JUDGMENT G.C. Mathur, J. - This is a special appeal directed against the judgment of a learned single Judge allowing a writ petition filed by Sir Narsingh Bhan Singh, respondent No. 1, and quashing the order of the State Government dated December 20, 1958, by which it had reviewed its previous order dated February 25, 1958. 2. The facts of the case are not in dispute. The respondent No. 1 was appointed as a temporary Toll Tax Inspector by the appellant on January 28, 1949, and he took charge of this post on February 1, 1949. He was confirmed in this post on March 15, 1949. According to respondent No. 1, sometime later, he officiated as Toll Tax Superintendent and was confirmed in that post on June 5, 1955. This fact is not admitted by the appellant, but we are not called upon to decide the correctness thereof. On February 21, 1956, the President of the Municipal Board suspended respondent No. 1 and thereafter purporting to act under Section 74 of the U.P. Municipalities Act he passed the following order dismissing the respondent No. 1 from service: "After careful consideration in the case of Sri Narsingh Bhan Singh, T.I. under suspension, I find that he was charge-sheeted for serious charges. The explanation received was not found satisfactory. Again he was served with a show cause notice to explain why he should not be dismissed and was asked to submit his explanation by 20th July 1956, but he failed to submit it by the time prescribed. As such the charges framed against him will remain unrebutted. I dismiss him from the municipal service with effect from July 25, 1956. He will get one-fourth of his pay with proportionate D.A. for the period of suspension. A copy of the order be served on him." Against this order of dismissal the respondent No. 1 preferred on August 22, 1956, an appeal to the State Government. By an order dated February 25, 1958, the State Government allowed the appeal, set aside the order of dismissal and directed the respondent No. 1 to be reinstated and "posted again to his substantive post of Toll Tax Superintendent. By an order dated February 25, 1958, the State Government allowed the appeal, set aside the order of dismissal and directed the respondent No. 1 to be reinstated and "posted again to his substantive post of Toll Tax Superintendent. Since the Municipal Board was of the view that the respondent No. 1 never substantively held the post Tax Superintendent but held the substantive post of only the Toll Tax Inspector, the President by a letter dated March 22, 1958, made a representation to the Government that the respondent No. 1 should have been ordered to be reinstated as a Toll Tax Inspector and not as a Toll Tax Superintendent. After receiving this representation the State Government made further enquiries, gave the respondent No. 1 a further hearing and came to the conclusion that the respondent No. 1 held the substantive post of Toll Tax Inspector and not of Toll Tax Superintendent. Accordingly by an order dated December 20, 1958, the State Government reviewed its previous order of February 25, 1958 and directed that the respondent No. 1 be reinstated to his substantive post of a Toll Tax Inspector. 3. Thereupon the respondent No. 1 filed two writ petitions in this Court. Civil Misc. Writ No. 265 of 1959 was filed for quashing the order of the State Government dated December 20, 1958, on the ground that the State Government had no power to review its previous order. Civil Misc. Writ No. 1375 of 1959 was filed for a mandamus compelling the Municipal Board to give effect to the order dated December 20, 1958, if that order was not quashed in the earlier writ petition. The two writ petitions were heard together by the learned single Judge and were disposed of by a common order. The learned single Judge held that the second order of the State Government dated December 20, 1958, was passed after giving a due hearing to the respondent No. 1, that the first order passed by the State Government dated February 25, 1958, on the appeal of the respondent No. 1 was a quasi-judicial order, that the State Government did not have the power to review, alter or vary its quasi-judicial order and that accordingly the second order dated December 20, 1958, reviewing the first order was made without jurisdiction. The learned single Judge accordingly allowed Civil Misc. The learned single Judge accordingly allowed Civil Misc. Writ No. 265 of 1959, quashed the order of the State Government dated December 20, 1958, and directed the Municipal Board to implement the order of the State Government dated February 25, 1958, since the learned single Judge allowed Civil Misc. Writ No. 265 of 1958, it was unnecessary to press Civil Misc. Writ No. 1375 of 1959 on merits and it was dismissed on that ground. It is against this judgment that the present special appeal has been filed. 4. After hearing the parties for some time, we directed the Standing Counsel to produce the records of the case before us and all the records relating to this case were produced before us. From a perusal of these records we are satisfied that the State Government, after giving respondent No. 1 a hearing and after considering the material produced before it, came to the conclusion that the respondent No. 1 had never substantively held the post of a Toll Tax Superintendent but had substantively held only the post of a Toll Tax Inspector. With this conclusion, we cannot interfere unless we find that the State Government has acted without jurisdiction. 5. The real question which arises for our consideration is whether the State Government had any power to review its previous order dated February 25, 1958. Sri. S.C. Khare, for the appellant, contends that the State Government, while passing an order in appeal under Section 74 of the Municipalities Act, was exercising an administrative function and the order passed by it was a purely administrative order and not a quasi-judicial order and that, as such, the State Government was quite competent to review its previous order. Sri S.C. Kakkar, for respondent No. 1, contends that, in disposing of an appeal under Section 74 of the Municipalities Act, the State Government was required to act in a quasi-judicial manner and the order passed by it was a quasi-judicial order which it had no power to review unless such a power was specifically conferred by the statute. 6. Sri Kakkar has relied on four decisions of the Supreme Court to show that the first order passed by the State Government was a quasi-judicial order. 6. Sri Kakkar has relied on four decisions of the Supreme Court to show that the first order passed by the State Government was a quasi-judicial order. These cases are Shivji Nathubhai v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 606, Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Shyam Sunder Jhunjhunwala, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1669, Board of High School and Intermediate Education, U.P. v. Ghanshyam Das Gupta, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1110 : 1962 A.L.J. 776 and an unreported decision in Laxam Purshottam Pimoutkar v. State of Bombay, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 436 (Civil Appeal No. 206 of 1960 decided on December 13, 1962). All these cases lay down the same principle, namely that an order of an administrative body or authority will be a quasi-judicial order only if one of the two following conditions are satisfied: (1) that there is a lis, i.e. there is a contest between one individual and another; and (ii) that when there is a contest between an authority purporting to do an act and a person opposing it, the statue imposes a duty on the authority to act judicially. It is unnecessary to refer to these decisions in detail as, apart from the principle stated above, they turn upon the facts of each case. Suffice it to say that in each one of these cases the Supreme Court has, on the facts thereof, found either that there was a lis or that the authority was required by the statute to act in a judicial manner. We have accordingly to see whether any of the two conditions mentioned above exists in the present case or not. 7. We will first consider whether there was any lis in the present case. We may mention that the learned single Judge was of the view that there was a lis between the Municipal Board and the respondent No. 1 before the State Government. We are unable to agree with this view. The respondent No. 1 was an employee of the Municipal Board was the dismissing authority. In the matter of dismissal there was really no dispute between two contending parties. In cases of disciplinary action it can never be said that there is a lis between the dismissing authority and the dismissing employee. In fact, a lis is usually understood in the sense of a contest between two individuals, apart from the authority who has to pass the order. In cases of disciplinary action it can never be said that there is a lis between the dismissing authority and the dismissing employee. In fact, a lis is usually understood in the sense of a contest between two individuals, apart from the authority who has to pass the order. In the words of the Supreme Court: "If a statute empowers an authority, not being a court in the ordinary sense, to decide disputes arising out of a claim made by one party under the statute which claim is opposed by another party and to determine the respective rights of the contesting parties who are opposed to each other, there is a lis and prima facie and in the absence of anything in the statute to the contrary it is the duty of the authority to act judicially and the decision of the authority is a quasi-judicial act." The decision of the Supreme Court in the Board of High School and Intermediate Education, U.P., Allahabad v. Ghanshyam Das Gupta A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1110=1962 A.L.J. 776 (supra) is conclusive of the point as it was clearly held therein that there was no lis between the Examinations Committee and the examinee, in proceedings for disciplinary action against the examinee. Administrative proceedings for the dismissal of an employee are of the same character. We are accordingly of the view that in the present case there was no lis at the stage of the dismissal of respondent No. 1: Nor can it be said that there was any lis before the State Government hearing the appeal. No provision has been brought to our notice from which it could be gathered that the Municipal Board was to be made a party as a respondent in the appeal or that notices were to be issued to the Municipal Board or that the Municipal Board was to be heard before decision of the appeal. The nature of the proceedings in appeal were identical with those at the earlier stage. There was, therefore, no lis even at the stage of the appeal before the State Government. 8. We have then to examine whether the Municipalities Act or the rules and regulations made thereunder required either the Municipal Board or the State Government hearing the appeal to act in a judicial manner. There was, therefore, no lis even at the stage of the appeal before the State Government. 8. We have then to examine whether the Municipalities Act or the rules and regulations made thereunder required either the Municipal Board or the State Government hearing the appeal to act in a judicial manner. The only provision which has been brought to our notice from which it could be inferred that the President in exercising his power under Section 74 of the Municipalities Act for the dismissal of an employee was required to act in a judicial manner are contained in certain regulations published in notification No. 6471/XI-226-46 dated November 29, 1946, printed at page 654 of the Municipal Manual. These regulations require the giving of a reasonable opportunity to the employee against the proposed action. They further required that the order be in writing specifying the charge or charges brought, the defence taken and also the reasons for the order. These regulations would certainly have required the dismissing authority to act in a judicial manner but since they have been declared ultra vires by a Full Bench of this Court in the U.P. State v. Murtza Ali 1961 A.L.J. 287 we cannot take notice of them. There is no other provision either in the Act or in the rules or regulation from which an inference could be drawn that the dismissing authority was required to act judicially. We have then to see whether the State Government, exercising its power of appeal under Section 74, was required to act judicially. Section 74 of the U.P. Municipalities Act is as follows:- "Subject to any provisions to the contrary contained in Sections 57 to 73 servants on a monthly salary exceeding Rs. 50/- or in a city Rs. 75/- shall be appointed and may be punished or dismissed by the President. Provided that an appeal shall lie- (a) in the case of dismissal or removal, to the Sate Government; and (b) in the case of any other punishment, to the Prescribed Authority; and shall be presented to the State Government or the Prescribed Authority, as the case may be, within one month from the date on which the order appealed against is communicated to the person concerned: Provided that an appointment on or drawing a monthly salary of Rs. 250/- or over in the case of cities and of Rs. 250/- or over in the case of cities and of Rs. 100/- or over in other cases shall be subject to confirmation by the board." There are no words in the section from which one could infer that the State Government hearing the appeal was required to act judicially. No rules or regulations have been brought to our notice from which such an inference could be drawn. Rules regarding submission of appeals of servants of Municipal Boards to the State Government published in notification No. 346/XI-468 dated February 6, 1936, printed in the Municipal Manual at pages 452-453, were placed before us by Sri Kakkar. Apart from the fact that there is nothing in these rules to indicate that the State Government was required to act judicially, these rules have now been superseded by the amendment of Section 74 in 1953. There is, thus, no provision either in the statute or in the rules or regulations requiring the State Government hearing an appeal under Section 74 of the Municipalities Act to act judicially. 9. We have come to the conclusion that at the time of the hearing of the appeal under Section 74 there is no lis before the State Government and that it is not required by the statute to act judicially and thus neither of the two conditions which would have obliged the State Government to act judicially has been fulfilled in the present case. 10. It is then contended by Sri Kakkar that the State Government deciding the appeal was bound to act judicially as all authorities who are entrusted with appellate powers must act judicially. In support of his contention he relies upon certain observation made in Pimoutkar's case A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 436 and in Local Government Board v. Arlidge 1915 A.C. 120. In the first case the observation made by the Supreme Court on which reliance is placed is as follows: "When an authority exercises its revisional powers it necessarily acts in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity." This observation read apart from its context certainly supports the contention of Sri Kakkar. But in our opinion the observation must be read in the context in which it was made and, so read, it merely means that the power of revision exercised by the State Government in that case under Section 79 of the Bombay Hereditary Offices Act, 1874, had to be exercised judicially. But in our opinion the observation must be read in the context in which it was made and, so read, it merely means that the power of revision exercised by the State Government in that case under Section 79 of the Bombay Hereditary Offices Act, 1874, had to be exercised judicially. In that case the Supreme Court found that the original order had been passed by the Collector under Section 12(a) of the Act and that order was a quasi-judicial order. It further held that the State Government exercised powers conferred by both Section 12(a) and Section 79. After giving these findings the Supreme Court made the observation quoted above. It is obvious from this that what was really meant by this observation was that, when an authority exercises its revisional jurisdiction against a judicial or quasi-judicial order, it must act judicially or quasi-judicially. This observation was not intended to lay down the proposition that revisional power even when exercisable against purely administrative orders must still be exercised judicially or quasi-judicially. 11. In the second case the observation relied upon was as follows: "When the duty of deciding an appeal is imposed, those whose duty it is to decide must act judicially." This observation also must be read in the context in which it was made. In this case it had been found that the Board, to which the appeal lay, had been entrusted with the decision of a question in dispute between parties, that the decision affected rights in property, that formerly such an appeal lay to the quarter sessions and that very jurisdiction of the Court had been transferred to the Board. It was in respect of such an appeal that the observation was made and it cannot be utilised for supporting the proposition that all appellate powers, even though the appeal be against a purely administrative order, must be exercised judicially. We are accordingly of the view that the observation in neither of these cases supports the contention of Sri Kakkar. 12. The order passed by the State Government in appeal must be held to be a purely administrative order. That being so, there was nothing to prevent the State Government from reviewing such an order. We are accordingly of the view that the observation in neither of these cases supports the contention of Sri Kakkar. 12. The order passed by the State Government in appeal must be held to be a purely administrative order. That being so, there was nothing to prevent the State Government from reviewing such an order. The State Government was quite competent to review the first order dated February 25, 1958, made by it in the appeal preferred by respondent No. 1 and to pass the subsequent order dated December 20, 1958. We accordingly hold that the order of the State Government dated December 20, 1958, was a perfectly valid and good order and that it was not liable to be quashed by a writ of certiorari. 13. The special appeal is allowed, the judgment and order of the learned single Judge is set aside and Civil Misc. Writ No. 265 of 1959 is dismissed. In the circumstance of the case, we direct the parties to bear their own costs of this special appeal and of the writ petition. 14. Before leaving this appeal, we would like to mention that the other connected writ petition No. 1375 of 1959 was not pressed before the learned single Judge for the reason that Civil Misc. Writ No. 265 of 1959 was being allowed. Now that we have dismissed Civil Misc. Writ No. 265 of 1959 also and no appeal has been preferred by respondent No. 1 against the dismissal of Civil Misc. Writ No. 1375 of 1959, it would mean that neither of the reliefs claimed in the two writ petitions have been granted. It is clear from the facts of the case that the respondent No. 1 is, in any case, entitled to be reinstated as a Toll Tax Inspector by virtue of the order of the State Government dated December 20, 1958. We are confident that the Municipal Board will give effect to that order.