Amichand Valanji and Ors v. G. B. Kotak — 1964 DIGILAW 66 (BOM)

judgment Tambe, J. (1) This is a petition under Article 226 of the constitution of India, wherein the vires of the Gold Control Rules, contained in part XIIA of the Defence of India Rules, have been challenged. In the prayer clauses of the petition no doubt, validity of the entire rule were not challenged but only some of the rule were not mentioned. But the arguments advanced before us the were in respect of rules in general. If would not therefore be necessary to consider each rule separately. (2) The two petitioners before us are dealers in gold. They profess and parties Jain religion. The two petitioners carry onto business in the name and style of ""Messrs. Chandkumar Amichand Co"". The principal business of the petitioner is in bullion. They buy and sell gold incourse of their business. In their petition they say that the business carried on by the them is on a vast scale. Eleven persons are employed by them in the firm and the annual salary to the Rs. 20,000. The firm is also a registered dealer for the purpose of the sale - tax and the petitioners claim that he sales - tax paid by them in S.Y. 2018 amounted to Rs. 2,56, 395,72 nP. (3) The challenge made by the petitioners is in substance now confined to the two grounds. Firstly, it is contend that the rule made are in excess of the rule making power to the central Government, and secondly that at any rate the rules contravene the fundament rights conferred on the petitioners under Articles 25 and 26 of the constitution of the India. The other contentions which have been raised by the petitioner satiated before us. But Mr. Mehta, learned counsel for the petitioners stated before us that he did d not advance any arguments on those contentions because the matter stood concluded by the recent decision the their Lordship of the supreme court in Makhan Singh Tarsikka v. State of punjab AIR 1964 SC 381 . Mr. Mehta, however stated that the petitioners marries these contentions I the supreme court if so advised. (4) To appreciate the contentions raised before us it is would be necessary to refer to the incidents relating to the promulgation of these impugned rules., it is common knowledge that the on 8th September 1962 Chines troops crossed the Indian Border. Mr. Mehta, however stated that the petitioners marries these contentions I the supreme court if so advised. (4) To appreciate the contentions raised before us it is would be necessary to refer to the incidents relating to the promulgation of these impugned rules., it is common knowledge that the on 8th September 1962 Chines troops crossed the Indian Border. By 20th October 1962, the aggression by China on the India Borders the was a on large scale. On 26th October 1962, the president offend, in execs of the powers conferred on him by Article 352 of the constitution, declared Thai a grave emergency exists, where byte security of India is threatened by external aggression. By reason of this proclamation the provisions of the Article 358 of the constitution immediately came into play. That the article provides that while a proclamation of the emergency is in operation nothing in Article 19 shall restrict the power of the state as defined in part III to make any law or to take any excessive action who is a the state would but for the provisions contained in that part be competent to make or to take but any law so made shall to the extent of the incompetence, cease to have effect to the as soon as the proclamation ceases to operate, except as respect things done or omitted to be done before the law so ceases to have effect. The declaration oft emergency further under Artless. That the 359 empowered further under Article 359 empower the presidents ""to declare that he right to move any court for the enforcement of such the rights conferred by part III as may be mentioned in the order and all proceedings pending in any court for the which the shall informants of the right mentioned shall remain suspended for the period during which the proclamation of the is force or of such shorter period a may be specified I note orders"" it is a necessary to notice two other Articles, and they are Article 250 and 353 (b). Art 250 provides: ""250 (1) Notwithstanding anythings in this Chapter Parliament shall, while a proclamation of Emergency is in operation, have power to make law for the whole or any part of the territory of India with the respect to any of the matters enumerated on the state List. Art 250 provides: ""250 (1) Notwithstanding anythings in this Chapter Parliament shall, while a proclamation of Emergency is in operation, have power to make law for the whole or any part of the territory of India with the respect to any of the matters enumerated on the state List. (2) A law made by the parliament of which parliament of would not but for the issue of a proclamation of Emergency have been competent to make shall to the extent of the incompetence , case to have affect on the expiration of the period of the six months after the proclamation has ceased to operate to except as respects thing done or omitted to be done before the expiration of the said period"". Article 353, Clause (b) provides that ""while a proclamations of emergency is in operation then the per of the parliaments to make law with respect to the any matter shall include power to make law conferring powers and inputting duets, or authorizing the conferring of the power and the imposition of duties, upon the union officers and authorities of the Union it is the one which the is not enumerated intake Union list"". We have already stated that the emergency was proclaimed by the president on the 26th October 1962. On the same day in exercise of the power under the article 123, the president promulgated an Ordinate styled as ""the Defence of India Ordinances"" It is not necessary for the purposes of this case to refer to the provisions of the defense of India ordinance, for its is not in dispute that the provisions of the Defense of India ordinance have now been incorporated in the Defence of the India Act, 1962. On 3rd November 1962, of the President in exercise of powers conferred the him by C1. On 3rd November 1962, of the President in exercise of powers conferred the him by C1. Of Art 359 of the constitution by a Gazette Notification of declared that the ""the rights of any person to move any court for the enforcement of the rights conferred by the Art. 21 and Art. 22 of the constitution shall remain suspended for the period during such which the proclamation of Emergency issued bet under loses (1) of Article 352 thereof on the 26th October 1962, is in force, if such person has been deprived of any such rights under the Defence of India Ordinances, 1962 (4 of 1962) or any rule or any rule or the order made thereunder"" by a further proclamation, Art. 14 also was added to this notification. The combined effect of the all the aforesaid provisions was that the parliaments gained authority to legislate on subjects contained in Lists I, II and III as it deemed proper gained Authority emergency. The fetter on the legislative power of the parliaments contained in Article 19 was removed. Further, if the fundamental rights of the citizens under Articles 14, 21 and 22 were contravened of by any rule or order made by the Central Government under the Defence of the India Ordinance or act, recourse to court for the enforcement of the those fundamental right was barred dings the period of the emergency. The Defence of India Ordinances or Act, recourses to court for enforcement of the those fundamental rights was barred during the period of the emergency. The preamble of the Defence of India Act (hereinafter called ""the Act"") declares that its is ""an act to provide for special measures to ensure of India did and civil defense and for the trial of certain and offenses and for matter connected therewith"". The preamble then revert the external aggression and the declaration of emergency by the presidents and therefore, it is therein stated: ""And whereas it is necessary to provide safety and interest, defense o the India and civil defense and for the trial certain offenses and for matter connected therewith. The preamble then revert the external aggression and the declaration of emergency by the presidents and therefore, it is therein stated: ""And whereas it is necessary to provide safety and interest, defense o the India and civil defense and for the trial certain offenses and for matter connected therewith. Be it, therefore enacted by the parliaments in the Thirteenth years of the Republic offend as follows"" sub - section (3) of S.1 provided that the act shall remain in force during the period of operation of the Proclamation of Emergency issued on the 26th October 1962, and for a period of Six months thereafter. The clauses of sub - section (3) provided for saying of certain things, with which we are not there concerned. Section 2 contains definitions of certain expresses. The express ""defense of India"" has not been defined. Section 3 confers powers on the central governments to the make framed and the Gold Central Government to make rules on the Gold control Rules to have been framed by the Central Governments in exercise of its powers under S.3 of the Act. The central Government promulgated the defense even there as no rule controlling or regulating there dealings in gold by the these rule. By a further amendments to the defences of India Rule Gold Controls to the rule were introduced in the Defenses of India rules as part XIIA of the Defence of India Rules. They came to into force on the 10th January 1963. The preamble of these rule reads: ""In exercise of the powers conferred by the S. 3 of the Defence of the India Act. 1962 (51 of the 1962), the central Government hereby makes the following further amendment of in the Defences of India Rules, 1962 namely:"" And the short title reads ""These rule may be called the Defence of India (Amendment) Rules, 1963"" The headings of part XIIA of the Defence of India Rules is ""Gold Control"". It conceits of the rule 126A to 126Z to and these rule are generally called and know is as Gold Control Rules"" and I would and hereafter also refer to these rules as the Gold Contra l Rules. It conceits of the rule 126A to 126Z to and these rule are generally called and know is as Gold Control Rules"" and I would and hereafter also refer to these rules as the Gold Contra l Rules. The rules initially framed on 10th January 1963 were further amended by two amendments t the defenses of the India Rules - (1) by the 7th June, 1963 and (2) by the 9th amendments which come into force on the 23rd September 1963. It would be sufficient for the purposes of this case to refers to the provisions of the Gold Control Rules as they stands after both these amendments. It may also be stated that for the purpose, of administration of these Gold Rules initially an All India Board called "" Gold Board"" was constituted. At the time of the hearings of the this petition, however by reason of he amendments of Gold Control Rules, the administration of the Gold Control is notion the hands of the ""Gold Board"" is not the hands of the administrators. Respondents Nos 1 to 4 to this petition are members of Gold Board. No order can be passed against the are Gold Board. The other two respondents are the collectors of central excise, Bombay, and the union of the India. (5) Rule 126A is an interpretation of clause. A dealer has-been defined in sub- section clause (c) as ""any persons who carries on directly or otherwise the business of - (I) making manufacturing buying selling meltings processing of the converting gold for the purposes of the making or manufacturing ornaments, (ii) buying, selling, supplying, distributing meltings processings of the converting gold for the purposes of making or the manufacturing ornaments whether for the cash or the for deferred payments, or for commission remuneration or others valuable consideration"". There is inclusive clauses including in an undivided Hindu family which carries on business, company society et. But it the is not necessary for the purposes of this case to the case to refer to these various clauses. There is inclusive clauses including in an undivided Hindu family which carries on business, company society et. But it the is not necessary for the purposes of this case to the case to refer to these various clauses. Clause (d) defined gold : ""Gold"" means gold, including its allow whether virgin, melted remitted wrought or un wrought in any shape or form of the purity of not less than nine carats and including any gold coin (Whether legal tender or not) any ornaments and any other article of gold"" Clauses (f) deftness Ian finished form meant for the any personal adornments, or for the adornments of any idol, deity or any other object of religious worship, made of or manufactures of religious worship made for manufactured from gold, whether not set with stones or gems real or the artificial or with the pearls real cultures or limitation or with all or any of the them and includes prates pendants or broken pieces of ornaments"" clauses (g) defines ""Primary gold"" as gold in any unfinished from and included all ingots, bars, blocks slabs billets, shots pellets rods and the wriest"". Clauses (h) defines a ""refiner"" as the owner or occupier of refinery and clauses (I) defines or ""refinery"" as place where gold is melted, processed, converted or reigned. Part XII - A has been converted or refined sub- divided into six chapters. The first chapter, containing rules 126B, 126C and 126D relates to control of the business in gold, and these provisions are the most important provisions for the purpose are the most important provisions for the purposes aerate petition. Chapter 3 deals with licensing of the dealers and refines. Chapter 4 relates to the returns and accounts. Chapter IV - A which has been amended by the amendment effected in the September 1963, has made certain concessions in favour of petty goldsmiths, called concessions in favours of petty called certified goldsmiths. Chapter V relates to declaration of the gold by individuals and chapter VI is ambiance lanes chapter. In my opinion it is not of these various rules in the six chapters ,but the it would be sufficient to the state the combined effect the these of this case. Chapter V relates to declaration of the gold by individuals and chapter VI is ambiance lanes chapter. In my opinion it is not of these various rules in the six chapters ,but the it would be sufficient to the state the combined effect the these of this case. The business of the gold has been controlled by t he these rules, principles by prohibiting manufacture of articles of gold other than ornaments by placing certain restrictions on makings of ornaments by imposing certain restrictions of ornaments imposing certain restorations of the prohibition I n the matter of grant of load by the bankers or the money lenders the hypothecation of gold, and he requiring he deletes refines, money tenders and persons other than the dealers of the refines in others than the deltas of the word common man to submit certain returns money a common certain forms. The provisions of these rules thus after deals refines money lenders as well as a common man. Now the term ""Dealer"" would include persons dealings in gold as well as persons dealing in ornaments and also include person who are doing the business of goldsmith. I would now proceed to summarize how these rules after these different categories of persons. (6) Dealers : We first proceed with the category of the ""Dealer"" He cannot make or manufacture and article of gold except ornaments but after the 24-6-1963 a delta is allowed to make articles other than ornaments, on obtaining authorization in this respect from the Administrator. He cannot accept any ornament of a purity exceeding 14 carats for policing or repair. No dealer can make or manufacture any article of gold of a purity exceeding 14 carats. He cannot manufacture, prepare sell or the wise transfer and agree to the sell or agreed to the transfer or expose or offer to sell o offer to the transfer any ornaments having gold or a purity exceeding 14 carts. It may however be stated that on months period from the commencements of these rule was allowed to the which dealers for disposal of stock of gold ornaments which was already in their possession. A dealer in was required to convert the primary gold already in the his possession prior to the coming into force of these rules into gold to purity of 14 carats. A dealer in was required to convert the primary gold already in the his possession prior to the coming into force of these rules into gold to purity of 14 carats. He is also similarly required to convert within the a week gold that the might be subsequently coming into the hi possession. A dealer cannot carry on the business on money lending on the same premises in which his carrying the business of the dealer. He cannot sell or otherwise transfer to any perinea any load irrespective which he has advanced any load was advanced of the fact whether the loan was before or after the commencement of the order. This additional condition has been imposed by the amendments which come into effect on the 24th June 1963. He cannot also deliver bank the gold to the borrower even where the load has been repaid by him, much less before without the permission of the administrative. A dealer who has been registered under the Sales Tax act cannot any more carry on business except or boating the license fro the administrator. Such a dealer is required to the make an application for a license. If a dealer who is required to make an application for a license, fails to the apply or the whose application has been rejected or canceled has to sell or otherwise transfer all the Gold in the his possession has otherwise transfer all the gold the intake his possession to another dealer or refiner licensed under the Act with the given time. A dealer who is required to make an application for license or to whom a licenses has been gated haste file periodically returns relating to the gold in his possession or under his control, and to give his such further particulars as may be prescribed from time to time. In the periodical returns, which his required to submit, in the has to show that additional gold coming into this possession after he has last coming in to the possession after the he has last made his return. A dealer cannot come acquire or agree to the acquire or but gold, from the any person other than licensed dealer or refiner. He cannot sell gold , the her than ornaments to any persons other than a person a holding permit or a licensed dealer or refiner. A dealer cannot come acquire or agree to the acquire or but gold, from the any person other than licensed dealer or refiner. He cannot sell gold , the her than ornaments to any persons other than a person a holding permit or a licensed dealer or refiner. (7) Refiner: A refiner cannot make or manufacture any article of gold other than primary gold. However after 24th June 1963, he is allowed to make or manufacture articles other than ornaments of any purity fro the administrator. A refiner was required to convert gold in this possession of the purity exceeding 14 carats into god to purity not exceeding 14 carats within the week of the date, or such further period as may be allowed from the date the rules come into force. Similarly he is required to convert the primary to the gold acquired by him subsequently into gold to the purity not exceeding 14 carts. The administrators however cold authorities into gold to exceeding in 14 carts. The primary gold manufactured of sold by the refiner after the date of the rules common to the force is required to be stamped by the a stamp approved by the Administrators giving certain prescribed particulars including the date of manufacture its purity and identify of the maker or manufacturer. By a subsequent notification of issued on the 1st May 1964, however, this rules has been relaxed and exemption has been granted in respect of article such as foils, leaves answers. But these articles are required to be labeled for the purpose of identification with the referee to purity, date to the make or manufacture maker or manufacturer. A refiner is required to obtain a license fro the Administrator in order to the enable to the him continue the business of refiner. He has to make periodical returns of the gold in his possession or under this control giving certain details as prescribed including the quantity and description thereof. He has to the maintain account books In the prescribed forms. He cannot sell or deliver gold to the any person a permit from the Administrator. He has to make periodical returns of the gold in his possession or under this control giving certain details as prescribed including the quantity and description thereof. He has to the maintain account books In the prescribed forms. He cannot sell or deliver gold to the any person a permit from the Administrator. (8) Common man: As regards a common man, which includes a minor, lunatic, deity, trusts, court of the Wards, Receiver official assignee a Hindu undimmed family, company firm wake institution and an individual he cannot place any other with the dealer whether licensed or not for making manufacturing or preparation of ornaments having gold of purity exceeding 14 carts. He has within 30 days oft date on which thermals came into force. To declare gold other than ornaments I this possession in excess of 20 grams in the case of the minor, and 50 grams in the case of any other person. He cannot but or otherwise iron obtaining a permit from the administrator, gold so acquired on permit cannot be sold without a permit. Gold not required to the bedeclared a permit gold without permits . it may however, been grated to certified goldsmiths. It is possible for the common man to convent his old ornaments new ornaments not exceeding that purity. (9) Concession of granted to certified Goldsmiths: This is an concession granted to the petty dealers who were not register for the purposes of sales tax and who were carrying on business of goldsmiths since before the coming into force the Gold Control Rules on obtaining is certificate fro the Administrator. They are allowed to do certain kind of business. They can accept fro the person other than a dealer or a refiner any ornaments of the purity in excess of 14 carats for the purpose of makings or manufacturing new ornaments subject to the restriction of that the gold contained in then ornaments that the gold contained in the new unman does not exceed purity and total quantity of gold contained intake or negative primary got of the purity exceeding 14 cares by the melting or processing or coverings any ornaments subject to the prime gold in the excess of 100 grams. On cancellations oft his certificates., he has be transfer gold to the dealers or are refiner. On cancellations oft his certificates., he has be transfer gold to the dealers or are refiner. (10) These is brief are the restriction and prohibitions imposed by the gold control rules of deters refines money lenders and other person. It is hardly necessary to the state that the effect of the Gold Control Rules are ferreting and largely affecting these persons. The effect in short is that business in gold exceeding purity more than 14 carats has been brogues partially to a standstill. It is only open to the convert old ornaments into new ornaments of purity exceeding 14 carats. The other effect its persons possession of the gold other than ornaments over certain very small quantity have to declare to the gold inter possession and thirdly, for much periodical possession and thirdly from three periodical returns which was are required to be furnished by the person falling in the aforesaid control categories the Administrator of gold. It is there provisions which have been challenged before me by the petitioners who is a dealer in gold. (11) I have already stated the two principal contentions which have been raised onto behalf of the Petitioner. The arguments advanced of by Mr. Mehta, learned counsel for the petitioners in short, is that the S. 3 o the act authorities the center l Government to make rules for certain purposes mentioned in sub -section (1) S. 3. The rules framed have in intimate real or proximate connection with the any to those purposes. On the other hand of the rule have been framed for the purposes of the bringing about a socio - economic reform with the view to changing the age long habits of the people of India, a purposes entirely outside the scope of the sub - section (1) of S. 3 of the Act. In other words the arguments of Mr. Mehta is that the rule framed are not with the competence of the central government inasmuch as they are in ecusee of the rule making power contained in the sub -section (1) S. 3 of the Defenses of the India At, and is colorable piece of the legislation. According to Mr. Mehta, there are the statutes book various enactments of the relating of the control of the smudging of the gold and the foreign the exchanges of India. According to Mr. Mehta, there are the statutes book various enactments of the relating of the control of the smudging of the gold and the foreign the exchanges of India. If really the government wanted to control smudging, they could easily have achieved this purpose by the suitable amending s those governments button the framing there rules, the governments has not really the motive oft controlling the smuggling of gold but on the other hand the has the motive of the effecting a socio - economic reform which the a view to the make people changes of the their habits. The other aspect of the arguments affirm. Mehta is the that the rule violate of the provisions of S. 44 of the act, inasmuch as they excessively and the UN unsanitary interfere with the ordinary avocations of the life and the enjoyments of the property of persons. The other contentions party is violation of the Articles 25 and 26 and the constitution. (12) Mr. Bhabha, learned counsel for the Respondents, o the other hand argues that in the constituting the rules that these rules haven placed before the parliament as required by the S. 41 of the Act. The parliaments has not thought it necessary either to modify or annual house rules. The fetter imposed onto legislative powers by Article 358 of the constitution. Enforcements of fundamental rights under Article 14, 21 and 22 have been barred. The entire legislative power rests with the a parliaments by reasons of the provisions of the power Article 250 and 353(b) of the constitution of the power to make rules is not confined be the sub - section (1) S. 3. On the other hand, the legislature in enacting sub - section (2) S. 3 has declared its intention that the rule made under any one oft more of the clauses of the sub - section (2) would necessarily be for securing any one or more of the purpose of the At. Therefore, where it is shown that the rule fall under any one or more of the clauses of the sub - section (2), it is no more necessary for the respondents to establish any excuse of the real or proximate connection of between the rules or providence connection of between the rules framed and the purpose mentioned I sub - section (1) . such rule can be struck and down only if it is show by the persons challenging the rules that that are totally incapable of being related to sub - section (1) of S. 3 of the At. According in to Mr. Bhabha, the rules falls nude clauses 23, and 33 of the sub =section (2) of S. 3 of the Act. In the alternative Mr. Bhabha contends that there is a real and proximate connections of that between the rules real and framed and the purpose mentioned in sub- section (1) S. 3 of the Act. The object of these lees is to the Act. The object to these rule is to arrest smuggling, and thereby to improve the position of the Government relating to foreign exchange. This objects has direct and proximate connection with the ""Defense of India"" and also for the arguments affirm. Bhabha that the expression ""defense of India"" is a form of wide amplitude, and would include by the Government to secure of the purposes mentioned in sub -section (1) of S. 3 of the act. There is a presumption oft in favor of validity . section 44 of the act imposes no restriction on the rule making powers of the central government. As regards the arguments affirm. Mehta that the Government could have achieved the object by suitably amending of other enactments. Mr. Bhabha contends that the it is open to this court to make any inquiry as to the necessity of making these rules so consider the question whether the Central Governments could have achieved the object by doing somethings else. The powers conferred on the central Governments under S. 3 of are of very wide amplitude, and the matter has been left to the discretion of the central governments entirely. As regards of the challenges under the Article 25 and Article 26 oft constitution Mr.Bhabha contends that the respondents of facts made o the petition. The decision of the this question involves the decisions of disputed questions of fact therefore could not be gone into enthuse petition. If at all the court feels inclined to go into these question the matter be remanded to the trial courtier the evidences on this matter. We should have stated earlier of that this petition has been filed on the ordinal this side of the high court and has been referred to us. If at all the court feels inclined to go into these question the matter be remanded to the trial courtier the evidences on this matter. We should have stated earlier of that this petition has been filed on the ordinal this side of the high court and has been referred to us. (13) The first question of that arises is the constructions of S. 3 of the Act. Material part of s. 3 reads: ""The central Government may, by notification in the official gazette, make such rules as appears to it necessary or expedients for securing the defenses of India and civil defenses the public safety, the maintenances of public order or the efficient conduct of military operations, or for maintaining supplies and services essential to e the life of the community. (2) Without prejudice to the generality to the powers conferred by sub - section (1), the rules my provide for the and may empowers any authority to make orders providing for all or any of the following matter s namely: XX XX XX XX XX (23) the control of trade or industry for the purposes of regulating or increasing for the supply of the obtaining of information with the regard to articles or things or any description whatsoever which may be used in the connections with the conduct of the military operations or civil defense or for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community; XX XX XX XX XX (33) controlling the possession use or disposal of or dealing in coin, bullion bank notes, currency notes securities or foreign exchange"". Turning to sub - section (1) S 3, it authorizes the Central Government to make rules for securing the following purposes. (1) The defense of India: (2) Civil defense; (3) Public safety; (4) maintenance of public order; (5) efficient conduct of military operations; and (6) maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community. For securing these purposes the Central Government is empowered to ""Make such rules as appear to it necessary or expedient"". (1) The defense of India: (2) Civil defense; (3) Public safety; (4) maintenance of public order; (5) efficient conduct of military operations; and (6) maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community. For securing these purposes the Central Government is empowered to ""Make such rules as appear to it necessary or expedient"". It would thus be seen that the power conferred by sub - section (1) of S. 3 is conditioned by two circumstances: The first is that the power can be exercised only for securing one or more of the authorized only for securing one or more of the authorized purposes, and the other is that the central government on application of its mind may find or it may appears to the central Government on application of its mind may find or t may appears to the central Governments necessary or expedient to the exercise if for securing the prescribed purpose. This is obviously so because the rules and regulations made in times of emergency entrench on the rights and liberties of persons, and it is therefore that the parliament requires the central Government to apply it its mind and consider whether it is necessary in the circumstances of the case tome such rules. It follows that merely becuases the rules relate to the purposes mentioned in sub - section (1) of the S. 3, by the itself it not sufficient to sustain the rules. It has further to be established that not only, that the rules secure the authorized purposes but it has appeared to the central government that it is necessary or expedient to make those that rules, similarly, it is not sufficient to show that it appeared to the central government that it is necessary or expedient to make those rules, but the rules must for securing any of the authorized purposes. In other words there must be a connection between the rules framed and the authorized purposes mentioned in sub = section (1) oft S. 3. To the extent or nature of the connection, we will advert later. In other words there must be a connection between the rules framed and the authorized purposes mentioned in sub = section (1) oft S. 3. To the extent or nature of the connection, we will advert later. (14) In my view, it is a well settled principle that the when a particular legislature is impugned, the court has to see whether the legislature has acted within its powers, and the second things it has to see it whether in exerting its powers it has not transgressed any of the limits imposed on it by the constitution in Part III of the constitution. In other words, the court has the see whether in enacting a particular legislation the legislature has not violated any of the fundamental right of the citizen. These principles, in my opinion, would equally apply when the courts is called upon to consider the validity or otherwise o the delegated legislation or a legislation made by an authority to a which the legislature had delegated powers. I have already referred to removal of certain Ferraris imposed on the legislature by a part III of the constitution by reason of the declaration of emergency and the orders may by the presidents suspending the enforcement of UN fundamental rights in Articles 14, 21 and 22. In fact, it has notion canvassed before us that the rules contravene any of the articles other than articles 25 and 26 of the constitution. I have therefore first to consider whether the rules made fall within the rule making power of the central government. The ambit power extent of the powers of the central government under sub - section (1) I have already stated. The question which net arises is whether sub - section (2) and (3) confers any additional powers on the central government of to make rules. It is the contention of Mr. Bhabha that sub - section (2) S.3 confer additional independents power. I find it difficult to sustain this arguments of Mr. Bhabha so broadly made. It may be noticed that the words ""Rules"" in sub - section (2) is preceded by the prefix ""the"". The prefix particularizes the rules, and when sub - section (1) , it appears to me that the rule mentioned in sub - section 92) are the rule which are referred to in sub - section (1) S. 3. It may be noticed that the words ""Rules"" in sub - section (2) is preceded by the prefix ""the"". The prefix particularizes the rules, and when sub - section (1) , it appears to me that the rule mentioned in sub - section 92) are the rule which are referred to in sub - section (1) S. 3. The rule making power conferred by sub - section (2) therefore is subject to the same limitations as are imposed by sub - section (1) of S. 3. To hold others would amount to conferral of unanalyzed control it and powers on the central governments. Colt it be said that the rules falling under any of the clause of sub - section (2) are valid rule even though they have no relations whatsoever, with any of the purposes mentioned in the sub - section 91) of S. 3 of the act? I would illustrate clause (6) of sub - section (2) empowers of the central Government to make rules ""regulating the publications of new and the inflammations"" it is open to the Government to require the newspapers to publish certain news which have no connection whatsoever with any of the purposes mentioned in sub =section (1) for instances, the births and marriages ate place of the governments servant. When I part the question to Mr. Bhabha in this from, Mr. Bhabha repaired that this entry being ambiguous ,it may be open to the court of the investigate the matter further. But it had been the arguments of Mr. Bhabha that causes (33) is specific of and there is no ambiguity about it. Turning to clauses (33) it inter alia, authorizes the central Government of the make rules ""Controlling the use....... of bullion"" and according to Mr. Bhabha, bullion included gold ornaments. I asked Mr. Bhanga that if a rule is made by the central Governments that no personal shall puts on ornaments of is his possession of any day including a festival day, would it be a value rule? I did not receive a satisfactory answer. Obviously if clauses (33) is interpreted as Mr. Bhabha wants me to interpret, the assumed rule would fall under that the clause. It is obvious that such a rule can have no connection whatsoever with the purposes mentioned it sub = section (1) of S. 3. I therefore find it difficult to accept Mr. Obviously if clauses (33) is interpreted as Mr. Bhabha wants me to interpret, the assumed rule would fall under that the clause. It is obvious that such a rule can have no connection whatsoever with the purposes mentioned it sub = section (1) of S. 3. I therefore find it difficult to accept Mr. Bhabha contention a so broadly stated. It appears to the me that the legislature having generally stated in sub - section (1) of S,. 3 the power conferred on the central government have projected its mind into future envisaging certain subjects relating to which the central governments may having to frame rules for securing the purposes mentioned in sub = section (1) of S. 3 it is appears to the central Governments necessary or expedient, to do so. In other words, the Legislature in enacting sub -section (2) has given a guidance's to the central government in the matter of what it can do far securing the aforesaid purposes in exercised of the powers conferred on it by the sub -section (1) of the S. 3 of the act. Sub = section (2) does not in any manner restrict the powers conferred by sub - section (1), because sub - section (2) intake terms states that it is without prejudice to the generality of the powers conferred by the sub - section (1), nor does it confer any additional power on the central Governments intake matter affirming rules. It would, therefore follow that the when it is shown that the rues framed a fall in the any one or more of the clauses of sub - section (2), the court will presume that the rule would have a bearing on any one or more of the purposes mentioning on any one or more of the purposes, mentioned in sub - section (1) of S. 3. The burden of proving the contrary would lie., and would lie heavily on the party which challenges this position. I find it difficult to take the matter any further of the than this. Apart from the construction of the section, the decided cases relating to the provisions similar to then with which I am concerned here. The burden of proving the contrary would lie., and would lie heavily on the party which challenges this position. I find it difficult to take the matter any further of the than this. Apart from the construction of the section, the decided cases relating to the provisions similar to then with which I am concerned here. (15) The first is a decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in King Emperor, v. Sibnath Benerji, 72 Ind App 241, (AIR 1945 PC 156) Sibnath Banerji and other were detained pursuant to order made under rule 26 of the Defence of India Rules 1940. These order were signed by the order of the governor. The said rule 26 was purported the have been made under S. 2(2) (x) of the Defense of India act 1939. It was held by the courts in India following the decision of the Federal court in Keshav Talpade, v. Emperor, 1943 FCR 49, (AIR 1943 FC 1) that the rule was ultra vires of the rule making power of the government of India under S. 2(2) (x) and the detention, therefore and was bad. An appeal was taken the decision of their lordship, it would be convenient to reproduce the relevant provisions of the said S. 2 of the Defense of the India Act 1939. ""2 (1) The central Government may, be notification in the official gazette, make such rules as appears to it to be necessary or expedient for securing the defense of British India, the public safety , the maintenance's of public order of the efficient prosecution of war or for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of the powers conferred by sub - section I, the rule may provide for ,or may empowers any authority to make orders providing for, all or any of the following matters, namely:- If the aforesaid provisions of S. 2 of the defense of India act, 1939, of are placed in just a position with the provisions of S. 3 of the Defence of India Act, 1962, it would be seen that the provisions are identical except that the certain more purposes have been added in subsection (1) of S. 3 of the act. The preamble of sub - section (2) of S. 2 of the Defence of the India Act 1939, is identical with the preamble of sub - section (2) of the of S. 3 and of the present act. The Federal court in Taplade' case 1943 FCR 49, (AIR 1943 FC 1) in construing rule 26, which had been framed under S. 2(2) (x), observed. ""The legislature having set out in the plain and unambiguous language in para (x) the scope of the rules which may be made providing the for apprehension, and detention in custody, it is not permissible to pray in aid the more general words in the S. 2, sub - section 1, in order to justify a rule which so plainly goes beyond the limits of part (x); though if the par (x) were not in the act at all....... We are compelled therefore to hold the rule making powers which the legislature has though fit to the confer upon the central government and is for that the reason invalid:"" The line for reasoning adopted by the Federal court was not the accepted by their lordships dealing with the aforesaid view their Lordships observed at p. 258 (of Ind app) (at p. 160 of AIR) of the reports; ""Their Lordships are unable to agree with the learned chief Justice of the Federal court on his Statement of the relative positions of the sub - section 1 and 2 of the Defense of India act and counsel for the respondents in the present appeal was unable to support that statement or to maintain R. 26 was invalid. In the opinion of the Lordships the function of the sub - section 2 is merely if an illustrative one, the rule - making power is conferred by sub =section 1, and ""the rule"" which are referred to intake opening sentence of sub -section 2, are the rules which are authorized by and made under sub -section 1, the authorized by and made under sub - section 2 are not restrictive of sub = section 1, as indeed in expressly stated b the words ""with out prejudice to the generality of the power conferred to by sub section 1."" From the aforesaid observations of their lordship it is clears that the Lordships were considering the relative positions of sub -section (1) and sub -section (2) of s. 2 oft Defense of the India Act, 1939 and the relative positions are that the rule making power is contained in that the sub -section (1) and the clauses of sub - section (2) of are merely illustrative of that powers. The illustrations given arrant exhaustive and do not restrict the scope of sub - section (1), do not restrict that scope of sub - section (1) but the position of the clauses is not any more than mere illustrations of the powers contained is sub - section (1). (16) The next decisions of Santosh Kumar Jain v. The state 1951 SCR 303 ; ( AIR 1951 SC 201 ) The provisions that were constructed by their lordships of the supreme court in this case are the orders made under sub - section (2) of S.3 of the Essential supplies (Temporary powers) Act 1946. Sub - section (1) of. 3 empowered the Central Government so far as it appears to it be necessary or expedient for maintain to increasing supplies of an Estonian commodity or for securing their equitable distribution and availability at fair prices by notified the order to the provide for regulating or prohibiting the production supply and distribution, thereof, and trade and commerce therein. Sub - section (2) provided that ""Without prejudice that the generality of the powers conferred b y sub = section (2) provided that the prejudciethe generality of the power conferred by the sub - section (1) an order made therefore under may provide....."". Sub - section (2) provided that ""Without prejudice that the generality of the powers conferred b y sub = section (2) provided that the prejudciethe generality of the power conferred by the sub - section (1) an order made therefore under may provide....."". it would be seen that sub -section 92) of the S. 3 of the E.S.T.P. Act is an to in identical terms with sub - section (2) of S.3 of the Defense of the India Act .there is a variation. The expression used in the Defended of India Act is ""the rules"" while the expression used intake E.S.T.P. Act is an order a made under. Construing, these provisions Mr .justice Patanli sastri, delivering the judgment of the court at p. 310 (of SCR): (at p. 203 of AIR) of the report observed: ""It is manifest that sub - section (2) of S. 3 confers no further or other powers on the central Government than what are conferred under sub - section (1) for it is ""an order made thereunder"" that may provide for one or the other of the matters specifically, enumerated in sub -section (2) which are only illustrative, as generality of the powers conferred by sub - section (1)"" Seizure of an article being thus shown to fall within the purview of sub - section (1) it must be competent for the central government of delegated the provincial governments to its delegate apart from and irrespective of the anticipated contravention of any others order as contemplated in clause (j) of sub - section (2) ......... The view we have expressed above receives support from the decision of the privy council in Sibnath Banerjee's case, 72 Ind App. 241; (AIR 1945 PC 156)"" It would be seen that though there is a slight variation in the language used in S. 2(2) of the Defense of India Act, 1939, and S. 3(2) of the Essential supplies (T.P) Act, 1946, the principle governing both the decisions is the same, namely the relative position of the two sub - sections. On this aspect of the case of its also necessary to refer to the decision of the privy council in Attorney General for Canada v. Hallet Agree Ltd., 1952 AC 427, a decision on which very strong reliance has been placed by Mr. On this aspect of the case of its also necessary to refer to the decision of the privy council in Attorney General for Canada v. Hallet Agree Ltd., 1952 AC 427, a decision on which very strong reliance has been placed by Mr. Bhabha not only on this aspect, but from other aspects of the case with which I am concerned. It would therefore be convenient to deal with this case in with which I am concerned. It would therefore be convent to deal with this case in detail at this stage and then refer to the passages on which Mr. Bhabha has placed reline in support of the his arguments on different aspects of this case. Facts giving rise to the decision is brief were. This case went to the privy Council from the Canada. During the last war the Canadian Legislature enacted ""War Measures act"" On the termination of the war, and emergency, it was found that it was necessary to continue certain provisions of the Emergency Act as well Aston make certain other provisions for certain other purpose. The National Emergency Transitional Powers Act, 1945 was therefore enacted,. Section 2(1) of the Act provided: ""The Governor - in - Council may do and authorize such acts and the things and make from time to time such orders and regulations, as he may be reason of continued existence of the National emergency arising out of the war against Germany and japan deem necessary or advisable for the purposes of the maintaining controlling and regulating use supplies and services, prices, transportation use and occupations of the property rentals employment's salaries and wages of the ensure economic stability and an orderly transaction to conditions of peace"". In exercise of the aforesaid powers conferred by the exercise sub - section (1) of S. 2 an Order in Council was and made on 3rd April 1947. Which by clause 22 provided that ""all oats and barley in commercial positions in Canada with certain specified exceptions in the hereby vested intake Canadian Wheat Board"". The respondent, who held a large stock and barely about 40,000 bushels was affected by the order. The validity of this order - in - council was challenged by the respondents. One of the arguments was that the Government expropriation was allowed was under sub - section (1) S. 2 oft Act. The respondent, who held a large stock and barely about 40,000 bushels was affected by the order. The validity of this order - in - council was challenged by the respondents. One of the arguments was that the Government expropriation was allowed was under sub - section (1) S. 2 oft Act. The argument of behalf of the respondents was that expropriation was in items allowed by a clause of sub - section (2) of the war Measures Act. In express terms such powers was not conferred by S. 2 (1) on the Governor in council by the National Emergency Transitional powers by Act. In had, therefore been argued that the governor had no such powers. On the other hand ,the arguments advanced on behalf of the government was that there was no curtailments of the Governors powers under the National the Emergency Transactional powers Act. The powers were identical with the powers execrable under sub - section (1) of S. 2 oft Transactional power act was limited to certain other purposes only. It may be noticed that between sub = section (1) of S. 3 of the war Measures Act and sub - Section (1) of S. 2, there was not only much material difference except as to the purposes. The contentions raised on behalf of the respondents which were based on the aforesaid difference in the two Act - the War Measures Act and the National Emergency Transitional powers Act - the were not accepted by the privy council. Dealing with the relative position of sub - section (2) and sub - section (1) of S. 3 of the war Measures Act, their Lordship at passages 448 - 449 observed. ""So the hold would threaten the very basis of the Act. Their lordships think that here is not by now any room for doubt as to the function performed by the list of permitted subjects in S. 3 of the War Measures Act. The form adopted is plainly borrowed from S. 91 of the Birth North America Act 1867. They do not extend the purpose already defined for they are directed to explaining what can be done, not the object for which thing may be done, they do not extend any more than they limit its powers for all that the they permit is already permitted by the general word that the precede them. They do not extend the purpose already defined for they are directed to explaining what can be done, not the object for which thing may be done, they do not extend any more than they limit its powers for all that the they permit is already permitted by the general word that the precede them. What they do is to state explicitly certain things do its to state expelifailing within the range of the general powers already conferred. In that sense alone they extend, because the amplify, those powers"". ""What can be done"" are to the be treated as falling within the range"" , ""they extend, because they amplify those powers and it is his arguments that this decision is an authority for the proposition that sub - section and (2) of S. 3 of the Act confers ineptness and additional powers one the central Government. In my opinion, on the arguments is not well founded. It is turn that the clauses is not on which emphasis has been laid by Mr. Bhabha if read in isolation of its context, may give of an impression that sub -section (2) confer power to make rules onto subjects mentioned in its clauses in addition to and independently of the provisions of sub - section (1). But reading those clauses in isolation would and when so read it is abundantly clear that sub - section have (1). In these observations their Lordship have pointed out that the function per formed by the list of permitted subject of the not the under sub - section (1). The rule making powers on the subjects mentioned in sub - section (2) has to be exercised only when it is required out for securing the purposes on mentioned in sub - section (1). Their lordships pointed out; ""They do not extent the purposes already defined for the thing may be done. They do not extent any more than they limit its powers"". It is in the context of this statement of the law that the other observations oft Lordship have to the understood. (17) Mr. Bhabha also has referred us to a passage from the judgment oft supreme court in AIR 1964 SC 381 . The observations on which he placed reliance are contained in paragraph 38 of the their Lordship Judgment. It is in the context of this statement of the law that the other observations oft Lordship have to the understood. (17) Mr. Bhabha also has referred us to a passage from the judgment oft supreme court in AIR 1964 SC 381 . The observations on which he placed reliance are contained in paragraph 38 of the their Lordship Judgment. ""In the present cases, one has merely to read S. 3(1) and the detailed provisions contained inter several clauses of S. 3 (2) of the be satisfied that the attack against the validity of the said section on the ground of the excessive delegation is patently unsustainble. Not only is the legislative policy broadly indicated I the preamble to the act, but the relevant provisions oft impugned section itself give such detailed and specific guidance's to the rule - making authority that it would be idle to the contend that the act has delegated essentially legislative function to the rule - making authority"". Now these observation have been made in repelling the contention of that S. 3 of the act, with which I am here concerned, suffered from the vice of excessive delegation of legislative powers. These observations of in my opinion no not assist the contention of Mr. Bhabha that the additional or independents rule making power has been conferred by sub = section (2) of S. 3 of the Act. The se are all the authorities to which counsel forth parties have drawn our attention. In my opinion, there fore no additional or independent rule - making authority or power has been conferred in the central Government of any of the caluses of sub -section (2) of S. 3 of the Act. It therefore follows, that the limitation imposed in sub - section (1) of S. 3 would equally be applicable to and govern the rule making power of the central Government relating to the subjects mentioned in clauses 1 to 57 of sub - section (2) of S. 3 of the act. In other words, the powers of the central Government to make rules on any of those subjects is execrable only for securing the purpose authorized by sub - section (1) of. 3 in the event of the Central Government from an opinion that it was necessary or expedient for it do so. In other words, the powers of the central Government to make rules on any of those subjects is execrable only for securing the purpose authorized by sub - section (1) of. 3 in the event of the Central Government from an opinion that it was necessary or expedient for it do so. A challenge to the validity of the rule made under any of the clauses of sub - section (2) or under sub - section (1) on either or both these grounds would, in my opinion therefore be justifiable issue. (18) I would, however, assume that sub - section (2) confer an independent and additional rule making power in central Government and proceed to examine whether the Gold Control Rules fall either under clause (23) or (33) of sub -section (2) of S.3 of the Act. I have already reproduced these clauses. The arguments of Mr. Bhabha relating to clause (23) is that this clauses authorities the Central Government to control trade or industry in respect of the articles or things of any description. The expression ""articles or things of any description"" is wide enough to the include gold. Gold control rule have been made for the Control of the trade is gold, these rules therefore fairly fall under clauses (23) of the sub - section (2), of S.3 of the Act. It is indeed true that clauses (23) permits the central Government of the make rules to control trade or industry in respect of articles or things of any description but on what that powers, the clauses itself has placed limitations. The limitation esthete the rule could be made only for the purposes of regulating or increasing the supply of such articles which may be used in connection with the conduct of military operations or civil defense or for maintaining the supplies or services essential to the life of the community. The rule making power conferred under this clauses is to enable the Government of obtain an adequatesupply of articles required for securing the aforesaid purposes. I have already stated that the effect of the rule is that the for all practical purposes dealings in gold of the azurite in excess of 14 carats have been brought to a standstill. New ornaments of gold purity in exec of 14 carats have been prohibited save and except converting old ornaments into new ones. I have already stated that the effect of the rule is that the for all practical purposes dealings in gold of the azurite in excess of 14 carats have been brought to a standstill. New ornaments of gold purity in exec of 14 carats have been prohibited save and except converting old ornaments into new ones. In the circumstances I fail to see how these could be said to be made for the purpose of ""Regulating or increasing supply of gold"". In fact it is the case of the respondents in their return that the object of the rule is to the stop smuggling of gold. If that be so, I against fail to see how it could be said that gold if the an article which is required in connections with the conduct of military operations or civil defense or for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community. I may also further state the rule made either fall under clauses (23) of the sub - section (2) of S. 3 of act or that the rules have been framed in exercise of the powers conferred by the said clause. In may opinion therefore the rules do not fall under the said clauses. (23). (19) Turning to clause (33), which confers power onto Central Government to make rules for controlling the possession, use or disposal of or dealing in the certain articles including bullion it is the contention of Mr. Bhabha that the words ""Bullion"" is wide enough to the cover gold it ornaments and article of the gold, which is the subject - matter of gold control rules. Onto other hand, Mr. Mehta contends that the words ""Bullion"" is not wide enough to include ornaments or articles of gold. The world only means mass of gold. The first question therefore that arises is what meaning is attributable to the words ""Bullion"" as contained in various dictionary. Mr. Bhabha referred to us to the meaning of ""Bullion"" as given by Jowitt in the Dictornary, of English law, Webster's Dictionary, and in the new Encyclopedia Britannic Volume 4 Mr. Mehta, on the other hand referred us to the meaning of the expression in Murray;s dictionary. Jewitt defines ""bullion"" as ""unchained gold and the silver in the mass. Mr. Bhabha referred to us to the meaning of ""Bullion"" as given by Jowitt in the Dictornary, of English law, Webster's Dictionary, and in the new Encyclopedia Britannic Volume 4 Mr. Mehta, on the other hand referred us to the meaning of the expression in Murray;s dictionary. Jewitt defines ""bullion"" as ""unchained gold and the silver in the mass. These metals are called so either the when melted from the native are and not perfectly refined, or when they are and perfectly refined, but melted down into bars or ingots, or into any unwrought body of any defer of finesses."". wesbter defines bullion as ""gold or silver considered merely as so much metal without regard to any value imparted to the by it from.... uncoiled gold or silver in the shape of bars ingots, or comparable masses an ornamental mental boss used on harness jewelry or other object."" In the Encyclopedia, the meaning given is ""the name given to gold and silver considered solely as merchandise. When coin and specie a are tread as bullion it is their weight and fineness which care reckoned, not their and face valve. Bullion thus means the gold and silver of the mines brought to a standard of purity"". Murray gives that meaning as ""Precious metal in the mass. Gold or silver in the lump, as distinguished from coin or manufactured gold or silver when considered or simply with reference to its value as raw material"". It would be seen that it those books, ""bullion has been described as mass of the gold not converted into any articles or ornaments. It would be clear that the rules which regulate the preparation of ornaments of and also regulate the borrowing of money on the hypothecation of the gold or gold ornaments and also regulate the borrowing of money onto hypothecation of gold of gold ornaments can hardly be said to befalling under clauses (33) of sub - section (2) of S. 3 of the Act. It is however the arguments of the Mr. Bhabha that clauses (33) empowers the Central Government of to make rules controlling possession use or disposal ordering in bullion. It would necessarily follow that the central Government of make rules controlling possession use of bullion. It is however the arguments of the Mr. Bhabha that clauses (33) empowers the Central Government of to make rules controlling possession use or disposal ordering in bullion. It would necessarily follow that the central Government of make rules controlling possession use of bullion. It would necessarily follow that the central Government would also have implied powers to make rules in order to enable it to exercise power which is conferred on it. According to Mr. Bhabha rules relating to controlling possession use or disposal or dealing in ornaments as well as dealings in ornaments and gold by hypothecation would also have implied powers is well settled and the principle is that they are such pwoer without the exercise of which the power expressly conferred cannot be exercised. The power expressly conferred to of ""controlling the possession use or disposal of or dealing in ornaments. We do not find anything's stated in the affidavit of the respondents showing how the exercise of the claimed implied power was necessary of the exercise of the power expressly granted of the Act. In absence of any material placed before us it is difficult to accept this contention of Mr. Bhabha. In Bidi, Bidi Leave and Tobacco Merchants Association Gondia v. State of the Bombay AIR 1962 SC 486 , their Lord ship of the supreme court after considering certain authorities and after the cited the observations of the police relating to the doctrine of implied power observed. ""In other words, the doctrine of implied powers can be legitimately invoked when Itis found that a duty has been imposed or a power conferred on an authority by a statutes and it is further found that the duty cannot be discharges onto authorities by duty cannot be discharged or the power cannot be discharged or the power cannot be exercised at all unless some to auxiliary or incidental power is assumed to exist. In such a case in the absence of an implied power the statute itself would become impossible of compliance. The impossibility in question must be of a general nature so that the performance of duty or the exercises of powers is rendered impossible in all cases. In such a case in the absence of an implied power the statute itself would become impossible of compliance. The impossibility in question must be of a general nature so that the performance of duty or the exercises of powers is rendered impossible in all cases. It really means that the statutory provision would becomes a dead letter and cannot be enforced unless subsidiary powers is implied."" It has not been made out either in the affidavit filed by the respondents or in her course of the arguments of the such a position exists nor has it been shown that it was impossible for the Central Government to exercise the power under the said clauses(33) of sub -section (2) of S. 3 without making the rules relating to preparation and ornaments or hypothecation of the ornaments. I therefore find it difficult to accept this aspect of the arguments of the Mr. Bhabha . Mr. Bhabha has also referred us to the definitions of the has also referred us to the different act, ""bullion"" and ""gold"" given different acts viz.,. the foreign Exchanges Regulations Act the Reserve Bank of the India Act. Public Debts Act. I do not consider in necessary to deal in detail with these definitions as in my opinion, these with these definitions as my be of any useful assurances in constrain the meaning of the words ""Bullion"" in classes (33). I may also state the in the notification bringing in force the Gold Control Rules, it has not been mentioned that the rules have been made in the exercise of the power conferred on the Central Government powers conferred on the under S. 3(2) (33). On the other hand, it has been stated that the rules have been framed in exercises of the powers under S. 3 it is true that the omission to mention that the rules have been made under S. 3(2) (33) would not be fatal to the arguments advanced by Mr. Bhabha if it could to have been shown that the rules made were referable to the said clauses. I have larey stated that in my opinion, the rules framed do not squarely fall under the said clause (33). (20) This brings me to the considerations of the question whether the rules framed fall within sub - section (1) of S.3 of the act. I have larey stated that in my opinion, the rules framed do not squarely fall under the said clause (33). (20) This brings me to the considerations of the question whether the rules framed fall within sub - section (1) of S.3 of the act. It is therefore necessary to see whether the rules have been made for securing any one or more of the authored purposes mentioned in sub section (1), and it has also to be ascertained whether opinion has been formed by the Government that the is necessary or expedient for securing the authorized purposes. As regards the first aspect., there has been considerable arguments as the car. On the question Aston what should be the nature do the connection between the object sought to the achieved by the rules and the purposes mentioned ins section (1) of S.3 of the Act the connection of Mr. Mehta had been that the connection must be real and proximate and not hypothetical and remote. On the other had the contention of Mr. Bhabha had been that if contention of Mr. Bhabha has been that it shown that the objects sought to be achieved by the rules are capable of being related to the purposes mentioned in sub = section (1) of S. 3 that is sufficient for the purposes of the sustaining the rules. A number of a authorities have been cited by counsel on both the that sides. It has been cited the arguments of Mr.Mehta that the connection of the between the objects sought to the be achieved by these the rules and the purposes be too remote. Rules have been made with the object of changing the habits of the people of India of making gold a ornaments of boarding gold. It is expected that if these habits are changed, then the demands for gold would be reduced. If the demands for gold is reduced, prices of gold would fall and if prices of gold fall smudging will be reduced. It smuggling is reduced more foreign exchanges would be available to the central Governments. According to Mr. Mehta, the connection between the object of the rules and the securing of the purposes is very remote and the problematic. It has also been the arguments of Mr. It smuggling is reduced more foreign exchanges would be available to the central Governments. According to Mr. Mehta, the connection between the object of the rules and the securing of the purposes is very remote and the problematic. It has also been the arguments of Mr. Mehta that be these rules smuggling will never stop and people will never cease to buy or prepare gold or nationerable number of the authorities in support of their respective at this state, in my view to refer to these authorities. (21) Mr. Mehta has referred me to the decisions reported in Rex v. Basudeva, AIR 1950 FC 67; Supdt, Central Prison, Fatechgrah v. Ram Manohar Lohia, (1960) 2 SCR 821 , [ AIR 1960 SC 633 ] Azim Khan v. Emperor AIR 1945 Lah 154; Lahore Eelctric supply Co.Ltd. 41, Chester v. Bateson (1920) 1 KB 829, attorney Gerneral v. De Keysor's Royal Hotal Ltd., 1920 AC 508. (22) Mr. Bhabha has referred me to certain observations in the decision in 1952 AC 427, and Ross Clunis v. Papadopeulles. [1958] I WLR 546. (23) AIR 1950 FC 67; Respondent, Basudeva was a dealer in kerosene oil, which was an essential commodity as defined in the U.P. Prevention of Black - Marketing [Temporeay powers] Act, On the allegation that the provincial Governement was satisfied that the respondents habitually indulged in back - marketing he was arrested and order to be detained in exercise of the power conferred by S. 3(1) (I) of the Act. The contention"