Judgment :- 1. This is undisputedly the third time in fact, at least the seventh time that a temporary permit has been granted for a stage carriage under S.62 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, for a route in respect of which an application for the renewal of a permit is pending. (This application for renewal has been pending with the 1st respondent Regional Transport Authority from 28 111961, i. e. for nearly two years and three months without any order being made, and the 1st respondent has not chosen to explain why. This is, to say the least, a most unsatisfactory state of affairs, and I trust that the 1st respondent will at least now be alive to its duty and proceed to do it by disposing of the application forthwith without being compelled by mandamus). The successive grants of these temporary permits after the first permit seem to me to be in flagrant violation of the section which runs as follows: "62. Temporary permits. A Regional Transport Authority may without following the procedure laid down in S.57, grant permits, to be effective for a limited period not in any case to exceed four months, to authorise the use of a transport vehicle temporarily.... (a) for the conveyance of passengers on special occasions such as to and from fairs and religious gatherings, or (b) for the purposes of a seasonal business, or (c) to meet a particular temporary need, or (d) pending decision on an application for the renewal of a permit; and may attach to any such permit any condition it thinks fit: Provided that a temporary permit under this section shall, in no case, be granted, in respect of any route or area specified in an application for the grant of a new permit under S.46 or S.54 during the pendency of the application: Provided further that a temporary permit under this section shall, in no case, be granted more than once in respect of any route or area specified in an application for the renewal of a permit during the pendency of such application for renewal." 2. A temporary permit may be granted for any of the reasons stated in clauses (a), (b), (c) and (d) of the section in fact clauses (a), (b) and (d) seem to be but particular instances of the general ground of a particular temporary need stated in clause (c) and a grant may be under any of these four clauses when an application for the renewal of a permit is pending. It is true that the reason stated in clause (d) can obtain only when there is an application for renewal pending, but, the converse, namely, that when there is an application for renewal pending the grant of a temporary permit can be only under clause (d), is not true. The grant, as I have already said, can be under any of the four clauses, for, special occasions such as fairs and religious gatherings mentioned in clause (a), a seasonal business mentioned in clause (b), or a particular temporary need mentioned in clause (c), can arise at a time when an application for the renewal of a permit is pending. That being so, I have little doubt that the prohibition in the second proviso to the section which says that "a temporary permit under this section (not, be it noted, under any particular clause of the section) shall, in no case be granted more than once in respect of any route or area specified in an application for the renewal of a permit during the pendency of such application," applies to a grant under any of the four clauses; and, with great respect to what has been said in J. T. Co-operative Society v. R. T. Authority (AIR. 1961 Rajasthan 98 F. B.), on the plain language of the section, I find it impossible to read the second proviso as applicable only to a grant under clause (d) as if the proviso instead of saying, "under this section" said "under the relevant clause, of this section," clause (d) being pitched upon as the relevant clause, any more than the application of the first proviso can be restricted to clause (c). 3. The question however remains whether I should interfere in exercise of my extraordinary powers under Art.226 of the Constitution at the instance of the petitioner. I think not. 3. The question however remains whether I should interfere in exercise of my extraordinary powers under Art.226 of the Constitution at the instance of the petitioner. I think not. In the first place I do not think that the petitioner has suffered any wrong or injustice so as to compel my discretion under Art.226. The petitioner is not the applicant for renewal. The applicant in fact, happens to be the petitioner's brother. But he has not chosen to complain. The petitioner's claim to sufficient interest in the matter to maintain this petition is that he is the managing director of a company and a partner of a firm which are operating on the route in question. The first capacity would not, I think, give him any personal interest in the matter, and, although the second would, I do not think it can be said that the operators on the route have suffered any wrong or injustice as a result of the illegal grant of the temporary permit in question. The very fact that a regular permit has expired and that an application for its renewal is pending is some indication that the route is not at the moment adequately served and that, in view of the fact that there is now one bus less running on the route, at least one bus more would be required to meet the needs of the public. It is only that one additional bus that is being provided by the temporary permit, and hence the other operators on the route have no legitimate ground for complaint although, of course, the applicant for renewal has. Moreover, it is not the petitioner's case that an additional bus is not necessary and that he would have opposed the grant of the renewal sought by his brother so that it seems to me abundantly clear that the running of an additional bus on the route as allowed by the temporary permit in no way affects the petitioner's rights. 4. This is not all. The very company on whose behalf the petitioner claims to have come forward with this complaint had, in fact, applied and obtained, it is clear from Exts. RI to R4, four previous temporary permits For the route, a fifth temporary permit, a permit as illegal as the one against which the petitioner is complaining. 4. This is not all. The very company on whose behalf the petitioner claims to have come forward with this complaint had, in fact, applied and obtained, it is clear from Exts. RI to R4, four previous temporary permits For the route, a fifth temporary permit, a permit as illegal as the one against which the petitioner is complaining. Surely a person who has obtained the advantage of an illegal grant is not exactly the kind of person the courts will encourage to come forward with the complaint that somebody else has likewise obtained an illegal grant. 5. I might add that at least four of the illegal temporary permits were in favour of the petitioner's brother and that for the present permit the petitioner's son was also an applicant. 6. In the circumstances I have little hesitation in holding that this petition is entirely lacking in bona fides. 7. I dismiss the petition. But, in view of the fact that the conduct of the respondents is no less blameworthy than that of the petitioner, I make no order as to costs. Dismissed.