Judgment Narasimham, J. 1. This is an application under Article 226 of the Constitution by a person who claims to be the proprietor of a High School named after him at Jhandaha, challenging the validity of certain actions taken by the educational authorities under the provisions of the Bihar High Schools (Constitution, Powers and Functions of Managing Committee) Rules, 1964, (hereinafter referred to as "the rules") for constituting a Managing Committee for the said school. 2. The petitioners case is that he started the said School sometime in 1937, constructed the building on his own plot of land at a heavy cost and for some years met the entire expenses of running the school. This statement of fact is not wholly accepted by the respondents on whose behalf an affidavit was filed to show that the school was started by donations made by a large number of the public also, though the petitioners total contribution to the school was more than Rs. 10,000. It was also asserted in the counter-affidavit that the school was getting aid and grant from Government regularly. Government therefore treated the school as an aided school and wanted to constitute a Managing Committee for the School in accordance with the provisions of the rules, though in view of the large contribution made by the petitioner, Government recognized him as a life-member of the said school as defined in Clause (10) of Rule 2 of the Rules. 3. Most of the legal questions involved in this writ petition are already concluded by a Division Bench Judgment of this Court in Sri Lal Mohan Sah V/s. State of Bihar, C. W. J. C. No. 618 of 1965, disposed of on 20-8-1965 (Pat), Mr. Basudeva Prasad for the petitioner, therefore, confined his argument to a very limited question, namely, whether by an artificial definition of the expressions "proprietor" and "proprietary school" in Clauses (12) and (13) of Rule 2 of the Rules the school could be taken away from the category of a proprietary school and treated as an ordinary aided school receiving grant and aid from the Government. For appreciating this point it will be useful to quote the definitions of the said two expressions: "(12) proprietor means a private individual, a group of individuals, a trust, an association or a corporate body who have been bearing the entire financial responsibility, for the running of a proprietary school and have been declared as such by the Director." "(13) proprietary school means a school the entire financial responsibility for the running of which is borne by a private individual, a group of private individuals, a trust, an association or a corporate body, and which is declared as such by the Director." Mr. Basudeva Prasads contention is that even admitting that the petitioner was receiving grants and aid from the Government for the purpose of running the school, nevertheless the school must be held to be a proprietary school, of the petitioner and that his vested interest in the school cannot be taken away by a mere definition. He fairly conceded that the school will not come within the category of a proprietary school as defined in the rules inasmuch as at present the entire financial responsibility for running the school is not borne by him. The counter-affidavit of the department shows that when the petitioner asked the Subdivisional Educational Officer to treat the School as a proprietary school the latter enquired from the petitioner whether he was willing to undertake the entire expenses of running the institution, including recurring expenses, but the petitioner discreetly kept quiet and has not given any reply to that query. 4 There are obviously disputed questions of fact. The petitioners claim to have started the school entirely at his own expense and to have run it for several years without any help from any other source is not accepted by the respondents, according to whom a large number of the public also made donations for the school. But even if it be assumed for arguments sake that at the time of commencement of the school and for some years thereafter the entire expenses for the construction of the school building and its equipment and the running expenses of the school were borne by the petitioner, the further question which arises for consideration is whether on subsequently accepting grants and aid from the Government the petitioner can still claim that the school is a proprietary school. Mr. Mr. Basudeva Prasads argument is that the petitioner obtained a vested interest in the school which would be "property" as understood in the Constitution, and that vested interest cannot be taken away even by a statutory provision without paying him adequate compensation. 5. In the aforesaid Division Bench decision I have pointed out that the Bihar High Schools (Control and Regulation of Administration) Act, 1960, was passed for the purpose of exercising control over non-Government Schools and their Managing Committees and that the said Act was not intended to nationalise all these aided schools by the Government completely taking over their administration. The rules were made under the provisions of the said Act. Even if it is assumed that the petitioner had some sort of proprietary interest in the school, that has been partially taken away by the provisions of the law made by the Legislature and the rules framed thereunder. Thus there is no infringement of Clause (1) of Article 31 of the Constitution which authorises the deprivation of the property of a person by authority of law. 6. Mr. Basudeo Prasad, however, relied on Clause (2) of Article 31 and urged that, in essence, the rules provide for acquisition of the proprietary interest in the school by the Government acting through their subordinate officials, and that, consequently, the petitioners proprietary interest has been taken away without adequate compensation. I have already shown in the aforesaid Judgment that the rules merely provide for the constitution of a Managing Committee in which all persons interested in the school get due representation. Hence there is no question of "acquisition" of the school for any public purpose by the State and no question of infringement of either Clause (2) of Article 31 or payment of adequate compensation arises. The rules make a distinction between proprietary schools and non-proprietary aided schools and while Chapter III deals with the constitution of Managing Committee of non-proprietary schools, chapter IV deals with the constitution of Managing Committee of proprietary schools. But the definition of the expression "Proprietary School" shows that unless the entire financial responsibility is borne by the private individual it cannot be a proprietary school. There is no illegality or unreasonableness in making this distinction between the two classes of schools and to provide in the rules for proper representation in the Managing Committees of these schools. 7. But the definition of the expression "Proprietary School" shows that unless the entire financial responsibility is borne by the private individual it cannot be a proprietary school. There is no illegality or unreasonableness in making this distinction between the two classes of schools and to provide in the rules for proper representation in the Managing Committees of these schools. 7. In my opinion, therefore, apart from the somewhat faint argument about contravention of the fundamental rights embodied in Article 31 of the Constitution, the petitioner could not make out any ground for me to hold that the definition of the expressions "proprietor" and "proprietary school" in the rules is invalid. 8. The petition is, therefore, dismissed but without costs. S.N.P.Singh, J. 9 I agree.