JUDGMENT Newaskar, J. 1. This appeal is directed against the decision of Tare J., in Misc. Appeal No. 106 of 1962 preferred by the appellant Gokuldas s/o Balkishan Mahajan of Amjhera and another against the decision of the Additional District Judge Dhar in Civil Suit No. 3 of 1953 refusing, to set aside the order recording a compromise in a suit filed after securing the consent of the Advocate General by the appellants under Section 92 C.P.C. for the removal of defendant Nandlal and his son Gokuldas from the temple and its properties of Goverdhannathji at Amjhera from the position of Nandlal as a Pujari appointed by the members of the Nima Mahajan and other Vaishnavaites of Amjhera and for appointment of another suitable person in his place of look after the worship of the deity and to manage the temple properties and for preparing a scheme for the afore-said purpose. It was alleged in the plaint that the said Nandlal was not earring out his duties regarding worship of the deity and management of the property properly and had begun laying personal claim to the temple and its properties. The plaintiffs alleged that the properties set out in the list attached to the plaint had been dedicated to the deity by the Vaishnavaites and is the Devottar property belonging to the Vaishnavait community. 2. The suit was resisted by the defendants contending that the house in which the deity of Gordhannathji was installed was a private house belonging to fore fathers of the defendants as the same had been gifted to them. The deities installed were private. They belonged to the defence family and not to members of Vaishnava community. The immoveable property is the personal property of the defendants whereas they do not have in their possession any moveable property in trust. The most of the moveable’s mentioned in the list are those belonging to the defendants and meant for their day to day domestic used. On these and other grounds the claim was denied. 3. The trial Court framed issues and later on evidence of both sides fully recorded. The case was then fixed for argument. Plaintiffs were represented by Mr. Bhandsavale while the defendants were represented by Mr. Bhavarlal. Arguments were heard and the case was reserved for judgment. However nearly a year elapsed and no Judgment was delivered. 3. The trial Court framed issues and later on evidence of both sides fully recorded. The case was then fixed for argument. Plaintiffs were represented by Mr. Bhandsavale while the defendants were represented by Mr. Bhavarlal. Arguments were heard and the case was reserved for judgment. However nearly a year elapsed and no Judgment was delivered. At this stage a talk of compromise was mooted between the counsel for the parties, The counsel then called their respective parties in Court on 4-4-1961 and the talk of compromise took place in the presence of Mr. Shambhunath Chaturvedi, the presiding officer of the Court. There is a dispute as to whether a final and binding compromise was reached between the parties on that date on 5-4-1961 an application for recording a compromise was submitted on behalf of the defendants. Later on 6-5-1961 another application for the purpose was submitted and along with it a writing containing the terms said to have been agreed to between the parties was submitted. This was signed by defendant No. 1 and his counsel Shri Bhavarlal but did not bear signature of the plaintiff. The plaintiffs resisted the said application for recording the compromise and denied that any such agreement had finally been reached. The trial Court thereupon held an inquiry and ultimately found that the compromise as indicated in the writing aforesaid had in fact taken place between the parties it accordingly directed the recording of the compromise and passing a decree in terms thereof. 4. The plaintiffs appealed against this order. The matter was heard by Tare, J., who affirmed the view of the trial Judges that the compromise in fact had taken place as had been found by the trial Court. The learned Judge consequently affirmed that finding. It was however further contended before the learned Judge that no compromise could take place in this manner in a suit under Section 92 C.P.C. The learned Judge on review of authorities held that a compromise can be effected in a suit of that sort although it is open for the Court while recording the compromise to examine whether interest of any public trust is not being bartered away for private ends. Considering the matter from this point of view the learned Judge observed:- “The question whether this was a public trust or a private trust would be a disputed question. Considering the matter from this point of view the learned Judge observed:- “The question whether this was a public trust or a private trust would be a disputed question. The property originally no doubt belonged to the ancestors of the respondents. In what capacity the first respondent and his ancestors have been carrying on their duty will be a debatable matter. Therefore, the question whether the trust is a public trust or private trust is not free from doubt. Under these circumstances, if the parties came to terms that a part of the property should be declared a public trust, while the remaining property should be considered to be the private property of the respondents, such a compromise cannot be said to be prejudicial to an alleged public trust, the very existence of which is not free from doubt. Therefore, I am of opinion that this compromise was in the interest of an alleged public trust and it cannot be said to be prejudicial to the same. Had the existence of public trust not been free from doubt. I would certainly nave refused to record this compromise, as it would be bartering away rights of the public trust.” 5. This appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent the question as to whether compromise in fact took place or not as well as the competency of such a compromise in a suit under Section 92 C.P.C. are raised. 6. As regards the first I am disposed to think that the concurrent finding reached on his question of fact, even though technically capable of being disturbed, ought not to be done in this case. It is not without significance that on the day the talk took place the parties had been called. The parties left with an understanding that a compromise contains terms settled was to be submitted on the following dav i.e. on 5-4-1961. It was on that day that it was submitted and the plaintiffs did not appear. It was concurrently found that the terms as disclosed in the writing Ex. D/C had in fact taken place. In reaching that finding the statement of the plaintiffs' counsel Mr. Bhadsavale and witnesses Prahaladdas, Harinarain examined on their behalf was taken into account, besides the statement of the defendants and the presiding officer Mr. Chaturvedi. The said presiding officer had no reason to side with any of the parties. D/C had in fact taken place. In reaching that finding the statement of the plaintiffs' counsel Mr. Bhadsavale and witnesses Prahaladdas, Harinarain examined on their behalf was taken into account, besides the statement of the defendants and the presiding officer Mr. Chaturvedi. The said presiding officer had no reason to side with any of the parties. I would therefore not interfere with this finding. 7. Next point is whether it is competent for the parties in a suit under Section 92 C.P.C. to reach a compromise. 8. Order 23 Rule 3 C.P.C. in this connection is as follows:- "Where it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that a suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or compromise, or where the defendant satisfies the plaintiff in respect of the whole or any part of the subject-matter of the suit, the Court shall order such agreement, compromise or sati5faction to be recorded and shall pass a decree in accordance therewith so far as it relates to the suit." It is thus clear that under the terms of the Rule no exception is made as regard the suit under Section 92 C.P.C. as is done with regard to suits by or against minors. As regards the latter Order 32 rule 7 C.P.C. provides for a special rule of procedure before any compromise binding upon the minor could become the rule of the Court. That rule requires the Court to examine whether the proposed compromise is in the interest of the minor or not and if it not be against his interest to grant leave to the next friend or guardian of the minor to effect a compromise. Such a procedure is not provided for by law. 9. But even on the terms of Order 23, Rule 3 there is a certain safeguard and that is that the compromise reached between persons appearing as or for the parties should be law full. The Court before whom a compromise petition is put is required to examine the same from this point of view before making it a rule of the Court. One such limitation is that such a compromise ought not to harm third party, vide Ajav Kumari Debi Vs. Maindra Nath Chatterjee [ILR 32 Cal 561 (566)] Asan Pandey Vs. Rajmon Misser [AIR 1919 Patna 325] Huknm Chand Vs. Ram Bahadur [AIR 1919 Patna 146 (155)]. 10. One such limitation is that such a compromise ought not to harm third party, vide Ajav Kumari Debi Vs. Maindra Nath Chatterjee [ILR 32 Cal 561 (566)] Asan Pandey Vs. Rajmon Misser [AIR 1919 Patna 325] Huknm Chand Vs. Ram Bahadur [AIR 1919 Patna 146 (155)]. 10. In the cases under section 92 C.P.C. it is no doubt true that at least on behalf of one of the parties question regarding interest of any express or constructive trust created for a public purpose of charitable or religious nature is raised. The Court in such a case has consequently a duty to examine whether what is being compromised affects the interest of a public trust of the sort contemplated under Section 92 adversely. This it would do not because there is any limitation placed by law upon the contractual freedom of the parties to a suit of this character but by reason of its obligation to prevent ex-facie parties from causing harm to a Trust which is meant for public purpose. In so doing the Court has to give due weight to the fact that those who come forward to represent that trust with the consent of the Advocate General must have paid attention to the fact whether compromise as whole is or is not in the interest of the trust. If the Court is not satisfied that the right vested in public trust is not being bartered away for private ends it is competent for it to refuse to record the compromise as being unlawful. 11. The Calcutta High Court in its earlier decisions had taken the extreme view that where it is proved or where it is in dispute that an endowment is a public one a suit under section 92 cannot be compromised, vide Abdul Karim Vs. Abdus Sobhan [AIR 1915 Cal. 193 (194)]. But in the later decisions of that Court this view has been considerably modified. In Chand Bibi Vs. Esmail [AIR 1949 Cal. 214], it is held that such a suit can be compromised but if the Court is satisfied that the proposed compromise is deterimental to the interest of the trust it should refuse to record a compromise. This is but in line with the view suggested above. 12. This aspect of the matter is admirably put in the decision of the Privy Council in Shankarlmga Nadan Vs. This is but in line with the view suggested above. 12. This aspect of the matter is admirably put in the decision of the Privy Council in Shankarlmga Nadan Vs. Raja Rajeswara Dorai [35 Indian Appeals 176]. Their Lordships observed at page 188- "Their Lordships have spoken of 'the respondents' generally; but it is necessary to note the episode in the proceedings euphemistically described as 'the compromise'. The original plaintiff in the suit was the Raja, who was the hereditary trustee of this temple, which was the temple of one of the villages in his zamindari. After the case had been decided in his favour by the subordinate Judge, this person thought fit to proffers that he now saw that he and the Judge were wrong; and he asked that the judgment should be altered, so as to defeat his own action. A very sordid motive for this surrender was specifically asserted and has not been disproved. The Court, on being applied to, very properly reinforced the cause of the worshippers of the temple by joining certain new plaintiffs to the original plaintiff (whose confidence in the justice of his suit had by this time convalesced). The principles applicable to the case of a trustee who thus betrays his trust by surrendering a decree have been well stated and applied by the High Court." 13. In Vardhanamma Vs. Subbarao [AIR 1949 Madras 851]. Viswanath Sastri, J., has followed this dictum and held that a Court is not compelled to accept a compromise arrived at between parties on the record were interests of a religious endowment are concerned. 14. It seems from the materials on record that neither the trial Judge nor the first appellate Court were unmindful of the caution which has to be observed list right of public trust is not bartered away. The trial Judge relied upon the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Kashiprasad Vs. Mst. Satwati [AIR 1945 All. 136] that it is open for the parties to a suit under section 92 C.P.C. to agree that a particular item is not a property of the trust or the deity but is private property of the 'Pujari'; The learned Single Judge while considering this aspect said what has been quoted above. Mst. Satwati [AIR 1945 All. 136] that it is open for the parties to a suit under section 92 C.P.C. to agree that a particular item is not a property of the trust or the deity but is private property of the 'Pujari'; The learned Single Judge while considering this aspect said what has been quoted above. On consideration of the pros and cons of the matter he was not satisfied that in effecting the compromise right of a public trust was being bartered away for private end. On the other hand in view of the contentions nature of the claim the c0mpromise was considered and that too rightly as a reasonable course. 15. I am therefore of the view that the appeal does not deserve to succeed. It is therefore dismissed with costs.