JUDGMENT V.G. Oak, J. - The short point for consideration in this Second Appeal is whether a sub-tenant is entitled to the benefit of Section 3 of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 (hereafter referred to as the Act). The dispute between the parties relates to a certain shop at Muzaffarnagar. One Jai Prakash is the owner of the shop. Babu Ram is the tenant-in-chief of the shop. Bhullan is Babu Ram's sub-tenant. The Plaintiff served upon the Defendant a notice to quit. But the Defendant did not vacate. Babu Ram Plaintiff, therefore, brought the suit against Bhullan Defendant for his ejectment. The Plaintiff also claimed Rs. 46/- as arrears of rent and Rs. 14/-as damages. The Defendant pleaded that the suit was not maintainable in the absence of any permission from the District Magistrate u/s 3 of the Act. The learned Additional Munsif of Muzaffarnagar, who tried the suit, upheld the Defendant's plea that the claim for ejectment was not maintainable in the absence of permission u/s 3 of the Act. The court passed in Plaintiff's favour a decree for Rs. 46/- only for arrears of rent. The remaining claim was dismissed. When the matter went up in appeal, the learned second Additional Civil Judge of Muzaffarnagar took a different view as regards the scope of Section 3 of the Act. He held that a sub-tenant was not entitled to the benefit of Section 3 of the Act. So the appeal by the Plaintiff was allowed. The Plaintiff's claim was decreed in its entirety. Bhullan Defendant has come to this Court in Second Appeal. 2. When the case was taken up by a learned Single Judge of this Court, he found that the question whether a sub-tenant is entitled to the benefit of Section 3 of the Act was important. He, therefore, referred the case to a Division Bench. 3. The terms 'landlord' and 'tenant' have been defined in Clauses (c) and (g) of Section 2 of the Act. These definitions were altered by Section 3 of the U.P. Amending Act No. XVII of 1954, in Clause (c) the words "of such person" were substituted for the words "of the landlord and tenant in relation to his subtenant". Again, the words "and includes any person holding or occupying any accommodation as a sub-tenant" were deleted from Clause (g). These definitions were altered by Section 3 of the U.P. Amending Act No. XVII of 1954, in Clause (c) the words "of such person" were substituted for the words "of the landlord and tenant in relation to his subtenant". Again, the words "and includes any person holding or occupying any accommodation as a sub-tenant" were deleted from Clause (g). The learned Civil Judge expressed the view that, after amendment of the two definitions, it is impossible to hold that the term 'tenant' defined by Clause (g) of Section 2 includes a sub-tenant. On the other hand, Mr. K.C. Agarwal, appearing for the Defendant Appellant, has urged that, by those amendments certain words were deleted as surplusage. 4. For purposes of the present appeal, it is not necessary to speculate about the object underlying the amendment. It is sufficient to note the present definitions of the two terms 'landlord' and 'tenant' given in Section 2 of the Act. According to the present definitions, 'landlord' means a person to whom rent is payable by a tenant in respect of any accommodation. 'Tenant' means the person by whom rent is or, but for a contract express or implied, would be payable for any accommodation. There is no doubt that a sub-tenant has to pay rent to the tenant-in-chief. There should, therefore, be no difficulty in holding that, the term 'tenant' as defined by Clause (g) of Section 2 of the Act, includes a sub-tenant. 5. In "Dr. A.G. Dass v. T. R.O. Lucknow" (1) (1962 AWR 455) Desai, G.J. observed on page 459 Gol. 1 thus: A sub-tenant is included in the definition of "tenant" because rent is payable by him for the accommodation; the tenant, whose sub-tenant he is, is his landlord, because rent is payable to him. 6. The learned Civil Judge remarked that the legislature did not intend to give protection to sub-tenants on the ground that, sub-letting has been recognized as a ground for ejectment under Clause (c) of Sub-section (1)of Section 3 of the Act. It is true that sub-letting without the landlord's permission has been recognised as a ground to support a suit for ejectment. But it must not be supposed that sub-letting is always illegal. According to Sub-section (3) of Section 7 of the Act, if accommodation is sub-let with the permission in writing of the landlord and the D.M., such subletting is legal. But it must not be supposed that sub-letting is always illegal. According to Sub-section (3) of Section 7 of the Act, if accommodation is sub-let with the permission in writing of the landlord and the D.M., such subletting is legal. It is not, therefore, correct to say that the legislature did not want to give any protection to sub-tenants. 7. In Express Estates Ltd. Vs. Modern Furnishing House, AIR 1953 Mad 414 it was observed that 'tenant' does not mean a sub-tenant. That decision was given with reference to the corresponding statute in force in the State of Madras. That statute was not brought to our notice. We are, therefore, unable to say how the matter stands under that statute. 8. The question for consideration is whether the Defendant is entitled to the protection of Section 3 of the UP Act. Sub-section (1) of Section 3 states: Subject to any order passed Under Sub-section [3] no suit shall, without the permission of the D.M., be filed in any civil Court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation except It is not disputed for the Respondent that the shop in question is 'accommodation' within the meaning of the Act. So, the only point for consideration is whether the Defendant is a tenant as defined by the Act. As explained above, a sub-tenant pays rent to the tenant-in-chief, and is, therefore, a tenant as defined by Clause [g] or Section 2 of the Act. A sub-tenant is, therefore, entitled to the benefit of Section 3 of the Act. Learned Munsif was right in dismissing the Plaintiff's claim for ejectment of the Defendant. The decree passed by the trial court must be restored. 9. The learned Counsel for the Plaintiff-Respondent urged before us that, certain subsequent developments have rendered the second appeal infructuous. The Appellant is not prepared to accept the position that the second appeal has become infructuous. Whether the appeal is infructuous or not is largely a matter for the consideration of the Appellant. Since the Appellant insists on the decision of the second appeal on merits, we must decide the second appeal according to law. 10. The second appeal is allowed. We set aside the decree of the lower appellate court, and restore the decree passed by the trial court. The Defendant-Appellant will get his costs before this Court and the lower appellate Court from the Plaintiff-Respondent.