Chandra Reddy, C.J.- This appeal is filed against the judgment of our learned brother Ramakrishnan, J., in Appeal No. 27 of 1959. The dispute relates to the Ellaichandu Chettimai Vinayakar Koil in Coimbatore. A petition was filed under section 84 of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act for declaring it to be a private temple. This petition was dismissed by the Board on the ground that it was a temple within the purview of section 9(12) of the Act. The aggrieved party presented a petition under section 84(2) and (3) of the Act (II of 1927) as amended by Act X of 1946 to set aside that order. Being of the opinion that the institution in question was a temple within the definition of section 9(12) of Act, the District Judge, Coimbatore, dismissed that petition. It is this judgment that was challenged in Appeal No. 27 of 1959. Concurring in the conclusion of the trial Court as to the character of the temple, Ramakrishnan, J., dismissed the appeal.It is this view of the learned Judge that is under challenge in this Letters Patent Appeal. The contention raised by learned Counsel for the appellant is that there are no features in this case which would justify the conclusion of the Courts below that the temple in question is governed by section 9(12) of the Act. Before we deal with the soundness of this contention it is convenient to state briefly the facts which led to this appeal. The temple in question was founded by Nanjappa Chetty and Pillaru Chetty, the ancestors of the appellant, some time prior to 1886. In the year 1886 there was a partition in that family at which the management of this temple and its properties were entrusted to one of the members of that family, Peria Nanjappa Chetty. He was required to perform the kattalais as usual. Some time later, under the terms of the dharmasasanam deed dated 17th April, 1902, a registration copy of which is marked as Exhibit A-4 the management of the temple was committed to eleven persons who were said to be interested in the institution. These persons were to administer the affairs of the institution and its properties subject to the supervision of the concerned Chettimai and his lineal descendants. These persons were to administer the affairs of the institution and its properties subject to the supervision of the concerned Chettimai and his lineal descendants. It appears from that document that the properties, the income from which was being utilised for the expenses of the temple, constituted the endowments of the institution. Nothing was heard of this institution till we come to 1949 when O.A. No. 22 of 1949, giving rise to this Letters Patent Appeal was presented before the Board of Commissioners for Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras, for the relief mentioned above. The contention that the institution is not a temple within the ambit of section 9(12) of the Act is once again sought to be sustained herein. The argument presented by Sri Venkatarama Ayyar, learned Counsel for the appellant, is that as the temple was founded for the benefit of sixty families attached to the religious headship of the appellant Chettimai the temple should be excluded from the purview of the Hindu Religious Endowments Act. As supporting this proposition reliance is placed on a passage in Lewin on Trusts occurring at page 15: "Another division of trusts is into public and private. By public must be understood such as are constituted for the benefit either of the public at large or of some considerable portion of it answering a particular description. To this class belong all trusts for charitable purposes, and indeed public trusts and charitable trusts may be considered in general as synonymous expressions. In private trusts the beneficial interest is vested absolutely in one or more individual who are, or within a certain time may be, definitely ascertained and to whom, therefore, collectively, unless under some legal disability, it is, or within the allowed limit will be competent to control, modify or determine the trust. On the basis of this passage it is urged by Sri Venkatarama Ayyar that the subject-matter of mis enquiry should be treated as a private one for the reason that that was founded and maintained for the benefit of individuals who could be definitely ascertained, viz., the sixty families attached to the religious leadership,, of the appellant Chettimai. On the basis of this passage it is urged by Sri Venkatarama Ayyar that the subject-matter of mis enquiry should be treated as a private one for the reason that that was founded and maintained for the benefit of individuals who could be definitely ascertained, viz., the sixty families attached to the religious leadership,, of the appellant Chettimai. Before we proceed to discuss the merits of this contention we will do well to refer to a similar passage in Mukherjea’s Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trust found at page 185 (1952 edition): "By public trusts it must be understood such as are constituted for the benefit either of the public at large, or of some considerable portion of it, answeringa particular description, while private trust concern only individuals or families. A private trust providing for the material or spiritual benefit of individuals and families could not rankas a charitable trust in English law which must be public in its character. In Hindu Law however, it is competent for a donor to create a religious trust, the benefit of which is confined to the members of a particular family or the disciples of a particular religious preceptor. So far as Debutter endowment is concerned the essential test to distinguish a private from a public place of worship is, whether the right of worshipping the idol is limited to the members of a particular family or group or extends to all persons professing the Hindu religion." It is seen from these passages that if a trust is conceived in the interests of the public at large, or, of a considerable portion of it answeing a particular description, it would be a public trust. If, on the contrary, the beneficial interest were to vest only in a few individuals that could be definitely ascertained it would be a private trust. Could it be posited in this case that this temple was founded and maintained for the use of an individual or individuals that could be definitely ascetained? At the outset it must be mentioned that neither Exhibit A-3 of 1886 nor Exhibit A-4 of 1902 render any support to the argument that the temple was intended for the benefit only of families that pertain to the appellant Chettimai. The case that the temple was meant for the use of the sixty families is put forward for the first time in this litigation. The case that the temple was meant for the use of the sixty families is put forward for the first time in this litigation. Assuming that it were so, we find it difficult to accede to the proposition advanced for the appellant. It should be remembered that the beneficial interest is supposed to accrue only to the families that acknowledge the religious leadership of a particular Chettimai. There can be little doubt that this would be a fluctuating number. This group may be diminished by families ceasing to acknowledge the religious leadership of this Chettimai, or it may increase by more families of this community professing to follow its lead. It is therefore difficult to satisfy in the instant case the test of definite ascertainment. What may be sixty families at a given time might increase to a hundred or even two-hundred, or, might diminish to ten or fifteen. In such a situation it cannot be premised that it is a private institution founded for the benefit of one or more individuals that could be definitely ascertained coming within the rule stated in the passage in Lewin on Trusts. On the contrary it could be safely asserted it is a public trust constituted for the benefit of a considerable portion of the public contemplated by the passage quoted above in Mukherjea’s Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trusts. It is useful at this stage to look at the definition of a ‘temple’ as contained in section 9(12) of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act. “‘Temple’ means a place, by whatever designation, known, used as a place of public religious worship and dedicated to, or for the benefit of or used as of right by, the Hindu community or any section thereof, as a place of religious worship.” It is not disputed that this institution is used as a place of public religious worship, the only dispute being whether it was not dedicated to, or for the benefit of or used as of right by, the Hindu community or any section thereof. On the material available here, there can be little doubt that it was being used as of right by the community or at least a section of it. We are unable to assent to the contention of learned Counsel that the families that are attached to a particular Chettimai do not constitute a section of the Hindu community. On the material available here, there can be little doubt that it was being used as of right by the community or at least a section of it. We are unable to assent to the contention of learned Counsel that the families that are attached to a particular Chettimai do not constitute a section of the Hindu community. In our considered opinion, even on the assumption that the use of this temple is to be confined to such of the families as acknowledge religious leadership of a particular Chettimai, they do constitute a section in the Hindu community. There is ample authority for this view of ours. As early as 1916 it was decided by a Division Bench of this Court in Muthiah Chetty v. Periannan Chetty1, that a temple dedicated for several branches of some families of Nattaukottai Chetties was a public temple within the meaning of section: 92, Civil Procedure Code. That case dealt with a temple called Ilyathankudi temple claimed by certain families of the Nattukottai Chetties as their private temple-While negativing that contention Wallis, C.J., who spoke for the Court, remarked: “There is, therefore, in our opinion, no case for holding that the temple is the private property of the Ilayanthankudi Kovil Nagarathars. Even if it had been shown that the temple was founded for the use of this particular section of the caste, which consists of several families not shown to be otherwise than very distantly related to one another, we should, as at present advised, be inclined to hold that they are a section of the public and that section 92 is applicable.” This ruling was followed by this Court on several occasions. In Ramanatha Ayyar v. Board of Commr. for H.R.E., Madras2; Govinda Menon and Basheer Ahmed Sayed, JJ., decided that dedication of a temple to a section of the Hindu community would be sufficient to bring it within the definition of a temple within the meaning of section 9(2) of the Act. There a temple which was situate in Nurani village was claimed by the grama samuham as their private temple. This claim was rejected by the Division Bench which heard the case, accepting the principle enunciated in Muthia Chetti v. Perianna Chetty1. There a temple which was situate in Nurani village was claimed by the grama samuham as their private temple. This claim was rejected by the Division Bench which heard the case, accepting the principle enunciated in Muthia Chetti v. Perianna Chetty1. While discussing this topic the learned Judges referred to the observations of Mitter, J., in Nabi Shirazi v. Province of Bengal,3 to the following effect: “The essential difference between a private and a public trust is that, in the former, the beneficiaries are definite and ascertained individuals or who, within a definite time, can be definitely ascertained, but, in the latter, the beneficial interest must be vested in an uncertain and fluctuating body of persons either the public at large or some considerable portion of it answering a particular description.” There can be little doubt that the persons entitled to resort to the temple fall within the class of an uncertain and fluctuating body of persons-either the public at large or some considerable portion of it answering a particular description. As we have already stated, the followers of a particular Chettimai are a fluctuating body of persons and they form a considerable portion of the public answering a particular description. There are several judgments of this Court which contain the same principle Reference in this context may be made to an unreported judgment of a division bench in Sri Chidambareswara Sivagami Ambigai Temple v. The Commr., H. R. & C. E. and P. S. VE. M. Ramanathan Chettiar v. The Commr., H. R. & C. E:, Madras1, and in M.PL. K. Lakshmanan Chettiar v. The Commr., H. R. & C. E., Madras2, which adumbrate the same principle. Our attention has not been drawn to any ruling of this Court or of other Courts which struck a different note. It follows that even on the basis of the beneficial interest being limited to the persons that follow the religious lead of a particular Chettimai the temple in question is a public one in the connotation of section 9(12) of the Act. We will now deal with cases called in aid by Mr. Venkatarama Ayyar as lending support to his claim. At the forefront of his argument learned Counsel cited before us the decision of the Supreme Court in Deoki Nandan v. Murlidhar3. We fail to see what assistance this pronouncement renders to Counsel for the appellant. The passage from. We will now deal with cases called in aid by Mr. Venkatarama Ayyar as lending support to his claim. At the forefront of his argument learned Counsel cited before us the decision of the Supreme Court in Deoki Nandan v. Murlidhar3. We fail to see what assistance this pronouncement renders to Counsel for the appellant. The passage from. Lewin on Trust extracted by Venkatarama Ayyar, J., who delivered the opinion of the Court, and, relied on by learned Counsel, does not advance his case. We have referred to it earlier and shown that it does not lend any countenance to the theory propounded by him. On the other hand, the position summed up by the learned Judge at page 35 furnishes a complete answer to his claim. The learned Judge said: "We may now refer to certain facts admitted or established in the evidence which indicate that the endowment is to the public. Firstly, there is the fact that the idol was installed not within precincts or residential quarters but in a separate building constructed for that very purpose on a vacant site". And as pointed out in Delroose Banoo Begum v. Navab Syud Ashgur Ally Khan4, it is a factor to be taken into account in deciding whether an endowment is private or public, whether the place of worship is located inside a private house or a public building. Secondly, it is admitted that some of the idols are permanently installed on a pedestal within the temple precincts. That is more consistent with the endowment being public rather than private. Thirdly, the puja in the temple is performed by an archaka appointed from time to time. And lastly, there is the fact that there was no temple in the village, and there is evidence on the side of the plaintiff that the Thakurdwara was built at the instance of the villagers for providing a place of worship for them." The temple in question answers the tests indicated above, viz., that the temple is not within the precincts of residential quarters, but is situate in a public place. Indisputably the deity is installed on a pedestal and it is having a garbagraha. It is not disputed that there is a permanent archaka performing worship in the temple. Indisputably the deity is installed on a pedestal and it is having a garbagraha. It is not disputed that there is a permanent archaka performing worship in the temple. As the tests laid down by the learned Judge in the passage extracted are fulfilled the temple must be held to be a public one. In the instant case in addition to the above features there are other insignia of a public temple, viz., there is a gopuram, the deity is carried in procession in the public streets on a number of occasions in a year and at that time the public make offerings. Thus this judgment of the Supreme Court, far from supporting the contention of learned Counsel, negatives it. We may now refer to a passage in Ganapathi Iyer’s Law relating to Hindu and Mohamedan Endowments, at page 167 of the second edition called in aid by the Counsel for the appellant: "Where archakas or priests have been appointed to make the puja or worship and other servants such as reciters of Vedas or Tamil Prabandhams (in the case of Vishnu temples), or Tamil Tevarams (in the case of Siva Temples) are also employed that is evidence to show that the temple is public." Again, this statement of law renders disservice to the appellant. The decision in The Madras H.R.E. Board v. Deivanai Ammal1is also not of much help to the appellant. That was a case where there was no need of dedication and the temple was of recent origin. There the worship was maintained and the expenses were met from out of the funds of a particular person. In that position the claim that the temple was a private one was upheld. The learned Judge said: “In the absence of any property being dedicated for the maintenance of worship in the temple it is difficult to hold that the temple has been dedicated to the public.” Such is not the situation here. Exhibit A-4 makes it abundantly clear that properties were dedicated to the temple and that the expenses of worship were met out of the income therefrom. That apart, P.W. 1 had specifically stated that members of the appellant Chettimai endowed their properties to the temple. The case cited above is therefore distinguishable and is inapplicable to the instant case and the principle indicated therein cannot govern the instant case. That apart, P.W. 1 had specifically stated that members of the appellant Chettimai endowed their properties to the temple. The case cited above is therefore distinguishable and is inapplicable to the instant case and the principle indicated therein cannot govern the instant case. In Subbiah Pillai v. Commissioner, H.R. & C.E. (Administration) Department2, relied on by the appellant it was held that a temple which was founded by the plaintiff’s family was a private one notwithstanding the fact that some members of the public were shown to be worshipping therein. The distinguishing features in that case were that the temple was situated not only adjacent to the plaintiff’s house, but the plaintiff had access and entrance to it directly from his house and there was an iron gate at the main entrance indicating that the plaintiff exercised some control over the right of people to offer worship in the temple and that the gate was always locked except when puja was performed by the archaka. Further, there was no permanent archaka for the temple. The entire properties belonging to the temple were in the possession of the plaintiff’s family. No member of the public interfered with their management and possession of the properties. And, no member of the public, as a matter of right, was allowed to worship in the temple. Here, as already stated, the temple is situated at a public place. There is abundant evidence to show that the members of the public accustomed to worship in the temple in large numbers. It appears from the evidence of R.W. 1 that there were festivals in the months of Purattasi and Margazhi and that there was no restriction for any section of the public worshipping the deity, in the temple. P.W. 1, though he did not belong to this Chettimai, was in the habit of worshipping in this temple. He does not state that at any time he obtained the permission of any of the persons belonging to this particular Chettimai before he entered it for worship. It is further in evidence that a deity from another temple would be taken in procession to this temple and a large number of people at that time would come to this temple for worship. Admittedly there are a number of shops within the precincts of this temple. Members of the public used to conduct bhajanas in the temple in question. Admittedly there are a number of shops within the precincts of this temple. Members of the public used to conduct bhajanas in the temple in question. It also transpires from Exhibit A-4 that a public school is being run within the premises of this temple. All these are circumstances indicative of the public character of the institution. In this connection we may refer to Exhibit A-3 which says that certain kattalais had to be performed in the temple and that there was a nandavanam attached thereto. It is also recited that the things mentioned therein were done by the ancestors of the parties to the document by way of charity which implies that this was meant for the benefit of the general public. It is worthy to note that under Exhibit A-4 the management of the institution and its properties were entrusted to eleven persons who were shown to be interested in the institution and that a number of festivals were being performed in the temple. Thus it is manifest that this temple has all the features of a public institution and there is no justification to exclude it from the purview of section 9(12) of the Act. We are therefore not persuaded that either the District Judge or our learned brother Ramakrishnan, J., who have disallowed the claim of the appellant have gone wrong in any way. In our considered opinion, this is the only legitimate conclusion that could be reached in a case like this. The evidence on record amply justifies their conclusion that this Ellaichandu Chettimai Vinayagar Koil is a public temple within the sweep of section 9(12) of the Act and it cannot be excluded from the purview of the provisions of the Act. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. R.M. ----- Appeal dismissed.