Judgment :- 1. The appellant sued to recover possession of the suit properties, which are two buildings, with arrears of rent and future rent. They belonged to Kannan Devan Hill Produce Company in Munnar and were taken on lease by Bacha Rowther, the appellant's father. He allowed his son-in-law, the respondent, to be in occupation, by carrying on a trade in item 1 and residing in item 2. This was in the year 1935. After the death of Bacha Rowther, the appellant took a lease from the company in the year 1944 in his name and allowed the respondent to continue in occupation, on payment of the rent to the company and on agreeing to surrender possession to the appellant whenever demanded. In June 1953, the appellant called upon the respondent to surrender the buildings and disputes which arose were settled by mediation, as a result of which, the respondent agreed to pay Rs. 50/- more per mensem by way of rent to the appellant and to vacate after two years. He did not surrender possession even on the expiry of the term and even attempted to induct someone into possession of the buildings. On these averments, the appellant sued for the reliefs aforesaid, and for an injunction to restrain the respondent from inducting anyone else into possession of the buildings. 2. The respondent contended, that Bacha Rowther gave the buildings to his deceased wife absolutely on stridhanam and denied being in permissive possession as alleged. He pleaded in the alternative, that after Bacha Rowther's death, his wife and Bacha Rowther's other legal representatives gave the appellant a power of attorney for management of the estate, by virtue of which, the appellant took the lease of the year 1944 in his name, the right under which enured to the respondent's wife and others and that after the death of his wife, the respondent is in possession as a fractional owner. 3. These contentions were negatived by the court of first instance which decreed the appellant's claim in full. 3. These contentions were negatived by the court of first instance which decreed the appellant's claim in full. On appeal being taken by the respondent, the District Judge allowed the appeal on the preliminary ground, without considering the other questions arising in the case, that the lease of 1953 June relied on by the appellant being for a term of two years and not being registered under S.107 of the Transfer of Property Act which had already come into force in the concerned area, the appellant was not entitled to maintain the suit, which accordingly was dismissed. 4. In this Court learned counsel complained, that the point as to non- registration had not been taken in the pleadings or in the memorandum of appeal to the District Court and for that reason ought not to have been entertained. I do not agree. It is a point of law which arose on the facts as alleged by the appellant, and the District Judge must be deemed to have accorded sanction for the point being urged before him, even though not covered by the appeal memorandum. The second contention was that the suit is really based on the lease of 1944 and that what took place in June 1953 was only an enhancement of the rent by Rs. 50/- per mensem payable to the appellant and the fixation of a term of two years. I cannot agree to this contention either. The rent having been enhanced and the term of the lease having been fixed as two years, the arrangement of June 1953 has necessarily to be held to be a new lease, which superseded the old, and it is impossible to accept the view that it is an arrangement in the garb of the old lease itself. Being a new lease it had to comply with the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. 5. But the third contention of the appellant has to prevail. Being for a term of two years and being not registered in compliance with S.107 of the Transfer of Property Act, that lease is void. But if as the appellant has alleged the respondent had been in possession of the buildings as lessee, his subsequent continuance in possession must be deemed to be under the new arrangement of lease. Being for a term of two years and being not registered in compliance with S.107 of the Transfer of Property Act, that lease is void. But if as the appellant has alleged the respondent had been in possession of the buildings as lessee, his subsequent continuance in possession must be deemed to be under the new arrangement of lease. He cannot contend, notwithstanding the failure of the appellant to have a lease deed executed and registered, that he is not a lessee. In such cases the presumption under S.106 of the Transfer of Property Act applies. That section provides, that in the absence of a contract to the contrary, a lease of immovable property shall be deemed to be a lease from month to month, the present lease being not for agricultural or manufacturing purposes. There was no contract to the contrary for the reason, that the arrangement of 1953 June was in the eye of law no contract at all. So the presumption under S.106 must have full scope and effect and simply on the ground that the arrangement of 1953 June is not evidenced by a registered document, the appellant cannot be non-suited. 6. This position is fortified by judicial decisions. The Supreme Court has held in Ram Kumar v. Jagdish Chandra (AIR. 1952 SC. 23) that the contract to the contrary, as contemplated by S.106 must be a valid contract, and that if it is no contract in law, S.106 will come into play and will regulate the duration of the lease. That was a case in which the Kabuliyat, though registered, was held to be inoperative under S.107, the document not having been executed by both the lessor and the lessee as prescribed by S.107. The Supreme Court affirmed the correctness of the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Aklu v. Emman (AIR. 1916 Calcutta 358) in which it was held, that on failure to register a document of lease fixing an annual rent, the lease would take effect from month to month under S.106 of the Transfer of Property Act. 7. It follows as a result, that the suit was not liable to be dismissed on this ground. The appellant's learned counsel contended, that the case has to be considered under S.106 of the Transfer of Property Act. 7. It follows as a result, that the suit was not liable to be dismissed on this ground. The appellant's learned counsel contended, that the case has to be considered under S.106 of the Transfer of Property Act. Apart from the contentions which the respondent has already raised in the first court, but which have been negatived by it, he may have other contentions to raise, if the case is held to fall under S.106 of the Transfer of Property Act. Learned counsel for the respondent also stated that he has a point, that the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1959, applies to the present case; even so, he might take it before the District Judge who is now being called upon to re-entertain the appeal on his file and dispose of it in due course of law. The judgment and decree of the District Judge are hereby set aside and the case is remanded to the District Judge for disposal. The costs of this appeal will be costs in the cause. The court-fee paid on the appeal memorandum will be refunded to the appellant. Allowed.