ORDER 1. Chandbai, the present applicant filed a suit for ejectment against Phoolchand, the non-applicant on three grounds (1) Non-payment of rent (2) sub-letting of the premises, and (3) genuine requirement of the accommodation as mentioned in S. 12 (1) (a) (b) and (e) of the Accommodation Control Act of 1961. 2. The house was purchased by Chandbai from previous landlord of the defendant in February 1961. A notice was given after the transfer to the defendant for terminating the tenancy on the grounds mentioned above. 3. The defendant contended amongst other pleas that the plaintiff cannot be allowed to press the ground of genuine requirement in view of section 12 (4) of the Act. According to him the transferee has to wait for a year at least before he could maintain a suit on the ground of genuine requirement. 4. The trial Court tried the issue regarding genuine requirement as preliminary issue and has held it in favour of the defendant. The plaintiff has now come up in revision. 5. It may be mentioned here that the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 came into force on 30-12-61 and the suit was filed on the next day i. e. on 1-1-62. The counsel for the applicant contends that when he had purchased the house in February 1961 there was no bar for filing a suit on the ground of genuine requirement and as that right had accrued previous to the coming into force of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act of 1961, there can not be any bar for his filing the suit or maintaining the same. 6. This involves two questions. One is whether the genuine requirement existed at the time of purchase thereby giving her the right to file or maintain a suit. This question however was not discussed by the trial Court nor does it seem to have been pressed there. The point however remains whether the plaintiff who had purchased the property before coming into force the M. P. Accommodation Control Act of 1961 has a right to go to the Court without waiting for the statutory period of one year not considering the change in the law on the date of filing the suit. 7. On the date when the trial Court gave a decision the suit could be maintained as it was more than one year after the date of transfer. 7. On the date when the trial Court gave a decision the suit could be maintained as it was more than one year after the date of transfer. Therefore when the suit was alive the trial Court should not have dismissed the suit on this ground. At that time, suit could be maintained, the plaintiff contends. 8. As regards the first question that there was a genuine necessity on the date when the plaintiff purchased the house; there is no finding. But the plaint allegation mention that the necessity existed and that is why the house in suit was purchased. The maintainability or the right to continue the suit depends on the allegations in the plaint and though ultimate result may be otherwise. The necessity therefore existed at the time when the house was purchased i. e. before the Act of 1961 came into force. The question therefore is whether the subsequent Act can take away this right. 9. It is a cardinal principle of interpretation of Statutes that a substantive light or a vested right cannot be taken away by a subsequent legislation, unless the subsequent legislation expressly or impliedly enjoins. 10. It is true that section 12 (4) of the Accommodation Control Act 1961 did not exist in any of the Statutes before this Act came into force and before 31-12-61 a landlord could file a suit on the ground of genuine necessity immediately the necessity occurred irrespective of the fact that the landlord has come as a transferee within one year of the filing of the suit. Accommodation Control Act of 1955 provided no such restriction. This 1955 Act was however repealed by section 52 of Act of 1961. 11. Section 52 reads as follows: – (1) The M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1955 is hereby repealed. (2) Notwithstanding such repeal, all suits and other proceedings under the said Act, pending, at the commencement of this Act, before any Court or other authority shall be continued and disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the said Act as if the said Act had continued in force and this Act has not been passed and the provisions for appeal under the said Act shall continue in force in respect of suit and proceedings disposed of thereunder ." 12. In State Vs. In State Vs. Moharsingh AIR 1955 SC 84 , it has been observed: – "A repeal therefore without any saving clause would destroy any proceeding whether not yet begun or whether pending at the time of the enactment of the repealing Act and not already prosecuted to a final judgment so as to create a vested right." 13. In Knnilal Vs. Udhamal 1957 JLJ 742=1957 MPLJ 526, Newaskar, J. quoted with approval following observations made by a Division Bench of the Nagpur High Court in Second Appeal No. 312 of 1948. "Generally an action dependent upon a statute falls with its repeal, even after the action thereon has been instituted, in the absence of a saving clause. Rights dependent upon a Statute and still inchoate, that are not perfected by a final judgment, are lost by a repeal of the Statute. 14. In the present case the right of filing a suit on the ground of genuine need existed but that right before it was put into action was hazed up by limitation. The right has not been taken away. The right still exists; only a particular time has been allotted before which right could be exerciseds. Therefore it cannot be said that the right has been taken away. What has been done is that it has been postponed to a future date. Therefore it cannot be said that subsequent legislation has taken away that right. 15. Even then according to me the provisions of subsequent Act viz. Act No.41 of 1961; if read as a whole, shows that if they had the right before the Act came into force it has been taken away by proper interpretation of the section. The right to sue is given in S. 12 (1) (e) on the ground of genuine requirement but that right is curtailed by the conditions mentioned in Section 12 (4) which says that no suit is maintainable under S.12 (1) (e) by a transferee unless a period of one year bas elapsed from the date of the acquisition. Section 12 therefore has to be read together. It is a procedural right so far as time of filing the suit is concerned. Section 12 therefore has to be read together. It is a procedural right so far as time of filing the suit is concerned. The procedural right can be taken away at any time even when the litigation is pending Chapter III of the Act under which section 12 comes deals with "Control of eviction of tenant." It prescribes the mode by which a landlord can go to Court. If any person wants to go to Court under this provision he has to follow the procedure laid down and can file a suit under those conditions. Therefore if a suit has to be filed it has to be filed by following those provisions. On the date when the suit was filed this provisions of Ss. 12 (1) (e) and 12 (4) came into existence. So if a person wants to file a suit under the Accommodation Control Act he has got to file a suit by fol1o wing those conditions. 16. The learned counsel has contended that the word 'Maintainable' appearing in S. 12 (4) should be distinguished from the words 'filing the suit', It is true there is a difference between the two words 'filing a suit' and 'maintaining a suit' if maintaining means to keep in existence. 17. The learned counsel for the applicant placed reliance on a decision of this Court in Bherusingh Vs. Rao Kanhyalal Civil Revision 469 of 58 decided on 31-8-59, in which my learned brother Newaskar, J. made a distinction between the two Acts, M. B. Money Lenders Act and M. P. Money Lenders Act. In that case his lordship was discussing a difference between the two Acts. In the M. P. Act the words used were 'shall proceed' whereas in the M. B. Act in place of the above expression the words "shall be entitled to bring the suit' are used. His lordship opined that there is a difference between the two clauses. 18. There cannot be doubt on this question. "shall proceed" means shall go on while in the words "No Money lender shall be entitled to bring a suit" bar is against bringing of the suit. In one case it is the further progress after the institution that if barred and in other case no suit can be instituted. 18. There cannot be doubt on this question. "shall proceed" means shall go on while in the words "No Money lender shall be entitled to bring a suit" bar is against bringing of the suit. In one case it is the further progress after the institution that if barred and in other case no suit can be instituted. In fact if we carefully read this judgment, we find that it goes against the contention of the applicant as his lordship has remarked" it is only further progress after its institution which is stopped." 19. I agree that in 12 (1) the words used are that no suit shall be filed, whereas in 12 (4) the words used are "no suit for the eviction of a tenant shall be maintainable". There is a difference between these two. Strictly speaking the first expression means one cannot go to the Court at all and the other is if one goes to the Court he cannot support his contention or keep it in existence. The Dictionary meaning of the word 'maintainable' given in the Oxford Universal Illustrated Dictionary, 3rd Edi. is "to continue, preserve, to carryon, to keep us." These phrases are undoubtedly different from the word "no suit shall be filed." There is always a difference between starting an action and maintaining the same S. 12 (1) is a bar for starting an action whereas S. 12 (4) is a bar for continuing the same. But in practice it makes very little difference. One cannot maintain the suit; means one cannot continue the suit after he has filed it and the suit becomes dead immediately after it has been filed. 20. Therefore the argument that on the date when the Court passed the order more than one year had elapsed will not be available to him. One cannot continue a thing which is already dead, Dead man cannot be given a life. Though it is one of the grounds on which he seeks ejectment but this ground is dead immediately after the filing of the suit on 1-1-62. A litigant after filing a suit maintains the same if he does not withdraw it. It is therefore clear that on the next day he illegally maintained the suit. That is prohibited under the law. Therefore a suit which is based on this ground cannot remain in existence. 21. A litigant after filing a suit maintains the same if he does not withdraw it. It is therefore clear that on the next day he illegally maintained the suit. That is prohibited under the law. Therefore a suit which is based on this ground cannot remain in existence. 21. I have already mentioned that genuine requirement is only one of the grounds, therefore the suit cannot be maintained on this ground and it cannot be agitated in the suit. 22. It is further agitated that as one year has elapsed he had a right to apply for an amendment, assuming the ground for genuine requirement could not be corporated originally. If such an amendment is made certainly many considerations would arise and it is not proper for me to discuss that question at this stage. The Court was therefore justified in holding the preliminary issue in favour of the defendant. 23. The result is the revision petition is dismissed with costs. Counsel fee according to scale, if certified.