked up by the appellant; later while the appellant was still in the bungalow, he was asked by the police officer to produce the envelope which the latter had thrown down and the appellant took out of his pocket some currency notes and placed them on a table without the envelope; the notes were seized by the police officer and his office rubber stamp seal was placed on them. At the trial for the offence of offering a bribe, evidence of the police officer as to what transpired at his bungalow was given and the High Court, after accepting that evidence convicted the appellant and in the appeal before the Supreme Court, it was contended that on the aforesaid facts, the appellant must be regarded as a person who was accused of an offence at the time the police officer asked him to produce the money and that the circumstances also showed that the appellant did so on compulsion. That contention was negatived by the Supreme Court on the ground that there was no formal accusation against the appellant relating to the commission of the offence inasmuch as it did not appear from the evidence of the police officer that he had ever accused the appellant of having committed any offence and it was further held that even if it were assumed that the appellant was a person accused of an offence, the circumstances did not establish that he was compelled to produce money which he had on his person. It was observed that no doubt the appellant was asked to do so but it was within his power to refuse to comply with the police officers request. The Court, therefore, held that on the faots established in the case, the appellant -accused had not been compelled to produce the currency notes and, therefore, the provisions of art. 20 (3) of the Constitution were not attracted. In support of the contention urged on behalf of the appellant -accused, reliance was placed upon the observations of Mr. Justice Jagannadhadas, which I have quoted above from Sharmas case and with reference to those observations the Supreme Court said as follows ( p. 126) : "These observations were unnecessary in Sharma 8 case having regard to the fa.ct that this Court held that the seizure of documents on a search warrant was not unconstitutional as that would not amount to a compulsory production of incriminating evidence. In the present case, even on what was stated in Sharma8 case there was no formal accusation against the appellant relating to the commission of an offence." It will thus appear clear that in Mohamed Dastagirs case the Supreme Court did not dissent from the observations of Mr. Justice Jaganna~hadas in Sharmas case but proceeded to distinguish the instant case before it from Sharmas case by pointing out that there was no formal accusation against Mohamed Dastagir relating to the commission of an offence as required under the observations of Mr. Justice Jagannadhadas. In other words, Mohamed Dastagirs case was decided on the peculiar facts obtaining in that case but there is no doubt that the observations which I have quoted above from Sharmas case were not dissented in that case. Further the Supreme Court has indicated what conditions must be fulfilled before art. 20 (3) of the Constitution could come into play by observing as follows (p. 125): " ... Before this provision of the Constitution comes into play two facts have to be established (1) that the individual concerned was a person accused of an offence and (2) that he was compelled to be a witness against himself. If only one of these facts and not the other is established, the requirements of Art. 20 (3) will not be fulfilled." 8. If only one of these facts and not the other is established, the requirements of Art. 20 (3) will not be fulfilled." 8. The third decision of the Supreme Court is State of Bombay V. Kathi Kalu.4 The question that arose in that case was whether by giving his specimen hand writing or impressions of his fingers or palms or foot, the accused person could be said to be furnishing evidence against himself within the meaning of article 20 (3) of the Constitution and the majority judgment held that giving thumb impressions or impressions of foot or palm or fingers, or specimen handwriting or showing parts of body by way of identification are not included in the expression "to be a witness" and it may be stated that the observations of Justice Jagannadhadas in Sharmas case were set out in extenso and approved. At the end of his judgment Chief Justice Sinha enlisted seven conclusions to which he arrived after considering the entire case -law on the point and conclusion No.7 which has material bearing on the question before me, was stated by him in the following words: "To bring the statement in question within the prohibition of Art. 20 (3), the person accused must have stood in the character of an accused person at the time he made the statement. It ill not enough that he should become an accused, any time after the statement has been made." In view of the aforesaid decisions it will be clear that before art. 20 (3) is brought into play, it must be shown that the person must be accused of an offence at the time he made the statement and that he must have been compelled to make the statement. Therefore, in order to sustain successfully his objection against the admissibility of his statements in question, the petitioner in the present oase will have to satisfy three conditions: (1) that at the time when he made those statements there was a formal accusation of commission of an offence Against him, (2) that he was compelled to make those statements and (3) that the statements which are now being used against him at the trial are incriminatory in nature. 9. 9. At this stage, it will be convenient to refer to the relevant provisions of the Gold Control Rules [Part XII -A of Defence - of India (Amendment) Rules, 1963) and of the Customs Act, 1962. The relevant rules of the Gold Control Rules are Rules 1261, 126L, 126M and 126P. Reference was also made by Mr. Mehta to Rule 142 of the Defence of India Rules, 1962, which contains a general provision for punishing any person, who Voluntarily obstructs or offers any resistance to or impedes or otherwise interferes with the performance of any duties by lawful authorities under the said Rules. Rule 1261 deals with declaration as to possession of gold other than ornament and sub -rule (1) runs as follows: "Every person, not being a dealer or refiner required to apply for a licence, or licensed under this Part, shall within thirty days from the commencement of this Part, make a declaration to the Board in the prescribed form as to the quantity, description and other prescribed particulars of gold (other than ornament) owned by him." then the material sub -rule is sub -rule (11) which runs as follows: "(11) Any person in possession or control of any gold, not being ornament, shall be presumed, until the contrary is proved, to be the owner thereof." It will be clear from the above provision that every person (not being a dealer or refiner - -and it is not the case that the petitioner -accused is a dealer or a refiner and as such is admittedly covered by this Rule) is bound to make a declaration within the prescribed period of 30 days in the prescribed form as regards the quantity, description and other particulars of gold which is owned by him, to the Gold Board constituted under the Rules and under sub -r. (11) every person who is in possession or control of any gold, until the contrary is proved, shall be presumed to be the owner of such gold and as will be clear from Rule 126P, which deals with penalties, possession of gold by a person without making a declaration in that behalf, has been made a penal offence. Then comes Rule I 26L, which deals with power of entry, search, seizure, to obtain information and to take samples and the relevant portion thereof, which is material to the present case is Rule 126L (2) which runs as follows: - - "Any person authorised by the Central Government by writing in this behalf may - (a) enter and search any premises, not being a refinery or establishment referred to in sub -rule (1), vaults, lockers or any other place whether above or below ground; (b) seize any gold in respect of which he suspects that any provision of this Part has been, or is being, or is about to be contravened, along with the package, covering or receptacle, if any, in which such gold is found and thereafter take all measures necessary for their safe custody. " Sub -rule (3) of Rule 126L provides that the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code relating to search and seizure shall, so far as they are applicable, apply in relation to search and seizure made under this Rule. Sub -rule (4) of Rule 126L is very material and the same runs as follows: “(4) Any gazetted officer authorised by the Board in this behalf may hold an inquiry for the purpose of ascertaining whether any contravention of any of the provisions of this Part has been, is being, or is about to be, committed and shall for the purposes of such inquiry have power to summon any person whose attendance he considers necessary either to give evidence or to produce any document or other thing." Sub -rule (5) of Rule l26L provides that the Gold Board may call for information from any person for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not there has been any contravention of any of the provisions of this Part. Then there is the provision for confiscation of the gold seized and adjudication in the matter of such confiscation which is to be found in Rule 126M. Under sub -rule (1) of Rule 126M any gold seized under Rule 126L is liable to confiscation while under sub -rule (2) a. provision has been made for adjudication of confiscation by certain officers and an appeal has been provided to. Under sub -rule (1) of Rule 126M any gold seized under Rule 126L is liable to confiscation while under sub -rule (2) a. provision has been made for adjudication of confiscation by certain officers and an appeal has been provided to. the Board against every adjudication of confiscation made under sub -rule (2); and sub -rule (4) states that every person adjudicating any confiscation under this Rule and the Board hearing any appeal against such adjudication shall have all powers of a civil Court under the Civil Procedure Code in respect of matters like summoning and enforcing attendance of witnesses, requiring the discovery and production of any document, requisitioning any public record, receiving evidence on affidavits and issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses or documents. Then the penalties have been provided by Rule 126P and the relevant provision thereof may be set out: "126P. PenaUie8: -(I) Whoever, - (i) fails or omits to make ••• any declaration including a further declaration as required by rule 126 I without any reasonable cause, or makes any statement in such return or declaration which is false and which he either knows or believes to be false or does not believe to be true, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year or with fine or with both; (ii) fails or omits to keep or to produce any account or other dOCUlDeJ1t or to furnish ant information when required to do so under any provision of this Part, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term of not less than one month and not more than one year and shall also be liable to fine; (iii) •••• (2) Whoever, - (i) ••• (ii) has in his possession or under his control any quantity, of gold in contravention of any provision of this Part, . (iii) sells or otherwise transfers or agrees to sell or transfer, or exposes or offers for sale or transfer, or delivers or otherwise parts with, any gold in contravention of any provision of this Part, (iv) buys, or otherwise acquires, or accepts gold in contravention 6t any provision of tills Part, ••• shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term of not less than six months and not more than two years and also with file." In the present case, as I have stated above, the petitioner -accused has been charged for having committed an offence under Rule l26P (2) (ii) inasmuch as according to the prosecution he had acquired certain quantity of gold (12 slabs of gold weighing 6644 grams) in respect whereof no declaration had been made by him as required by Rule 1261 (1) of the Gold Control Rules. As regards the offence said to have been committed by the petitioner -accused under the Customs Act, 1962, the allegation against him is that he had acquired possession and was concerned in carrying, removing, harbouring, keeping, concealing and otherwil56 dealing with the said smuggled gold, which he knew or had reason to believe to be liable to confiscation under section 111 of the Customs Act, 1962, and that thereby he had committed an offence punishable under section 135 (2) of the Customs Act. 10. In support of his argument that the petitioner Was accused of an offence at the time when he made the statements in question, Mr. Mehta strongly relied upon the recitals and the operative part of the Search Authorisation dated April 5, 1962 (exh. A) as well as on certain statements which are to be found in the Panchanama (exh. 0) that was made on that date in the flat of the petitioner. The relevant portion of the Search Authorization No. 11 of 1963 that was issued under the signature and seal o~ Superintendent Wagh of the Central Excise may be quoted as follows: "Whereas there is reason to believe that gold, in respect of which provisions of Part XlIA of the Defence of India Rules, 1963, have been are being or are about to be contravened, is secreted in the premises of Shri Ambalal Chimanlal Neeta No. 90, Marine Lines, ... Bombay. Now Therefore in exercise of the powers conferred on me by the Central Government by Notification No .... Bombay. Now Therefore in exercise of the powers conferred on me by the Central Government by Notification No .... dated 9th January 1963, I hereby authorise Shri V. B. Rane, Dy. Supdt. of Central Excise, .… to enter and search the premises mentioned hereinabove for the aforesaid gold and if found to seize and produce the same forthwith before me." Mr. Mehta also invited my attention to the following recitals which are to be found in the Panchanama: "The cloth bags together with the 12 (twelve) slabs of yellow metal appearing to be gold and the newspaper wrappings, paper slips, rubber band, have been taken into his possession by Superintendent Shri J. S. Wagh of Central Excise, under tl;1e reasonable belief that it is smuggled Gold and also in respect of which the D. I. Rules have been contravened. " Mr. Mehta contended that in view of the language used in the Search Authorization under which the search was carried Qut and in view of the language used in the recitals of the Panchanarna quoted above, it is clear that there was a formal accusation against the petitioner even at the time of that search. In the first place Mr. Mehta pointed~ out that under Rule 126 (2) (b) even if the person authorised by the Central Government in that behalf merely entertained a suspicion that any provision of this Part (meaning Part XIIA) had been, or was being or was about to be contravened, a Search Authorization to make entry, search and seize could be issued, but in the present case, the Search Authorization (exh. A ) was issued not on mere suspicion but as the recital therein indicates, on the basis that there .was reason to believe that gold in respect whereof a contravention of Part XlIA had been committed or was being committed or was about to be committed, was secreted in the premises of the petitioner and Mr. Mehta urged that the recital "whereas there is reason to believe" is stronger than mere suspicion that may be entertained by officer concerned in that behalf. Secondly, Mr. Mehta contended that though the three alternatives had been disjunctively used with reference to apprehended . contravention of Part XIIA of the Defence of India Rules, present tense had been expressly used in regard to the impugned gold by reciting in exh. Secondly, Mr. Mehta contended that though the three alternatives had been disjunctively used with reference to apprehended . contravention of Part XIIA of the Defence of India Rules, present tense had been expressly used in regard to the impugned gold by reciting in exh. A as follows: "gota in respect of which .... is secreted, in the premises .... " . Thirdly, Mr. Mehta pointed out that the operative part of the Search Authorization expressly authorises Shri Rane, Deputy Superintendent" to seize and produce" the said gold before the Superintendent of the Central Excise. According to Mr. Mehta, these three aspects of the Search Authorization (exh. A) are clearly indicative of the fact that the petitioner was accused of commission of the offence of contravening the Gold Control Rules in respect of the gold that was said to have been secreted by him in his premises. Similarly, since in the panchanama similar language had been used to the effect that the gold in question was taken into his possession by Superintendent Wagh "under reasonable belief that it is smuggled gold and also in respect of which D. I. Rules have been contravened", it would be clear that at the material time the petitioner was accused of an offence. Mr. Mehta, however, fairly conceded that in terms the Search Authorization was addressed by the Superintendent of Central Excise Shri Wagh not to the petitioner but to Shri V. B. Rane, the Deputy Superintendent of Central Excise, who was authorised to enter and search the premises of the petitioner for gold and to seize the same if found there, but according to him in view of the recitals and the operative part of the Search Authorization ( exh. A ) , it was clear that at the material time information had• been laid before the Superintendent of Central Excise, who issued the Authorization, on the basis of which the said officer had reason to believe that gold in respect of which provisions of Part XIIA had been contravened, was secreted by the petitioner -accused in his premises and as such the language of the Search Authorization clearly implies that the petitioner was accused of being in pos. session of the said gold without making the necessary declaration under Rule 1261 and that thereby had committed an offence under Rule 126P(2). On the other hand, Mr. session of the said gold without making the necessary declaration under Rule 1261 and that thereby had committed an offence under Rule 126P(2). On the other hand, Mr. Gumaste, the learned Additional Government Pleader, contended that there are two indications in the Search Authorization itself which clearly show that the officer under whose signature and seal the Authorization was issued, was not certain whether there was a positive contravention of Gold Control Rules on the part of the petitioner at that time. He pointed out that in the first place, the recitals of the Search Authorization, which contain all the three alternatives in regard to the apprehended contravention of Gold Control Rules disjunctively, show that the officer was not sure whether in respect of the gold said to have been secreted by the petitioner, contravention had been committed or was being committed or was about to be committed. Secondly, he pointed out that the officer was not even sure whether the gold said to be secreted would be found in the premises of the petitioner and, therefore, the operative part of the Search Authorization stated that the said gold, if found, should be seized and produced before the Superintendent. He, therefore, contended that the mere use of a strong expression that there was reason to believe that gold was secreted, should not lead to the inference that the petitioner had a formal accusation of the commission of offence made against himself. He further relied upon the fact that throughout the Search Authorization ( exh. A), it has nowhere been stated that the gold was secreted by the peti. tioner but all that has been stated is that gold was secreted in the premises of the petitioner. 11. In my view, in order to decide the question as to whether the petitioner was accused of an offence at the time when the Search Authorization was issued and the search of his flat was made in pursuance thereof, not only the language used in the Search Authorization but the purpose or the object with which, Rule I26L has been framed will have to be taken into consideration. The marginal note of Rule I26L, which is to the effect: "Power of entry, search, seizure, to obtain information and to take samples" clearly indicates that the. The marginal note of Rule I26L, which is to the effect: "Power of entry, search, seizure, to obtain information and to take samples" clearly indicates that the. provisions contained therein have been framed for the purpose of ascertainment of the fact as to whether any contravention of any of the provisions of: Part XlIA,has been, or is being or is about to be committed by any person, in respect of gold. This is also clear from the contents of sub -r. 1, 2,4 and 5 thereof. Sub "rule (1) deals with the premises of a refiner or a licensed dealer in gold and under that sub -rule, power to enter and search a refinery of a refiner or the establishment of a licensed dealer is conferred upon an officer authorised by the Board in that behalf and power is also conferred upon such officer to seize any gold in respect of which he suspects that any provision of this Part has been, or is being or is about to be contravened. Sub -rule (2) deals with premises of any other person not being a refiner or a licensed dealer and under that sub -rule power is conferred upon an officer duly authorised in that behalf by the Central Government to enter and search such premises and to seize from such premises any gold in respect of which such officer suspects that any provision of this Part has been or is being, or is about to be contravened . The fact that both these sub -rules authorize seizure of gold even when a mere suspicion is entertained that in respect of such gold, contravention has taken place, or is taking place or is about to take place, clearly shows that such power to seize gold . is conferred for ascertainment of the fact of contravention. Sub -rule (4) in terms says that the officer authorized by the Board in that behalf "may hold an inquiry for the purpose of ascertaining whether any contravention of any of the provisions of this Part has been, is being or is about to be committed" and such officer has been given the power to summon. any person, either to give evidence or to produce any document for the purpose 0 such inquiry, that is to say, for the purposes of ascertaining the fact of such contravention. any person, either to give evidence or to produce any document for the purpose 0 such inquiry, that is to say, for the purposes of ascertaining the fact of such contravention. Similarly, sub -rule (5) expressly states that the Gold Board may call for information from any person "for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not there has been any contravention of any of the provisions of this Part." In other words, both the marginal note as well as the contents of sub -rules 1,2,4 and 5 of Rule I26L clearly indicate that whatever steps or proceedings are taken under this rule, they are for the purpose of ascertainment of the fact whether. there has been any contravention of any provisions for Part XIIA or not. In other• words, in my view any step or proceeding including a Search Authorization taken under Rule I26L is of exploratory nature for the purpose of ascertaining whether any contravention of Gold Control Rules has been committed or not and is not, concerned with any accusation against the person whose premises are being searched or from whose premises gold is directed to be seized under sub -r. (1) or, sub -r. (2), or from whom information is sought by an officer under sub -r. (4) or by the Board under sub -r.(5). It may be that as a result of such exploratory measures having been taken, the facts ascertained might disclose some offence and the facts so ascertained might form the basis of a future prosecution, which may be launched under Rule I26P but that would not make the step or proceeding taken under Rule 126L to be a step or proceeding amounting to an 841cusation of an offence. Having regard to the aforesaid object with which Rule 12614 has been framed, therefore, it is clear that the Search Authorization (exh. A) in this case, which has been expressly and in terms issued under the said rule, will have to be regarded as an exploratory step or proceeding taken with a view to ascertaining whether in respect of the gold which is said to have been secreted by the petitioner in his premises, the petitioner has committed, or is committing, or is about to commit a contravention of any provision of Part XIIA and that, the same was not concerned with any accusation against the petitioner of actual contravention. 12. 12. Turning to the language used in the Search Authorization (exh. A), in my view the use of present tense to the effect "that gold in respect of which .... is secreted" and the further fact that the same was authorised to be seized under exh. A, do not convert the Search Authorization into any accusation of commission of an offence against the petitioner, for under c1. (b) of sub -r. (2) of Rule 126L, even where gold is secreted by a person and a mere suspicion is entertained that in respect of such gold, a contravention of any provision of Part XXIA has taken place, an authorization to seize such gold could be given and the Search Authorization in that behalf, will contain similar provision as is to be found in exh. A. I do not think that if in exh. A instead of the recital "whereas there is reason to believe" the recital were "whereas there is reason to suspect" or "whereas it is suspected" and the remaining portion of the Search Authorization was the same as is to be found in exh. A, it could be seriously contended that such Search Authorization would amount to accusation of an offence against the petitioner. Therefore, merely because present tense in respect of secreting of gold has been used or merely because such secreted gold is directed to be seized it would not convert the Search Authorization into any accusation of an offence. The only ground on which Mr. Mehta strenuously contended that the Search Authorization in this case should be taken to contain an accusation of an offence on the part of the petitioner was that the Search Authorization (exh. A) contained a stronger recital viz. "whereas there is reason to believe." There is no doubt that the word "believe" is a much stronger word than "suspect" and the recital in exh. A is a strong recital but can it be said that because such recital is found in this Search Authorization, there is an implied accusation of the commission of an offence on the part of the petitioner 1 Unfortunately the materials on which Shri Wagh came to hold the reasonable belief that there might have been a contravention have not come on record. Further since all the three alternatives in regard to apprehended contravention have been disjunctively mentioned, it could be said that Shri Wagh had such materials be. fore him that he could not positively say that there was in fact a positive contravention of the provisions of Part XlIA on the part of the petitioner and if Shri Wagh himself was not sure in that behalf, he could never have thought of accusing the petitioner of such contravention. In any case at the highest such a. recital would show that information or material placed before him was such that as a reasonable man he (Shri Wagh) subjectively must have felt convinced that the secreting of the gold was in contravention of the rules which is far from saying that the petitioner was accused of such contravention. All that the Search Authorization at the highest means is that according to the reasonable belief of the issuing officer gold is secreted by the petitioner in his premises and it has been expressly so stated in the Panchanama (exh. O), - -but that does not amount to any accusation being made against the petitioner that he has contravened any provision of Part XIIA. I do not think that the mere use of such a recital in the Search Authorization has the effect of converting it into any implied accusation of the commission of an offence on the part of the petitioner. I do not think that mere use of such a recital robs the Search Authorization of its exploratory character. Having regard to the object of Rule 126L under which this Search Authorization was issued and also the language used therein, it is clear to me that it was not concerned with making any accusation against the petitioner. 13. I may usefully refer to one decision of the Madras High Court in Bhagwandas V. Union of India. Having regard to the object of Rule 126L under which this Search Authorization was issued and also the language used therein, it is clear to me that it was not concerned with making any accusation against the petitioner. 13. I may usefully refer to one decision of the Madras High Court in Bhagwandas V. Union of India. No doubt it was a case under Foreign Exchange Regulation Act of 1947 and the appellant Bhagwandas Goenka was convicted for contravening certain provisions of the said Act, but there the Reserve Bank had "received information that the accused unauthorisedly acquired dollars in the U. S." and on the basis of such information the Bank had issued certain directives in the form of interrogatories to the accused under s. 19 (2) of the said Act and the accused had given replies thereto and the question arose whether the said replies of the accused were inadmissible in evidence under art. 20 (3) and the Court held that the directives by the Bank were of exploratory character and were issued for ascertainment of facts and there was no accusation made against the appellant and as such the replies given were admissible in evidence. Headnote (d) of the report runs as follows: "Even assuming that Art. 20 (3) would be applicable not merely to judicial proceedings of any character, but to a multiplicity of situations in which judicial proceedings might be in prospect, it is still impossible to hold that, when certain facts are ascertained, it may be under an obligation to furnish an answer, in order to explore and determine if a person had committed an offence, this exploration itself already places him in the situation of a virtually accused person, and thus renders his explanations inadmissible in evidence. The directives of the Reserve Bank under S. 19, and the replies thereto are not inadmissible in evidence, under Art. 20 (3) of the Constitution, as incriminating answers furnished ,by a party in the virtual position of an accused, under testimonial compulsion. The statements which a party makes under fear of penalties prescribed by the Act are not hit by Art. 20 (3) and cannot be excluded from being used in evidence against him after he has become an accused and when he is on. trial. The person is not in the position of an accused when he furnishes replies to the directives under S. 19. trial. The person is not in the position of an accused when he furnishes replies to the directives under S. 19. The protection or immunity under Art. 20 (3) is available only to a person against whom a formal accusation relating to the commission of an offence has been levelled." In view of the aforesaid discussion I am unable to accept Mr. Mehtas contention that at the material time i. e. when the Panchanama was made or when the petitioners detailed statement was recorded the petitioner was accused of any offence or there was a formal accusation of commission of an offence levelled against the petitioner. 14. Mr. Mehta next contended that the petitioner was compelled to make those statements in question to the Central Excise officers and in that behalf he fairly conceded that this was not a case where compulsion or duress in the sense of threats of physical injury or bodily harm or actual beating had been administered to the petitioner before he made the statements in question. In fact, he himself pointed out that at the end of the detailed statement of the petitioner, that was recorded by Deputy Superintendent Parekh under instructions of Superintendent Wagh on April 6, 1963 (exh. Z -10), the petitioner had stated that he had given that statement voluntarily, meaning thereby that there was no physical coercion exerted on him when he made that statement, but Mr. Mehta contended that there was legal oompulsion upon the petitioner to make those statements both at the time of making the Panchanama as also on April 6, 1963,. when his detailed statement was recorded, inasmuch as having regard to the provisions of Rule 126L (4) and Rule 126P (1) (ii), if he did not make a statement or furnish information as required by the officers concerned when he was interrogated by them, he was liable to be punished with imprisonment for a term of not less than one month and not more than one year and was also liable to be sentenced to pay a fine. In this behalf Mr. In this behalf Mr. Mehta pointed out to me that both these statements which were made by the petitioner, first at the time when the Panchanama was being drawn up and secondly when his detailed statement was recorded by the Deputy Superintendent Parekh, he was interrogated by the two officers, who acted under the powers vested in them by the Defence of India Rules and the petitioner made these statements by way of giving replies to such interrogation. It may be stated that Superintendent wagh of the Central Excise, who gave evidence at the trial on behalf of the prosecution, clearly admitted in his evidence that at the time of making of the Panchanama, he questioned the petitioner with regard to the gold that was found in the pit (on the ledge) and he also questioned the petitioner about the currency notes and the other things found in the bag in Modys house and the petitioner made statements in regard to both these items of property that was seized, in pursuance to his questions. Similarly, Superintendent Wagh further admitted that he questioned and interrogated the petitioner -accused on April 6, 1963, and the petitioner -accused gave replies which were recorded in the form of his detailed statement and Superintendent Wagh has further clarified the position by stating that all this inquiry and interrogation and recording of the statements made of the petitioner was done under the powers vested in the officers by virtue of the Gold Control Rules. This is what Superintendent Wagh has stated in his evidence in that behalf: "I acted in this case under the powers of the Gold Control Rules and the Customs Act. All the enquiries subsequent to the seizure of gold were conducted in this case under Gold Control Rules and even the statements were recorded under Gold Control Rules. Under the powers of Gold Control Rules, I questioned the accused myself. He did give me replies to my questions. After this interrogation I asked Dy. All the enquiries subsequent to the seizure of gold were conducted in this case under Gold Control Rules and even the statements were recorded under Gold Control Rules. Under the powers of Gold Control Rules, I questioned the accused myself. He did give me replies to my questions. After this interrogation I asked Dy. Superintendent Parekh to record his i. e. accuseds statement … In the course of inquiries in this case under the Gold Control Rules, I questioned Kotak and Mody also." This evidence of Superintendent Wagh makes it amply clear that it was as a. result of the interrogation that was done by the Central Excise Officers in exercise of the powers vested in them by virtue of Gold Control Rules, that the statements of the petitioner -accused both in the Panchanama as well as in his detailed statement same to be recorded and Mr. Mehta has contended that under the relevant provisions of Rules 126L and 126P the petitioner -accused was legally bound to make those statements on pain of being prosecuted if he did not give replies to the interrogation made by the Central Excise Officers and therefore, there was legal compulsion on the petitioner -accused to make those statements and as such those statements cannot be used in evidence against the petitioner -accused in the case. I find considerable force in this contention of Mr. Mehta. Sub -rule (4) of Rule 126L empowers any gazetted officer duly authorised in that behalf by the Board to hold an inquiry and he has been further authorised to summon any person whose attendance he considers necessary either to give evidence or to produce any document for the purpose of such inquiry and Rule 126P(1) (ii) clearly provides that if any person so summoned by that gazetted officer, either fails to produce any document required to be produced or fails to furnish any information when required to do so under any provision of this Part (which would obviously include s. 126L (4)); he is liable to be punished with imprisonment - for a term mentioned therein and also liable to pay fine. Mr. Mr. Gumaste, the learned Additional Government Pleader, contended that sub -rule (4) of Rule 126L authorises a gazetted officer, who is holding an inquiry to summon any person "to give evidence or to produce any document or other thing" and as such will not apply to a case of a person failing to furnish informat10n when required to do so under any provisions of this Part as is contemplated under Rule 126P (1) (ii). He further pointed out that there are other provisions in this Part which require a person to furnish information and as an Instance he pointedly brought to my notice the provision of sub -r. (5) of Rule 126L itself, which provides that the Gold Board may call for information from any person for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not there has been any contravention of any provision of this Part and according to Mr. Gumaste, it was only when a person was required "to furnish information" either by the Board as per sub -r. (5) of Rule 126L or by any other officer, who has been empowered to call for information, and if he failed to furnish any such information that he comes within the mischief of Rule 126P (1) (ii). I do not think that the expression "to give evidence" has been used in sub -r. (4) of Rule 126L in the , narrow technical sense of giving evidence on oath either by affidavits or making statements on oath but that expression has been used in a wider sense so as to include the act of furnishing the statements or information. This is clear from the fact that sub -r. (4) not only uses the expression "to give evidence" but also the further expression "or produce any document or other thing" and it is clear that by producing a document or a thing a person furnishes information to the officer concerned. The marginal note of Rule 126L, which is to the effect "Power of entry, search, seizure, to obtain information and to take samples" also makes this position clear. The marginal note of Rule 126L, which is to the effect "Power of entry, search, seizure, to obtain information and to take samples" also makes this position clear. In my view, even under sub -r. (4) of Rule 126L the officer duly authorized in that behalf, who is holding an inquiry for the purpose of ascertaining whether any contravention of any of the provisions of this Part has been, or is being, or is about to be committed, is authorized to collect or gather information by means of obtaining statements or documents. In this view of the matter, it is clear that the penal provisions of Rule 126P (1) (ii) would be attracted if a person fails to furnish information by omitting to make statements when he is interrogated by the officer concerned under Rule 126L (4). It is, therefore, clear that since the petitioner -accused in the present case was interrogated by the Central Excise Officers, who were conducting the inquiries under powers vested in them by virtue of Gold Control Rules and was bound to give answers or replies to such interrogation, he was legally compelled to make the statements in question to the Central excise Officers and, therefore, the revelant condition required by art. 20 (3) of the Constitution for the applicability thereof could be said to have been fulfilled in this case. 15. On the point as to whether the statements in question, which are being used against the petitioner at the trial, are self -incriminatory or not, I do not think that there could be any doubt that those statements which are being sought to be proved against the petitioner are self -incriminatory. It was urged by Mr. Gumaste that actually in his statement, the petitioner had completely disowned any connection with the gold in respect whereof he is being prosecuted, while in regard to the currency notes, in respect whereof, there is no charge levelled against him, the petitioner has in his statement claimed that the money belonged to him and stated that the cloth bag which contained the currency notes had been put by him in his neighbours flat across the balcony without the knowledge of that neighbour ,and that, therefore, it could not be said that the petitioners statements were self -incriminatory. It is difficult to accept Mr. Gumastes contention in this behalf. It is difficult to accept Mr. Gumastes contention in this behalf. It is true that in regard to the gold in question the petitioner disclaimed any connection with the same but the latter part of the petitioners statement in regard to the currency notes wherein he stated before the officers that he had put the cloth bag containing the said notes in his neighbours flat across the balcony without the neighbours knowledge, is being expressly relied upon by the prosecution for the purpose of rendering highly probable a similar conduct on the part of the petitioner in regard to the gold in question, for it is the prosecution case that just as he put the cloth bag containing currency notes in his neighbours flat across the balcony the petitioner must have also thrown the gold in question on the ledge outside the balcony of another neighbour of his viz. Mr. Kotak and in fact as I have indicated earlier, in the complaint that has been lodged by the respondent against the petitioner in this case, it is in this manner that the possession of gold with the petitioner in contravention of Gold Control Rules is sought to be established by the prosecution. (See para. 16 of the complaint quoted above). There could be no doubt that this conduct an the part of the petitioner in throwing the bag containing the currency notes (which money is claimed by him as his) into his neighbours flat across the balcony, which emerges from the statement made by him to the Central Excise Officers, is gravely. incriminating and it is clear that his statements which contain an admission of this conduct will have to be regarded as self -incriminatory statements. I may paint out that even the learned Magistrate, while holding that the statements of the accused in question did not amount to a confession under s.25 of the Evidence Act, took the view that that statements contained an admission of a gravely incriminating fact. There is no doubt, therefore, that the statements in question will have to be regarded as self -incriminatory. 16. There is no doubt, therefore, that the statements in question will have to be regarded as self -incriminatory. 16. Since however, I have held that the petitioner Was not accused of an offence at the material time when the statements in question were made by him to the Central Excise Officers, it is clear that the privilege or the immunity claimed by the petitioner cannot be availed of by him. The statements in question, therefore, cannot be regarded as inadmissible in evidence under art. 20 (3) of the Constitution. 17. The rule in the revision application is, therefore discharged. Rule discharged.