Judgment 1. This appeal has been filed by an insolvent person under the provisions of Section 75 (3) of the Provincial Insolvency Act. It is directed against an order of the District Judge by which he has held that the income received by the insolvent was not exempted under Sec. 60 (1), proviso (h) of the Code of Civil Procedure, from attachment for the purpose of paying the insolvents debts. The learned Judge has further held that an amount of Rs. 15/- per month should be utilised for the purpose of satisfying the insolvents debts and this amount should be remitted by his employer to the Insolvency Court for the purpose of distribution to the creditors, who have proved their debts. The insolvent has come up in appeal against this order and the only point that has arisen for consideration is whether the earnings of the appellant is exempted under Sec. 60 (1), proviso (h). The proviso runs thus: "Provided that the following particulars shall not be liable to such attachment or sale, namely:- (h) the wages of labourers and domestic servants, whether payable in money or kind." It is contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that the earnings of the appellant were the wages of a labourer and, therefore, no part of it was liable to attachment for the payment of the appellants debts. Learned counsel has relied upon two decisions of the Bombay High Court, which are reported in K.U. Kulkarni V/s. Ganpat Hiraji, AIR 1942 Bom 191 and Mansuri Ibrahim Mahamed V/s. Shetti Kantilal Balabhai, AIR 1956 Bom 276 . It is argued, on the principle enunciated by their Lordships of the Bombay High Court, that the appellant was a mere labourer and his earnings were the wages of a labourer and, therefore, the judgment of the learned District Judge attaching Rs. 15/- per month is illegal. It appears to us that the principle, upon which proviso (h) has to be interpreted, is not in doubt and that each case has to be determined upon the evidence on record. It has been judicially recognised that the expression "labourer" connotes a limited class of wage earners who earn by manual labour or in occupations which required little or no art or skill or previous education. It has been judicially recognised that the expression "labourer" connotes a limited class of wage earners who earn by manual labour or in occupations which required little or no art or skill or previous education. This was so held in Jechand Khusal V/s. Aba and Baik, ILR 5 Bom 132, mentioned in the decision reported in AIR 1942 Bom 191. In the decision reported in AIR 1942 Bom 191, the person concerned was a head jobber and his work was certain kind of supervision over spinning mill-hands and it included work by the person personally, if necessity arose. The personal work of the person concerned was the same as that of the mill-hands working under him. On the facts of the case, it was decided by Wassoodew, J., that the workman came within the definition of a labourer. In the case reported in AIR 1956 Bom 276 , the workman was a weaver in a textile mill. Upon a consideration of the materials on the record, Gajendragadkar, J., (as he then was) held that the person concerned there, who did weaving work, was a labourer. In the instant case, both sides have adduced oral evidence as to the nature of the work done by the appellant and, therefore, it will be necessary to consider whether the appellant should be held to be a labourer within the meaning of proviso (h) or not. The appellant has described himself as a labourer getting Rs. 8/6/- per day. He has stated that he was not a skilled hand. He has deposed that he had never received any training. The work done by him has been stated to be to separate hot iron sheets, by pressing them with his boot and with gloves in hand. Thus, according to the appellant, he came within the definition which entitled him to an exemption of his earnings. On the other hand, one Deva Prakash was examined to prove the nature of work that was done by the appellant. This witness was an Assistant Superintendent of the Sheet Mills and the appellant worked under him. According to Deva Prakash, the appellants designation was "doubler" and a doubler was a skilled labourer. According to this witness, further, it required skill to discharge the work done by the appellant and an ordinary labourer could not do that work. This witness was an Assistant Superintendent of the Sheet Mills and the appellant worked under him. According to Deva Prakash, the appellants designation was "doubler" and a doubler was a skilled labourer. According to this witness, further, it required skill to discharge the work done by the appellant and an ordinary labourer could not do that work. Having scrutinised the evidence of these two witnesses, it appears to us that the appellant was not such a kind of labourer, that he will be entitled to the exemption claimed under Section 60 (1), proviso (h), of the Code of Civil Procedure. The evidence given by the appellant to the effect that he had received no training, does not appear to be correct. He himself stated that he began his career under his employer as a cooli earning 8 annas per day. Before becoming a doubler, he was a packer of hot sheets. According to Deva Prakash, the appellant had got training on the job. The appellant had acquired skill for the job, because of his working on the job. Deva Prakash has further stated that it required eight to ten years experience to do the job that the appellant was then doing. It is clear, therefore, that the description given by Deva Prakash of the appellant "as a skilled artisan" represents the true state of affairs. It is clear from the evidence that the work that the appellant was doing at the relevant time did require art and skill. It is difficult to accept the appellants evidence that he got promotion only due to seniority in service and not because of any training or experience. So far as training is concerned, Deva Prakash has clarified that the appellant got his training in the job that he was doing. In our opinion, every test has been satisfied to indicate that the appellant was doing work requiring art and skill and that what he was actually doing Was the result of training that he got under his employer. The question whether the appellant got wages or whether the earnings amounted to salary, has not been very much clarified. According to Deva Prakash, the appellant is paid monthly but on daily wage rate. Then, it also appears that the appellant is entitled to one day off in a week. The question whether the appellant got wages or whether the earnings amounted to salary, has not been very much clarified. According to Deva Prakash, the appellant is paid monthly but on daily wage rate. Then, it also appears that the appellant is entitled to one day off in a week. However, the consideration as to whether the earnings of the appellant amounted to wages need not enter into the picture, if it is held that the appellant was not a labourer within the provision of law relied upon by him. In view of this conclusion, this appeal must be held to be without any merit. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed, but under the circumstances, without cost.