Judgement ORDER :- The petition is filed against the order passed by the District Magistrate, Kanyakumari, directing the petitioner herein to deliver possession of the temple and their records to the respondents. 2. The respondents are trustees appointed by the Area Committee on 15-6-1963, for Adhimoolavinayagar and Chinthamarai Amman temple at Umapangoseri in Nagarcoil. The petitioner was removed from the trusteeship and directed to hand over possession of the said temples and accounts to the respondents. The petitioner having failed to do so, the respondents filed an application under S. 101 sub-clauses 1(a) and (b) of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act for delivery of possession. The application was dismissed by the District Magistrate on 20-08-1963 on the ground that the order of appointment passed by the Area Committee was not in conformity with the provisions of the Act. After rectification of the defects in the appointment of trustee, they again moved the District Magistrate's Court by an application dated 24-09-1963, for an order under S. 101 of the Act for possession of the temples, their records and accounts. The petitioner filed a civil suit, O. S. 537 of 1960, in the District Munsif Court, Nagarcoil, against the respondents for a declaration that the petitioner is entitled to be in possession of the religions institutions and properties as lawful trustee, and for an injunction restraining the respondents from molesting the possession of the petitioner, of the institution and properties. In the suit, the petitioner obtained an interim injunction, on 14-10-1963, against the respondents from in any way interfering with possession of the petitioner. When the order of injunction was pending against the respondents, the order, which is sought to be revised was passed by the District Magistrate on 14-11-1965, directing delivery of possession by the petitioner to the respondents. 3. Mr. Martin, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the order passed by the District Magistrate under S. 101 of the Act, when an interim injunction was in force against the respondents is unsustainable. He submitted that the proceeding under the section is only summary, subject to the decision of civil court. 4. Mr. 3. Mr. Martin, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the order passed by the District Magistrate under S. 101 of the Act, when an interim injunction was in force against the respondents is unsustainable. He submitted that the proceeding under the section is only summary, subject to the decision of civil court. 4. Mr. Rajagopalachari, learned counsel for the respondents, submitted that the right of suit provided for an aggrieved party under the proviso to S. 101 is only for establishing title to the property, and that the aggrieved party has no right to question an order directing delivery of a religious institution. He pointed out the difference that is made in the procedure prescribed for obtaining possession of an institution, and the property. In the case of an institution, the duly appointed trustee, can obtain possession of it on production of an order of appointment, whereas in the case of property, he must produce a certificate from the Deputy Commissioner, in the prescribed form, that the property belongs to the religious institution. As a distinction is made between the institution and property, learned counsel submitted, that proviso which gives right to the aggrieved person, for establishing his title to the property, can only be confined to his right to the property and not to the institution. I am unable to accept this contention. The section provides for obtaining possession of the religious institution, records, accounts and property thereof. Regarding the institution possession can be obtained on the production of an order of appointment by the duly appointed trustee, whereas in the case of immoveable property, a certificate that the property belongs to the religions institution, from the Deputy Commissioner is necessary, Regarding obtaining possession of records and accounts, no specific procedure is mentioned. Because in the section a particular procedure is prescribed for obtaining possession of property; it cannot be said that the word "property" is used in a restricted sense in the proviso also. Normally, the word "property" would include not only immovable property, but also the institution, records and accounts thereof. In the proviso the word is used in a general sense to include the institution, records, accounts and property. The contention of the learned counsel, therefore, is unacceptable. 5. Normally, the word "property" would include not only immovable property, but also the institution, records and accounts thereof. In the proviso the word is used in a general sense to include the institution, records, accounts and property. The contention of the learned counsel, therefore, is unacceptable. 5. Learned counsel then submitted, that the District Magistrate acting under S. 101 of the Act is not subordinate to any civil court that the order of injunction passed by the civil court is not binding on him, and that the issue of an order of injunction by a civil court, is specifically prohibited by the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act. He strongly relied on a decision of this court, in Nallamuthu Chimpiraya, In re 1952-2 Mad LJ 441 : ( AIR 1953 Mad 219 ). In that case, the petitioners obtained an order of injunction, against the duly appointed trustees restraining them from taking possession of the lands, till the disposal of the suit. Pending the order of injunction, the joint Magistrate passed an order under S. 87 of the Act, directing delivery of possession of the properties, to the duly appointed trustees. Ramaswami, J. held that the First Class Magistrate was vested with jurisdiction, to inquire into the matter of putting the trustee or executive officer in possession and the pendency of a civil suit, would not in any way affect his jurisdiction. He also held that S. 62 of the Act, while enabling an aggrieved party to file a suit, did not confer power on the civil court, to stay the Commissioner's order, pending disposal of a suit. He further held, that the Joint Magistrate was not subordinate to the Subordinate Judge, and an injunction could not be granted by the civil court, to stay the proceedings, in the court of the joint Magistrate. The decision is, no doubt, very much in favour of the contention of the learned counsel. But considerable doubt about its correctness, was expressed by a Division Bench of this court in Muthuswami Gurukal v. Ayyasami Thevan, 1958-1 Mad LJ 256. The Bench held, that it is not as if the civil court has no jurisdiction to grant any interim relief, in a suit under S. 62(1) of the Act. The ban imposed by that section, can be applied only to the extent warranted by the language of that statutory provision. The Bench held, that it is not as if the civil court has no jurisdiction to grant any interim relief, in a suit under S. 62(1) of the Act. The ban imposed by that section, can be applied only to the extent warranted by the language of that statutory provision. Referring to the decision of Ramaswami, J., in 1952-2 Mad LJ 441 : ( AIR 1953 Mad 219 ) the Bench observed at p. 258 : "In the course of those criminal revision proceedings the learned Judge could not, and did not go into the question, whether the interim injunction, granted by the civil court, should be vacated or treated as non est in law. Apparently the learned Judge did not consider what the effect would be of leaving both the orders, intact, that of the criminal court directing delivery of possession of the lands to Veerayya, and that of the civil court prohibiting Veerayya, from taking possession of those lands". In considering the question whether S. 62(1) forbears the civil court, from granting interim relief, the Bench observed : "If the ordinary jurisdiction of the civil court, is to be ousted, it must be by the express words, or by necessary intendment of the statutory provisions, on which reliance is placed. The ban imposed by S. 62(1) can be applied only to the extent, warranted by the language of that statutory provision". Referring to the view expressed, that the civil court cannot injunct, lawfully appointed trustees from taking possession of the properties, from persons who claim to be trustees, the Bench expressed its dissent and held that the civil court has jurisdiction to grant interim relief asked for by the plaintiff in that case. The authority of the decision of Ramaswami, J., in 1952-2 Mad LJ 441 : ( AIR 1953 Mad 219 ) is thus considerably shaken in that, the view of the learned Judge, that the civil court cannot grant in junction under S. 62 of the Act was dissented from by the Bench. 6. The present suit is not one filed tinder S. 62 corresponding to S. 70 of the new Act. The suit was filed, as already stated, for declaring that the petitioner is entitled to possession of the religious institution and properties, as lawful trustee. 6. The present suit is not one filed tinder S. 62 corresponding to S. 70 of the new Act. The suit was filed, as already stated, for declaring that the petitioner is entitled to possession of the religious institution and properties, as lawful trustee. In disposing of a criminal revision case, this court cannot go into the questions, whether the suit was properly laid, whether the Munsif court has jurisdiction, and whether the relief claimed, cannot be obtained, without having recourse to the procedure, laid down under the Act. Right of suit is given to an aggrieved party, under S. 101 of the Act, for establishing his title to the property. It has been held by a Division Bench of this court in Pratipati Dandaiah v. Venkatarama Dikshitalu, 1953-2 Mad LJ 550 : ( AIR 1954 Mad 500 ) that the provisions of the section, which enables a duly appointed trustee, to obtain an order from the Magistrate, for dispossession of the ex-trustees was valid as it was in public interest and that the rights of the aggrieved person were amply safeguarded, by enabling him to approach the civil court, for establishing his title to the properly. Subba Rao, J. (as he then was) observed as follows at p. 5.54 (of Mad LJ) : (at p. 503 of AIR) : "The underlying purpose of the section is apparent. It is conceived and enacted in public interests, to enable a trustee of a temple, to recover its properties expeditious, from recalcitrant ex-trustees, or other servants of the temple. . . . The section also provides for safeguards against arbitrary eviction . . . The summary order is liable to be challenged, in a court of law by an aggrieved party, by filing a suit for establishing his title. While it enables the temple to recover its properties from the ex-officeholders, it gives them adequate protection, against arbitrary eviction .... when the Legislature in its wisdom, thought fit to make a provision like S. 87 which in its ultimate analysis, only drives the office holder to file a suit, to establish his title, if he had not proved the same, before the Commissioner, cannot be considered to be an unreasonable restriction, on the right of the petitioner to hold the property." 7. Thus the constitutional validity of the section, was upheld on the ground that the driving of an office-holder, to file a suit to establish his title, cannot be said to be an unreasonable restriction. The right of an aggrieved party to establish his title in a civil suit, cannot therefore be questioned. The aggrieved party need not wait, till an adverse order is passed against him by the Magistrate under S. 101 of the Act, When his possession is threatened, he can go to the civil court for obtaining reliefs. The power granted to the Magistrate is only subject to the aggrieved party establishing his title in the civil suit. It may be that the hands of the Magistrate are not tied by the mere filing of a civil suit but when an order of Injunction is obtained against the duly appointed trustees, the Magistrate cannot proceed with the enquiry and pass an order directing delivery of possession which is contrary to the terms of the injunction order. Where the civil court has granted an order of injunction the criminal court under S. 101 of the Act, cannot go into the validity or otherwise of that order, and the proper procedure will be for the duly appointed trustees to approach the civil court for redress. In the present case, an order of interim injunction has been passed by the civil court and it is for the petitioner to question the maintainability of the order, in the manner open to him in law. 8. In the result, the order of the Magistrate, is set aside and the revision petition is allowed.