ORDER 1. This appeal had previously been decided by me on 8-8-1962. But the decision was set aside by me at the instance of one of the parties in Misc. Civil Case No. 128 of 1963, dated, 11-9-1963 on the ground that one of the respondents had died prior to the delivery of the order. Therefore, the appeal has been heard again after substitution of legal representatives of the deceased respondent. 2. This appeal under section 47, Civil Procedure is by the decree-holder against the order, dated, 9-1-1962 passed by Shri S. S. Pancholy, Additional District Judge, Barwani, in Misc. Civil Appeal No. 17 of 1961, arising out of the order, dated 15-3-1961, passed by Shri L. P. Gupta, Civil Judge Class II, Anjar in execution case No. 55 of 1959 arising out of the decree, dated 2-9-1950 in Civil Suit No. 91 of 1949. 3. A money decree for Rs. 571-9-6 was passed in favour of the appellant against Shobharam, the father of the first respondent. In execution of the said decree, the respondents' agricultural land, having an area of 25.97 acres was attached. The land, prior to the coming into force of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959, was the Pakka tenancy land, which was governed by, section 71 of the M. B. Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, 1950; and which under section 158 (b) of the M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1959 became their Bhumiswami land. The M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1959 came into force with effect from 2-10-1959 during the earlier execution proceedings. On behalf of the judgment-debtors an objection was raised that in the previous execution an order had been passed by the Collector holding that the land could not be attached and sold in execution of the money decree on account of a bar provided by section 71 (2) of the M. B. Land Revenue and Tenancy Act. 1950. It was, therefore, urged that the said order would operate as resjudicata so as to bar a subsequent attachment and sale of the said property. The second contention of the judgment-debtors was that they were entitled to protection granted by sub-section (2) of section 71 of the M. B. Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, 1950, under which 15 acres of land of every Pakka tenant was exempt from attachment and sale. 4. The second contention of the judgment-debtors was that they were entitled to protection granted by sub-section (2) of section 71 of the M. B. Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, 1950, under which 15 acres of land of every Pakka tenant was exempt from attachment and sale. 4. The learned Judge of the executing Court dismissed the judgment debtors objection holding that the previous order of the Collector or of the executing Court did not operate as resjudicata. It was also held that the judgment-debtors were not entitled to protection afforded by section 71 (2) of the M. B. Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, 1950, but only to the exemption granted by Section 165 (7) (a) of the M. P. Land Revenue Code. 1959, which exempts only 10 acres of land from attachment and sale. 5. The judgment-debtors appealed to the District Court. The learned appellate Judge, reversing the order of the executing Court, held that the previous order passed by the executing Court operated as resjudicata. The other point was not decided by the learned appellate Judge, as its decision became unnecessary. 6. The learned counsel for the decree-holder appellant urged that the view of the learned-appellate Judge, based on the case of Sunder and others Vs. Sheo DattSingh AIR 1937 All 48, was incorrect, as the question here was not relating to the applicability of the principle of resjudicata. There can be no doubt that the proposition laid down by a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court is correct and in accord with the dictum laid down by Their Lord-ships of the Privy Council in Raja of Ramnad Vs. Velusami Tevar and others LR 48 IA 45. Therefore, there can be no doubt that any orders passed in earlier executions will certainly operate as resjudicata in subsequent executions. Had that been the position in the present case, the principle of resjudicata would certainly have applied. But the precise question here is that the protection afforded by section 71 of the M. B. Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, 1950 has been modified by the provisions of section 165 (7) (a) of the M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1959. The latter Act is a consolidating Act, which has repealed the regional enactments. But the precise question here is that the protection afforded by section 71 of the M. B. Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, 1950 has been modified by the provisions of section 165 (7) (a) of the M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1959. The latter Act is a consolidating Act, which has repealed the regional enactments. Can it be said that the judgment-debtors can still avail of the provisions of section 71 (2) of the earlier Act, although the same has been repealed by the new consolidating Act. The Madhya Bharat Act provided for exemption of 15 acres of land from attachment and sale, while the M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1959 provides for exemption of 10 acres of unirrigated and 5 acres o irrigated land from attachment and sale. 7. In this connection, section 10 of the M. P. General Clauses Act, 1958 has to be considered. It is as follows: – "Where any Madhya Pradesh Act repeals any enactment then unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not : (a) revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the repeal takes effect; or (b) affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder; or (c) affect any right, privilege obligation or liability, acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed; or (d) affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence committed against any enactment so repealed; or (e) effect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid; and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced; and any such penalty, for feiture or punishment may be imposed, as if the repealing Madhya Pradesh Act had not been passed." Therefore, unless the provision in a repealed Act has been specifically saved by a provision in the repealing Act, any right conferred by the repealed Act cannot be enforced-after such repeal. It is only in the case of a saving that it can be enforced. The exception or the saving must be by a specific provision, or by necessary implication or intendment. In the absence of any such thing, a saving of the old right cannot be inferred. It is only in the case of a saving that it can be enforced. The exception or the saving must be by a specific provision, or by necessary implication or intendment. In the absence of any such thing, a saving of the old right cannot be inferred. Therefore, it is clear that after 2-10-1959 when the M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1959 came into force a party cannot seek the protection of a repealed regional enactment, such as, M. B. Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, 1950. The only protection that the judgment-debtors can enforce in the present case is the one afforded by section 165 (7) (a) of the M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1959. 8. The learned counsel for the respondents however, urged that the protection once given by the M. B. Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, 1950 will be available to the respondents, as the M. P. Land Revenue Code 1959 cannot we be said to have any retrospective operation. In this connection attention is invited to the observations of a Division Bench of this Court in Ithoba and two others Vs. Bhagchand and-another 1964 JLJ 606 =1964 RN 396=1964 MPLJ-SN 22. In the said case, the learned Judges constituting the Division Bench clearly observed that section 165 (7) (a) of the M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1959 would be-operative against any sale that may be sought to be effected after the Code comes into force. According to the Division Bench, if would be so without holding the said section to be retroactive. Therefore, according to the learned Judges, section 165 (7) (a) of the M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1959 will be applicable to sales sought to be-effected after the Code even in pending execution proceedings, as there is a clear prohibition indicated by the said section. 9. So far as that view is concerned, it is based on the Supreme Court case of Ahmad Hafiz Khan Vs. Mohd. Hassan Khan 1963 JLJ 657=1964 RN 374=1963 MPLJ 660,. In that case, the Sir and Khudkasht land of an expropriator had been attached before the coming into force of the M. P. Abolition or Proprietary Rights Act, 1950. It was sought to be sold after the date vesting in the said Act, namely, 31-3-1951. Mohd. Hassan Khan 1963 JLJ 657=1964 RN 374=1963 MPLJ 660,. In that case, the Sir and Khudkasht land of an expropriator had been attached before the coming into force of the M. P. Abolition or Proprietary Rights Act, 1950. It was sought to be sold after the date vesting in the said Act, namely, 31-3-1951. An objection was taken by the judgment-debtor that by virtue of section 43 of the M. P. Abolition of Proprietary Rights Act, 1950, his Sir and Khudkasht land could not be sold. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court, upholding the judgment-debtors objection, laid down that as there was an absolute prohibition, the attachment, though earlier to the enactment of the M. P. Abolition of Proprietary Rights Act, 1950, the Sir and Khudkasht land of the ex-proprietor could not be sold after the Act came into force. Therefore, it is clear from the observations of the learned Judges of the Division Bench based on the enunciation of the law by Their Lordships of the Supreme Court that if there be an absolute prohibition about sale the attachment effected earlier cannot lead to an auction sale because of the prohibition. Thus there is no doubt that Their Lordships of the Supreme Court laid down that section 43 of the M. P. Abolition of Proprietary-Rights Act, 1950 would be applicable even to pending cases, if the sale is sought after coming into force of the Act. Similarly, the Division Bench also, following that dictum, laid down that section 165 (7) (a) of the M. P. Land Revenue Code. 1959 will be operative even in respect of pending eases where the sale is sought after the coming into force of the M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1959. From this point of view, even without giving section 165 (7) (a) retroactive action, the learned Judges of the Division Bench applied the said section prospectively even to pending casts. 10. However, that alone does not solve the problem in the present case. Here the exact question is whether the respondents, after the repeal of the M. B. Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, 1950, can avail of the greater benefit-conferred by that Act which has been to some extent-reduced by section 165 (7) (a) of the M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1959. Here the exact question is whether the respondents, after the repeal of the M. B. Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, 1950, can avail of the greater benefit-conferred by that Act which has been to some extent-reduced by section 165 (7) (a) of the M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1959. It is only in this connection that, in my opinion; section 10 of the M. P. General Clauses Act; 1958 can be involved. The effect of repeal cannot revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the repeal takes effect. Therefore, it is by virtue of section 10 (a) of the M. P. General Clauses Act, 1958 that the provision of the repealed Act will not be available to the respondents. But they can certainly avail of the repealing Act. If it be their contention that the benefit conferred by the repealed Act is still available to them, it would be for them to establish that their right has been saved by the repealing Act. Nothing of the kind is pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondents. Therefore, I am of opinion that the appellants are only entitled to the benefit conferred by the repealing Act. 11. It is further clear that the order passed either by the Collector or by the executing Court on the earlier occasion cannot operate as res judicata; particularly in view of the fact that the provisions of the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, 1950 have been repealed, As long as the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, 1950 was in force, the previous 'order of the executing Court would certainly operate as res judicata, as laid down by Their Lordships of the Privy Council in the case mentioned above. But once that Act stands repealed, the question of res judicata exactly would not at all arise, because the only protection available to the judgment-debtors would be the one granted by the repealing Act. Therefore, there can be no doubt that the order passed in the earlier execution was a good and operative order as long as the repealed Act was in force. During all that period the decree holder could not have attached and sold the judgment-debtors' Land in contravention of the provisions of section 71(2) of the M. B. Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, 1960. During all that period the decree holder could not have attached and sold the judgment-debtors' Land in contravention of the provisions of section 71(2) of the M. B. Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, 1960. But the benefit can no more be availed of by the judgment-debtors after 2-10-1959. Therefore, I am unable to accept the view of the learned appellate Judge that the previous order of the executing Court operated as res judicata. 12. However, a further question arises whether each one of the two judgment-debtors is entitled to exemption of 10 acres of land. In this connection, it is to be noted that the wording of section 165 (7) (a) is as follows :– ''(1) Subject to the other provisions of this section and the provisions of section 168 a Bhumiswami may transfer any interest in his land. (7) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) or in any other law for the time being in force– (a) Only that part of a holding of a Bhumiswami shall be liable to attachment or sale in execution of any decree or order as is in excess of five acres irrigated or ten acres of unirrigated land; * * * * Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply where a charge has been created on the land by a mortgage." Therefore, the exemption from attachment and sale is only in respect of that part of a holding of a Bhumiswami, which is upto 5 acres of irrigiated or ten acres of unirriagated land. It is only the land in excess of that minimum that can be attached and sold in execution of any decree or order. 13. Upon a reference to the definition of the words 'holding' and 'ten un-holder', as provided by the M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1959, we find section 2 (i) of the Act as–follows :– 'holding' means– (i) a parcel of land separately assessed to land revenue and held under one tenure; and (ii) in reference to land held by a tenant a parcel of land held from a Bhumiswami under one lease or set of conditions;" Further on, section 2 (z) of the Act defines a 'tenure holder' as under:– "tenure-holder' means a person who holds land from the State Government and who is or is deemed to be a Bhumiswami under the provisions of this Code ;" 14. The present respondents are deemed to be Bhumiswamis under the provisions of this Act as per Section 158 (b) of the Act. The said is as follows: – ''Every person, who at the time of coming into force of this Code; belongs to any of the following classes shall be called a Bhumiswami and shall have all the rights and be subject to all the liabilities conferred or imposed upon a Bhumiswami by or under this Code; namely : – * * * * (b) Every person in respect of land held by him in the Madhya Bharat-region as a Pucca tenant or as a Muafidar; Inamadar or Concessional holder; as defined in the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, Samvat 2007 (66 of 1950)." Therefore, the real test would be to ascertain as to what the word 'holding' means. It is only the holding of a Bhumiswami, which is exempt from attachment and sale upto a minimum of 10 acres of unirrigated land; and 5 acres of irrigated land. A holding is defined as a parcel of land assessed to land revenue and held under one tenure. Therefore, a parcel of land can be called a holding, if it is separately assessed to land revenue and held under one tenure. From this point of view, any land held by a person under one tenure, which is separately assessed to land revenue alone will constitute a holding. If it is held under different tenures, it will certainly constitute different holdings. But in the former case it cannot be divided into several holdings by resorting to a fiction by interpreting the word ‘holding’ to mean a field or a Khasra number. That would be interpreting the provisions of the Act too widely unwarranted by the rules of interpretation. 15. Although this question may not be free from difficulty, I am of opinion that the words 'holding' and 'tenure-holder' occurring in section 165 (7) (a) of the M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1959 have to be interpreted in the-light of the definition of the word 'holding' as provided by section 2 (i) of the Act. Therefore, it is only necessary to see if the two respondents hold the land under one tenure and whether the parcel of land is separately assessed to land revenue. Therefore, it is only necessary to see if the two respondents hold the land under one tenure and whether the parcel of land is separately assessed to land revenue. The revenue records filed in the• present case show both the respondents recorded as Pakka tenant jointly and all the lands are assessed to land-revenue-jointly, and not separately. Therefore, it is clear that the said fields constitute only one holding and they cannot to be considered to be different holding. 16. The learned counsel for the respondents further urged that, at any rate, the two judgment-debtors should be considered to be different Bhumiswamis, each entitled to the minimum of 10 acres of land as per section 165 (7) (a) of the Act. Even assuming that they might be considered to be two different tenure holders or Bhumiswamis, it is only 'the holding' of a Bhumiswami which is exempt from attachment and sale. Therefore, although-there my be more Bhumiswamis, unless they hold a holding as defined under section 2 (i) They cannot get the exemption separately. But, put together, both of them will certainly be entitled to the protection afforded by section 165 (7) (a) of the Act. In that view, there can be no doubt that the respondents, who are joint Bumiswamis, have one joint holding which consists of fields, which together are assessed to land revenue. Therefore, they are not entitled to any exemption to the extent of to acres of unirrigated land. The rest of the land, namely, 15.97 acres of land will be liable to be attached and sold in execution of the appellant's decree. 17. Therefore, I am unable to agree with the conclusions of the learned appellate Judge exempting all the lands from attachment and sold. As a result, this appeal succeeds and is allowed to the extent indicated. The order of the appellate Court is set aside, while that of the trial Court is restored. In view of the fact that matter was not free from doubt, I order that there shall be no direction as to the costs through out, which shall be borne as incurred.