JUDGMENT 1. - This is an appeal against the order of the Election Tribunal, Alwar, dated March 26, 1963, dismissing, with costs the election petition which had been jointly filed by the appellant Shri Mohendrasingh and Shri Sukhram to challenge the election of Shri Hari Prasad to the Rajasthan Legislative Assembly from the Mandawar Constituency at the General Election held in February, 1962. 2. Election petitioners Shri Mahendrasingh and Shri Sukhram filed their nomination papers for the election in question the latter's nomination paper having been filed on January 20, 1962, while Shri Mahendra singh's nomination paper was accepted, the nomination paper of Sukhram was rejected by the Returning Officer on January 23, 1962. The rejection was due to the fact that the Returning Officer reached the conclusion that Sukhram held an office of profit under the State Government which disqualified him for being chosen as member of the Legislative Assembly under Article 191 of the Constitution. Respondent Shri Hari Prasad contested the election along with nine other candidates, including appellant Shri Mahendrasingh, and came out successful when the result was declared on February 26, 1962. Thereupon, appellant Shri Mohendrasingh, as well as Shri Sukhram (who is now arrayed as respondent No. 2 before us), filed an election petition to challenge Shri Hari Prasad's election on the ground that Shri Sukhram's nomination paper had been improperly rejected by the Returning Officer. It was urged in the election petition that the Returning Officer erred in rejecting the nomination paper of Shri Sukhram in spite of the fact that he (Shri Sukhram) had resigned his office as a teacher in the Karwar Primary School which was thought by the Returning Officer to be an office of profit within the meaning of Article 191 of the Constitution. 3. In order to appreciate the controversy, it is necessary to mention some of the salient facts of the case which are, in fact, not in dispute, Shri Sukhram joined Rajasthan Government service as a school teacher on September 1, 1954. He continued to serve as a teacher under the State Government until the Constitution of the Kot Kasim Panchayat Samiti when he was serving as the Head Master of the Primary School at Karwar. The Panchayat Samiti then became responsible for the maintenance of the Primary School within its area. He continued to serve as a teacher under the State Government until the Constitution of the Kot Kasim Panchayat Samiti when he was serving as the Head Master of the Primary School at Karwar. The Panchayat Samiti then became responsible for the maintenance of the Primary School within its area. As Shri Sukhram wanted to contest the election to the State Legislative Assembly, he submitted his resignation (Ex. 9) to the Vikas Adhikari of the Panchayat Samiti on December 28, 1961, stating that he was prepared to deposit a month s salary in accordance with the provisions of the Rajasthan Service Regulations and praying that his resignation may be accepted within 24 hours. The same day, the Vikas Adhikari called upon the Sub-Deputy Inspector of Schools to make his report on Shri Sukhram's resignation, the report of the Sub-Deputy Inspector of Schools does not bear any date, but it was quite favourable. The then Chairman of the Administrative Standing Committee of the Panchayat Samiti passed an order on January 2, 1962 for the consideration of the resignation at the meeting of the standing Committee of that date. It was, however, adjourned by the Committee for consideration on January 15, 1962. In the meantime, Shri Sukhram submitted a reminder (Ex. 10) to the Vikas Adhikari, dated January 4, 1962 stating that he was prepared to deposit a month's salary according to the rules and repeating his request that his resignation may be accepted by the following day. Shri Sukhram made it clear that if this was not done he would leave the headquarter without the acceptance of his resignation which would then be deemed to have been accepted from the date of his leaving the charge. The matter came up for consideration before the standing Committee again on January 15, 1962 and the Committee passed a resolution to the effect that it would be for the Pradhan to accept or reject the resignation and that, so far as the Committee was concerned, it had given full authority to the Pradhan in that respect. It appears from the Pradhan's order dated January 18, 1962, that he accepted Shri Sukhram's resignation on that date, and Shri Sukhram's case was that the Vikas Adhikari thereupon issued order Ex. It appears from the Pradhan's order dated January 18, 1962, that he accepted Shri Sukhram's resignation on that date, and Shri Sukhram's case was that the Vikas Adhikari thereupon issued order Ex. 1 dated January 19, 1962, conveying the acceptance of his resignation with effect from January 19, 1962 and requiring him to hand over the charge to Shri Dayanand who was the other teacher of the Karwar Primary School. It seems that the Pradhan rescined the acceptance of the resignation by his order dated January 19, 1962, which appears at the fact of Ex. 9, by directing that the acceptance may be stayed. So far as Shri Sukhram is concerned, he took the stand that he actually relinquished the charge in pursuance of order Ex. 1, and he placed reliance on the charge report of Shri Dayanand Ex. 16A to prove that this was so. On the other hand, it was urged by respondent Shri Hari Prasad that after the Pradhan had stayed the acceptance by his order dated January 19, 1962, the decision of the Samiti thereon was given only on March 15, 1962 by which he was relieved from service by a resolution of the Samiti. 4. Thus the controversy is that while Shri Sukhram claims that he ceased to hold the office of teacher of the Karwar Primary School on January 19, 1962, Shri Hari Prasad has urged that this was not so and that Shri Sukhram continued to hold that office until after the election was over, so that the Returning Officer was justified in rejecting his nomination paper on January 23, 1962, by his order Ex. 8 of that date. Shri Hari Prasad expressly took the plea that the Pradhan had no authority to accept Shri Sukhram's resignation as the power could not have been delegated to him. Certain other pleas were also taken in the written statement but we are not concerned with them although issues were framed and were tried by the learned Tribunal in regard to them. We are only concerned with issues Nos. (5) to (8) in which the main question for determination was whether Shri Sukhram ceased to hold the office of profit on January 19, 1962 when he claims to have relinquished the charge of the post of Head Master of the Karwar Primary School on the alleged acceptance of his resignation. We are only concerned with issues Nos. (5) to (8) in which the main question for determination was whether Shri Sukhram ceased to hold the office of profit on January 19, 1962 when he claims to have relinquished the charge of the post of Head Master of the Karwar Primary School on the alleged acceptance of his resignation. The Tribunal's finding on that point went against the election petitioners and, the rejection of Shri Sukhram's nomination paper was not held to be improper, the election petition was dismissed, as mentioned above. 5. The first point which Mr. Rastogi, learned counsel for the appellant, tried to argue before us was that the office of Head Master of the Karwar Primary School was not an office of profit under the State Government so as to disqualify its holder Shri Sukhram under Article 191 of the Constitution. We did not, however, find it possible to allow the learned counsel to address us on this aspect of the case because it was brought to our notice that no such plea had been taken in the election petition. In fact it appears that the case which was put forth in the election petition was that Shri Sukhram was no longer holding any office of profit as he had "tendered his resignation which was already accepted" (Vide paragraph 4 of the election petition). This was reiterated in paragraph 6(1) as well. Further, it was stated in paragraph 6(iii) of the election petition as follow:- "(iii) That after the acceptance, which was duly communicated to the petitioner No. 2 and as a consequence thereof the petitioner No. 2 after handing over charge of his office of the teacher got a clear release horn his service, the contract of service was terminated. The petitioner No. 2 thus ceased to hold any office of profit with effect from the 19th of January, 1962 much before the date his nomination paper was filed and the Returning Officer acted illegally in rejecting the nomination paper of the petitioner No. 2 on the ground that he held an office of profit." 6. The petitioner No. 2 thus ceased to hold any office of profit with effect from the 19th of January, 1962 much before the date his nomination paper was filed and the Returning Officer acted illegally in rejecting the nomination paper of the petitioner No. 2 on the ground that he held an office of profit." 6. These averments in the election petition clearly go to show that the petitioners admitted that the office of Head Master of the Karwar Primary School was an office of profit and that it was only on relinquishing that office that Shri Sukhram ceased to suffer from the disqualification to contest the election in question. Such a conclusion would in fact be irresistible from a perusal of Shri Sukhram's letter of resignation (Ex. 9) on which he has placed considerable reliance. In the very first sentence of that letter he has made a mention that he wanted to resign from his "government service at once". This is also the tenor of his deposition before the Tribunal, for he has mentioned in his statement that when Shri Hari Prasad raised an objection that he was a Government employee he (Shri Sukhram) "brought Ex. 1 from the school and had produced it before the Returning Officer". The letter Ex. 1 referred to by Shri Sukhram was no other than the letter referred to by us earlier by which it was intimated by the Vikas Adhikari that Shri Sukhram's resignation had been accepted with effect from the afternoon of January 19, 1962. Apart from these facts, it is also significant that although the Returning Officer rejected Shri Sukhram's nomination paper on the ground that he was holding an office of profit under the State Government, Shri Sukhram did not take any plea in his election petition that his office as teacher of the Primary School was not an office of profit of that nature. This is why no issue was framed on the point, which was sought to be raised by Mr. Rastogi, that the office of profit under the Panchayat Samiti was not an office of profit under the State Government. On the other hand, the parties joined issue on the question whether Shri Sukhram handed over charge of his office on January 19, 1962 so that his services were terminated and he ceased to hold an office of profit with effect from that date. On the other hand, the parties joined issue on the question whether Shri Sukhram handed over charge of his office on January 19, 1962 so that his services were terminated and he ceased to hold an office of profit with effect from that date. This was clearly the subject-matter of issue No. (7). In all those circumstances, we could not allow Mr. Rastogi to raise the argument that the office held by Shri Sukhram was not an office of profit under the State Government. 7. The question then is whether Shri Sukhram ceased to hold the office of teacher on January 19, 1962, the petitioners contention being that his resignation had duly been accepted by a competent authority by that date and he had relinquished charge of his office in pursuance of that acceptance. This was the subject-matter of the following two issues,- "(5) Whether the petitioner No. 2 submitted his resignation on 28-12-61 to the competent authority and was the same validly accepted by the Pradhan on 18-1-62 and was the acceptance communicated by the Vikas Adhikari, Kot Kasim to the petitioner No. 2 on 19-1-1962? (7) Whether petitioner No. 2 handed over charge of his office on 19-1-62 and thus his services were terminated and he ceased to hold office of profit with effect from 19-1-62?" 8. It is not in dispute that Shri Sukhram addressed his resignation (Ex. 9) dated December 28, 1961 to the Vikas Adhikari, and the main question therefore that arises for consideration in respect of these two issues is whether that resignation had duly been accepted by a competent authority on January 18, 1962. We have already set out the facts and circumstances under which the resignation came up for consideration before the Standing Committee of the Panchayat Samiti on January 15, 1962 and a resolution was passed by that Committee authorising the Pradhan to accept or reject the resignation. It has not been disputed, as has been mentioned earlier, that by his order dated January 18, 1962 the Pradhan accepted Shri Sukhram's resignation, although there is a dispute on the points whether the acceptance had been conveyed by the issue of order Ex. 1, dated January 19, 1962 and whether Shri Sukhram actually relinquished charge of his office on the next day by handing it over to Shri Dayanand. 1, dated January 19, 1962 and whether Shri Sukhram actually relinquished charge of his office on the next day by handing it over to Shri Dayanand. As the alleged communication of the Pradhan's order accepting Shri Sukhram's resignation and the latter's relinquishment of his charge on January 19, 1962 would be of relevance only if it could be shown that the Pradhan was competent to accept the resignation in pursuance of the resolution of the Standing Committee, we shall at once address ourselves to that question. 9. In this connection Mr. Rastogi has argued that Shri Sukhram was an employee of the Panchayat Samiti and that the Administrative Standing Committee of the Samiti could, under section 20(9) of the Rajasthan Panchayat Samiti and Zila Parishad Act, 1959 (hereafter referred to as the Act) exercise such powers and perform such functions of the Samiti as the Samiti delegated to it from time to time. It has been urged that the Samiti's resolution No. 2, dated December 13, 1959, by which the Standing Committee was empowered to make appointments of Primary School teachers, was sufficient to authorise the Standing Committee to accept the resignation of such teachers because the appointing authority could accept the resignation of its employees. Further, the learned counsel has placed reliance on the provisions of sub-section (3) of section 84 of the Act for the argument that the Standing Committee exercising such a delegated power could redelegate it to any person or authority subject to the prescribed restrictions, limitation and conditions, and that as the delegation in favour of the Standing Committee was completely unrestricted, the Standing Committee was competent to delegate to the Pradhan the power to accept or reject the resignation of Shri Sukhram under the Committee's resolution, dated January 15, 1962. By way of an alternative argument Mr. Rastogi has urged that under sub-section (4) of section 89 of the Act the Standing Committee was competent to inflict all the major punishments, including the punishment of removal from service, on a teacher of a Primary School, and that the Committee could, at any rate, delegate that power of accepting Shri Sukhram's resignation to the Pradhan under section 84(3) of the Act. 10. Now, it seems to us, on a perusal of the relevant record and the provisions of the law, that the position of Shri Sukhram was like this. 10. Now, it seems to us, on a perusal of the relevant record and the provisions of the law, that the position of Shri Sukhram was like this. He was, according to his own statement, an employee of the State Government since September 1, 1954 and continued to serve as a teacher in that capacity since then. After the constitution of the Panchayat Samiti, the appointing authority in the case of a Primary School teacher was the Panchayat Samiti, as would appear from section 31(4) of the Act. By virtue of the provisions of sub-section (5) of section 31 of the Act. Shri Sukhram shall be deemed to have been substantively appointed to his post by the Panchayat Samiti because it was admittedly encadred in the service constituted under section 86 of the Act. It may also be pointed out that clause (n) of rule 2 of the Rajasthan Panchayat Samities and Zila Parishads Service Rules, 1959, also defines, "appointing authority" to mean "the Panchayat Samiti or the Zila Parishad, as the case may be", and it is not in dispute that it is the Panchayat Samiti which is the appointing authority in the case of teacher of the Primary School. There can therefore be no doubt that the Panchayat Samiti shall be deemed to be an appointing authority in the case of Shri Sukhram. 11. The question is whether the Panchayat Samiti delegated its powers as an appointing authority to the Administrative Standing Committee. There can be little doubt that a Panchayat Samiti may delegate its powers and functions to its Standing Committee, in relation to the subjects assigned to it, under sub-section (9) of section 20 of the Act, but it was nobody's case at the trial that there was any such delegation under which the Standing Committee could exercise the powers of the appointing authority in the matter of accepting the resignation of a Primary School teacher. As we have pointed out, the Panchayat Samiti merely passed a resolution on December 13, 1959, delegating its power to fill the vacant posts of Primary School teachers and no more, and it cannot therefore be justifiably argued that the Standing Committee was authorised to exercise all the powers of the appointing authority by virtue of that resolution of the Panchayat Samiti. As a matter of fact, as would appear from the English rendering of the wordings of the resolution reproduced below, the delegation is merely to the effect that the Standing Committee would fill and make appointments on vacant posts of teachers of Primary Schools,- "Resolution No. 2. The Panchayat Samiti unanimously resolved that the following posts shall be filled and appointments thereto made by the Administrative Standing Committee,- (1) Lower division-clerks..........4. (2) Teachers of Primary Schools." 12. It cannot therefore be said that by this resolution the Panchayat Samiti delegated all its other controlling powers, including the power to accept the resignation in respect of Primary School teachers to the Standing Committee. As such, the question of delegation of any such power by the Standing Committee, in its turn, to the Pradhan, could not be said to arise. 13. It may however be mentioned that even if it is assumed, for the sake of argument, that the Panchayat Samiti had delegated its powers of control over the Primary School teachers to the Standing Committee, a serious question would arise whether such a power could be re-delegated by the Standing Committee to the Pradhan. "Delegates potestas non potest-delegari" is a well-known maxim to the effect that a delegated authority cannot be re-delegated. Then there is the further maxim "delegatus non potest delegare" according to which the person to whom any office or duty is delegated cannot lawfully devolve the duty on another, unless he be expressly authorised so to do. Mr. Rastogi tried to get round this difficulty by arguing that such a re-delegation would be permissible under sub-section (3) of section 84 of the Act which is to the following effect:- "84. (3) A Panchayat Samiti or a Zila Parishad or any person exercising or performing any powers or functions by or under the provisions of this Act may delegate its or his powers or functions in writing to any person or authority subject to such restrictions, limitations and conditions as may be prescribed." 14. The learned counsel has submitted that the expression "any person" would include the Standing Committee by virtue of the definition contained in clause (42) of section 3 of the General Clauses Act. The learned counsel has submitted that the expression "any person" would include the Standing Committee by virtue of the definition contained in clause (42) of section 3 of the General Clauses Act. The short answer to such a contention is that, at any rate, the Standing Committee cannot be said to be exercising or performing any power of function "by or under the provisions of the Act" when it purports to exercise or perform a power or function which has admittedly been delegated to it by the Panchayat Samiti but which has not been given to it by or under the provisions of the Act itself. We are therefore unable to uphold the contention that the Panchayat Samiti delegated the power of accepting the resignation of a Primary School teacher to its Administrative Standing Committee or that such a power could lawfully be re-delegated to any one else by that Standing Committee. 15. Coming to the alternative argument of Mr. Rastogi, it is true that sub-section (4) of section 89 of the Act authorises a Standing Committee to inflict all the major punishments', including that of removal, in the case of a Primary School teacher, but the question is whether the Panchayat Samiti could, by virtue of such a provision, delegate its power of accepting Shri Sukhram's resignation to the Pradhan simply because the acceptance of a resignation could not be said to be a higher power than the power of removal from service altogether. The argument' is not so simple as may appear at first sight and there are at least two serious objections to it. Firstly, section 89, in terms, relates to disciplinary proceedings against, and punishment to be inflicted on, the staff of the Panchayat Samitis and Zila Parishads and it does not deal with the case of a resignation. Secondly, sub-section (4) of that section provides that the punishments which the Standing Committee is authorised to inflict can be inflicted by it "subject to the prior approval of the District Establishment Committee". Thus the prior approval of the District Establishment Committee has necessarily to be obtained for the exercise of the power of punishment and it is nobody's case that any such prior approval had been taken before the Standing Committee accepted Shri Sukhram's resignation. As a matter of fact Mr. Rastogi has , frankly conceded that this was not so. 16. Thus the prior approval of the District Establishment Committee has necessarily to be obtained for the exercise of the power of punishment and it is nobody's case that any such prior approval had been taken before the Standing Committee accepted Shri Sukhram's resignation. As a matter of fact Mr. Rastogi has , frankly conceded that this was not so. 16. For the reasons mentioned above, we are unable to accept the view that the Pradhan had the authority to accept Shri Sukhram's resignation and our conclusion is that the Pradhan's order dated January 18, 1962 accepting his resignation was clearly unauthorised. 17. Faced with such a situation, Mr. Rastogi argued that it was not at all necessary that Shri Sukhram's resignation required to be accepted and that he could unilaterally take a decision to relinquish his employment by tendering his resignation and by specifying the date on which it would take effect. The learned counsel tried to support his argument on the authority of the provisions of Article 19 of the Constitution and section 21 of the Specific Relief Act. He contended that Shri Sukhram had a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution to practise any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business and that it was open to him to give up the profession of service under the Panchayat Samiti whenever he chose to do so as his freedom of action in that respect had not been restricted by any law made under any of the subsequent provisions of that Article. Further, Mr. Rastogi urged that section 21 of the Specific Relief Act would also be applicable to the present case as a contract to render personal service could not be specifically enforced. For this letter argument, the learned counsel placed reliance on Dr. S. Dutt v. University of Delhi, AIR 1958 Supreme Court 1050 . Further, it was urged by him that abandonment of service on the part of Shri Sukhram was sufficient to determine his relationship as an employee of the Panchayat Samiti with effect from the date of the resignation. The argument was sought to be supported by reference to in re Duruvasula Venkata Subbrarao, AIR 1944 Madras 132 , Bhaskar Mukherjee and another v. Nilmoni Nath, AIR 1962 Calcutta 285 and Ram Sahai v. Gajja and another, I.L.R. (1959) 9 Rajasthan 339 . The argument was sought to be supported by reference to in re Duruvasula Venkata Subbrarao, AIR 1944 Madras 132 , Bhaskar Mukherjee and another v. Nilmoni Nath, AIR 1962 Calcutta 285 and Ram Sahai v. Gajja and another, I.L.R. (1959) 9 Rajasthan 339 . Lastly it was argued in this connection that it was not even necessary for Shri Sukhram to give a notice to his employer for the termination of his service as there was no statutory requirement to that effect and the learned counsel invited attention to Maharana Shri Bhagwat Singhji of Udaipur and others v. Keshu Lal, I.L.R. 1963 (13) Rajasthan 370 . 18. The question which arises for consideration in this respect is whether an employee can terminate his employment with effect from the date from which he chooses to resign his employment. We are not persuaded to hold that a mere unilateral action on the part of an employee to resign his employment should necessarily have the effect of terminating his employment with effect from the date he tenders the resignation or the date mentioned by him as the date from which the resignation is to be effective. It takes two to give rise to an employment for there has to be an employer and an employee and it could not be that such a contractual relationship should be terminable by a unilateral act on the part of one or the other of the contracting parties unless there is a condition justifying it in the terms of the employment. As far as we can see, one mode of putting an end to a contract of service would be by giving notice in accordance with the service rules governing the employee or the conditions of his employment. The other mode of terminating an employment is that the employee may resign from the employment, but in such a case we have no doubt that the mere tender of the resignation would not necessarily make it effective from the date of its tender, or from the date mentioned by the employee for the termination of the employment, unless the employer agrees to it or unless the letter of resignation gives a reasonable time for its acceptance by the employer. The following observations at pages 353-54 in Barewell and Kar's "The Law Relating to Service in India", volume I, 1952 edition, would bear out our-point of view,- " The word 'resignation' is not a Term of Art. It only means 'give up'. Resignation by a servant does not operate as discharging the contract by bringing it lawfully to an end, unless such resignation he accepted by the master. When that is the case, the parties have, by agreement, determined the contract from the date of the master's acceptance. But if the resignation be not accepted, the servant remains bound, and should be choose to withhold his services, his conduct will be a breach of the contract entitling the master to damages, unless, though speaking of his action as one of resignation the servant is in fact mentioning a date for it to take effect which would bring his conduct within what the contract requires as a proper notice to determine it." 19. The above observations appear to be based on Ganesh Ramchandra v. G.I.P. Railway Co., (1900) 2 Bom, L.R. 790 , in which Jenkins C.J. made the following observations,- "Now a contract of service is continuing in its nature, and its continuance and the obligations under it can only be terminated in certain defined modes. Mere resignation obviously is not enough unless it is assented to, or unless it complies with those terms which the law implies or the prior agreement of the parties may permit." 20. We would like to make it clear, however, that, in our opinion, it would not be open to an employer to refuse to accept the employee's resignation or to defer its acceptance to an unreasonable length of time. 21. We cannot therefore accept the argument that the employer is not entitled to a reasonable notice from the employee. While summarising the modes for the termination of a contract of service, there is the following exposition of the law on the point in paragraph 928 of Halsbury's Laws of England, third edition, volume 25, page 483,- "In general, a contract of hiring and service may be discharged by performance, by mutual agreement, by impossibility of performance, or by the death of either the master or the servants." 22. It seems to us that a case like the present would fall under the second category under which a contract of service could be discharged by mutual agreement, for it has not been contended that any of the other modes of termination of the employment could be said to be attracted to Shri Sukhram's case. Thus it was necessary dial there should have been a "mutual agreement" in regard to the acceptance of Shri Sukhram's resignation and not merely a unilateral act on his part by way of the submission of a resignation with the stipulation that it should be accepted within 24 hours. As we have already stated, we are also of the opinion that while the resignation would be effective from the date of its acceptance by the competent authority, we would not like to be understood to say that it would be open to the employer to refuse to accept the resignation or to put off its acceptance to an unreasonable length of time. The question what would be the reasonable time for the acceptance of a resignation is a question of fact which has to be decided on the facts and circumstances of each case. We may mention that it was argued by Mr. Bhargava on behalf of the respondent that when a month's notice has been provided for the termination of a temporary employment under rule 23A of the Rajasthan Service Rules which, according to Shri Sukhram were applicable to him, there is no reason why at least that much period should not be required for a resignation by a permanent employee. While it is difficult to reject the argument as unreasonable, we would rest content by saying that it would be a question of fact in each case whether a particular period of notice for the acceptance of a resignation would or would not be reasonable. The parties did not, however, join issue to have this aspect of the matter tried and we would not therefore go into it, but we have 110 doubt whatsoever that 24 hour's notice for the acceptance of the resignation on the part of Shri Sukhram could not be said to be reasonable in this case. He was the Head Master of the Karwar Primary School where there was only one other teacher. He was the Head Master of the Karwar Primary School where there was only one other teacher. The sudden withdrawal of the services of the Head Master was bound to upset the smooth running of the School and in relinquishing the charge of his office on January 19, 1962 without, as we have shown, the acceptance of his resignation by competent authority, Shri Sukhram cannot be said to be justified in contending that his employment must be held to have terminated with effect from January 19, 1962 so as to discharge him from the office of profit which he admittedly was holding and which was held by the Returning Officer to disqualify him under Article 191 of the Constitution from contesting the third general election to the State Legislative Assembly from the Mandawar Constituency. 23. Before leaving this aspect of the case we may point out that Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution does not, to our mind, justify the argument that a citizen who chooses to practise the profession of service has the fundamental right to give up that profession in favour of any other profession, occupation, trade or business without putting an end to the service in a manner which would not prejudice his employer. It is easy to imagine cases in which the interests of the general public may sutler considerably if an employee, in the exercise of his supposed right of freedom guaranteed under Article 19 of the Constitution, decides to withdraw himself from his employment by merely tendering his resignation and stipulating that it would be effective within the unreasonably short period of lime specified therein. It is no answer to such an argument to say that since the Legislature has not imposed any reasonable restriction on the right of such an employee, he can exercise it in any manner he likes. We have no doubt that Article 19(1)(g) cannot be invoked by the petitioner for the argument that by his act of volition in tendering the resignation of his office as a teacher of the Primary School he had lawfully put an end to his employment. 24. So also, we are not persuaded that section 21 of the Specific Relief Act has any direct bearing on the controversy before us. 24. So also, we are not persuaded that section 21 of the Specific Relief Act has any direct bearing on the controversy before us. It is true that specific performance of a contract to render personal service cannot be enforced, but that is far from saying that section 21 will have the effect of authorising an employee to put an end to his employment by a mere letter of resignation without caring to give a reasonable notice for its acceptance. In this view of the matter, Dr. S. Dutt's case (1) on which reliance has been placed by Mr. Rastogi can be of no avail to the appellant for this is not a case in which we are required to give a declaration that Shri Sukhram still continues to be a teacher under the Kot Kasim Panchayat Samiti and there is no question of directing the specific performance of a contract of personal service at all. 25. In the view which we have taken, it is hardly necessary for us to deal separately with Mr. Rastogi's argument about Shri Sukhram's right to abandon his service by a mere act of volition on his part to that effect, or to his other argument that notice for termination of service was not necessary on the part of Shri Sukhram in the absence of a statutory requirement to that effect as they are amply answered by the reasoning which has prevailed with us in taking a contrary view. 26. Our conclusion therefore is that Shri Sukhram could not be said to have ceased to hold an office of profit under the State Government for purposes of the election in question at the date of the scrutiny and rejection of his nomination paper on January 23, 1962 and he was therefore disqualified for the election under Article 191 of the Constitution and we would dismiss the appeal with costs which we fix at Rs. 500. We direct that a substance of this decision shall forthwith be intimated to the Election Commission of India and the Speaker of the Rajasthan Legislative Assembly and an authenticated copy thereof shall also be sent to the Election Commission as required by sub-section (6) of section 116A of the Act.Appeal dismissed. *******