JUDGMENT ABHYANKAR J. -This revision arises out of an order of the Special Officer as a Taxing Officer, by which the applicant has been called upon to pay a deficit court -fee of Rs.1,746.25 nP. as a condition precedent to the registration of the second appeal in this Court. As the revision raised a point as to the interpretation of section 6 (ii) of the Bombay Court -fees Act, 1959, of frequent occurrence, before one of us (Abhyankar J.), the matter was referred to be decided by a Division Bench, and we have to deal with it under those circumstances. 2. A few facts giving rise to the question raised may now be stated. The question has arisen in the second appeal filed by the appellant. The appeal has arisen out of a suit for maintenance filed by the opponent Saraswatibai who is the wife of the applicant. In this suit, Saraswatibai claimed Rs. 7,500 by way of arrears of maintenance and future maintenance at the rate of Rs. 125 per month or Rs. 1,500 per year. The trial Court decreed the plaintiffs claim for arrears to the extent of Rs. 4,000 and also granted yearly main - tenance at the rate of Rs. 1,200 per year. Against this decree, the applicant preferred a first appeal in the lower appellate Court. The opponent preferred cross -objections. The first appeal filed by the applicant was dismissed and the cross -objections were allowed fully. Thus, the result of the decree passed by the lower appeallate Court was that the opponent was granted Rs. 7,500 by way of arrears of maintenance and also a decree for yearly maintenance of Rs. 1,500 as claimed by the plaintiff. In other words, the plaintiff was given full relief as claimed by her in the plaint. The applicant filed a second appeal and in this appeal he has paid court -fees on Rs. 7,500 on account of the sum awarded as arrears of maintenance and also paid court -fees on Rs. 1,500 which is the yearly amount of future maintenance granted by the lower appellat Court. 3. After the appeal was filed, an objection was raised about the adequacy of court -fees payable in respect of the claims agitated in this litigation. It may be mentioned that the opponent had filed the suit in forma pauperis and appparently had not paid any court. 3. After the appeal was filed, an objection was raised about the adequacy of court -fees payable in respect of the claims agitated in this litigation. It may be mentioned that the opponent had filed the suit in forma pauperis and appparently had not paid any court. fees on any of the reliefs. The Special Officer in his order under challenge has held that under the proviso to section 6 (ii) of the Bombay Court -fees Act, the appellant as a defeated defendant was liable to pay court• fees calculated under the proviso both in respect of the decree of the first Court as well as of the first appellate Court. That sum came to Rs. 1,746.25 nP. and though it has been found by the Special Officer that the court -fees have been properly paid by the applicant on the memorandum of second appeal filed in the High Court, the applicant was not entitled to have his second appeal registered unless the applicant paid the deficit court -fee of Rs. 1,746.25 nP. according to the liability created by the proviso to section 6 (ii) of the Bombay Court -fees Act. We have to examine the correctness of this decision of the Special Officer. 4. Section 6 (ii) with its proviso, of the Bombay Court -fees Act is as follows: "In suits for maintenance (with or without, a prayer for the creation of a charge), and for annuities or other sums payable periodically according to the value of the subject -matter of the suit, and such value shall be deemed to be, in the case of a suit for maintenance, the amount claimed to be payable for one year and in any other case ten times such amount: Provided that. if in a suit for maintenance the plaintiff obtains a decree for maintenance the defendant shall be liable to make good the deficit.. if any. between the fee payable on ten times the amount awarded for one year and the fee already paid by the plaintiff; and the amount of such deficit shall. without. prejudice to any other mode of recovery, be recoverable as an arrear of land revenue;" 5. if any. between the fee payable on ten times the amount awarded for one year and the fee already paid by the plaintiff; and the amount of such deficit shall. without. prejudice to any other mode of recovery, be recoverable as an arrear of land revenue;" 5. The contention of the State through their counsel is that a proper construction of the proviso as well as the substantive section must lead to the conclusion that the valuation of the relief in a suit for maintenance after the suit is decided must be calculated at ten times the amount of maintenance claimed for one year. A concession is given originally to the plaintiff who comes to Court claiming an amount of future maintenance to value that relief on the basis of one years amount. But that is not the valuation intended by the Legislature. As it were, a fictional or a notional or a concessional valuation is provided only for the benefit of the plaintiff who comes to Court claiming future maintenance, but that concession in the matter of valuation of the relief is not available to a defendant and the defendant must pay court -fees on ten times the amount payable for one year by way of future maintenance as claimed by the plaintiff. 6. The Special Officer has not accepted this contention. One of the two points raised before him was whether the notional valuation as given in section 6 (ii) applied to appeals irrespective of the fact as to which party prefers the appeal, and he found the answer in the affirmative. In other words, as observed by the Special Officer, the Court - fees Act provides that in a suit for maintenance the value of the subject -matter of the suit shall be deemed to be the amount claimed to be payable for one year. The Act does not provide for any separate valuation for an appeal against a decree for maintenance and in the absence of such a specific provision the notional valuation as mentioned in section 5 (ii) must be made applicable to the appeal also. The Act does not provide for any separate valuation for an appeal against a decree for maintenance and in the absence of such a specific provision the notional valuation as mentioned in section 5 (ii) must be made applicable to the appeal also. On this view, the Special Officer has come to the conclusion that the conclusion to that the notional valuation of the relief in a suit for future maintenance to be fixed at the amount payable for one year is available not only to the original plaintiff but also to the appellant or the person who may be required to file an appeal against the decree of the trial Court, whether it is a first appeal or a second appeal in our opinion, this conclusion arrived at by the learned Taxing Officer is correct and must be upheld. 7. On a plain reading of section 6 (ii) with the proviso, it is clear that the section speaks of the value of the subject -matter of the suit and makes no reference to the plaintiff or the defendant. What is further to be noted is that a. legal fiction is created by the use of the words "such value shall be deemed to be" in the case of suits for maintenance and that is equated with the amount payable for one year. It was necessary to create such a legal fiction because the amount payable for maintenance is also in a sense an amount payable periodically or is in the nature of an annuity. But whereas in the case of an amount payable periodically or for annuities, the valuation is fixed at 10 times such an amount, the Legislature has chosen to make an exception in the case of an amount payable for maintenance and has fixed that valuation at the amount claimed for one year in respect of maintenance and not ten times the yearly claim. This concession is not taken away and the legal fiction created under the substantive section is not in any manner cut down because the matter is agitated in the further stages in the same lis at the distance of any party by way of an appeal. This concession is not taken away and the legal fiction created under the substantive section is not in any manner cut down because the matter is agitated in the further stages in the same lis at the distance of any party by way of an appeal. The lis is the same and it continues to have the same character, whether it is taken from one Court to another, and the Legislature having fixed a notional value of the relief for maintenance by creating a legal fiction, we do not find that there is any justification for not giving the benefit of the legal fiction or the notional valuation at all the stages of the lis including a first appeal or a second appeal or even an appeal under the Letters Patent, under section 6 (ii) of the Bombay Court -fees Act. H. It is however urged that the proviso also must be given its legal effect and the proviso uses the words "the fee payable" and that fee is computed at ten times the amount payable for one year and therefore that must be taken to be the real valuation of the relief. We do not think that it is possible to accept this interpretation of the proviso. As far as we can see, the proviso comes into effect only after the suit is decided and a suit is not finally decided until the lis comes to a final conclusion between the parties. A suit is not necessarily decided by the decree of the first Court because the person aggrieved by the decision has a right to challenge it in further appeals. We must therefore hold that the provision made by the Legislature in creating a liability in favour of the State Exchequer and for which a machinery is provided for its realization can really be worked out only after the suit is finally decided. It may well happed that the plaintiffs suit for maintenance is decreed fully or partially or not decreed at all in the first Court. It is only the final decision of the claim of the plaintiff for maintenance that will give rise to the liability created by the proviso which is of a special nature. The special feature of this liability is that the liability is attraote:1 only when the plaintiff succeeds. If the plaintiff fails, there is no question of recovering any deficit. It is only the final decision of the claim of the plaintiff for maintenance that will give rise to the liability created by the proviso which is of a special nature. The special feature of this liability is that the liability is attraote:1 only when the plaintiff succeeds. If the plaintiff fails, there is no question of recovering any deficit. It may well be that the Legislature wanted that the State revenue may not suffer in respect of a certain amount which may otherwise be payable as court -fees but which is recoverable only from a defeated defendant after the final decision of the lis between the parties. The stage at which therefore the liability created under the proviso is to be worked out is the final decision of the suit and not merely at the end of the litigation in the trial Court or the first appellate Court. 9. The special Officer has also taken the view that the liability which is created against a defeated defendant must be made good as a condition precedent for his filing a first or a second appeal. We do not see any warrant for such a construction of the proviso in the Act. The learned counsel appearing for the State as well as the opponent have not supported this view which has found favour with the Special Officer. We also do not see that there is any such provision in the Court -fees Act which makes the filing of a first or a second appeal bya defeated defendant dependent on his paying or making good the liability which is created by the proviso. As far as we can see, the liability created under the proviso is a liability in the nature of a revenue due which is recoverable, apart from other modes that may be available, as an arrear of land revenue. The stage at which and the authority by which this liability may be realized does not arise until the final decision of the suit and one of the modes is to recover it as an arrear of land revenue. This obviously means that Revenue Officers are entitled to call upon the defeated defendant to make good this liability, and on his failure, to proceed to recover it as an arrear of land revenue. This obviously means that Revenue Officers are entitled to call upon the defeated defendant to make good this liability, and on his failure, to proceed to recover it as an arrear of land revenue. We are not called upon to decide in this revision application whether this liability is in the nature of a tax or a fee though it is called a deficit between the fee payable on ten times the amount awarded for one year and the fee already paid by the plaintiff. Therefore, we do not feel it necessary to pronounce on the virus of the proviso or whether it is within the legislative competence of the Legislature of the State. 10. We have thus come to the conclusion that there is no difference in valuing the relief when the claim is for future maintenance, whether it is in a suit or in an appeal, and that relief is to be valued at the amount claimed for one year. The valuation does not change because the lis is at the stage of a. suit or a first appeal or subsequent appeals. The proviso does not come into operation until the final termination of the li8 and the liability of the defeated defendant is to be worked out only after the termination of the lis. Whatever liability may arise at that stage is not relevant in entertaining or registering the first or second appeal. The court -fee which he is liable to pay will be according to the provision in the substantive section, namely, on the notional value of the relief or the amount claimed by way of future maintenance for one year. 11. Thus, the result is that the application for revision is allowed, but in the circumstance there will be no order as to costs. Application allowed.