JUDGMENT V.R. NEWASKAR, J. 1. This is a plaintiff's appeal. His suit against the State of Madhya Pradesh, the Chief Secretary of Madhya Pradesh and the Collector, Dhar for cancellation of a certificate filed in the office of Collector Dhar by the District Excise Officer Dhar, Madhya Bharat, for the recovery of Rs. 36,255-15-0, was dismissed by the Additional District Judge, Dhar. The nature of the plaintiff's claim, the defence set up by the defendants and the circumstances leading to the filing of the present suit may be briefly stated as follows. 2. The plaintiff, who was an ex-excise contractor in the erstwhile Dhar State had taken contract for running for liquor shops in the town of Dhar for the year 1947-48 in respect of the period from 1.10.1947 to 30.9.1948 for Rs. 75,200 as being the license-fees for the same. Immediately on the taking of the contract picketing started at the instance of citizens of Dhar at the four liquor shops which were being run by the plaintiff. This adversely affected plaintiff's business. As a result of picketing the plaintiff could also not be supplied sufficient quantity of liquor required for his shops from the state godowns. The plaintiff thereupon approached Dhar Darbar with a prayer to cancel the outstanding contract due to the extraordinary circumstances aforesaid having cropped up and for starting the commission system (i.e. for the sale of liquor at the four shops by the plaintiff on commission basis) in place of the contract system as had been done in the past. The then Excise Commissioner, Dhar, Shree Chensingh, thereupon submitted the matter to the then Diwan Dhar with a recommendation that the outstanding contract might be cancelled and that the contractor might be charged at the rate of Rs. 3/- per gallon for 'Rashi' and Rs. 6 per gallon for 'Dubara'. The matter was placed by the Diwan for consideration by the Council of which his Highness Maharaja Dhar was the president. Thereupon the Council in their meeting dated 28.6.1948 inter alia cancelled the aforesaid contract and sanctioned introduction of commission system for the entire period of the contract i.e. for the period from 1.10.1947 to 30.9.1948 as per recommendation of the Excise Commissioner Shree Chensingh. Subsequent to the Council resolution aforesaid the plaintiff continued to receive country liquor for sale at his four liquor shops upto the end of September 1948. Subsequent to the Council resolution aforesaid the plaintiff continued to receive country liquor for sale at his four liquor shops upto the end of September 1948. But before that date the Dhar State merged into the State of Madhya Bharat on 30.6.1948. The District Excise Officer, Dhar of the newly formed State of Madhya Bharat rejected the plaintiff's stand as to his liability on the basis of commission system sanctioned by the Council resolution of the erstwhile Dhar State and made a demand of Rs. 31,072 on the basis of the original contract. The plaintiff had paid Rs. 4,000 on 24.9.1947 and Rs. 4,000 on 19.2.1948 out of which he had been given credit for Rs. 4,000 only. He becomes entitled to the credit of Rs. 4,000 more. The plaintiff claimed that due to sanction of commission system he was not liable for the aforesaid sum. 3. Besides this item of Rs. 31,072 there were other six items claimed from him in respect of the contracts of earlier period as below:– S. No. Balance of dues. (1) For the year 1919-20 in respect of the liquor Rs. 695-0-0 shop at the village Singhana. (2) For the year 1930-31 in respect of the Rs. 917-0-0 Hempdrugs shop at Kukshi. (3) For the year 1947-48 in respect of Chelur Rs. 48-0-0 liquor shop. (4) For the year 1946-47 in respect of the Rs. 3,487-2-9 Hempdrugs shop at Dhar. (5) For the year 1949-50 in respect of Rs. 137-8-0 Hempdrugs shop at Dhar. (6) For the years 1936-37, 1937-38 and Rs. 2,087-8-0 1938-39 in respect of the Hempdrugs shop at Dhar Rs. 240, Rs. 1150 and Rs. 697-8-0 in all. 4. Plaintiff's case with respect to these six items is as under:– I. Regarding item no. (1) of Rs. 695-0-0 and item no. (2) of Rs. 917-0-0 it is alleged that the items were remitted by the State in 1944. II. As regards item no. (3) the plaintiff alleges payment of Rs. 646 towards the total liability of Rs. 610/- he is therefore, a creditor to the tune of Rs. 36 without there being any liability of his. III. Regarding the item no. (4) of Rs. 3,487-2-9 it is alleged that the relevant contract in respect of this item was not given to the plaintiff but to his son Shreekrishna. 646 towards the total liability of Rs. 610/- he is therefore, a creditor to the tune of Rs. 36 without there being any liability of his. III. Regarding the item no. (4) of Rs. 3,487-2-9 it is alleged that the relevant contract in respect of this item was not given to the plaintiff but to his son Shreekrishna. This contract however was cancelled by the Order No. 3367/7-2-1947 as the State could not supply opium for sale. The cancellation was effected after recovering opium weighing 15 Seers which had been allowed to the contractor as his commission for the contract. IV. Regarding item no. (5) of Rs. 137-8-0 the plaintiff was not the contractor for Hemp-drugs for Dhar. V. Regarding the items totaling Rs. 2087-8-0 no. (6) it is alleged that the contracts in question had been cancelled in the beginning of each year and commission system had been followed. Orders in respect of the same bearing numbers 42 dated 17.11.1936, 139 dated 22.2.1937 and 297 dated 10.9.1938 had been issued. 5. The plaintiff therefore seeks a declaration that he is not liable for the alleged Government dues amounting to Rs. 36,255-15-0 or any amount and that the certificate filed by the Excise Department for the realisation of the aforesaid amount in the office of the Collector, Dhar is ineffective in law and prays that the said certificate be cancelled. 6. In the written statement filed on behalf of the defendants it was admitted that the District Excise Officer, Dhar had found that the plaintiff was liable to the State in respect of his excise dues to the extent of Rs. 36,255-15-0 and that proceedings for its recovery had been started against the plaintiff under the Public Demands Recovery Act. It was further admitted that the plaintiff had objected to this recovery but his objection had been overruled by the District Excise Officer, intimation whereof was given to the plaintiff on 12.11.1956. The amount which was sought to be recovered however was stated to be Rs. 36,561-3-0 and not Rs. 36,255-15-0. 7. Plaintiff's allegations as to cancellation of his contract for the year 1947-48 and introduction of commission system under the orders of Dhar Darbar (or Council) were denied. The amount which was sought to be recovered however was stated to be Rs. 36,561-3-0 and not Rs. 36,255-15-0. 7. Plaintiff's allegations as to cancellation of his contract for the year 1947-48 and introduction of commission system under the orders of Dhar Darbar (or Council) were denied. According to the defendants, as the amount recoverable from the plaintiff as per terms of the contract had remained in arrears, with a view to facilitate him in discharging the same the State allowed him, on initial deposit of Rs. 4,000, to pay Rs. 3 per gallon at the time of supply in addition to the price and duty thereof. It was asserted that there was no default on the part of the State in issuing liquor to the plaintiff when needed upto the end of the year and money recovered on the basis of such issue. It was contended that both the items of Rs. 4,000 each had been paid by the plaintiff and they bad been given credit to and after allowing for the excess amount paid at Rs. 3 and 6 per gallon on Rashi and Dubara respectively, the balance which had remained due from him was Rs. 31,072 for the year 1947-48. 8. As regards the item of Rs. 695 for the year 1919-20 it was asserted that the said dues were in respect of Indore State dues as for the relevant period, there was joint Administration of Indore and Dhar States so far as Excise Department was concerned for the village Singhana to which the recoveries related. It was asserted that it was only the dues of Dhar State which had been and could be remitted and not the dues of Holkar State which continued to be recoverable. The second item of Rs. 917-0-0 is not due from the plaintiff and is not included in the total of Rs. 36,561-3-0. As regards the item no.3, it was pointed out that the items of payment mentioned by the plaintiff had been given credit to. The plaintiff in adding them up had committed a mistake and wrongly mentioned the payment to amount to Rs. 646 when in fact it was only Rs. 322. The total amount received from the plaintiff however was Rs. 562 towards the liability of Rs. 610. The plaintiff in adding them up had committed a mistake and wrongly mentioned the payment to amount to Rs. 646 when in fact it was only Rs. 322. The total amount received from the plaintiff however was Rs. 562 towards the liability of Rs. 610. As to item no.4, it was asserted that the contract for the year 1946-47 relating to 'opium and Maska at' was in the name of the plaintiff and not that of his son Shreekrishna son of Mangalsa. The said contract had not been cancelled under the Order No. 3367 dated 7.2.1947 of the Excise Commissioner, Dhar nor were the dues in respect thereof had been remitted. As to item no.5, it was asserted that the contract was in the name of the plaintiff and Rs. 137-8-0 were due from him. As to item of Rs. 2,087-8-0, it was asserted that the plaintiff's liability therefore had been fixed under the final decision of the Dhar State dated 20.3.1948. It was further asserted that Rs. 36,561-3-0 were in fact due from the plaintiff. 9. The cause of action had not arisen, according to the defendants, on 12.11.1950. Notice under section 80 C.P.C. was said to be invalid in law. The plaintiff's claim for declaration and cancellation of certificate was consequently said to be untenable. 10. The trial court framed issues covering these contentions and after trial found that the plaintiff had failed to prove the cancellation of his contract for the year 1947-48 and the introduction of commission system as alleged. According to it, the system of recovering Rs. 3 per gallon on the issue of 'Rashi' and Rs. 6 per gallon on 'Dubara' appeared to have been meant only for convenient realisation of the dues from the plaintiff in respect of the defendants' contention with respect of the same as being well founded and the amount was rightly held recoverable and not having been remitted. The item of Rs. 917 objected by the plaintiff was also held not to have been included in the certificate of demand filed by the Collector. The plaintiff's contention with reference to the rest of the items was held not made out. As to notice under section 80 given by the plaintiff it was held to be bad on the ground that no notice had been served either upon the Chief Secretary of the State or upon the Collector, Dhar. The plaintiff's contention with reference to the rest of the items was held not made out. As to notice under section 80 given by the plaintiff it was held to be bad on the ground that no notice had been served either upon the Chief Secretary of the State or upon the Collector, Dhar. It was served only upon the District Excise Officer Dhar. The present suit was held by the trial Court to be for securing a declaration as to plaintiff's non-liability. Such a claim for a declaration, not being in respect of any legal character or some right to any property, was held to be not maintainable. As regards the relief of injunction that too was held to be not claimable as it had not been alleged that the plaintiff had filed a petition under section 8 of the Public Demands Recovery Act before the Collector and that the same had been determined. The second ground on which this relief could not be granted to the plaintiff was held to be that the plaintiff had not valued his claim for injunction and paid Court fee thereon. On these findings plaintiff's suit was dismissed. He appeals. 11. A preliminary objection is raised on behalf of the respondent that the memorandum of appeal in this case is not properly stamped. 12. The present suit was filed by the plaintiff for cancellation of a certificate filed in the office of the Collector, Dhar for the recovery of Rs. 36,255-15-0 against him and for permanent injunction restraining the defendant State, the Chief Secretary of the State and the Collector, Dhar from recovering the said amount. 13. The certificate, for the cancellation of which the present suit was filed by the plaintiff had been issued by the District Excise Officer, Dhar and the Collector Dhar had started proceedings for the recovery of the aforesaid sum under the Public Demands Recovery Act. The plaintiff had filed his objection to the said recovery in the office of the Collector. This objection was decided by the issuing authority (namely the District Excise Officer) against the plaintiff. It was then that the present suit for the aforesaid relief's was filed by the plaintiff. 14. The plaintiff had filed his objection to the said recovery in the office of the Collector. This objection was decided by the issuing authority (namely the District Excise Officer) against the plaintiff. It was then that the present suit for the aforesaid relief's was filed by the plaintiff. 14. It is contended on behalf of the respondent on the basis of decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Badrilal vs. State, Madhya Pradesh, 1963 JLJ 674=ILR 1966 MP 108=ILR 1965 MP 485, that the plaintiff appellant ought to have valued the suit and the appeal properly for the purpose of Court fee to the extent of the amount mentioned in the certificate and ought to have paid ad-valorem Court fees. 15. Mr. Pande for the appellant contends that this is virtually a suit for setting aside a summary decision of the District Excise Officer rejecting the plaintiff's objection that he is not liable to pay the amount sought to be recovered by the Collector. The suit is under section 20 of the Madhya Bharat Public Demands Recovery Act and is a suit akin to a suit under Order 21 Rule 63 C.P.C. and fixed Court fee is payable both for the suit in the trial Court and in this appeal. He relies upon the decisions of Dixit, J., as he then was, in Civil Revision No. 90 of 1358 Ghisalal vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and others decided on 20.8.1958 and Civil Revision No. 81 of 1958 Mangalsa vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and others decided on 20.8.1958 as also upon the decision of Srimati Bibi Phul Kumari vs. Ghanshyam Misra, 35 IA 22. 16. In the last mentioned Privy Council case the facts were that the plaintiff had purchased a certain immoveable property from another. Against the latter a creditor had obtained a decree for money. This decree had been put into execution and the plaintiff's property was attached. Plaintiff lodged a claim with the execution Court on the basis of his purchase prior to the date of attachment. This claim was rejected. The plaintiff thereupon filed the suit out of which arose the appeal to the Privy Council. This decree had been put into execution and the plaintiff's property was attached. Plaintiff lodged a claim with the execution Court on the basis of his purchase prior to the date of attachment. This claim was rejected. The plaintiff thereupon filed the suit out of which arose the appeal to the Privy Council. The sub-ordinate Judge, who heard the suit, held that the Court fee payable was ad valorem on the amount of the decree which the creditor had obtained against the plaintiff's vendor and Article 17 of Schedule II was inapplicable. The decision was affirmed in appeal. On appeal to the Privy Council their Lordships had regard to the following terms of Article 17 of Second Schedule to the Court Fees Act viz. "Article 17 (1)–To alter or set aside a summary decision or order of any of the civil Courts not established by Letters Patent or of any revenue Court." They considered the nature of the suit and held the description of the suit given in the aforesaid provision exactly answered the one which the plaintiff had in that case brought. It was consequently held that the fixed Court fee as provided in Article 17 of Second Schedule was payable. 17. Section 22 of the Madhya Bharat Public Demands Recovery Act provided that the person against whom the order is made in objection proceedings may file a suit for cancellation of the certificate. This is exactly the kind of suit contemplated by Article 17 (1) of Second Schedule to the Court Fees Act. It is therefore clear that in such a suit payment of fixed Court fee as laid down in the aforesaid article is sufficient. 18. In the present suit the plaintiff had questioned his liability under the certificate of the Excise Officer, Dhar lodged with the Collector and the Excise Officer Dhar after considering the same had overruled it. The Madhya Bharat Public Demands Recovery Act in section 22 made a specific provision entitling the plaintiff to have the decision of the Excise Officer set aside by means of a suit in a civil Court. The decision of the Excise Officer in these circumstances cannot but be a summary decision. It is no doubt true that the plaintiff in this case does not in so many words confine his relief to setting aside or altering the summary decision of the Excise Officer. The decision of the Excise Officer in these circumstances cannot but be a summary decision. It is no doubt true that the plaintiff in this case does not in so many words confine his relief to setting aside or altering the summary decision of the Excise Officer. The cause of action is mentioned by him as the date when he is informed (according to practice no date is fixed for judgment or order but information is given to a party about it) of the decision of the Excise Officer dismissing his objection, but he asks for cancellation of the certificate and permanent injunction restraining the Collector from realising the alleged dues. This however was unnecessary and does not constitute an essential part of the claim he had made. Similar prayer for injunction was made in the case before the Privy Council referred to above but their Lordships considered that fact as being of little consequence in determining the real nature of the plaint and Court fee required for it. Their Lordships said at page 25:– "Misled by the form of the action directed by section 283, both parties have treated the action as if it were not simply a form of appeal, but as if it were unrelated to any decree forming the cause of action. Accordingly, on the one hand, the appellant, pointing to her prayer for a declaration, says she pays Rs. 10 on that and pointing to her prayer for injunction, says she pays other Rs. 10 on that. In their Lordships' judgment this is not the proper view of the suit taken as a whole, but if it were, it would be extremely difficult for the appellant to bring her suit, which asks consequential relief as well as a declaratory decree within the enactment which she invokes. On the other hand, the respondent equally ignore the essential fact that this is a plaint for review of a summary decision and they go on to bring the action, treated as an original action, within the class of cases where the Court fees are ad valorem of the action. Their Lordships, however, are satisfied that there is in the statute no general or overriding reference to value. The terms of sub-section 1 of Article 17 (which they hold to apply) contains no reference to value. Their Lordships, however, are satisfied that there is in the statute no general or overriding reference to value. The terms of sub-section 1 of Article 17 (which they hold to apply) contains no reference to value. In like manner the class of suits dealing with arbitration awards is coupled with suits such as that immediately in question; awards may be of value Rs. 10 or of value Rs. 1,00,000 and yet no distinction is made. In short, the statute, for good reasons or bad, has dealt with certain actions irrespective of value and the present action is one of them." 19. In the Single Bench decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Civil Revision No. 90 of 1958, Ghisalal vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and others decided on 20.8.1958. Dixit J. (as he then was) has, relying upon the aforesaid Privy Council case and the decision of the Calcutta High Court in a similar case reported in Joy Durga Dassi vs. Maharaj Kumar Sourish Chandra Roy Bahadur, AIR 1940 Cal. 215, taken the view, in a case similar to the present, that the Court fee payable was not ad valorem on the amount of the certificate sought to be avoided but the fixed Court fee payable under Article 17 (1) of Schedule II of the Court Fees Act. 20. The decision in Badrilal vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1963 JLJ 674, upon which the learned Additional Government Advocate relies is clearly distinguishable. In that case in both the suits, with reference to which the matter of Court fee was considered, the claims were for declaration and that the plaintiff in each of them was not liable to a certain sum and for permanent injunction restraining the defendant State from demanding or making recovery of the same. It is clear from those decisions that there was no summary decision there nor had the suits been filed for setting aside any summary decision. The case therefore has no application. 21. The memorandum of appeal is therefore properly stamped. The preliminary objection is consequently overruled. 22. This takes us to the contention as to validity of notice under section 80 C.P.C. The learned trial Judge has held the notice to be bad in law as it had not been served either upon the Chief Secretary or the Collector. 21. The memorandum of appeal is therefore properly stamped. The preliminary objection is consequently overruled. 22. This takes us to the contention as to validity of notice under section 80 C.P.C. The learned trial Judge has held the notice to be bad in law as it had not been served either upon the Chief Secretary or the Collector. This view of the lower Court does not take sufficient account of the pleadings of the parties and other materials on record. 23. In para 6 of the plaint the plaintiff asserted that notice under section 80 C.P.C. had been given to the defendants ¼izfroknhx.k½ . The defendants' reply to this assertion in para 6 of the written statement is that the notice referred to in para 6 is admitted to have been received and the same is replied to through the (appropriate) department of the same but the said notice is not in accordance with law. 24. It is thus clear that the objection in the written statement is not as regards want of due service either upon the Chief Secretary or the Collector, Dhar but it is as to its not being in accordance with law. The objection thus has reference to its contents and not to its service upon proper authority contemplated under section 80. In para 32 of the judgment the learned trial Judge concludes upon this point:– "No notice seems to have been sent either to the Madhya Pradesh Government, Chief Secretary or the Collector Dhar. Thus neither the notice was given to proper authorities nor was it in accordance with the mandatory provisions of section 80, C.P.C. It was consequently invalid." 25. As regards the mandatory provisions under section 80 to which the learned Judge made reference they related to the authorities named in section 80 (c) i.e. the Chief Secretary and the Collector of the District concerned and it being addressed to them. The pleadings referred to above make it clear that these were not the specific contentions raised with reference to the notice under section 80. In fact it was admitted that the Madhya Pradesh State defendant No.1 Chief Secretary defendant No.2 and the Collector, Dhar defendant No.3 had received the said notices. The pleadings referred to above make it clear that these were not the specific contentions raised with reference to the notice under section 80. In fact it was admitted that the Madhya Pradesh State defendant No.1 Chief Secretary defendant No.2 and the Collector, Dhar defendant No.3 had received the said notices. The issue framed in this connection too was as to the validity of notice under section 80 and not as to absence of its service upon the defendants or it being not addressed to them. 26. The notice was sent through the counsel Shri Manaklal Porwad who represented the plaintiff at the trial. The person who would therefore be in the know of this was Mr. Manaklal Porwad and not the plaintiff, yet the learned Judge referred to the plaintiff's admission in para 14 and 24 of his deposition and concluded that Ex. P/43 was the only notice given to the Government. In para 14 the plaintiff had started that he had given notice to the Government under section 80 through Manaklal pleader which was Ex. P/43 and in para 24 he again stated the same thing. On this answer being given the Court proceeded to make a note of his demeanour saying that he was not giving definite answer and was saying things in doubtful strain. The Court noted that the plaintiff was asserting that he had given notice to the Government. In fact this question did really not arise on the pleadings. Apart from this neither the Chief Secretary nor the Collector Dhar have appeared in the witness-box to explain their admissions in the pleadings. The District Excise Officer Mr. Hiralal Baghela who was examined says nothing about it. 27. The Court below was therefore not justified in holding that the notice was bad. 28. One more point which if found in favour of the respondent would go to the root of the matter was raised on behalf of the respondent, that was regarding limitation. It is contended that the claim was barred by limitation as the plaintiff has not proved on which date the impugned summary decision was given and that his suit is within six months from that date as required under section 20 of the Madhya Bharat Public Demands Recovery Act, 1954. 29. It is contended that the claim was barred by limitation as the plaintiff has not proved on which date the impugned summary decision was given and that his suit is within six months from that date as required under section 20 of the Madhya Bharat Public Demands Recovery Act, 1954. 29. In the first place no issue of limitation was specifically raised nor was it clear from the pleadings as to what specific objection was there on the point of limitation. The only thing said in the written statement was that the defendants did not admit that the date on which the cause of action arose was 12.11.1956. The suit was filed on 3.5.1957. In para 2 of the plaint the plaintiff had definitely asserted that intimation regarding the decision of the District Excise Officer was received by the plaintiff on 12.11.1956. The defendants while replying to this clearly admitted that the District Excise Officer had decided the plaintiff's objection adversely to him and that its intimation had been given to the plaintiff. Nothing was said about its being given earlier than 12.11.1956. On the well-known rule of pleadings as contained in Order 8 Rule 5, C.P.C. the assertion not specifically denied should be deemed to have been admitted. The general trend of the reply to this para 2 of the plaint was to admit what had been asserted. No issue was sought about this assertion. It is no doubt true that under section 20 of the Madhya Bharat Public Demands Recovery Act the date from which the period of six months is to be computed is the date of the determination of the petition denying liability. If the deciding authority fixed a date on which the decision would be given then it is that date which will have to be taken into account. On the other hand when this was not or could not be done then the date of decision (would be the date on which information) was given to the objector. An authority cannot by writing out a decision say that the date of decision is the date when be came to certain conclusion. Such date would be the date when be discloses that decision to the parties if they are informed about his intention to do so by a specified date. An authority cannot by writing out a decision say that the date of decision is the date when be came to certain conclusion. Such date would be the date when be discloses that decision to the parties if they are informed about his intention to do so by a specified date. Else it would be the date on which the party is informed of it, vide Md. Zaman vs. Hans Raj, AIR 1938 Lah. 707 and Sagarmal Marwari vs. Lachmisaran Misir, AIR 1923 Patna 129. In the present case the intimation of determination of the plaintiff's petition denying liability was given to him on 12.11.1956 and he filed his suit on 3.5.1957 i.e. within six months. 30. The claim is therefore within time. 31. This takes us to the main contention as to merits. 32. The largest and hotly contested item is with reference to the plaintiff's liability in respect of the contract for 1947-48 in respect of the four liquor shops at Dhar. The amount in respect of this, included in the certificate in question for Rs. 36,255-15-0, is Rs. 31,072. The plaintiff's case is that he could not be held liable for the full amount of the contract namely Rs. 75,200 since on a representation made by him and others and in view of special circumstances which had cropped up, such as picketing and unavailability of liquor at the Government godowns on account of such picketing, the State Council, on recommendation of the then Excise Commissioner, Shree Chensingh had passed a resolution sanctioning recovery of Rs. 3 per gallon for 'Rashi' and Rs. 6 per gallon for 'Dubara' from the defaulting contractors for the entire period of their contract. The order was issued a day subsequent to merger of Dhar State into Madhya Bharat, i.e. on 1.7.1948 by the State of Madhya Bharat. The original Council resolution or the order issued on its basis dated 1.7.1948 have not been produced by the State nor has their unavailability due to loss or destruction, satisfactorily established. We have therefore to proceed on the materials as they are on record. Material documents in this connection are Ex. P/l and D/2. 33. The original Council resolution or the order issued on its basis dated 1.7.1948 have not been produced by the State nor has their unavailability due to loss or destruction, satisfactorily established. We have therefore to proceed on the materials as they are on record. Material documents in this connection are Ex. P/l and D/2. 33. It appears that after the plaintiff secured contract in respect of the four liquor shops at Dhar he began to complain about the loss he was suffering due to picketing and also due to unavailability or sufficient quantity of liquor at appropriate time. On 19.2.1948 he submitted an application Ex. D/3-c on depositing Rs. 4,000 stating that although he had been given 'Bachat' to the extent of Rs. 1-14-0 per gallon he was prepared to deposit Rs. 3 per gallon on liquor of quality called 'Rashi' and that he would run the shop after taking liquor from the State on that basis and that an order to that effect might be issued to the Inspector (Excise). Similar application for the liquor of quality known as 'Dubara' was made on the same date. An order accordingly was issued (Ex. D/18). Later an application dated 29.5.1948 Ex. D/5c was submitted complaining that due to establishment of 'Congress' Rule in the State and due to bad year the sale of liquor had materially fallen and it had become impossible for him to continue the contract. He granted that an order had been passed for issuing to him liquor on payment of Rs. 3 per gallon 'Rashi' and Rs. 6 per gallon 'Dubara' but according to him, the figure of his contract (Theka) had not been cancelled. He therefore prayed that an order might be passed canceling the contract figure and directing recovery on the commission basis from 1.10.1947 upto 30.9.1948 at Rs. 3 per gallon 'Rashi' and Rs. 6 per gallon 'Dubara'. He also prayed for adjustment of his deposits towards his liability thus fixed. A note no. 967 dated 26.6.1948 was thereupon submitted to the Dhar Darbar whereupon an order was issued on 1.7.1948 from the Darbar Office in the name of the Commissioner of Excise. The Commissioner, on the strength of this Darbar Order issued an order in the name of Inspector Excise on 29.7.1948 Ex. D/2 and in the name of the plaintiff Ex. P/1. 967 dated 26.6.1948 was thereupon submitted to the Dhar Darbar whereupon an order was issued on 1.7.1948 from the Darbar Office in the name of the Commissioner of Excise. The Commissioner, on the strength of this Darbar Order issued an order in the name of Inspector Excise on 29.7.1948 Ex. D/2 and in the name of the plaintiff Ex. P/1. The orders practically carry the same purport although the one issued in the name of the Inspector Ex. D/2 is more detailed. It is as follows:– ORDER "It may be written to the Inspector of Excise and Custom that out of the shops which had been knocked down in auction in the name of Mangal Gangaram and Shri Kishan Mangal, on taking into consideration the sales in respect of such of them as are mentioned below as per sanctioned Government Order No. 3558 dated 1.7.1948 this order is being issued which may be complied with accordingly. 1. Whatever might have been received either as deposit or at Rs. 3 for 'Rashi' and Rs. 6 per gallon for 'Dubara' from the contractor from all the four shops in the city (Dhar) viz.; Gachhewadi, Hatwada, Pindar Khidki and Naogaon similarly shops at Gyanpura, Delmi, Sitapat, Tornod, Dilavara and personal shop at Anarad, may be credited towards the contract amount (in each case). Nothing is to be refunded to him out of these receipts nor is it to be credited towards the dues of other shops. 2. Whatever may have been in balance, after adjusting the amount received from them towards the entire issue of liquor uptil today at the rate of Rs. 3 per gallon for 'Rashi' and Rs. 6 per gallon for 'Dubara' may be recovered first and credited to the treasury. 3. After recovering the balance due in respect of the aforesaid shops on the basis of issue (as above) the account may be squared off and hereafter pass may be issued after receiving Rs. 3 per gallon on 'Rashi' and Rs. 6 per gallon on 'Dubara'. 4. No other shop besides those mentioned will be taken to be entitled to the aforesaid concession. 5. In accordance with the above mentioned intention a tabulated statement be made in respect of each of the aforesaid shops showing what amount has been received as deposit, installment or sale commission, within four days. 6. 6 per gallon on 'Dubara'. 4. No other shop besides those mentioned will be taken to be entitled to the aforesaid concession. 5. In accordance with the above mentioned intention a tabulated statement be made in respect of each of the aforesaid shops showing what amount has been received as deposit, installment or sale commission, within four days. 6. A Dakhala may be issued in reply to his application dated 12.7.1948 to Mangal contractor that the concession has been allowed as per Dhar Government Order No. 3558 dated 1.7.1948 on the basis of issue of liquor at Rs. 3 for 'Rashi' and Rs. 6 for 'Dubara' for the following shops. 6 (1) Regarding all the four shops in the City (Dhar) viz.; Gachhewadi, Hatwada, Pindar Khidki and Naogaon and of shops in the mofussil namely Gyanpura, Delmi, Sitapat, Tornod, Dilavara and Anarad, whatever has been received in respect of these shops either as deposit or installment or at Rs. 3 per gallon on 'Rashi' or Rs. 6 per gallon on 'Dubara' will be reckoned as having been paid towards the contract amount. But in case the amount is found to be paid in excess it would not be refunded. He should comply with the requirement of paying the amount at the time of securing pass according to concession allowed on the basis of issue, dated 29.7.1948." 34. It is clear from Para Nos. 2 and above quoted that the Government Order of Dhar Darbar passed some time before the merger of the State on 30.6.1948 and issued on 1.7.1948 remitted performance of the contract in part by allowing concession to the contractor to pay Rs. 3 per gallon on 'Rashi' and Rs. 6 per gallon on 'Dubara' liquor which had been issued upto the date of the order and thereafter upto the completion of the contract period subject to the conditions that in case the amount of deposit or installment at the above rate on issue which the contractor might have paid till that day is found to exceed the amount calculated on the basis of price at the aforesaid rate, it would not be refunded to him. If it be less than such amount the account would be squared off and adjusted. If it be less than such amount the account would be squared off and adjusted. Section 63 of the Contract Act provides that a party to a contract can remit the performance of any promise made to him either wholly or in part. If such remission is made, which does not require any independent consideration, it binds the promissor. 35. The learned trial Judge has not correctly interpreted the above quoted order. He particularly does not seem to have paid sufficient attention to the words 'Aaj Tak Ke Sharab issues Par' in para 2 and 'Hisab Ki Safai Samajhi Jave' in (second) Para 2. The order clearly roughly meant to substitute commission system in place of contract system subject to the reservation that in case the amount is found to be in excess it would not be refunded. The learned Judge considered it as an arrangement merely with a view to facilitate payment of contract amount without intending to remit any liability thereunder even in parts and that the original contract continued and had not been annulled. This view does not accord with the entire tenor of Ex. D-2 and Ex. P-1. 36. I am, therefore of the view that the certificate issued on the basis of the original contract for the year 1947-48 is not valid and deserves to be cancelled. It is open for the State to issue a fresh certificate as per arrangement sanctioned by the Dhar Government as per above mentioned documents Ex. D-2 and Ex. P-1. 37. As regards item no.1 of Rs. 695 it is clear that this relates to Holkar State dues which have not been remitted by that State. Remission related to the dues of Dhar State on the occasion of accession of the Maharaja of Dhar to the Gadi. 38. As regards item no.2 referred to at the outset of Rs. 917 it is not disputed by the defendant that the plaintiff is not liable therefore and it is asserted that the said amount is not included in the certificate of Rs. 36,255-15-0. The plaintiff has not shown that it is so included. 39. Regarding item no. 3 of Rs. 48 the plaintiff has not proved that he had paid more than Rs. 562 admitted by the defendants. The items of payment mentioned by him moreover do not make a total of Rs. 646. 36,255-15-0. The plaintiff has not shown that it is so included. 39. Regarding item no. 3 of Rs. 48 the plaintiff has not proved that he had paid more than Rs. 562 admitted by the defendants. The items of payment mentioned by him moreover do not make a total of Rs. 646. It is also not likely that he would pay in excess. 40. As regards item no.4 of Rs. 3487-2-9 the plaintiff's stand that the contract for hemp-drugs for the year 1946-47 for the town of Dhar stood in his sons name and not in his name is belied by his own statement. Its cancellation or annulment also has not been proved. Document D-8 upon which he relied at the trial for the purpose is not sought to be included by him in the paper book. The contention of the plaintiff with respect to the same is therefore rejected. 41. Item No.5 of Rs. 137 8-0 for the year 1949-50 is found by the trial Court to be not recoverable from the plaintiff. 42. As regards item no.6 in respect of the contract of hemp-drugs for the shop at Kukshi for the years 1936-37, 1937-38 and 1938-39 the plaintiff's case about the cancellation of these contracts has not been established by any evidence. He could not therefore claim to have been discharged from the aforesaid liability of Rs. 2087-50 P. 43. It therefore follows that the certificate issued against the plaintiff for the amount of Rs. 36,255-15-0 deserves to be cancelled to the extent of Rs. 31,072 and Rs. 137-8-0. As regards the items of Rs. 695, Rs. 48. Rs. 3487-2-9 and Rs. 2,087-8-0 the certificate ought to stand. It is open for the Excise Department of the State to issue fresh certificate in respect of any dues that may be found due in respect of the contract of 1947-48 of the four liquor shops at Dhar keeping in view the interpretation put in this judgment upon documents Ex. P.1 and Ex. D-2. The parties are entitled to their costs throughout according to their success or failure. S.B. SEN, J. 44. I entirely agree with the conclusions arrived at by my learned brother in this appeal, but I wish to add a few lines on the question of limitation. 45. P.1 and Ex. D-2. The parties are entitled to their costs throughout according to their success or failure. S.B. SEN, J. 44. I entirely agree with the conclusions arrived at by my learned brother in this appeal, but I wish to add a few lines on the question of limitation. 45. On the question of limitation, section that is relevant is section 20 (2) of the M.P. Public Demands-Recovery Act No. 24 of 1954. According to sub-section 2, the suit may be brought at any time within six months (a) from the service upon the defaulter of the notice required by section 6 or (b) from the date of determination of a petition, denying liability under section 8 or section 9 or (c) from the date of the protest lodged by him under section 15. 46. In paragraph 4 of the plaint, the plaintiff has stated that the cause of action arose on 12.11.1956. He also mentioned in the said paragraph that the proceedings for the recovery are going on in Dhar District and therefore the said Court had jurisdiction. 47. The reply to this allegation by the defendants is that the cause of action did not arise on 12.11.1956. The defendants have not mentioned as to when the cause of action arose. In fact their contention is that there has been no cause of action. It is for the plaintiff to show that the claim is within limitation. 48. So far as the date 12.11.1956 is concerned the only averment in the plaint is in paragraph 2 in which it has been stated that the plaintiff has filed an objection before the Collector, Dhar. The application has been disposed of by the District Excise Officer, Dhar holding against him. The intimation of this decision was given on 12.11.1956 and the proceeding before the Collector is still pending. The final decision has not yet been made. Even then the proceedings for recovery have been started by the Tahsildar, Kukshi and that is the reason why he has been forced to bring the suit. 49. I have already given the point of time from which six months can be counted. He does not claim it under section 20 (2) (a) and has also not mentioned the date of the service of notice. 49. I have already given the point of time from which six months can be counted. He does not claim it under section 20 (2) (a) and has also not mentioned the date of the service of notice. Section 20 (2) (b) which has been sought to be made applicable gives the starting points, the date of determination of a petition denying liability. It is clear from the very wording of the section 20 (2) (b) limitation would start from the date of determination. No date has been given of this determination. The plaintiff has not stated that the petition was decided on 12.11.1956. His only contention is that the intimation of the decision was received by him on 12.11.1956 and the defendants have also admitted this position. But it is not stated that it was for the first time that he received the intimation. Date of intimation of determination is distinct from the date of determination. 50. I am aware that in Mohammad vs. Hansraj, AIR 1938 Lah. 707, it has been held:– "Where a Court delivers a judgment without having previously fixed a date for pronouncing judgment and the defendant being absent on that date, the judgment is informed to his counsel on same later day, this later day must be regarded as the date for pronouncing judgment and period of limitation for appeal must be deemed to run from that date on which the judgment is actually pronounced." But it is nowhere stated in the plaint that no date was fixed for pronouncing the order nor it is known whether he was present on the date when the order was passed. 51. Similar is the view in Sagarmal vs. Lachmisaran, AIR 1923 Patna 129. Both these cases start on the basis that the parties were not given date of a decision. It has not been alleged in the instant case that they were absent on the date when the order was passed or that they were not told that an order would be passed on a particular date. 52. The discussion is however purely academic as nothing turns on whether the limitation is taken from the date of intimation or from the date of determination as the date of determination itself is 10.9.1956. This is clear from the record of the Collector which has been produced along with the case. 52. The discussion is however purely academic as nothing turns on whether the limitation is taken from the date of intimation or from the date of determination as the date of determination itself is 10.9.1956. This is clear from the record of the Collector which has been produced along with the case. The Limitation is six months under section 20 (2) (b) from the date of determination. If the notice period is added to this, limitation available would be eight months. The suit was filed on 3.5.1957. Claim would, therefore, be within limitation. 53. Before closing I may add that the defence in this case has not been what is expected. The law officers of the State while submitting the written statement should have understood the importance of their statement in para 6 wherein they admitted the receipt of the notice. Not only that, they also admit to have replied to the same. After these admissions in what way the notice was not according to law, they should have mentioned. At least the receipt of the notice by the defendants have been admitted. Though single izfroknh has been used but it meant all the defendants. 54. As regards the limitation the reply is only a denial. It has been stated in reply to para 4 of the plaint that the defendants deny that the cause of action arose on 12.11.1956. They are silent when did it arise nor do they say why it did not arise on 12.11.1956.