J. B. MEHTA, J. ( 1 ) THIS revision petition raises an interesting question as to whether a trustee who has got no trust property in his hands could sue as a pauper on behalf of the trust even if he is possessed of sufficient means in his individual capacity. ( 2 ) ONE Mohanlal Nihalchand the deceased had made a will on 16 March 1949 by which he had given the life interest to one Chanchalben and after her death the estate was to go over to the various trusts. Chanchalben died on 8th September 1958. There were three executors of the said will one of whom was Laherchand who expired on 22nd April 1958 Therefore the present two executors have filed a suit in forma pauperis as plaintiffs Nos. 1 and 2 as the trustees under the will against the main defendants 1 and 2. Defendant No. 1 is the testators sisters daughter and defendant No. 2 is her husband. The suit is for recovery of the properties of the trust in possession of the opponents worth about Rs. 36 0 Opponents Nos. 1 and 2 and other opponents and the Government having taken up a preliminary objection as to the maintainability of this application the learned Civil Judge had come to the conclusion that such trustees who were admittedly not paupers having got sufficient means in their individual capacity for payment of the court fees they could not sue as paupers on behalf of the trust. He also came to the conclusion that plaintiff No. 2 was not present at the time of the presentation of the application and therefore the application was not properly presented as required under Rule 2 of 0. 33 of the Civil Procedure Code hereinafter referred to as the Code. Accordingly he has rejected the application of the trustees and has directed them to pay the requisite court fees on the suit. The said trustees have therefore filed the present revision application. ( 3 ) ORDER 33 of the Code prescribes the procedure for institution of a suit by a pauper. Rule 1 provides that subject to the following provisions any suit may be instituted by a pauper. The said trustees have therefore filed the present revision application. ( 3 ) ORDER 33 of the Code prescribes the procedure for institution of a suit by a pauper. Rule 1 provides that subject to the following provisions any suit may be instituted by a pauper. The explanation provides that a person is a pauper when he is not possessed of sufficient means to enable him to pay the fee prescribed by law for the plaint in such suit or where no such fee is prescribed when he is not entitled to property worth one hundred rupees other than his necessary wearing apparel and the subject matter of the suit. Rule 2 provides that every application for permission to sue as a pauper shall contain the particulars required in regard to plaints in suits and Rule 3 sets out the mode of presentation of the application and it provides that the application shall be presented to the Court by the applicant in person unless he is exempted from appearing in Court in which case the application may be presented by an authorized agent who can answer all material questions relating to the application and who may be examined in the same manner as the party represented by him might have been examined had such party attended in person. Rule 4 provides for the examination of the applicant or his agent as aforesaid regarding the merits of the claim and the property of the applicant. Rule 5 directs the Court to reject the application if any of the prohibitions mentioned in clauses (a) to (e) exists. Thus Order 33 prescribes the method for institution of a suit by a pauper without payment of the institution fees as prescribed in the Court Fees Act. It is a provision intended to facilitate the institution of suits so that justice is not denied to any person merely because he has no means to pay even the institution fees. Some other provisions of the Code may also be noted at the outset. Order 7 Rule 4 provides that where the plaintiff sues in a representative character the plaintiff shall show not only that he has an actual existing interest in the subject matter but that he has taken steps necessary to enable him to institute a suit concerning it. Some other provisions of the Code may also be noted at the outset. Order 7 Rule 4 provides that where the plaintiff sues in a representative character the plaintiff shall show not only that he has an actual existing interest in the subject matter but that he has taken steps necessary to enable him to institute a suit concerning it. Order 2 Rule 5 also provides that no claim by or against an executor administrator or heir shall be joined with claims by or against him personally unless the last mentioned claims are alleged to arise with reference to the estate in respect of which the plaintiff or defendant sues or is sued as executor administrator or heir or are such as he was entitled to or liable for jointly with the deceased person whom he represents. These provisions in the Code clearly indicate as rightly observed by Shrinivasa Aiyangar J. in Sivagami Ammal and another v. T. 5. Gopalaswami Odayar and others A. I. R. 1925 Mad. 765 that the person contemplated even by the law of procedure is the juridical person. It would be possible for an individual human being to his possessing a number of juridical personalities by reason of his possessing separate juridical capacities. Salmond on Jurisprudence Eighth edition at pages 325-335 observes that persons are the substances of which rights and duties are the attributes. A natural person is capable of having a double personality. A trustee is for many purposes two persons in the eye of law. In the right of the beneficiary he is one person and in his own right he is another. That is a natural person could have different personalities according to the character of his rights and duties. The provision in the Code for minors and lunatics would also show that such persons being under disabilities the acts required under the Code to be performed on their behalf are to be done not by them in person but through others. Order 31 similarly provides for representation of beneficiaries in suits concerning property vested in trustees. In all suits concerning property vested in a trustee executor or administrator where the contention is between the person beneficially interested in such property and a third person the trustee executor or administrator shall represent the persons so interested and it shall not ordinarily be necessary to make them parties to the suit. In all suits concerning property vested in a trustee executor or administrator where the contention is between the person beneficially interested in such property and a third person the trustee executor or administrator shall represent the persons so interested and it shall not ordinarily be necessary to make them parties to the suit. Thus a suit in a representative capacity is well known to the Code. Even under the General Clauses Act 1897 under section 3 (39) unless there is something repugnant to the subject or context the word person would include any company association or a body of individuals whether incorporated or not. We must therefore consider what is the meaning of the word person intended in the explanation to Rule 1 of Order 33 whether it means only the natural person or also embraces a juridical or artificial person. ( 4 ) TWO views have been canvassed before us supported by a number of authorities. According to one view on account of the mention of wearing apparel in the explanation to Rule 1 and on account of the necessity of the application being presented in person under Rule 3 by someone who is to be examined under Rule 4 by the Court the subject or context of the various Rules under Order 33 would necessitate the narrow construction of the word person in the sense of only a natural person. While the other view is that the Code contemplates suits in a representative character or by Legal or juridical persons as well. Such facility for institution of suits should not be restricted merely because such persons are incapable of possessing a wearing apparel or whose physical presence would be impossible or where the law directs owing to any disability as in the case of minor that all acts required by the Code should be performed by the next friend. ( 5 ) THE former view has found favour with Davar J. in Manji Rajuji v. Khandoo Baloo I. L. R. 36 Bom. 279 at page 281 where the learned Judge observed that all the provisions of Order 33 of the Civil Procedure Code seem to negative the idea of anybody but an actual pauper a real pauper a man without means being permitted to maintain or defend a suit in forma pauperis. 279 at page 281 where the learned Judge observed that all the provisions of Order 33 of the Civil Procedure Code seem to negative the idea of anybody but an actual pauper a real pauper a man without means being permitted to maintain or defend a suit in forma pauperis. He held that the privilege of maintaining a pauper suit is a personal privilege granted to people who have no means of carrying on or continuing limitation and the legal representative of a pauper could not continue a suit in forma pauperis unless he was himself a pauper. The decision proceeded on a concession or the lawyer because of some observations of Starling J. In the matter of the will of Dawubai Hajikhan Hubib Khan I. L. R 18 Bom. 237 which indicated that an executor or an administrator would not be allowed either to maintain or to continue any petition unless and until it was shown that he himself was a pauper which observations were really obiter in that case as the executor there was actually a pauper. This is the view of the Rangoon High Court also in S. M. Mitra v. Corporation of the Royal Exchange Assurance 17 A. I. R. 1930 Rang. 259 where it was held that the official receiver could not sue on the ground that the requirement about wearing apparel and the necessity of presenting the application in person would justify the restricted construction of the word person in the sense of a natural person only in the context of Order 33. The same view is also expressed by the Calcutta High Court in Bharat Abhyuodoy Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Maharajadhiraj Sir Kameshwar Sing A. I. R. 1938 Cal. 745 where it was held that a limited company could not sue or appeal as a pauper. It may be noted that in the case of Nemichand v. Kevalchand 26 Bombay L. R. 380 the Division Bench consisting of Macleod C. J. and Shah J. approved the dissenting view in Venkatanarasayya v. Achemma (1881) I. L. R 3 Mad. 745 where it was held that a limited company could not sue or appeal as a pauper. It may be noted that in the case of Nemichand v. Kevalchand 26 Bombay L. R. 380 the Division Bench consisting of Macleod C. J. and Shah J. approved the dissenting view in Venkatanarasayya v. Achemma (1881) I. L. R 3 Mad. 3 and held that the rule of English practice which prevents a minor from instituting a suit in forma pauperis through his next friend unless he gives proof not only that he himself is a pauper should not be deduced from the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code and that it was only necessary to show when a minor was seeking to file a suit in forma pauperis that the minor had do means to pay the Court fees. Finally Mudholkar J. In the case of Gendalal Mills v. Basant Kumaribai 62 Bom. L. R. 594 differed from the Calcutta view in the B. A. Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Kameshwar Sing (Supra) and distinguished the earlier Bombay decision in Manaji Rajuji v. Khandoo Baloo (Supra) and held that a Corporation is entitled to sue in forma pauperis and therefore the official liquidator of a limited liability company could under Order 33 R. 1 institute a suit in forms pauperis for obtaining possession of the property belonging to the company. Thus the latest trend in Bombay is clearly in favour of the latter view. The latter view has been well considered and approved in the Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court in Swaminathan v. Official Receiver Ramnad I. L. R. 1937 Mad. 549 where it was held that the word person occurring in the Explanation in Rule 1 of Order 33 would include both natural and legal persons and the official receiver was a person within the meaning of the said explanation. Their Lordships of the Madras High Court had considered Salmonds definition of a juridical person and it was held that a natural person in his own right was a different person when he represented the estate of another. The test was whether in that representative character and as the owner of that estate he was a pauper within the meaning of the explanation. The test was whether in that representative character and as the owner of that estate he was a pauper within the meaning of the explanation. It was also held that the context and object of the enactment would not exclude an official receiver or a person suing in a representative character or an artificial person. The mention of wearing apparel in the explanation and the necessity of presenting the application in person would not excluded such a juridical person who could not possess a wearing apparel whose value could be deducted and in whose case physical presence would be impossible or in cases where the law directs owing to the disability that all the acts required by the Code should be performed by the next friend. In Sivagami Ammal and another v. T. S. gopalswami odayar and other A. I. R. 1925 Mad. 765 Srinivasa Aiyangar J. has also held that the executor of a pauper plaintiff could not be dispaupered because personally he was not a pauper. According to him the correct principle was to have regard to the real juridical plaintiff in the case and not to the person who may be acting for the plaintiff. He referred to the provisions of Order 7 Rule 4 and Order 2 Rule 5 and held that those provisions would clearly indicate that the person contemplated by the law of procedure was the juridical person and to hold otherwise would obviously lead to serious and inconvenient consequences. He rightly pointed out that in the converse case where a trustee was possessed of sufficient means as a trustee of a trust with plenty of money he would be denied the right to sue as a pauper in respect of his own personal claims. Even the Calcutta High Court in Sm. Mabia Khatun v. Sheikh Satkari and others A. I. R. 1927 Cal. 309 has held that when a plaintiff sues in a representative character such as a Mutawalli trustee or a shebait unless it is shown that the plaintiff has in his possession property belonging to the wakf estate or trust or the idol for whom he sues sufficient to enable him to pay the requisite Court-fee prescribed by law he may be allowed to sue as a pauper even if it is shown that he has sufficient personal property of his own. The capacity of a person suing in a representative character must be kept distinct from his personal capacity. Finally we find this view approved in U. M. Usman v. Mayor Simon A. I. R. 1959 Kerala 218 which relied upon similar observations of the Oudh Chief Court and the Full Bench of the Mysore High Court. ( 6 ) WE are in complete agreement with this latter view as approved by the Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Swaminathans case (Supra) and we would now state some of our reasons for the said preference. ( 7 ) THE word `person in the explanation being capable of both a wide and a narrow meaning we should give that construction which would advance this salutory remedy and achieve the purpose underlying the enactment so that this facility for institution of a suit without the payment of the requisite court-fees can be properly availed of by all persons who would be otherwise denied the remedy merely because the person had no funds to pay the requisite fees. We agree with the observations of Srinivasa Aiyangar J. in 1925 Mad. 765 that the other construction would lead to anomalous results. The pauper minors and lunatics who on account of their legal disabilities could not act except through someone else on their behalf could not sue at all unless the next friend or guardian was a pauper because they could not present the application in person. Similarly the trustee or executor or a mutawalli or a shebait could not sue or appeal against a decree against a trust estate unless they were themselves paupers or they chose to put in their own moneys to finance the litigation. If pauper persons could file such suits in a representative character the difficulties would start for the real plaintiff in execution of the decree obtained. Such results could not have been intended by the Code which in terms provides for suits in a representative capacity by splitting ones own natural personality. ( 8 ) FURTHER there is nothing is the subject or context which would negative this wider interpretation which is in consonance with the object of these provisions. Such results could not have been intended by the Code which in terms provides for suits in a representative capacity by splitting ones own natural personality. ( 8 ) FURTHER there is nothing is the subject or context which would negative this wider interpretation which is in consonance with the object of these provisions. The rule of construction which was adopted by the Rangoon High Court and the Calcutta High Court to restrict the scope of the word person to natural persons because of the mention of wearing apparel in the explanation has not been accepted by the Supreme Court as it appears from the observations in Nagpur Electric Light and Power Co. Ltd. v. K R. Shreepathirao A. I. R. 1958 S. C. 658 where their Lordships seem to approve the contrary view taken in Perumal Gaudan v. Thirumalarayapuram Jananakoola Dhanasekhara Sangha Nodhi. I. L. R. 41 Mad. 624 regarding this explanation. In the Madras case the question was whether the provisions of Order 33 could be applied to the companies and it was held that it would be wrong to construe the provisions to mean that only a person who could possess wearing apparel could sue as a pauper. Merely because the test of wearing apparel could not be fulfilled and no deduction of its value could be claimed by persons possessing no wearing apparel it would not justify a construction that the word person in the clause refers only to natural persons who can possess wearing apparel. So also there is no difficulty in complying with Rule 2 as regards the presentation of the application by the person himself. In such cases of trustees and executors if the suit is brought in a representative capacity they could present the application in that capacity and they would remain present as such before the Court to answer any question relating to the trust. If the distinction between the representative capacity in which a person sues and the personality of the individual himself is kept in mind there would be no difficulty presented by Rule 2. Even the view as regards the claim being personal to the pauper himself has to some extent lost ground after the decision of the Supreme Court in Vijay Pratap v. Dukh Haran Nath A. I. R. 1962 S. C. 941 at page 945. Even the view as regards the claim being personal to the pauper himself has to some extent lost ground after the decision of the Supreme Court in Vijay Pratap v. Dukh Haran Nath A. I. R. 1962 S. C. 941 at page 945. That was a case of a minor suing through the next friend. The Supreme Court in that case had held that there was nothing personal in that application under Order 33 and any person who claimed to be transposed as a plaintiff under Order 1 Rule 10 could also join the petitioners if he was a pauper. In view of these observations of the Supreme Court we find that the former view seems to have lost its appeal as it proceeded to give a narrow construction to the word person on the ground of mention of wearing apparel in the explanation and because the application could not be filed in person by such juridical person. ( 9 ) SO far as the question of a limited company is concerned no doubt the Bombay view as earlier set out is in conflict with the Calcutta view but it is not necessary for us in the present case to express any final opinion in that question. ( 10 ) MR. Sheth also relied on certain decisions like Brahamaramba v. Seetharamayya A. I. R. 1947 Mad. 405 Salem B. S. R. V. Motors (P) Ltd. v. S. S. Krishna Sastry A. I. R. 1962 Mysore 47 Satish Chandra v. Phani Bhushan De A. I. R. 1952 Cal. 696 Mt. Annapurna Bai v. Balaji Maroti A. I. R 1946 Nag. 320 and certain other authorities where it was held that the legal representatives could continue the application filed by the deceased in forma pauperis only on payment of the necessary court fee or on the proof that they were themselves paupers. But these decisions have not considered the question of a dual personality of the same person and how far the Code has included juridical person in its scope and that is why the earlier decisions which support the other view were not referred to in these decisions. But these decisions have not considered the question of a dual personality of the same person and how far the Code has included juridical person in its scope and that is why the earlier decisions which support the other view were not referred to in these decisions. These decisions have therefore no application to the present case and in so far as they proceeded on the ground that the relief was personal in nature even that view seems to have lost its appeal after the decision of the Supreme Court in Vijay Pratap v. Dukh Haran Nath (Supra ). ( 11 ) WE are therefore of the view that the correct test in such cases is to see in what capacity a person sues and whether in that capacity he is a pauper. The trustees could therefore sue on behalf of the trust provided they had no sufficient trust moneys in their hand to pay the necessary court fees even though in their individual capacity they may not be paupers. Resources of the trustees themselves in their individual capacity would be entirely irrelevant. ( 12 ) MR. Sheth next contended that the application was presented by the pleader for the applicants and was not presented by any of the trustees in person. It was therefore not a sufficient compliance with Rule 3 or Order 33. Now it appears from the Rojnama that the applicant No. 1 was examined in the Court on the same day. The learned Judge was therefore right in holding that applicant No. 1 was present in the Court and the application must be deemed to have been presented by him. In the case of co-trustees it is sufficient if anyone of the co-trustees applies to the Court and remains present personally for examination by Court as required under Rule 4 all the trustees having a common cause. In these circumstances the learned Judge was wrong in holding that the application was not properly presented as required by Rule 3. ( 13 ) MR. Sheth urged that the trust must have sufficient properties as probate had already been obtained but it would be open to the lower Court to consider all such objections as and when they would be raised before the learned Judge. ( 13 ) MR. Sheth urged that the trust must have sufficient properties as probate had already been obtained but it would be open to the lower Court to consider all such objections as and when they would be raised before the learned Judge. ( 14 ) IN the result the order of the lower Court is set aside and the matter is remanded to the learned Judge for being disposed of according to law in the light of our observations. The petition is accordingly allowed and the Rule is made absolute. No order as to costs throughout. Rule made absolute. .