JUDGMENT PATEL J.-These four petitions are directed against the levy of rates against each of the petitioners by the Municipality of Ulhasnagar. 2. Bya notification dated September 20, 1900, the State Government constituted a new permanent municipal limits known as the Municipal District of Ulhasnagar to come into being from October 1, 1960. The notification is at Exh. B. By Exh. C of the same date, the Government appointed from October 1, 1960, eighteen Councillors, including the President and the Vice President, for a period of one year in the first instance or till the elected body took over, whichever was earlier. It is now an accepted position that all these four petitioner companies are situate within the newly constituted municipal District of Ulhasnagar. The municipality imposed, by its rules framed under section 59 of the District Municipal Act, rates on properties situate within its limits. The rules were sanctioned on April 21, 1962 by the Commissioner, and a resolution was passed by the municipality on May 23, 1962, adopting those rules. Taxes were to be effective from July 1, 1962. It seems that in February 1963, attempt were made to obtain some information from the petitioner companies regarding their respective properties. In October, certain other information was sought, and thereafter valuation was made for the purpose of the rates and due notice was served on each of the companies in terms of section 65 of the Act. It appears that, in the original assessment, so far as the properties of these companies were concerned, they were divided into different areas(1) productive area, (2) non-productive area., (3) open space area, (4) canteen area. The productive area was assessed at Rs. 5 per 100 square feet per month, the non-productive area at Rs. 4 per hundred square feet per month. the open apace area at Ra. 2 per 100 square feet per month, and the canteen area at Rs. 30 per 250 square feet per month. The area under baths and lavatories was exempted. Objections were invited, and after the objections were lodged by each of the petitioner-companies, they were heard by the Assessing Officer appointed by the Government and he authenticated the lists in November. In the case of petitioner-companies in Special Civil Applications Nos. 30 per 250 square feet per month. The area under baths and lavatories was exempted. Objections were invited, and after the objections were lodged by each of the petitioner-companies, they were heard by the Assessing Officer appointed by the Government and he authenticated the lists in November. In the case of petitioner-companies in Special Civil Applications Nos. 517, 518 and 1816 of 1964, the Assessing Officer accepted the earlier assessment except as regards the open space where he reduced the valuation to one rupee per 100 square feet per month. In accordance with his assessment, each of the petitioner companies was called upon to pay the tax, first in the amount (If Rs.49,282.92, the second in the amount of Rs.42,819.12 and the third in the amount of Rs. 18,084.40. In the case of the petitioner company in Special Civil Application No. 635 of 1964, the Assessing Officer, on the footing of the cost of construction, altered the basis of taxation and fixed the annual letting value at 5 per cent. of the actual cost of construction with regard to structures and Rs.2 per 1000 square feet with regard to the open space. The tax, therefore, in regard to building was assessed at Rs. 98,590 and in regard to land at Rs. 15,057, totalling to Rs. 1,13,647. -Bills were subsequently issued for the official year from April!. The petitioners challenge these bills and seek to quash them. The first three sets of petitioners have also presented appeals as provided by section 86 of the Act to the Magistrate. The petitioner in Special Civil Application No. 635 of 1964 has not filed any appeal whatsoever. 3. Mr. Gurusahani for the municipality has raised a preliminary objection that we should not entertain the petitions as the petitioners have adequate remedy provided by the Act. He relies upon the decision in K. S. Rashid &, Sons v. I. T. I. Commission (1). The second reason why he says we should not entertain them is that they involve disputed questions of fact. He relies upon the decision in Thanaingh v. Supdt. of Taxes (2). The scope of an appeal under section 86 is limited. In such an appeal the legality or validity of the tax cannot be challenged. Only the valuation in the assessment list and the amount of the tax claimed can be challenged. This was decided in Ankleshwar Municipality v. Chottalal (3). of Taxes (2). The scope of an appeal under section 86 is limited. In such an appeal the legality or validity of the tax cannot be challenged. Only the valuation in the assessment list and the amount of the tax claimed can be challenged. This was decided in Ankleshwar Municipality v. Chottalal (3). This case has consistently been followed in this High Court. We propose, therefore, to consider in these petitions only the question as to the legality of the tax and no further. 4. In these petitions, a large number of contentions were taken up. In the first three Special Civil Applications Nos. 517, 518 and 1816 of 1964, the grounds on which the bills are challenged are five in number, they being (1) that the rules are ultra t1ires the Act or illegal inasmuch as they do not provide for the basis for the fixation of valuation for the purpose of the rate, (2) that, in any event, the actual valuation that is made is arrived at by a method which is not permissible in law, (3) that, in any event, the municipality is not entitled to tax the open land, and to the extent to which open land is taxed, the bills are illegal, (4) that the municipality is guilty of discrimination between the three petitioner companies on the one hand and the petitioner, company in Special Civil Application No. 635 of 1964 on the other inasmuch on the basis of tax is entirely different, and (5) that, according to the rules, a register prepared under section 65 could only be operative after the date of authentication and not before. To the extent, therefore, to which tax for the prior period is sought to be recovered, the bills are illegal. 5. In Special Civil Application No. 635 of 1964, Mr. Mathur has raised some additional contentions in relation to the constitution of the municipality itself. His contentions are (1) that the imposition of the tax is made by a municipality which had no existence in law, inasmuch as the tenure of the Members appointed by the resolution dated September 20,1960, came to an end on September 30, 1961. Therefore, the rules promulgated for the purpose of imposing the tax were ineffective. His contentions are (1) that the imposition of the tax is made by a municipality which had no existence in law, inasmuch as the tenure of the Members appointed by the resolution dated September 20,1960, came to an end on September 30, 1961. Therefore, the rules promulgated for the purpose of imposing the tax were ineffective. (2) That the appointment of office bearers of the municipality i. e. the President and the Vice President, is illegal, and, therefore, also the resolution is bad. (3) Assuming that the rules are not bad on these grounds, an interim municipality could not levy or impose any new tax under the provisions constituting the new municipality. In any event, it was merely a municipality for purposes of the Act and not for purposes of imposing any tax. Mr. Mathur attempted to raise some other points, in respect of which there were no allegations in the petition, and such as found a place were so vague that they could not be allowed to be raised. Such contentions were-(a) that the municipality did not follow the proper procedure required by sections 59 to 65 in making the rules and in imposing the tax, and (b) that the Assessing Officer appointed by the Government was not properly appointed. In support of contention No.1, the allegations relied upon are in para. 12 of the petition. These allegations only recite that there was noncompliance with the provisions of sections 59 to 65 of the Act. No particulars in respect of which there was non-compliance have been given. An. attempt was made to rely on some stray document which appeared in the counter affidavit, and on the footing of that document some sort of argument was tried to be developed. We did not permit Mr. Mathur to raise that contention, inasmuch as no specific allegation of the breach of any particular rule or provision of any particular section was made in the petition. Similarly, in Support of the second contention, there was no allegation on the basis of which the contention could be founded that the appointment of the officer was not valid. We have not allowed Mr. Mathur to raise this contention either. The last contention that he raised was that the assessment was not according to the rules. Similarly, in Support of the second contention, there was no allegation on the basis of which the contention could be founded that the appointment of the officer was not valid. We have not allowed Mr. Mathur to raise this contention either. The last contention that he raised was that the assessment was not according to the rules. It may also be stated that he generally supported the other contentions which were raised on behalf of the other petitioners. 6. The first contention is that the rules framed by the municipality are ultra vires. The rules which are framed by the municipality are described as House Tax Rules. Rule 1 is divided in two parties. The first deals with the name and the second with the extension of the rules. It is difficult to follow the exact purport of this rule. It extends the rules to all buildings or houses or shops or huts etc. Rule 2 is a definition rule and defines amongst other things, a building or house. Rule 3 provides as follows: "In respect of every building or house within these municipal District the house tax shall be payable to the Secretary or any other person from time to time appointed by the municipality for that purpose at the municipal office before the 15th of April in each year by the owner or occupier thereof, at the rates calculated in accordance with schedule No.1 hereto annexed." The Schedule mentions the rate according to which the tax would be payable. Rule 4 provides for preparation of the assessment list under section 63 of the Act. It also provides for other formalities to be observed in that connection. Rule 5 makes a provision for hearing of objections made by the assessees. Rule 6 relates to the presentation of the bill on or about April 1, in each year, and so on. Now, the Schedule which lays down the rates according to which tax is to be calculated, is in general terms and provides that in respect of all buildings, houses, etc., the house-tax shall be charged, except the tenemants lying vacant and the tenements in occupation of the Government which are exempted. It then provides further as follows: "All per section 63 of the Bombay District Municipal Act. 1901, we have to determine the annual letting value; a sum equal to 10 per cent. It then provides further as follows: "All per section 63 of the Bombay District Municipal Act. 1901, we have to determine the annual letting value; a sum equal to 10 per cent. of the said valuation shall be deducted therefrom in lieu of all allowances for repairs or any other account whatsoever and on the figure thus arrived at, it is proposed to levy House tax at 15 per cent. or RI. 12 per year whichever is more." 7. It is contended that the Schedule which lays down the rule for taxation does not comply with the requirements of section 60 which enables the municipality to impose the relevant tax. Section 59 gives the municipality a power to impose certain taxes amongst which is enumerated in clause (i) a rate on buildings or lands or both, situate within the municipal district. Section 60 is as follows: "Every Municipality before imposing a tax shall observe the following preliminary procedure: (a) They shall, by resolution passed at a general meeting. (i) select for the purpose one or other of the taxes specified in section 59; (ii) prepare rules for the purposes of clause (i) of section 46 prescribing the tax selected; and shall by such resolution and in such rules specify. (iii) the class or classes of persons or of property, or of both, which the Municipality desire to make liable and any exemptions which they desire to make; (iv) the amount for which, or the rate at which, it is desired to make such classes liable; [(iv-a) in the case of a rate on buildings or lands or both the basis, for each class, of the valuation on which such rate is to be imposed]; (v) all other matters. which the State Government may so require to be specified. " It is argued that the provisions of sub-clause (iv-a) of clause (a) have not been complied with in this case inasmuch as method of valuation for each class of the property on the basis of which rate is to be imposed has not been prescribed or laid down. It is argued that every taxing statute must strictly comply with the provisions of law, and if any provision of law is not complied with then the tax is not leviable. 8. It is argued that every taxing statute must strictly comply with the provisions of law, and if any provision of law is not complied with then the tax is not leviable. 8. Now, this clause was introduced in section 60 of this Act by Bombay Act XXXV of 1954, section 10, and it has been taken from the .Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925. The scheme of the Municipal Boroughs Act in relation to tax appears in Chapter VII. Sections 59 and 60 of the District Municipal Act, 1901, correspond to sections 7a and 75 of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925. There is, however, a difference between section 60 of the 1901 Act and section 75 of the 1925 Act. In section 75 of the latter Act, there is an explanation which is in these words: "In the case of lands the basis of valuation may be either capital or annual letting-value.” And, it is for this reason that, in the latter Act, sub-clause (iii) of clause (a) which is similar to sub-clause (iv-a) of section 60 found a place. The Legislature itself having prescribed that the basis of valuation for the purpose of a particular tax could be either capital or annual letting-value, it had to provide in section 75 (a) (iii) that the municipal corporation shall frame a rule specifying the basis, for each class, of the valuation on which rate was to be imposed. In section 60 of the District Municipal Act, there is no such corresponding provision as the explanation to section 75 whereby similar power is given to the municipality. It seems, by Act No. XXXV of 1954, some amendments were made to both the Acts, and section 10 amended section 60 by the addition of the new clause (iv-a). Notes on clauses as given in the Statement of Objects and Reasons, Bombay Government Gazette, Part V, 1954, page 65, show that the Legislature was providing for the deduction of 10 per cent. Notes on clauses as given in the Statement of Objects and Reasons, Bombay Government Gazette, Part V, 1954, page 65, show that the Legislature was providing for the deduction of 10 per cent. out of the gross annual letting value for the purpose of assessment of the tax as it existed in section 78 (2) of the 1925 Act, and it is said: "An incidental amendment to section 60 on the lines of clause (a), sub-clause (iii) of section 75 of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, is also proposed to be made." Inasmuch as in the 1901 Act, in section 50, there was no provision corresponding to the explanation to section 75 of the 1925 Act, the addition of sub-clause (iv-a) of section 60 was most inappropriate, and has no meaning. In the Act of 1925, it had to be provided because both the land and building could be taxed on the basis of the annual letting value or, if the municipality so chose, the land could be taxed on the basis of capital value, and it is for this reason that it became necessary to provide that a rule shall be framed by the municipality laying down the basis on which valuation has to be made. 9. It is argued that the purpose of adding this clause was to require the municipality to lay down precise principles of valuation for houses and buildings or lands for purposes of rates. As we have stated above, in the Municipal Boroughs Act that provision appeared because of the special provisions of the Act. So far as this Act is concerned, it had no place. The principles of valuation are not modes of valuation. It is well known that the word "rate" has acquired a definite meaning in local taxing statutes. The question was analysed by the Supreme Court in Gordhandaa v. Municipal Commr. (1). Wanchoo J. speaking for the majority says (p. 73): "In England…….. The principles of valuation are not modes of valuation. It is well known that the word "rate" has acquired a definite meaning in local taxing statutes. The question was analysed by the Supreme Court in Gordhandaa v. Municipal Commr. (1). Wanchoo J. speaking for the majority says (p. 73): "In England…….. the word rate ………..had acquired a special meaning, namely that it was a tax on the annual value of lands and buildings found in one of the three modes we have already indicated." Then after analysing various Municipal Acts in India, the learned Judge says (p. 76): "……….It would, therefore, be right to say that the word rate had acquired a special meaning in English legislative history and practice and also in Indian legislation where that word Was used and it meant a tax for local purposes imposed by local authorities, and the basis of the tax was the annual value of the lands or buildings on or in connection with which it was imposed, arrived at in one of the three ways which we have already indicated." Their Lordships have also pointed out that three methods were generally followed in arriving at the rateable value of lands and buildings. In Mahad Municipality v. Bombay S. R. T. Corp. (2), sitting singly, I had occasion to consider the matter under the same Act as now, and after considering the relevant definitions and provisions, I have pointed out that, in determining the annual letting value, the municipal authority is not limited to the exercise of its powers in a defined manner. It is not bound to value the whole of it as one unit, it may divide it into several units and value differently each one of them for arriving at a fair and reasonable valuation and for doing so it might employ different methods for different units, namely, the competitive or comparative method, the profits basis, the contractors method or the unit method. See Faraday on Rating, Fifth Edn., page 24. In Mersey Docks and Harbour Board v. Birkenhead Assessment Committee (1), the following observations occur (p. 180): "That is the proposition which is put before the parish officers-that is the question which "hey have to answer; and they are to arrive at that value, so far as I know unfettered by any statute as to the way in which they can do it. I am not aware of any rule of law or any statute which has limited them as to the mode in which they shall arrive at. It is not a question of law at all-it. is a question of fact." In Port of London Authority v. Assessment Committee of Orsett Union (2), Lord Birkenhead L. C. says (p. 281): "Several methods are available for such oases and it does not follow that the rating authority would necessarily be wrong if it adopted one method when dealing with one hereditament and another method when dealing with a different hereditament. Cardiff Rating Authority and Cardiff Assessment Committee v. Guest Keen Baldwins Iron and Steel Co., Ltd. (3), illustrates the different modes of valuation. It seems to us that the Supreme Court did not in Gordhandass case (4) intend to decide that only three modes of valuation can be resorted to, for the learned Judge says (p. 72): "The methods in use for the purpose of arriving at rateable value were generally three." (Italics are ours). It must also be remembered that their Lordships were not dealing with actually the question of valuation. 10. By rules, it is almost impossible to expect a municipality to provide for all eventualities and for all kinds of property. It is impossible, therefore, to expect the municipality to lay down the methods by which valuation should be effected. In fact, there i8 nothing, either in the provisions of the Municipal Boroughs Act or in the provisions of the present Act, to suggest that what was intended by clause (iii) in section 75 of the 1925 Act and by sub-clause (iv-a) of clause (a) of section 60 of the 1901 Act, was that the municipality was required to frame rules prescribing the modes by which annual letting-value was to be determined. If that is 80, we do not think that the absence of a rule or rules laying down the methods according to which the Assessing Officer must value properties for purposes of the tax, can be regarded as rendering the entire taxing rules invalid. This contention, therefore, we reject. 11. The next contention is in relation to the order of assessment itself. This contention, therefore, we reject. 11. The next contention is in relation to the order of assessment itself. The assessment list is prepared under section 63 of the 1901 Act, and when it was prepared a notice was given to each of the companies showing the amounts of valuation made in respect of its properties. As stated earlier, the valuation was based on the floor area which was classified in four categories. Objections were invited under section 65 and they were heard. In the case of the three companies, valuation in respect of open space was changed i.e. reduced, while in the case of the company in Special Civil Application No. 535 of 1964, the entire valuation was changed. It is argued on the authority of the Lokmanya Mills v. Bari Municipality (5) that determining the annual letting value solely on the floor area of the structures and the area of the land, is not valid. We are, therefore, invited to quash all the assessment. 12. There is a distinction between that case and the present case. In that case the Barsi Municipality, by its rules, provided how the valuations were to be computed. The offending rule was as regards mills and factorial and buildings relating thereto, in respect of which it was prescribed that the annual letting-value shall be fixed at Rs. 40 per 100 square feet or part thereof for every floor, ground floor, or the cellar, and the tax shall be assessed on the said annual letting value at the ordinary rate. Their Lordships have observed that, by prescribing valuation computed on the area of the factory building, the municipality not only fixed arbitrarily the annual letting value which bore no relation to the rental which a tenant may reasonably pay but rendered statutory right of the tax-payer to challenge the valuation by appeal illusory, as an appeal would be in fructuous. The rule was, therefore, struck down and so was the assessment. In the present case, the rule does not say that the valuation shall be made on the basis of floor area. It is only the valuing officer who has adopted that particular means of valuing the property. The Act prescribes that after the lists are authenticated bills are to be issued. When the bill .. In the present case, the rule does not say that the valuation shall be made on the basis of floor area. It is only the valuing officer who has adopted that particular means of valuing the property. The Act prescribes that after the lists are authenticated bills are to be issued. When the bill .. is issued, the tax payer is entitled to file an appeal before the Magistrate under section 86 on conditions being satisfied viz. (1) that he must have filed an objection to the assessment list, (2) that the appeal is filed within fifteen days, and (3) that the amount of the tax is deposited. The Magistrate is then required to make an enquiry. The assessment list is to be corrected in accordance with his decision. From his decision a revision lies before the Sessions Court. This is a complete procedure for challenging the valuation and the tax, and this has been held in Ankleshwar Municipality v. Chhotalal (1). This provision is intended to meet cases where the municipality values the property on an erroneous or incorrect basis. In each case, determining the annual letting value will be a matter of weighing and considering the evidence that is brought before the valuing officer and before the tribunal. It may be that the officer concerned is able to satisfy the appellate authority that the measure for determining the annual letting-value adopted by him is not arbitrary and that it is related to the actual cost of construction. It is a pure question of fact to be determined on evidence and not at all a question of law, as has been held in decided cases. It is significant to note that the petitioners who want the assessments quashed do not even state the costs of constructions. 13. Quashing the assessment would also probably cause grave injustice to the Municipal Corporation. The assessment lists are to be authenticated in the official year. If the Magistrate decides the appeal and alters the valuation or the amount of the tax, a change is accordingly made in the list and then the tax becomes payable. If we quash the bill then the machinery for correction of the list ceases to be operative. The list cannot be corrected and the liability is probably gone. If the Magistrate decides the appeal and alters the valuation or the amount of the tax, a change is accordingly made in the list and then the tax becomes payable. If we quash the bill then the machinery for correction of the list ceases to be operative. The list cannot be corrected and the liability is probably gone. We do not think we would be justified in interfering with the valuation and the bill, in exercise of powers under the constitution. 14. The third contention is that, under the rules and bye-laws framed by the municipality, only houses and buildings were intended to be taxed and not open lands, and as the bills include tax on open land they are illegal and need to be quashed. Rule 3 already referred to is relevant. It says that, in respect of every building or house, house-tax shall be payable at the rates calculated in accordance with Schedule No. I annexed to the rules. Rule 2, clause (7), defines the words building or house to mean any building, house, shop, hut (Jhupras) and with a roof thereof constructed for human habitation or otherwise. It is, therefore, contended that it is only a building or a house which falls strictly within this definition that is liable to the house-tax, and if an attempt was made to tax open land, that attempt was illegal. 15. Mr. Gurusahani, on the other hand, contended that the Rules were made under section 46 of the Act, while the tax is imposed under section 59 which enables the municipality to levy a tax called rate on building or land. Section 3, sub-section (7), defines the word building which is inclusive and includes also walls (including compound wall and fencing), verandahs, fixed platforms, plinths, door-steps and the like. He says that as the entire land is enclosed by a compound wall, the whole, area must be treated as a unit and be taxed for the purposes of house- tax. 16. It is no doubt true that the definition of "building or house" given in rule 2 (7) is very wide. This would, however, mean the word "building" wherever used in the Act will have that meaning if the context does not otherwise suggest. It must be remembered that the municipality had the choice to decide as to whether or not it will tax a particular property within its limits. This would, however, mean the word "building" wherever used in the Act will have that meaning if the context does not otherwise suggest. It must be remembered that the municipality had the choice to decide as to whether or not it will tax a particular property within its limits. It was open to the municipality to tax only buildings or only lands, and if it chose to tax only one and not the other, merely because the definition in the Act is wide, the Court cannot hold that the owner of land is liable to pay the tax. Analysing the rules, we must notice that at no place has any reference been made to open land for the purpose of tax in the whole set of rules. In specific terms, the tax is made payable in respect of every building or house which is defined to mean some construction with a roof made for human habitation or otherwise. Admitting, as is contended by Mr. Gurusahani on behalf of the respondents, that the rules made by the municipal authority should be liberally construed, we find it extremely difficult yet to say that, by this rule, it was intended by the municipality to levy tax on open land as such. By no stretch of language is it possible to infer from rule 3 read with rule 2 (7) that the municipality intended to tax open land as such. 17. Mr. Gurusahani then relies on rule 1 (2), which lays down the extent of the House Tax Rules. This clause seems to have been thoughtlessly framed and does not really convey the sense that might probably have been intended to be conveyed. It says: "These rules extend to all buildings or houses or shops or huts (Jhupras) whatsoever form any property within the Ulhasnagar District Municipality limits except……….” It is argued that it was intended to cover every kind of immoveable property which fell within municipal limits for the purpose of imposition of the tax, and we must, therefore, in spite of the terms of rule 3, extend it to cover even open land. Mr. Gurusahani also relied upon Schedule I to the House Tax Rules. Mr. Gurusahani also relied upon Schedule I to the House Tax Rules. It says: "All buildings or houses or shops or huts (Jhupras) whatsoever from any property within the Municipal District limit will be charged the Rouse Tax except……….” Even here, the meaning intended to be conveyed is not clear at all. We fail to understand what was meant by the words "form any property" or "from any property". In all probability, what was intended to mean is, "forming any property", and this inference is supported by clause (2) of rule 1, where the words "form any property" are used. Apart from this, Schedule I merely purports to lay down the method of calculating the tax and the rate at which it is to be imposed. It is not the taxing provision, nor does it in any manner touch the taxing provision. Even on the assumption that a Schedule to an Act may qualify or extend the meaning of the words used in the body of the Act in a given case, in the present case, it is not possible to infer that the intention was to extend by the Schedule the class of properties which were made liable to tax under rule 3. Mr. Gurusahani was not in a position to show any words except those we have quoted above in support of his contention that the Schedule must be regarded as extending the meaning of rule 3 so as to include open land for the purpose of taxation. 18. In view of this reasoning, it ill clear that open land as such is not liable to taxation, and it is only the building or construction that could be taxed. 19. Mr. Gurusahani, however, contends that what the municipality is seeking to tax, in any event, is not open land as Buch. He contends that rate is to be imposed on the tenement or hereditament on basis of the annual letting value of the property, which is to be arrived at by finding out what a hypothetical tenant will pay for the same from year to year with all its advantages and facilities. The open land goes to enhance the value and can not be ignored from consideration. He is right in his contention. The open land goes to enhance the value and can not be ignored from consideration. He is right in his contention. In Mersey Docks and Harbour Board case (1), Lord Halsbury says (p. 182): “……..What you are to find out is what a tenant will reasonably give, looking, surely at all the circumstances of the particular occupation, including therein the business that has been done on the premises," In Port of London Authority v. Assessment Committee of Orsett Union (2), after referring to Sculcoates Union v. Kingston-upon-Hull Dock Co. (3), Lord Buck master says (p. 305): "The particular hereditament of which the hypothetical tenant is to be determined must be the particular hereditament as it stands with all its privileges, opportunities and disabilities created or imposed either by its natural position or by artificial condition of an Act of Parliament .... " See also Mahad Municipality v. Bombay S. R. T. Corp. (4). The principle is well established and can hardly be disputed now. It is obvious that, in the case of a factory, open land would be an asset for the purpose of its use as a factory. If the construction is to be taxed on the basis of its use as a factory, then all amenities, including that of open land along with its liabilities if any which exist, have to be considered. It is obvious, therefore, that if open land is an adjunct to the factory, then, to that extent, existence of such land will enhance the annual letting-value of the factory, and while assessing the building itself this factor has to be taken into account. 20. Mr. Gurusahani contends that, in view of the position in law as to the liability to rate, it is impossible for us to say in this writ petition that the tax levied by the municipality is a tax on open land as such merely because its valuation is separately made. Much will depend upon the nature of the use made by the factory of the open land for its purposes, and unless the matter is properly and fully investigated in a proper proceeding, it is not possible to say whether or not valuation of the entire factory or the factory as a whole is erroneous, even though the valuing officer has shown separate valuations for different kinds of property. As stated in Makair Municipality v. Bombay S. R. T. Corp. As stated in Makair Municipality v. Bombay S. R. T. Corp. (1) the effect of decided cases is that while valuing the property for the purposes of rate the valuing authority is not confined to one method alone. Even in respect of the factory it may adopt different methods of valuation of its different parts. In the end, the whole attempt, nonetheless, is to find out what is the real value to a tenant of the property in the condition in which it is with all its advantages and disadvantages. If that is so, in this proceeding, it is impossible for us to say that a particular portion of the tax, though apparently calculated on the basis of open space available is wrongly imposed without considering the factors involved which would depend only on the evidence that is brought before the authority. Ultimately, the learned Magistrate before whom the appeals are pending will determine to what extent the open land used for the benefit of the factory, would enhance the rateable value of the property. We cannot, therefore, interfere with the bill; 21. Mr. Coopers next contention is that there has been discrimination by the municipality in the valuation of the property. As stated earlier the valuation of the factories of the three petitioner companies in the first three petitions is made on the basis of the floor area and different kinds of uses to which the proper by is put. Originally, in the case of the petitioner company in Special Civil Application No. 635 of 1964 also, the same basis was adopted. Objections of the parties were heard by the Assessing Officer appointed by the Government, and he made the final order on March 6, 1964, in all the four cases, and surprisingly enough in the case of the petitioner-company in Special civil Application No. 635 of 1964, he considered the cost of construction and fixed the rateable value at 5 per cent. of that cost and reduced the value of the land to Rs. 2 per 1,000 square feet; while in the case of the other three petitioner companies he maintained the original valuation. The reasoning given by the Assessing Officer is highly unsatisfactory. No doubt there is discrimination, but that does not entitle us at this stage to quash the bills. of that cost and reduced the value of the land to Rs. 2 per 1,000 square feet; while in the case of the other three petitioner companies he maintained the original valuation. The reasoning given by the Assessing Officer is highly unsatisfactory. No doubt there is discrimination, but that does not entitle us at this stage to quash the bills. Appeals are pending before the learned First Class Magistrate, Kalyan, and he is the proper authority to find out whether or not the valuation made by the municipal authority is correct. As soon as this difference is brought to his, notice, we have no doubt that learned Magistrate will consider the matter and pass, such suitable orders as the justice of the ,case may require. It is not in every case, that interference is to be made under Article 226 of the Constitution, There is an adequate remedy, and we do not see why the petitioner Companies should not be left with that remedy, so that when proper evidence is led before the appellate authority proper orders would be passed . 22. The next contention raised by Mr. Cooper is that according to the rules the tax could only be prospective and not retrospective from the commencement of the official year. In this connection, it is necessary mention that the assessment lists were prepared after the commencement of the official year and objections were invited. Thereafter, the Government appointed the Assessing Officer who reviewed the objections and then finally determined the valuations and authenticated the assessment lists as required by section 65 in November of 1963 and the tax is sought to be realised for the period from April 1, 1963 to March 31, 1964. 23. In support of this contention, Mr. Cooper has placed reliance on some of the rules viz. Nos. 4, 5, 6 and 7 framed by the municipality. 23. In support of this contention, Mr. Cooper has placed reliance on some of the rules viz. Nos. 4, 5, 6 and 7 framed by the municipality. Rule 4 provides that, on or before February 1, in each year, the Managing Committee shall prepare an assessment list under section 63 of the Act and give a public notice on the same day under sections 64 and 65 of the Act about the same having been prepared, specifying the time and place when and where the said list would be open for inspection and calling upon the public to submit their objections within a certain time, an d also stating a day in the first week of March on which the Managing Committee would sit for hearing objections. Clause two of that rule provides for a special notice in certain oases to be given to individual owners. Rule 5, clause (1), provides that the Managing Committee, on the day prescribed in the notice under rule 4, shall sit to hear all objections, investigate and dispose of all of them and make the necessary amendments to the assessment list as a result of such decisions. The clause further, provides that the assessment list should be authenticated and that a general notice should be given on or about March 15, of the assessment list being authenticated and being kept for inspection. Clause (2) of rule 5 provides that the assessment list to be prepared at the beginning of the years should be prepared subject to the provisions of section 67 of the Act. Rule 6 requires that a bill as prescribed under section 82 (1) should be presented to the person liable for payment of house tax on or about April 1, in each year. Rule 7, clause (l) requires that on of about April 15, the "Managing Committee shall cause to be presented to such person liable for payment of the tax a notice prescribed under section 82 (3) of the Act and if the tax is not paid &s required it shall take such steps as are prescribed under sections 83 and 84 for the recovery of the tax. Clause (2) of rule 7 provides for an appeal as provided under section 86 of the Act against the bill presented by the municipality. Clause (2) of rule 7 provides for an appeal as provided under section 86 of the Act against the bill presented by the municipality. On the footing of the provisions of these rules which require that, the assessment list should be ready completely authenticated under section 65 of the Act by March 15 of each year and that the bill should be presented by about April 1, each year, it is argued that the municipality is bound by the rules framed by itself for the imposition of the tax, and inasmuch as the procedure laid down by the rules requires that the list should be completed before the commencement of the official year, it is not entitled to levy the tax retrospectively from the commencement of the official year if the list is not ready as required by its own rules. In support of this contention, Mr. Cooper relies on a decision of the Division Bench of this Court under the, same Act in Ambalal Sarabhai v. Ahmedabad Municipality (1). He reinforces his argument by the observations of the Supreme Court in State of Kerala v. P. J. Joseph (2). 24. In order to consider whether or not the provisions contained in these rules viz. rules 4 to 7 are mandatory in nature, we have to consider the entire scheme of the Act and also the rules framed for the purposes of the tax. Rule 3 provides without any qualification that, in respect of every building or house, house• tax shall be payable before April 15, in each year by the owner or occupier thereof, which means that the liability to pay the house-tax arises during the current year before April 15, it does not depend upon the assessment list being prepared and authenticated prior to it. We must also in this connection notice the provisions of the Act which have a bearing on this question. Section 63 which requires the municipality to prepare the assessment list does not lay down that the list should be prepared before the commencement of the official year. Section 65, sub-section (4), relates to the authentication of the assessment list. It requires that the list should be authenticated in the manner provided therein, which again does not lay down that it should be authenticated before the commencement of the official year. Section 65, sub-section (4), relates to the authentication of the assessment list. It requires that the list should be authenticated in the manner provided therein, which again does not lay down that it should be authenticated before the commencement of the official year. Sub-clause (2) of clause (b) of sub-section (6) provides that the assessment list shall be accepted as conclusive evidence for the purposes of any tax imposed on buildings or lands of the amount of each such tax leviable thereon through out the official year to which such list relates. It is clear from the provisions of the Act itself that it is not incumbent upon the municipality to prepare the assessment list or to get it authenticated before the commencement of the official year for the levy of the tax. There are at least three decisions of this Court wherein this view has been taken under similar Acts. In Subbappa Mallappa v. Bonna (1), the question arose under the provisions of the Municipal Boroughs Act of 1925. In this case, objections of the tax payer were not heard until August 1939, and on October 18, 1939, he was informed of the result of the hearing of his objections. It was held that his liability commenced from April 1, 1939. Relying on the authority in The Queen v. Ingall (2), it was held that the rules of the municipality regarding preparation of the assessment list etc. were directory and not mandatory, and the right of the municipality to collect the tax from the commencement of the official year was upheld. A similar question arose in Shantaram Balaja v. Vengurla Municipality (3) before Chagla C. J., sitting singly, under the present Act, where again the learned Chief Justice, upheld the right of the municipality to collect the tax from the commencement of the official year, in spite of the fact that the lists were not authenticated prior to the commencement of the official year. To the same effect is the ratio of the decision in Ahmedabad Mun. Corpn. v. Kulinsinh (4), decided by Rajadhyaksha J. It is true that in Ambalal Sarabhai’s case (5), it was held that, by reason of one of the rules framed by the municipality, the tax did not operate retrospectively from the commencement of the official year. To the same effect is the ratio of the decision in Ahmedabad Mun. Corpn. v. Kulinsinh (4), decided by Rajadhyaksha J. It is true that in Ambalal Sarabhai’s case (5), it was held that, by reason of one of the rules framed by the municipality, the tax did not operate retrospectively from the commencement of the official year. Rule 74 which came to be interpreted in that case after providing for the preparation of the list and hearing of the objections and disposal thereof, provided that the Managing Committee after due investigation shall communicate its decision in each case to the owner or tenant before April 1, and the payment of tax shall be considered due on that date. It was held that rule 74 was binding equally upon the municipality and the house owners, and its non compliance by the municipality entitled the plaintiff to recover what was levied from him by way of house and property tax in excess of what was payable by him at the beginning of the year. Shah J. has observed in this connection as follows (p. 53): “The rule distinctly indicates that the amount payable for the year is the amount fixed at the commencement of the year. Unless the increased amount determined in the manner contemplated by rule 74 the only amount that could be laid to be due by the owner for 1911-12 was the amount, which was fixed for the next preceding year." Largely, the decision proceeded on the interpretation placed by the Court on rule 74. It is true, as emphasised by Mr. Cooper, that in Subbappa Mallappa v. Bonni (1), Ambalal Barabkais case (2) particularly relied upon by the petitioners has been distinguished. Mr. Cooper went on to contend that the learned Judges deciding Bubbappas case (1) affirmed what was said in the earlier case. We are not prepared to say so. In the first place, the matter did not fall for their consideration under the present Act, and the learned Judges have not, after due consideration of the provisions of this Act, affirmed the ratio in A.mbalal Barabkais case (2). As we have stated, in each case, the Court is bound to consider the rules framed by the municipality itself. In the first place, the matter did not fall for their consideration under the present Act, and the learned Judges have not, after due consideration of the provisions of this Act, affirmed the ratio in A.mbalal Barabkais case (2). As we have stated, in each case, the Court is bound to consider the rules framed by the municipality itself. If there is nothing in the rules to indicate that the tax became due only if it was determined, the right of the municipality to levy the same from the commencement of the official year cannot be denied. Having regard to the provisions of the relevant rules, in particular rule 3, in our view, the rules were intended only to be directory and not mandatory. Apart from this, section 67-A was inserted by Bombay Act LIII of 1954, by which power Was given to the Government to appoint a person or persons to prepare, revise or adopt and authenticate the assessment list if the municipality was negligent. This rule also clearly indicates that merely because the municipality has failed in preparing lists and authenticating them in time as required by the provisions of sections 63 to 66, it would not mean that the tax-payer is not liable to pay the tax for the official year. Under this section, the person or persons so appointed are enabled to authenticate the list before the last day of the official year to which the list relates. We must, therefore" reject this contention also. 25. We now come to the additional contentions urged on behalf of the petitioner in Special Civil Application No. 635 of 1964. Mr. Mathur contends that, having regard to the fact that the councillors were appointed for one year from October 1, 1960, their appointment came to an end on September 30, 1961, and as the rules imposing the tax under section 59 were framed after that date, they were not prepared by a competent body and, therefore, they were infructuous in making the petitioners liable. In this connection, we have already referred to the Government notification. It is indeed only for one year. By this notification, the Government purported to appoint a President and also a Vice President and altogether, including these two, eighteen councillors, one of whom was the Prant Officer of Thana Prant who was an ex-officio member. In this connection, we have already referred to the Government notification. It is indeed only for one year. By this notification, the Government purported to appoint a President and also a Vice President and altogether, including these two, eighteen councillors, one of whom was the Prant Officer of Thana Prant who was an ex-officio member. Interim municipality was constituted by the State Government under section 191-B which occurs in Chapter XIV-A of the Act. This Chapter was substituted by Bombay Act VIII of 1959 for the original Chapter XIV-A. By section 191-B, the State Government became entitled when any local area was declared to be a municipal district to provide for matters mentioned in clause (i) of the section. By this clause, it became entitled to constitute an interim municipality consisting of such number of councillors appointed by the State Government as it thought proper. It was also entitled to make provision for any of the matters or all of the matters as provided in the subsequent clauses. Sub-section (3) (a), (b) and (c) which are material are as follows: "(3) (a) Where an order is made under this section the State Government shall before the expiry of the term of the councillors or administrators appointed or elected under paragraphs (i), (ii) or (iv) or of the municipality in whose case the number of councillors is reduced under paragraph (iii) of sub-section (1), take steps in accordance with section 11 of this Act or the provisions of the relevant municipal law for the purpose of determining the number of councillors of, and for holding election for, the new municipality or municipalities, as the case may be.” (b) The councillors of the interim municipality or of the municipality in whose case there is an interim increase or reduction in their number of the administrator or administrators appointed or elected under such order, as the case may be shal1 notwithstanding the expiry of the term for which they may have been appointed or elected, continue in office for the area concerned, until immediately before the first meeting of the new municipality, or municipalities, as the case may be. (c) Save as otherwise provided by or under this section, the provisions of the relevant municipal law shall mutatis mutandis apply to any such municipality, its councillors or administrator." Inasmuch as by clause (b), in spite of the expiry of the term for which the councillors were appointed, they continue to hold office, prima facie, it would" mean that they would be entitled to frame rules under section 59 of the Act. 26. It is, however, contended that, to continue as a member of the municipality is one thing and to act as a member is quite another thing. Merely because the members continue to be members, it is not correct to say that they are entitled to act as members and decide questions of policy., In support of this contention, Mr. Mathur relies on the provisions of section 17 read with section 23 (7 A) of the Act. Section 17 (1) prescribes, the office of the councillors to be for a period of four years from the date of election and it further provides that it is extensible by order of the commissioner to a term not exceeding in the aggregate five years under certain defined circumstances. Sub-section (2), clause (b) is as follows: "The term of office of the outgoing councillor shall be deemed to extend to and expire with the day before the date of such meeting." Sub-section (7A) of section 23 is as follows: "On the expiry of the term of office of a municipality the president and vice-president shall continue to carry on the current administrative duties of their office until such time as a new president and vice-president shall have been appointed or elected and shall have taken over charge of their duties." It is argued that, even though by the provisions of section 17 (2), the councillors are deemed to continue until the elected members are assembled in a meeting, under section 23, the President and Vice-President could carry out their current administrative duties only. It is argued, therefore, that no other functions can be performed by the municipality under such circumstances, and if that is so, under the provisions of section 17 read with section 23 (7 A), the same result must follow as under section 191B, sub-section (3), clause (b). In support of the construction placed by him on section 17, sub-section (2), read with section 23, sub-section (7), Mr. In support of the construction placed by him on section 17, sub-section (2), read with section 23, sub-section (7), Mr. Mathur relied upon a decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Narayan v. Secretary, Government (1), where. sections 25 and 19 (2) of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act fell for consideration. It was held by the learned Judges that section 25 (2) (b) was a provision which, by a legal fiction extended the term of the outgoing councillors so as to preserve the conceptual continuity of the municipality. It did not enable the outgoing councillors to function actively as councillors after their term came to an end. 27. In our view, there is a marked distinction between section 17 (2) and section 191B (3) (b). It is held in State of Bombay v. Pandurang (2), that where there is a deeming provision the Court ought to give effect to all logical consequences which follow from the fiction created by the statute. It is a matter of construction, but it may be that the statute itself may place some limitation upon the effect of a legal fiction created by it. In the District Municipal Act, 1901, that limitation is placed by section 23 (7-A), and in the Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925, by section 19 (2). The present provisions with which we are concerned is not a provision of a similar nature. It does not create a fiction at all. It provides in positive terms that the councillors shall continue to hold office until the elected members take over the functions of the municipality. No limitations are placed on their powers. It also could not be urged that section 23 (7 A) applies independently to the present case, inasmuch as this is a special provision while section 23 (7A) applied in the context of section 17 of the Act. In our view, therefore, it is impossible to hold that there was no properly constituted municipality which could make the rules under section 59. 28. It is then contended that the President of the municipality was not validly appointed under the provisions of the Act at all. The substance of the argument is that though under section 191B the Government is entitled to constitute an interim municipality even by nominating councillors, it had no right to appoint the President and Vice President. 28. It is then contended that the President of the municipality was not validly appointed under the provisions of the Act at all. The substance of the argument is that though under section 191B the Government is entitled to constitute an interim municipality even by nominating councillors, it had no right to appoint the President and Vice President. In this connection, we may refer to section 23 which provides for the office of the President and the Vice President. Sub-section (2) of section 23 says: "Every president shall be either- (a) appointed by the State Government by name; or (b) an ex-officio president, that is to say, a person executing the functions of any office which the State Government from time to time notifies in this behalf; or (C) if the State Government so directs, elected by the Municipality." It is clear that there is power in the State Government to nominate a President for a municipality. It is true that such power is not given specifically by section 191B, but then inasmuch as the power exists under section 23, it is not really necessary to give to the Government power under section 191B. A grievance is then made that even if the State Government has got such power under section 23, in the notification itself, the source of power is not mentioned. Exhibit B refers only to section 191B. Even so, we are not prepared to hold that the nomination of the President by the State Government is invalid. There is power in the State Government to appoint the President. Merely because the source of power is not mentioned in the notification, it cannot be held that the exercise of the power is illegal. The power may be proved otherwise, and if such power is established, then the act cannot be regarded as illegal. 29. It is then contended that, in any event, the Vice-President of the municipality was not validly nominated by the Government. Section 23, sub-section (3), provides for an elected vice-president. It would appear that the Government has no power to nominate a vice-president. That, however, does not render the action of the municipality in framing the taxing rules invalid. It may be possible to contend that certain acts done by the vice-president as vice president are not valid. Section 23, sub-section (3), provides for an elected vice-president. It would appear that the Government has no power to nominate a vice-president. That, however, does not render the action of the municipality in framing the taxing rules invalid. It may be possible to contend that certain acts done by the vice-president as vice president are not valid. We have not been pointed out any act done by the vice-president as vice-president in connection with the framing of the Rules. That being so, the validity of the rules is not affected. Apart from this, the absence of a vice-president also has no bearing on the powers of the municipality to perform its duties in accordance with the Act. 30. It was then contended that it was not within the powers of the Government to enable the interim municipality to frame rules for the levy or imposition of the rates or taxes, and even if it had such power, it has not, in fact, authorised the municipality to frame rules in that behalf, and, therefore, the action of the municipality in framing the rules was invalid. The simplest answer to this contention is contained in section 191B, sub-section (3), clause (c) which applies to such interim municipality all the provisions mutatis mutandis. As all the provisions apply, the municipality would be entitled to frame rules for the imposition and collection of the taxes. It was also suggested that though the interim municipality was a municipality for all purposes, it was not a municipality for the purpose of framing of the rules for the imposition and collection of taxes. Crudely put, the argument would amount to this that it was no municipality for the cleaning of latrines and streets and not for collecting service charges. We are not impressed by this argument either. 31. It was lastly contended on behalf of this petitioner Company in Special Civil Application No. 635 of 1964 that the assessment was not according to the Rules. We do not see how the question of assessment can be gone into by us. The assessing officer considered the objections of the company and fixed the rateable value at 5 per cent. of the actual cost of construction. This is a recognised mode of determining annual letting value of a property. He also fixed the annual value of the land at Rs. 2 per 1000 square feet per month. The assessing officer considered the objections of the company and fixed the rateable value at 5 per cent. of the actual cost of construction. This is a recognised mode of determining annual letting value of a property. He also fixed the annual value of the land at Rs. 2 per 1000 square feet per month. It is argued that tax on open land could not be allowed and, therefore, this portion of the levy must, in any event, be disregarded. As observed by as in the earlier part of the judgment, the municipality is not seeking to levy tax on open land as such. The factory itself has to be valued, taking into consideration all its amenities, including the amenity of open land attached to it. It is a matter of evidence as to what is the worth of the amenities. It is not possible for us to go into this question here and regard it merely as no tax on open land. It must be remembered that the tax is levied on the whole property as no unit and not on open land as such. It is said that the company has not filed any appeal against the bill. If that is so, it must thank itself for not being able to challenge the valuation as being improper. That is no reason for exercising our jurisdiction under Article 226, when the result would be highly unjust to the municipality. 32. It was then contended that the assessing officer increased the valuation instead of decreasing it at the time of the hearing of objections. The reason for this contention is that different methods of valuation have been followed by the two authorities. The assessment list was prepared in the first instance by considerations of the types of areas viz. productive area, nonproductive area, open space, canteen and bath and lavatory. In the case of the first, second and fourth areas, the respective yearly tax was Re. 30,951.12, Rd. 19,374.72 and Rs. 1,944, totalling to Rs. 52,269.84. The assessing officer, after hearing the objections, took only the cost of constructions from the figures given in the audit report of the Company as Rs. 1,46,05,920. He fixed the annual letting value at 5 per cent. of this figure and made assessment of the tax at Rs. 98,590. He reduced the tax on open space to Rs. 52,269.84. The assessing officer, after hearing the objections, took only the cost of constructions from the figures given in the audit report of the Company as Rs. 1,46,05,920. He fixed the annual letting value at 5 per cent. of this figure and made assessment of the tax at Rs. 98,590. He reduced the tax on open space to Rs. 15,057 and the total tax came to Rs. 1,13647. Merely because the valuation of several items might vary, it does not mean that the tax has been increased unfavourably by the assessing officer in answer to the objections. We have to take the "annual valuation of the entire property ail a whole, and that can certainly not be said to have increased after the hearing of the objections. We do not find any substance in this contention whatsoever. 33. In the result, no orders are necessary either in respect-of the valuation or in respect of the bills in the first three petitions i.e. Special Civil Applications 517, 518 and 1816/64. In the case of these three petitioners, the matters are pending before the learned Magistrate in appeal. Mr. Gurusahani undertakes that the Municipality will not insist that they should confine their contentions in appeal only to the grounds urged in their objections to the assessment list under section 65. The petitioners will be entitled to urge that the valuation is erroneous on any ground available to them. The learned Magistrate will deal with the appeals having due regard to the observations made in this judgment. Parties will bear their own costs. 34. So far as Special Civil Application No. 635 of 1964 is concerned, for the reasons stated above, we discharge the rule with costs. The respondents would be entitled to recover the amount deposited in this Court by this company. Order accordingly.