JUDGMENT PARANJPE J. -This first appeal has been placed before us for a decision of the preliminary objection regarding its tenability in this Court as directed by Mr. Justice Abhyankar. 2. The respondent No.1 Brijmohan filed Civil Suit No. 3 -B of 1955 on 17 -1 -1955 in the Court of the Civil Judge, Class I. Khamgaon, for recovery of Rs. 7,600 on account of the price of a motor truck, alleged to have been sold by him to the defendant -appellant. On the date of filing the suit, the Central Provinces and Berar Courts Act, 1917 (Act No. 1 of 1917), was in force in this area. Under section 17 of that Act, the Courts of Civil Judges, Glass II, were given jurisdiction to hear and determine suits or original proceedings of a value not exceeding Rs. 5,000 and the Courts of Civil Judges, Class I, were given jurisdiction to hear and determine suits or original proceedings of a value not exceeding Rs 10,000. Under section 20 of that Act, an appeal from the decree or order of a Civil Judge, Class I, lay to the District Court if the value of the subject -matter in the suit did not exceed Rs. 5,000, and to the High Court if the value exceeded Rs. 5,000. In 1956, an Amending Act called the Madhya. Pradesh Courts (Amendment) Act, 1956 (Act No.2 of 1956), was passed and it came into force on the 1st of July 1956. This Amending Act abolished the distinction between Civil Judges of the First Class and Civil Judges of the Second Class and extended the jurisdiction of, the Civil Judges to cases involving subject -matter valued upto Rs. 10,000. Section 7 of this Amending Act amended section 20 of the Act of 1917 by providing that an appeal from the decree or order of the Court of a Civil Judge shall lie to the District Court, and an appeal from the decree or order of an additional Judge of the District Court shall lie to the District Court if the value of the subject. matter of the suit does not exceed Rs. 10,000 and shall lie to the High Court if it exceeds Rs. 10,000. matter of the suit does not exceed Rs. 10,000 and shall lie to the High Court if it exceeds Rs. 10,000. The suit of the plaintiff respondent was decreed against both the defendants on the 25th , of September 1956 after the aforesaid Amending Act No.2 of 1956 had come into force on 1st July 1956. In accordance with the provisions of the C. P. and Berar Courts Act of 1917, which were in force at the time when the suit was filed in the Court of the Civil Judge, Class I, Khamgaon, the present appeal was filed in this Court. When it came on for hearing before Mr. Justice Abhyankar, the learned counsel for the respondent No.1, raised a preliminary objection to the tenability of this appeal in this Court. 3. It was urged before Mr. Justice Abhyankar that in view of the Amending Act, the appeal would lie before the District Court and not before this Court. In the course of arguments, the learned Advocate for the respondent No.1 had submitted that, though another single Judge had overruled a similar objection, in First Appeal No. 137 of 1957, decided on 12 -12 -1962, a Division Bench of this Court had taken a contrary view in First Appeal No. 90 of 1958 wherein the memorandum of appeal was returned for presentation to the proper Court, namely, the District Court, on 11 -8 -1 U58. The transcript of the judgment by Mr. Justice Chandrachud in First Appeal No. 137 of 1957 was not available at the time when the matter had come up for hearing before Mr. Justice Abhyankar on the 17th of December 1962. Mr. Justice Abhyankar directed that the matter should be placed before a Division Bench on making the following observations: "Normally, I should have proceeded with the hearing of the appeal as I am inclined to take the view that the right of appeal, unless expressly taken away, is governed by the law applicable to the parties on the date of the commencement of the lis. I do not interpret the provision of section 9 either as expressly taking away this right or necessary intention to do it is to be implied from anything contained in that section. I do not interpret the provision of section 9 either as expressly taking away this right or necessary intention to do it is to be implied from anything contained in that section. However, in view of the order passed by the Division Bench in First Appeal No. 90 of 1958 on identical facts I consider it desirable that the matter should be placed before a Division Bench for decision." That is how the matter has come before us. 4. In First Appeal No. 90 of 1958, decided on 11.8 -1958, the Office had raised an objection that the appeal was not maintainable by reason of the provisions as contained in the Amending Act of 1956. In view of that objection, the learned single Judge, Mr. Justice B. N. Gokhale, ordered that the matter be placed before a Division Bench. Acting upon that objection, the Division Bench passed its order directing that the appeal should be returned for presentation to the proper Court. The point, that the right of appeal in a pending action was not taken aW8,y by the Amending Act, does not seem to have been argued before them and the learned Judges have not delivered any judgment in that case. If they had considered this question on its merits and had delivered a judgment, we are sure that we would not have purported to dissent from them and would have made a reference to a Full Bench in accordance with the dictum of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Jai Kaur V. Sher Singh (1). Since, however, the matter was disposed of on first impressions and since there was no judgment in the case, we think that it would not be wrong for us to consider the question on its merits. 5. Mr. Since, however, the matter was disposed of on first impressions and since there was no judgment in the case, we think that it would not be wrong for us to consider the question on its merits. 5. Mr. Kalele was contending that the right to file an appeal in the High Court, which existed under the old Act, was not continued or saved by section 7 or any other provision in the Amending Act No.2 of 1956, and section 9, which reserved the right of appeal with respect to suits decided before the commencement of the Amending Act, did not similarly preserve the right to file appeals with respect to suits filed before the Act came into force but decided after the Act came into force, and consequently it ought to be held that the Legislature intended to affect the right of the parties to file an appeal in the High Court. Mr. Natu, Advocate for the appellant, contended, on the other hand, that the vested right of an appeal arose not on the day when a lis is decided but at the time of the institution of the lis; and since the parties had a right of filing their appeal to the High Court under the old Act, this right could not be adversely or retrospectively affected by the Legislature without making a specific provision therefore. According to him, no provision in the Amending Act had the effect of negativing, modifying or reducing the rights of the litigants with regard to the tiling of appeals which they had on the date of the filing of the suit. He characterized section 9 either as redundant or as meaningless. In his view, it was not possible to say that the Legislature had, by necessary intendment, purported to amend the right of appeal retrospectively. 6. We do not think it necessary to quote the authorities in support of the well established position that the right of appeal is a vested right. We have, however, not been able to appreciate the contention of Mr. Kalele that this vested right of appeal arose on the date on which the appeal was filed. That argument, in effect, meant that the right of appeal did not arise at the time of the commencement of the lis but it accrued on the date when the defendant -appellant chase to enforce or exercise it by filing his appeal. Kalele that this vested right of appeal arose on the date on which the appeal was filed. That argument, in effect, meant that the right of appeal did not arise at the time of the commencement of the lis but it accrued on the date when the defendant -appellant chase to enforce or exercise it by filing his appeal. No authority was shown in support of that contention. On the contrary, the following observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Garikapati V. Subbiah Choudhry (1), would show that this right of appeal to enter the superior Court accrues to a litigant and exists as on and from the date the lis commences, and is to be governed by the law prevailing at the date of the institution of the suit and not by the law prevailing at the date of the decision or the date of the filing of the appeal: - "From the decisions cited above the following principles clearly emerge: (i) That the legal pursuit of a remedy, suit, appeal and second appeal are really but steps in a series of proceedings all connected by an intrinsic unity and are to be regarded as one legal proceeding. (ii) The right of appeal is not a mere matter of procedure but is a substantive right. (iii) The institution of the suit carries with it the implication that all rights of appeal then in force are preserved to the parties thereto till the rest of the career of the suit. (iv) The right of appeal is a vested right and such a right to enter the superior Court accrues to the litigant and exists as on and from the date the lis commences and although it may be actually exercised when the adverse judgment is pronounced such right is to be governed by the law prevailing at the date of the institution of the suit or proceeding and not by the law that prevails at the date of its decision or at the date of the filing of the appeal. (VI) This vested right of appeal can be taken away only by a subsequent enactment. if it so provides expressly or by necessary intendment and not otherwise. (Italics are ours)." No other decision to the contrary was shown by Mr. Kalele and the above observations effectively answered his contention. (VI) This vested right of appeal can be taken away only by a subsequent enactment. if it so provides expressly or by necessary intendment and not otherwise. (Italics are ours)." No other decision to the contrary was shown by Mr. Kalele and the above observations effectively answered his contention. It was, therefore, clear that the right of the appellant to file the present appeal would be governed by the law as it stood on the date when he filed this suit in 1955 and accordingly the appeal to this Court was competent. 7. Mr. Kalele did not dispute that the Amending Act No.2 of 1956 did not contain any express or specific provision whereby the vested right of appeal which the appellant had on the date of filing his suit in 1955 was taken away. In order to get over that difficulty, Mr. Kalele was suggesting at one stage of his argument that there was no question of restrospectivity of the provisions of the Amending Act. That contention, however, was based on the assumption that the right of an appeal accrued on the date the right was enforced or exercised and not at the commencement of the lis. We have already pointed out above the authority of the Supreme Court which negatives this basic assumption of Mr. Kalele that the right of appeal accrues on the date it is enforced. Mr. Kalele did not seriously press that contention. He then contended that the provisions of the Amending Act, whereby appeals against decisions of Civil Judges lay to the District Court, were retrospective by necessary intendment for the following three reasons: (1) There was no saving clause in the Amending Act which reserved the appellants right of coming in appeal directly to this Court which he had under the former Act No.1 of 1917. (2) The clauses substituted by section 7 in the Amending Act• only generally stated that certain appeals would lie to the District Court and certain other appeals to the High Court without saying that those appeals were to be with respect to the litigations commenced before or after the Act. (3) Section 9 specifically provided that appeals from decrees or orders passed prior to the commencement of the Act shall lie to the Court to which it would have lain under the old Act. We would consider these reasons in the sequel. 8. (3) Section 9 specifically provided that appeals from decrees or orders passed prior to the commencement of the Act shall lie to the Court to which it would have lain under the old Act. We would consider these reasons in the sequel. 8. As regards the first ground, the original Act No.1 of 1917, as also the Amending Act No.2 of 1956, did not prescribe or lay down the right of appeal which the litigants had. They were enacted only to prescribe the forum of appeal if and when the litigant had a right of appeal given to him by certain enactments. Consequently, it was not at all necessary to state in the Amending Act that the right of appeal, which was not the creation of that Act or the earlier Act, was saved or preserved by the amendment. A law with regard to the forum where the right was to be enforced, need not have made a provision for saving the right itself which arose not under the Act, but independently of it. In the original section 20 of the C. P. and Berar Courts Act, 1917, forums for appeals against certain kinds of decrees or orders by certain cadres of Judges were prescribed but without specifying the period of time or the point of time at which they were filed or when they were pending. It was not disputed by Mr. Kalele that there was no reason or occasion for making any such specification in that section. Section 7 of the Amending Act No.2 of 1956 was enacted only to replace the original section 20 in the old Act. Consequently, there was no necessity or occasion for the Legislature to state in the new clauses in the amending section 7 whether the decrees or orders were to be with reference to the litigations which were either pending on a particular date or were decided on or after a particular date. Consequently, the omission of the Legislature to refer to a point of time, which was not at all relevant or necessary for the purpose of the amendment, cannot lead to an inference that the omission was intentional or was made for the specific purpose of bringing about a retrospective amendment as was urged by Mr. Kalele. 9. Section 9 on which Mr. Kalele. 9. Section 9 on which Mr. Kalele was largely relying was in the following terms: "Notwithstanding the amendments made by section 7 of this Act, an appeal from a decree or order passed prior to the commencement of this Act shall lie to the Court to which it would have lain if the amendments made by that section had not been made". The argument of Mr. Kalele was that since this section provides that the right of appeal with respect to decisions given before the commencement of the Act was to be governed by the old unamended Act, the necessary implication of that provision was that the Legislature intended that the old law should apply only to the cases mentioned in section 9 and not to any other cases. \V e are unable to agree with this submission because, in the first place we find it difficult to -appreciate the purpose for which section 9 has been enacted. Even if section 9 was not enacted, the consequences would not have been different. If that section purported to restate the position of law as it stood till that law came into force, such a restatement was redundant and unnecessary. The Legislature must be presumed to have known the principle of law that a right of appeal is a vested right and cannot be affected except by the use of express language or by necessary intendment. Therefore, if the Legislature meant or intended to take away the right of appeal as on the dates when the lis had started prior to the amendment, the Legislature should have used express words but that had not been done. If the intention of the Legislature was only to restate the correct position of law, then it should also have mentioned in section 9 appeals against all orders in matters which were pending on the date when the new law .came into force but that had not been done. The mere failure to mention that other class of appeals in cases pending on the date when the Amending Act came into force, would not justify Mr. Kalele in saying that the Legislature had thereby intended to obliterate or exclude from section 9 cases or appeals in litigations which were pending on the date when the Amending Act came into force. Kalele in saying that the Legislature had thereby intended to obliterate or exclude from section 9 cases or appeals in litigations which were pending on the date when the Amending Act came into force. If such was the intention of the Legislature, there wag nothing to prevent it from using specific words to the effect but that had never been done. That argument of Mr. Kalele would obviously mean that the Legislature meant to retrospectively amend and alter the provision regarding appeals, but we have already pointed out the observations of the Supreme Court on this point which would show that such a retrospective amendment could only be made either by express words or by necessary intendment. There is nothing in section 9 to support the view of Mr. Kalele that there was a necessary intendment of effecting a retrospective amendment. 10. Mr. Kalele was apparently relying on the maxim "expressio, unius exclusio alterius" in support of his contention that when one was expressed in the statute, the omission to express the other must be an indication of negativing it by the Legislature. This argument firstly assumed that section 9 from which he was drawing the inference was really necessary for the purpose of the Act. We have already pointed out that aection9 was not at all necessary but was redundant as it only purported to restate the law with respect to cases decided before the commencement of the Act for which no provision in the Amending Act was necessary. The following observations in Salmond on Jurisprudence, Eleventh Edition, page 155, with regard to the maxim quoted above would be pertinent: "However, the maxim is not a compelling rule of law, but only a phrase that may be used by the Court in expounding the probable intent of the Legislature. It is, in the oftquoted words of Lopes, L. J, a valuable servant but a dangerous master. Quite frequently the Court holds that the express provision made in the one instance is ex abundanti cautela, and does not displace the normal implication to the same effect in the second instance. It may also be no\iced that the maxim cannot be used to extend, the operation of a statute beyond the provision that it actually makes." 11. Quite frequently the Court holds that the express provision made in the one instance is ex abundanti cautela, and does not displace the normal implication to the same effect in the second instance. It may also be no\iced that the maxim cannot be used to extend, the operation of a statute beyond the provision that it actually makes." 11. Maxwell on Interpretation of Statues, page 321, Eleventh Edition, also observes that this maxim is not now applied in all cases, and it was apparent from the commentary that such an inference could not be drawn in this particular case. On carefully studying the provisions of this Act, it appears that the Legislature had enacted section 9 ex abundanti cautela in order to safeguard against frivolous objections to filing of appeals in matters which were decided shortly before the new law came into force. Such provisions made by way of abundant caution cannot be utilised for drawing inferences which are not warranted therefrom. 12. A similar question with respect to the forum of appeals in cases instituted before but decided after the Amending Act No.2 of 1956, had come up before a Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Lalchand V. Keshaorao (1). After considering the old law and the amended provisions, the Division Bench relied on the observations of Maxwell to which we have made a reference and also to the decision of the Supreme Court in Garikapati V. Subbiah Choudhry (2), and came to the conclusion that section 7 of the Amending Act did not propria vigore affect pending cases and section 9 was superfluous. With respect, we agree with the view of that Division Bench. 13. A similar question had also come up before this Court in two other oases. In Raghunath Hanumant V. Sada8hiv (3), the question of interpreting a similar amendment to the Bombay Civil Courts Act by the Amending Act of 1949 had come up before a Division Bench of this Court. In that case, the appeal was filed before the High Court and an objection was raised on grounds similar to those considered in this judgment. On considering the provisions of the original Act and the Amending Act, the Division Bench came to the conclusion that the right of appeal, which existed prior to the amendment, could not be adversely affected by the subsequent amendment. Mr. On considering the provisions of the original Act and the Amending Act, the Division Bench came to the conclusion that the right of appeal, which existed prior to the amendment, could not be adversely affected by the subsequent amendment. Mr. Kalele was trying to distinguish that ruling on the ground that section 6 of the Bombay Amending Act had purported to lay down a saving clause which saved appeals arising in suits which were pending in the Court on the date of the amendment. While realising that there is this difference, in that an additional saving clause was mentioned in the Bombay Act, we do not think that the absence of such a saving clause would, by itself, have the effect of postulating a retrospective amendment either by necessary words or by necessary amendment when the wordings of the Amending Act No.2 of 1956 did not indicate any such necessary intendment. 14. In Prabhakar Bhaskar V. Usha Prabhakar (4), the question arose whether an appeal lay before the District Court or before the High Court. Under the Bombay Hindu Divorce Act, 1947, the suit was instituted in the Court of the District Judge, Thana, but it was transferred to the Court of the Civil judge, Thana, when section 5A was inserted by amendment of the which came into force on May 27, 1950. Eventually the suit was decided by the Civil Judge. After considering the arguments similar to those advanced before us, the Division Bench came to the conclusion that the right of going to the High Court in appeal which the parties had at the commencement of UB, cannot be affected or modified by a subsequent amendment to the Act which did not purport to retrospectively affect that right of appeal. 15. The last contention of Mr. Kalele was that the right of appeal to the High Court has not been adversely affected or defeated by the amendment" because the parties can even now come to this Court in second appeal. Mr. Natu contended, on the other hand, that the right of coming in a first appeal -was much more valuable, because questions of fact were open in a first appeal and litigants could have the advantage of a final decision on facts from this Court whereas in second appeals this Court would be bound by the findings of fact by the Courts below. We are inclined to agree with Mr. Natu that though the parties would have a right of coming to this Court even after the amendment, that would be by way of a second appeal in which the findings of fact by the Courts below shall ordinarily not be open to question and the parties would lose the right of getting a final decision on facts from this Court. Mr. Kalele did not show any authority in support of his suggestion that the Legislature could so adversely affect a partys right of appeal to a higher Court. A reference to the numerous cases considered by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Garikapati V.subbiah Chaudhry (1), would show, on the other hand that imposing any conditions or liabilities on the right of an appeal would also fall in the same category as defeating or denying the right of appeal to the prejudice of the party. 16. We are, therefore. in agreement with the learned single Judge that the right of appeal to this Court, which existed on the date of the commencement of the lis, was not affected by the Madya Pradesh Courts (Amendment) , Act No.2 of 1956 and consequently the objection of the respondent to the tenability of the appeal must be overruled. We accordingly direct that the appeal be placed for hearing before a single Judge. Costs shall be costs in the cause. Appeal to High Court held competent.