V. B. RAJU, J. ( 1 ) THE applicant was convicted under section 279 and 338 I. P. Code and sections 116 and 121 of the Motor Vehicles Act. In revision it is urged that the finding of rashness and negligence is not sound. It is true that rashness or negligence though questions of facts are inferences from facts. The facts found are that two carts were coming from opposite directions on the road and the applicant took his jeep car on the extreme left of the road and struck a tree and injured the person standing near the tree. On these facts the inference of rashness and negligence would be quite sound and I cannot say that the inference is improper. A portion of the road which is not meant for use is not ordinarily expected to be used. It may be used in exceptional cases provided the driver of a motor vehicle takes care to see that there is no possibility of causing any injury to any person. But this has not been done in the present case and therefore the inference of rashness and negligence is quite proper and the conviction cannot therefore be challenged in revision. ( 2 ) 2. It is next contended that where there is a conviction under section 279 I. P. Code and section 338 I. P. Code there cannot be a conviction under section 116 of the Motor Vehicles Act. The provision contained in section 71 I. P. Code and section 26 of the General Clauses Act must be borne in mind. Section 71 I. P. Code reads as follows:-"where anything which is an offence is made up of parts any of which parts is itself an offence the offender shall not be punished with the punishment of more than one of such offences unless it be so expressly provided. Where anything is an offence falling within two or more separate definitions of any law in force for the time being by which offences are defined or punished, or where several acts of which one or more than one would by itself or themselves constitute an offence constitute when combined a different offence the offender shall not be punished with a more severe punishment than the Court which tries him could award for any one of such offences. " ( 3 ) SECTION 26 of the General Clauses Act reads as follows:-"where an act or omission constitutes an offence under two or more enactments then the offender shall be liable to be prosecuted and punished under either or any of those enactments but shall not be liable to be punished twice for the same offence. " ( 4 ) THE Indian Penal Code and the Motor Vehicles Act are two separate enactments and therefore section 26 of the General Clauses Act would apply. The applicant is prosecuted for an act which according to the prosecution falls under sections 279 and 338 I. P. Code and section 116 of the Motor Vehicles Act. In view of section 26 of the General Clauses Act the applicant cannot be punished both under the Penal Code and under the Motor Vehicles Act but he can be punished only under either or any of them in respect of the same act. Section 71 of the Penal Code applies where an act is an offence falling within two or more separate definitions of any specific enactment. That does not apply where an act constitutes an offence under two or more enactments. Section 71 of the Penal Code applies where the act is an offence under two or more separate definitions of any particular enactment. For example an act may be an offence both under section 323 I. P. Code and section 324 I. P. (:-ode. To convict a person both under the Indian Penal Code and under the Motor Vehicles Act and to give him two separate sentences would be to punish shim twice in respect of the same act which is contrary to section 26 of the General Clauses Act. The conviction of the applicant under section 116 of the Motor Vehicles Act is therefore set aside. But his conviction under section 121 of the Motor Vehicles Act is not set aside because the said conviction relates to a different act. ( 5 ) [the rest of the judgment is not material for the reports. ] Conviction partially set aside. .