S. K. Kapur ( 1 ) THE present appeal arises out of a petition filed by Hari Ram appellant against his wife, Smt. Maharani, under section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, for restitution of conjugal rights. The parties were married at Delhi on 24-4-1955 and lived together as husband and wife till 10-2-1956. On 5-3-1956, a daughter was born to them in Saint Stephen s Hospital at Delhi. The petition was filed on 21-9-1960. It is alleged in the petition that on 10. 2. 1956, the respondent left the petitioner s house on the pretext of visiting her parents and took away her ornaments and clothes ; that about a month after the birth of the daughter the petitioner and his father visited the house of her father and asked her to accompany the petitioner, but she avoided to come ; and that after that also several efforts had been made by the petitioner and his parents, but of no avail. In the written statement, the respondent pleaded that the treatment of the petitioner and his parents towards the respondent, had been very cruel ; that she was severly beaten, because the petitioner and his parents were dissatisfied with the dowry brought by the respondent ; that the respondent did not take away any ornaments ; that she was turned out by the petioner and his parents in wearing apparel ; that the petitioner and his parents wanted to avoid expenses in connection with the birth of the child ; and that she apprehanded danger to her life. The following four issues were iramed by the trial court-- (1) Whether the respondent has withdrawn herself from the society of the petitioner without and reasonable cause ? (2) Whether the petitioner is guilty of cruelty towards the respondent ? (3) Whether the petitioner has deserted the respondent ? If so for what effect ? (4) Relief. ( 2 ) THE crux of the problem is whether the respondent withdrew from the society of the petitioner without any reasonable excuse. If it be held that the petitioner was guilty of cruelty towards the respondent, it would obviously follow that she was justified in withdrawing herself from the petitioner s society. I have been taken through the evidence by the learned counsel for the parties. If it be held that the petitioner was guilty of cruelty towards the respondent, it would obviously follow that she was justified in withdrawing herself from the petitioner s society. I have been taken through the evidence by the learned counsel for the parties. H. N. Tiwari, D. W. I has spoken about the admission of the Respondent 1n the hospital on 4-3-1956 and her remaining there till 19-3-1956. He has also stated that Rs. 332. 00 were paid on 19. 3 1956 in the name of the respondent. This evidence is relied upon in support of the contention that the petitioner did not even care to look after the Respondent 1n the hospital or foot the bill, which had to be paid by the respondent herself out of her meagre resources. Babu Ram P. W. 3 is a peon of the respondent s sister husband, Jagdish Pershad, an advocate. He stated that he went to the petitioner s house four times to extend; certain invitations to them on behalf of Shri Jagdish Pershad. He has. deposed that on one of such occasions he saw the petitioner s mother-in-law givining a kick to the respondent and abusing her. Ishwar Dayal D. W. 6, brother-in-law of the respondent, also spoke about seeing the petitioner abusing the respondent and saying that her father did not give descent dowry. Surinder Nath P. W. stated that he had been going to the house of the petitioner and heard the petitioner s mother telling the respondent that she belonged to a mean faimly and her parents did not give any dowry. He also deposed about the petitioner placing a hot electric iron on the hand of the respondent. To corroborate the burning of the hand by placing of hot electric iron. Dr. S. N. Khanna D. W. 2 has been produced, who has deposed that the respondent visited him with a burn on her left hand. The respondent has herself appeard as D. W. 8 and deposed about the various acts of cruelty. ( 3 ) ON behalf of appellant, it has been suggested that the evidence of Babu Ram D. W. 3, should not be believed, as he was unable to given the number of the house or the name of the bazar where it was situate. ( 3 ) ON behalf of appellant, it has been suggested that the evidence of Babu Ram D. W. 3, should not be believed, as he was unable to given the number of the house or the name of the bazar where it was situate. It is further said that the evidence of Uttam Chand D. W. 4 and Ram Pershad D. W. 5 was not admissible, beacause when the respondent went and told them about the acts of cruelty she was making an admission in her own favour. Moreover, it is alleged to be hearsay evidence. It is, however, contended on behalf of the respondent that the onus is on the husband to prove that the wife left without any just cause and that onus has not been satisfied on the evidence on record. ( 4 ) HAVING carefully gone through the evidence, I am not prepared to place any reliance on the incident of placing hot electric iron on the hand of the respondent. In her evidence, the respondent stated that the petitioner put hot electric-iron on her hand, but when the petitioner appeared in the witness box he was asked whether his brother or mother did it. I think, that is enough to discard the incedent about the hot electric-iron. I am, however, satisfied on other evidence that two things have been established that (1) the wife was being treated cruelly by the petitioner s mother and the petitioner not only acquiesced in it, but supported his mother in this conduct, and (2) the petitioner was also himself treating the respondent cruelly, maltreating her and abusing her in the presence of outsiders. Having regard to the above, I am of the view that cruelty has been established and that was sufficient ground for her to part company with the husband. It must, therefore, be held that there was a reasonable excuse for the wife withdrawing from the society of the husband. It is not possible to give any precise definition of cruelty and that is why the Jugdes have found themselves content with determining whether the facts in the particular case constitute cruelty. It must, therefore, be held that there was a reasonable excuse for the wife withdrawing from the society of the husband. It is not possible to give any precise definition of cruelty and that is why the Jugdes have found themselves content with determining whether the facts in the particular case constitute cruelty. The same is the criteria adopted for deciding whether or not cruelty proved constitutes a good cause for a spouse to leave the partner s roof Malice is not an essential element of cruelty which justifies a wife in leaving her husband s abode Cruelty even consistent with affection may constitute a good ground for parting. I am not unconscious of another recognised rule which has woven itself into the divorce law that Judges should not countenance severance of matrimonial unions on grounds of mere austerity of temper, petulance of manners, rudeness of language, a want of civil attention and accomodation or even occasional sallies of passion. At the same time, Judges connot forget that the obligation of the husband extends not merely to providing a house, but extends to providing a home too. An unjustifiable course of conduct which utterly destroys the legitimate ends and objects of matrimony or which produces a reasonable apprehension of bodily harm may well fall within the area of extreme cruelty. I think the nature of cruelty inflicted in this case fulfills the requirements of law providing justification, for the wife withdrawing from the society of her husband. I agree with the finding of the trial Court that the respondent left the house because of the cruel reatment and because of the absence of efforts of reconciliation. The trial Court also granted apermanent alimony of Rs. 80. 00 per month. Both the parties agree that the order under appeal, to that, extent, is illegal, as the same could he passed, in view of section 25 of the said Act, only if the restitution of conjugal rights was decreed. To that extent, the order of the trial Court will be set aside. ( 5 ) IN the result, the appeal fails to the extent that the petition of the appellant for restitution of conjugal right is dismissed. It, however, suceeds in so far as the decree for permanent alimony is set aside. Parties will bear their own costs.