ORDER -This is a revision petition filed by Khanduji and 4 others, the tenants, against Banibai, the landholder and Rangrao and 3 others, the rival claimants as the owners to the suit lands, under section 37 -A and 38 -E of the Hyderabad Tenancy Act. There was declaration to the extent of 10 acres 25 guntas out of S. No. 102 and 2 acres 15 guntas out of S. No. 103 in favour of Khanduji, 2 acres 18 guntas out of S. Nos. 377 and 4 acres 39 guntas out of S. No. 378 in favour of Nagoba, 9 acres 8 guntas out of S. No. 376 in favour of Dattaraj 4 acres 23 guntas out of the said S. No. 376 in favour of Kerba, 9 acres 8 guutas out of S. No. 377 in favour of Nagoba and 4 acres out of S. No. 379 in favour of Sant Ram Singh. All these lands belong to the village Kallamber, Taluka Kandhar. Against these provisional declarations Banibai, the landholder preferred the objection petition on 21.12.1958 before Sp1. Tahsildar, Degloor. In it she alleged that her total holding was 103 acres 14 gunthas. She further alleged that 18 acres of land was sold to one Sant Ram Singh and the permission was obtained. It is also alleged that S. No. 376 was donated to a School and S. Nos. 378 and 379 were gifted away to her daughter Padmavatibai two months prior to the submission of objection petition. The objection petitioner contended that her holding was less than two family holdings and as such there could not be any valid declaration in favour of the tenants. Rangrao, Nagorao, Ganpatrao and Laxmanrao sons of Gopalrao filed the other objection petition against the provisional declaration. They contended that they were the owners of the lands under declaration and Banibai was their cousin -sister and she had been supervising the said lands. She has nothing to do with the ownership of the lands. It was also referred that some civil suit was also pending before the Court. The matter was not considered by both the lower Courts and it came upto M. R. T. Aurangabad, which remanded the case to the original Court for holding full enquiry into the matter. She has nothing to do with the ownership of the lands. It was also referred that some civil suit was also pending before the Court. The matter was not considered by both the lower Courts and it came upto M. R. T. Aurangabad, which remanded the case to the original Court for holding full enquiry into the matter. After the remand the certificate copy of the decree based on compromise of the parties drawn by District Judge, Nanded, dated 3rd August, 1959, the compromise deed of the same date; the copy of the plaint dated 25 -5.1956 submitted before Sub -Judge, Nanded and the copy of the judgment of the Sub -Judge, Nanded dated 23•2.1959 in Civil Suit No. 33/1 of 1956 were filed. In addition to this, the copies of the mutation register regarding the pherphar of the 1960 were also filed. In oral evidence, the parties gave their statement and they also examined some witnesses in support of their contention. The original Court, after perusing the evidence, oral and documentary, came to a finding that the compromise decree would have the effect from the date of the institution of the suit, i. e. 25.6.1956 and as such it was prior to the notified date, i. e. 25 -5 -1957. In the light of the said decree, it cancelled the declaration already made in favour of the said tenants on the grounds that the declarations were against the holding of Banibai, who in the light of the said decree was not the owner of the lands. Against this order, the tenants, preferred the appeal before Deputy Collector, Land Reforms, Nanded, who dismissed the appeal and confirmed the order of -cancellation of tenancy passed by the original Court. Being aggrieved by these orders, the said tenants have come before this Tribunal in revision. 2. I have seen the file. I have heard the arguments of the parties. The -entire question hinges on the point as to what is the effect of the compromise decree dated 3rd August 1959 passed by the District Court, Nanded, in Appeal No. 82/4 of 1959? I have seen the certified copy of the plaint dated 25 -8 -1956 filed before the Sub -Judge, Nanded in Suit No. 33/1/1956. It was a suit for the declaration of ownership and possession of the lands, which are under dispute in this case. I have seen the certified copy of the plaint dated 25 -8 -1956 filed before the Sub -Judge, Nanded in Suit No. 33/1/1956. It was a suit for the declaration of ownership and possession of the lands, which are under dispute in this case. The said suit was dismissed by the said Court on 23.2 -1959. Rangrao and others preferred the appeal before the District Court, Nanded, and during the pendency of that appeal on 3 -8 -1959 the parties filed a compromise before that appellate Court, embodying various terms and on the basis of the said compromise the District Court drew a decree. The original Court has laid stress that this compromise in question is operative form the date of the institution of the suit, i. e. 25th June 1956, and it has further asserted that when the said Rangrao and others have been deolared as the owners of the suit lands even prior to the notified date, no question remains as to the declaration in favour of the tenants against the holding of Banibai. The said Court has treated the decree drawn on the basis of compromise as tantamount to the decree passed by the Court based on merits. This view is not correct under the provisions of law. 3. The tenants and four others were not the parties to the said suit and as such no question of res judicata arises. 4. A compromise decree is a creature of the agreement on which it is based and is subject to all the incidents of such agreements. A compromise decree is but a contract with a command of a Judge super -added to it. Hence, Such a decree is of no great validity than the contract on which it is based. In view of these circumstances, the said terms of compromise would be operative at the most from the date on which they have taken place, viz., 3 -8 -1959. Since that date Rangrao and others may be treated as the landholders to the extent of some portions in the said lands. The tenants were already declared under section 37 -A and subsequently under section 38 -E of the Hyderabad Tenancy Act against the holding of Banibai on such notified date, i. e. 12th March 1956 and 25 -5 -1957 respectively. The tenants were already declared under section 37 -A and subsequently under section 38 -E of the Hyderabad Tenancy Act against the holding of Banibai on such notified date, i. e. 12th March 1956 and 25 -5 -1957 respectively. Banibai was the landholder on these dates and the revenue authority rightly declared the tenants as owners under the above mentioned sections. Rangrao and others as the landholders were not in picture then. They have got certain rights on the basis of compromise, only from 3 -8 -1959 and the terms of compromise would not have any retrospective effect on the said notified dates. As such they cannot raise any objection . regarding the declarations in favour of the tenants. 5. Under the principles embodied in rule 3 of Order 23 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1908, a compromise should be lawful. The expression lawful refers to the legality of the terms of the agreement. The agreement opposed to public policy cannot be treated as lawful. Moreover, when they involve injury to third party they cannot be treated as lawful. In the present case, the compromise has taken place on 3 -8 -1959 and by the terms embodied therein, it. appears that an attempt is made to contravene the principles of public policy. By virtue of the said compromise the holding of the said Banibai, which she was having on the notified date, is reduced below the 2 family holdings. It is. against the principles of public policy which is aimed at in the provisions of the Hyderabad Tenancy Act. Similarly the terms of compromise are going to sustain the injury to the rights of the said tenants, which they have already acquired since the notified date. Under these circumstances, the compromise and the decree drawn on that basis cannot affect the declarations already made in favour of the tenants. ORDER -The revision petition is, therefore, allowed. The orders of the lower Courts are set aside. The provisional declarations are confirmed.