Judgment :- 1. This appeal was referred to a Division Bench for decision by one of us as the question of law raised in the appeal was thought to be of some importance. 2. The plaintiffs are the appellants. The trial court dismissed the plaintiffs' suit on 7-6-1958. The judgment is in the following terms: "Suit is dismissed". On the day when the suit was dismissed the case stood posted for the examination of the parties and for hearing. Counsel for the plaintiffs applied for an adjournment on that day on the ground that the plaintiffs' karyasthan was laid up and that the plaintiffs wanted time for his examination. The court dismissed the application and passed the judgment in terms referred to above. It was against this that the appeal was preferred before the lower appellate court, and that court found that the appeal was not maintainable as the decision of the trial court was not on the merits, but a disposal for default under 0.9 R.8 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 3. The main submission on behalf of the appellants was that the court below went wrong in holding that the decision of the trial court was a disposal for default, and that no appeal lay from that decision. In other words the submission was that the decision of the trial court was on the merits under 0.17 R.3 and that the only remedy of the aggrieved party was to file an appeal. In other words the submission was that the decision of the trial court was on the merits under 0.17 R.3 and that the only remedy of the aggrieved party was to file an appeal. 0.17 R.3 is in the following terms: "Where any party to a suit to whom time has been granted fails to produce his evidence, or to cause the attendance of his witnesses, or to perform any other act necessary to the further progress of the suit, for which time has been allowed, the Court may notwithstanding such default, proceed to decide the suit forthwith." It is clear that in order that this Rule may apply it has to be proved that the hearing of the case was adjourned on the application of the party to the suit as distinguished from an adjournment by the court on its own motion, that the hearing was adjourned on the application of the party, who subsequently made the default, and that the adjournment was granted to enable the party to produce his evidence or to cause the attendance of his witness or to perform any other act necessary to the further progress of the suit, and the party failed to perform any of the acts for which the adjournment was granted within the time allowed by the court. In Parvathy Pillai v. Kuttan Pillai (1961 KLT.178) Madhavan Nair, J., has held that 0.17 R.3 empowers the court to dispose of the suit on merits against a party only in case where the suit has been adjourned at his instance to enable him to produce evidence or to do any other act necessary for the progress of the suit. In Francis Peter v. Rajamma Pillai (1963 KLT. 256) Velu Pillai, J., has held that in order that 0.17 R.3 might apply the hearing of the suit should have been adjourned on the application of the party who subsequently makes the default. In the present case it is clear from the progress diary that the suit was adjourned to 7-6-1958 not on the basis of any application for adjournment by the plaintiffs. The case was adjourned to that day by the court without any application by the plaintiffs, on its own motion, and therefore on this simple ground it has to be held that the dismissal of the suit on 7-6-1958 was not a disposal on merits. The case was adjourned to that day by the court without any application by the plaintiffs, on its own motion, and therefore on this simple ground it has to be held that the dismissal of the suit on 7-6-1958 was not a disposal on merits. The decision of the trial court, therefore, was a disposal for default. It is also clear that the appearance of counsel on 7-6-1958 was only for the purpose of applying for an adjournment of the case. Whether that would constitute appearance is a matter on which we do not express any opinion. In our view it is sufficient for the decision of this case to say that the adjournment of the case to 7-6-1958 was not on the basis of an application by the plaintiffs, and therefore the disposal of the case on that day can only be under 0.17 R.2. If that be so the lower appellate court was clearly right in holding that no appeal would lie. The mere fact that a decree was drawn up by the trial court in terms of its judgment cannot alter the nature of the disposal. 4. The appeal therefore fails, and it is dismissed, but we make no order as to costs. Dismissed.