Judgment Misra, J. 1. The appellant Man Mohan Deo, was a candidate for election as a member of the Bihar Legislative Assembly from the Deoghar constituency during the elections held in 1962. There were seven candidates to contest the seat. The nomination papers filed by the candidates other than the appellant were accepted as valid by the Returning Officer, but that of the appellant was rejected. The ground on which order was passed by the Returning Officer was that the appellant was a Ghatwal of the Rohini Estate which was a Government Ghatwali. He was thus the holder of an office of profit within the meaning of Article 191 (1) (a) of the Constitution and as such he was disqualified to be a candidate. His nomination was accordingly rejected under Sec.36 (2) (a) of the Representation of the People Act, 1051. 2. After the election was over and the result announced, the appellant filed an election petition stating that his estate had already vested in the State of Bihar under the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950, and as such he had ceased to be a Ghatwal. The Election Tribunal, however, dismissed the election petition following a decision of this Court in Badri Narain Singh V/s. Kamdeo Prasad Singh, AIR 1961 Pat 41 In which it was laid down that even after the notification under the Bihar Land Reforms Act taking over the estate of the Ghatwal, the office of profit would continue; and as such, under Art. 191 of the Constitution, the Ghatwal would be disqualified from offering himself as a candidate for a seat in the Legislature. 3. When the appeal was heard by us, Mr. J. C. Sinha argued that the decision in Badri Narain Singhs case, AIR 1961 Pat 41 on which rested the decision of the Election Tribunal, was incorrect and the matter should be heard by a larger Bench. After having heard the respective contentions of the learned Counsel for the parties, we thought it proper to refer the matter to a larger Bench. After having heard the respective contentions of the learned Counsel for the parties, we thought it proper to refer the matter to a larger Bench. The opinion of the majority of the Full Bench has been that when the estate of a Ghatwal including that of a Government Ghatwal is taken over by the State of Bihar under the Land Reforms Act, the office of profit of the Ghatwal no longer exists and as such he cannot be deemed to be suffering from any disqualification In regard to his candidature for a seat In the Legislature. The decision of this appeal accordingly would depend upon the answer returned by the majority of the Full Bench on the question referred to it for consideration. 4. It is thus correct that if the appeal could be disposed of only on this issue the decision of the Election Tribunal would have to beet aside, and, as such the election of the successful candidate also would not be sustained. As it is, however, it transpires from the examination of the order passed by the Returning Officer that he rejected the nomination paper of the appellant not merely on the ground that he was a Government Ghatwal but that he did not make over charge of the estate to the State of Bihar in spite of the notification and filed a Civil Suit in the court of the Subordinate Judge at Deoghar and the latter issued an injunction restraining the State from taking over charge from him. In the circumstances, it could not be said that Man Mohan Deo, the appellant, had ceased to be the Ghatwal. It may be stated that when the matter was referred to a larger Bench Mr. B. C. Ghose appearing for the respondents did not press this question, but when the matter was argued before the Full Bench this question was also taken up. At this stage, Mr. B. C. Ghose had urged that whatever might be held by the Full Bench In regard to the effect of the order of vesting of the estate of the Ghatwal on his status as the holder of an office of profit, this would not affect the present order passed by the Returning Officer in the peculiar circumstances of this case. B. C. Ghose had urged that whatever might be held by the Full Bench In regard to the effect of the order of vesting of the estate of the Ghatwal on his status as the holder of an office of profit, this would not affect the present order passed by the Returning Officer in the peculiar circumstances of this case. As a result of the decision of the Full Bench, no doubt, It must be held that the candidature of the appellant had been affected by the order of the Returning Officer regarding the status of the appellant as a Government Ghatwal; but since he had not made over charge of the estate to the Government of Bihar, he was certainly holding an office of profit. Mr. J. C. Sinha has urged in reply that there is no force in this argument because whether the appellant was the holder of an office of profit and was as such disqualified from standing as a candidate for membership of the Bihar Legislative Assembly would depend not upon whether he made over charge of the estate but upon a determination of that question by the Tribunal. In my opinion, the contention of Mr. Sinha must be accepted as correct. If the Ghatwall tenure would come to an end as a result of the notification under the Bihar Land Reforms Act, the mere fact that he had not made over charge of the estate would not necessarily mean that his status as the holder of an office of profit continued. As his status was terminated by the notification, the mere holding over would be the act of a trespasser for which he might be liable to the State Government in damages or otherwise; but it could not be urged that he was still a Ghatwal. Mr. B. C. Ghose has further urged, however, that in any case the order of the Returning Offi-cer cannot be challenged as erroneous inasmuch as the appellant had actually filed a civil suit which is pending even now in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, In which the appellant has challenged the right of the State of Bihar to take over his estate. It is true, no doubt, that his previous suit T. S. No. 42 of 1950, for the same relief failed successively In all stages up to the Supreme Court, but the subsequent suit was instituted for a slightly different relief. Mr. J. C. Sinha has contended that there is no merit in that suit as the objection to his estate being taken over which was the subject matter of the prior suit has become untenable after the decision of the Supreme Court. Mr. B. C. Ghose has urged that the question to be determined in this election appeal regarding the correctness of the order of the Returning Officer cannot be answered on the basis of the merit of the appellants suit which is still pending but with reference to the fact that the appellant himself was maintaining before the Returning Officer that he had not ceased to be a Ghatwal. If that was the stand taken up by the appellant before the Returning Officer, the latter was fully justified In giving legal effect to it which necessarily resulted in the view that the appellant suffered from a disability as the holder of an office of profit. In view of the suit of the appellant, he could not be permitted to deny its validity at a subsequent stage just to support his case that he had ceased to be a Ghatwal. To permit this would result in allowing the appellant to blow hot and cold in the same breath. In my opinion, this contention of Mr. Ghose must be acceded to. If the appellant himself told the Returning Officer, which was clear from the suit that he had instituted, that he had not ceased to be a Ghatwal and his estate could not be taken over and if the Returning Officer acted upon it, it cannot be urged that his order was incorrect. If the order was, therefore, not Incorrect at the time that it was passed, and in the circumstances that it was passed, the election of the successful candidate cannot be affected by a subsequent declaration that the appellant was no longer holding the status of a Ghatwal. If the order was, therefore, not Incorrect at the time that it was passed, and in the circumstances that it was passed, the election of the successful candidate cannot be affected by a subsequent declaration that the appellant was no longer holding the status of a Ghatwal. In the result, therefore, it must be held that the order passed by the Returning Officer was a correct order and the result of the election cannot be held to have been vitiated because the nomination paper of the appellant was rejected In the circumstances mentioned above. 5. The appeal, therefore fails. Since, however, the rejection of the nomination paper of the appellant took place on two grounds principally and the appellant has succeeded In regard to one of the two grounds, the parties shall bear their own costs. Bahadur, J. 6 I agree.