JUDGMENT : Misra, J. - Nabin had three sons-Luxman, Rama and Bharat. Plaintiff is the son of Bharat through his wife Dalimba. His case is that after the death of his mother, Bharat kept Champa, widow of his elder brother Luxman, as his concubine and through her Defendant No. 1 and the husband of Defendant No. 4 were horn. Defendants 2 and 3 are the sons of Defendant No. 1. By the time of the settlement, Luxman and Rama were dead. Bharat falsely recorded Defendant No. 1 as the son of Rama. In respect of the entire ancestral properties, Defendant No. 1 was recorded in respect of five annas and four pies and Bharat for the balance ten annas and eight pies. Defendant No. 1 and Champa had great influence on Bharat. Bharat executed a registered deed of gift on 7-12-1939 in favour of Defendant No. 4 and two registered sale deeds on 2-1-1947 and 19-8-1950 in favour of Defendant No. 1 in respect of different portions of the land. These documents are old and did not affect the interest of the Plaintiff. Plaintiff filed T.S. 7958 in the Court of the Munsif, Kendrapara, valuing it at Rs. 1040- for the purpose of court-fee and jurisdiction, for declaration of title over Ka and Kha schedule lands and for recovery of possession on various averments, the details of which need not be mentioned. That suit ended in a compromise. Plaintiff's case is that in the talk preceding the compromise, it had been settled that the Plaintiff would get ten annas eight pies and Defendant No. 1 five annas four pies in Ka and Kha schedule lands. Plaintiff had full confidence in one Bramhananda Mal under whose supervision the compromise was being effected. Sometime after the passing of the compromise decree, Defendant No. 1 interfered with the possession of the Plaintiff and declared that the Plaintiff had no title in any of the lands. On reading the compromise decree Plaintiff came to know that it did not embody the terms which had been settled. This suit is for a declaration that the compromise decree is not binding on the Plaintiff and for partition of Ka and Kha schedule lands allotting ten annas eight pies interest in those lands to the share of the Plaintiff. In para 15 of the plaint, the suit was valued at Rs. This suit is for a declaration that the compromise decree is not binding on the Plaintiff and for partition of Ka and Kha schedule lands allotting ten annas eight pies interest in those lands to the share of the Plaintiff. In para 15 of the plaint, the suit was valued at Rs. 694- for court-fee and jurisdiction on the footing that the total value of the disputed lands is Rs. 1040- and the value of Plaintiff's ten annas eight rupees interest is Rs. 694. An objection was raised by Defendant No. 1 challenging the valuation of the suit. It was contended for Defendant No. 1 that the market value of Ka and Kha schedule lands was more than Rs. 2000-, and the T.S. 5563 having been filed for setting aside the compromise decree the suit is to be valued on the market value of the properties comprised in the compromise decree. It is to be noted that the question of valuation of the suit was emphasised upon to indicate that the Additional Munsif of Kendrapara, before whom the suit is pending for trial, had no jurisdiction to try the suit as he was competent to try suit upto a valuation of Rs. 1000-. The learned Additional Munsif heard the parties and held by the impugned order that the suit was properly valued at Rs. 694- and that it was not beyond his own pecuniary jurisdiction. Against this order the Civil Revision has been filed by Defendant No. 1. 2. It may be clarified at the outset that if the valuation of the suit is increased, more court-fee may be payable. Interference in Civil Revision at the instance of Defendant No. 1 is, however, not permissible if it concerned merely a question of payment of less court-fee. If, however, by a wrong determination of the valuation of the suit a Court illegally exercised jurisdiction which it had not, the order is liable to be quashed u/s 115, CPC even though as a result of such interference the Plaintiff might be called upon to pay higher Court fee. Rathnaarmaraja. Vimla 1961 S.C.D. 532, is an authority for the view that the High Court cannot interfere u/s 115, CPC merely on the question of court-fee at the instance of Defendant No. 1. 3. Rathnaarmaraja. Vimla 1961 S.C.D. 532, is an authority for the view that the High Court cannot interfere u/s 115, CPC merely on the question of court-fee at the instance of Defendant No. 1. 3. To appreciate the issue involved in this case, Section 7(i-A) of the Court-fees Act, as amended in Orissa, may be quoted. The amendment was brought into for the first time in Section 8 of Orissa Act of 1939. 7. The amount of fee payable under this Act shall be computed as follows: i-A. In a suit for cancellation of a decree for money or other property having a money-value or other document securing money or other property having such value, according to the value of the subject-matter of the suit, and such value shall be deemed to be if the whole decree or other document is sought to be cancelled, the amount or the value of the property for which the decree was passed or the other document executed, if a part of the decree or other document is sought to be cancelled, such part of the amount or value of the property. Explanation-In any case where a suit for the cancellation of a whole decree for money or other property having a money value, or other document securing money or other property having such value ba.s to be instituted, but the substantial relief claimed is only in respect of a part of the amount or the value of the property for which the decree was passed or the other document was executed, the value of the subject -matter of the suit shall be deemed to be such part of the amount or value of the property in respect of which the relief is sought. That the court-fee is payable under this provision was not disputed before the trial Court and also before me. Plaintiff being a party to the compromise decree in T.S. 7958 cannot get any relief in this suit without getting that decree cancelled. The previous decree was for the property having a money value. In terms, therefore, it comes within the purview of the Orissa Amendment. Ad valorem court-fee is payable on the value of the subject-matter of the suit. How the subject-matter of the suit is to be valued, no indication has been given in the section. In Madras, since 1922 this very provision, excluding the explanation, exists. In terms, therefore, it comes within the purview of the Orissa Amendment. Ad valorem court-fee is payable on the value of the subject-matter of the suit. How the subject-matter of the suit is to be valued, no indication has been given in the section. In Madras, since 1922 this very provision, excluding the explanation, exists. In Govindaraja Pillai Vs. Vanchinatham Pillai it was authoritatively pronounced that the expression "value of the subject-matter of the suit" meant the market value of the subject-matter. The reasoning given therein was that unless there was an indication to the contrary', the value of the property must mean market value. The reasoning is sound and must be accepted. This decision covers a case of cancellation of a deed of conveyance. The same principle applies to a suit for setting aside a decree. In AIR 1940 Mad 113 (F.B.), the principle was expressed thus In respect of decrees passed against him (minor) in suits in which he had been co-nomine impleaded as a party, it is plain that he must pay the fee prescribed by Section 7(i-A) of the Madras Act. The Plaintiff must be held to have impliedly asked for a cancellation of the decrees passed against him and must accordingly stamp his plaint ad valorem on the amount of the decrees and not merely on his share fraction as his liability is for the full amount, though necessarily limited to the extent of his share in the joint family assets. Thus two principles evolve out of the aforesaid decisions-(i) the value in Section 7(i-A) means the market value; and (ii) u/s 7(i-A), without the Explanation, ad valorem court-fee is payable on the entire market value of the property in respect of which the previous decree had been passed where the suit was to set aside the entire previous decree. In this case, the suit is for setting aside the previous decree, and until the compromise decree is set aside as a whole, no relief can be granted in favour of the Plaintiff. Mr. Patra argued that the Plaintiff was to pay ad valorem court-fee on the entire market value of Ka and Kha scheduled properties. His contention would be fully correct if this case was one u/s 7(i-A) as amended in Madras where the Explanation does not occur. Mr. Patra argued that the Plaintiff was to pay ad valorem court-fee on the entire market value of Ka and Kha scheduled properties. His contention would be fully correct if this case was one u/s 7(i-A) as amended in Madras where the Explanation does not occur. The Explanation, however, introduces a further condition that even though a suit may be for the cancellation of the whole decree, the Court is to look into the substantial relief claimed in the suit. If the Plaintiff had filed a suit for setting aside the previous compromise decree claiming title in the entire Ka and Kha schedule properties, the substantial relief claimed would be in respect of the entire property, and ad valorem by court-fee would be payable on the market value of the entire property. The substantial relief claimed in this case, however, is ten annas eight pies of Ka and Kha schedule properties. Under the Explanation, the subject-matter of the suit shall be deemed to be such part of the value of the property in respect of which relief is sought. Thus by the deeming clause a legal fiction is introduced that though the relief sought is for setting aside the entire decree, it shall be deemed as if it is for declaring ten annas eight pies interest in favour of the Plaintiff. On the aforesaid analysis, Plaintiff is liable to pay ad valorem court fee on the market value of ten annas eight pies "interest in Ka and Kha schedule properties. It is elementary that the question of court-fee must be considered in the light of the allegations made in the plaint and not by the pleas in the written statement or by a final decision of the suit on merits S.Rm.Ar.S.Sp. Sathappa Chettiar Vs. S.Rm.Ar.Rm. Ramanathan Chettiar, . 4. Section 8 of the Suits valuation Act, lays down that where in suits other than those referred to in the Court-fees Act, 1870, Section 7, paragraphs, i and ix and paragraph x, Clause (d), court-fees are payable ad valorem under the Court- fees Act, 1870, the value as determinable for the computation of court-fees and the value for purposes of jurisdiction shall be the same. This section postulates that the Plaintiff should first value his claim, for the purpose of jurisdiction would be on the basis of such claim S.Rm.Ar.S.Sp. Sathappa Chettiar Vs. S.Rm.Ar.Rm. Ramanathan Chettiar. This section postulates that the Plaintiff should first value his claim, for the purpose of jurisdiction would be on the basis of such claim S.Rm.Ar.S.Sp. Sathappa Chettiar Vs. S.Rm.Ar.Rm. Ramanathan Chettiar. As I have already said, u/s 7(i-A), ad valorem court-fee is payable on the market value of ten annas eight pies interest in Ka and Kha schedule properties. The value so determined would be the valuation of the suit on which jurisdiction of the Court would be determined. 5. The learned Additional Munsif was Rot alive to the aforesaid legal concept. When objection was raised by Defendant No. 1 regarding jurisdiction of the Court, since should have been taken to determine the market value of ten annas eight pies interest in Ka and Kha schedule lands. If the valuation so determined were above Rs. 1000-, the case should have been returned for trial to the Munsif, Kendrapara who has higher jurisdiction. It seems, there is now no Additional Munsif at Kendrapara. The learned Munsif could now go into the question of valuation as directed and dispose of the suit as early as possible. 6. In the result, the order of the learned Additional Munsif is set aside and the Civil Revision is allowed. As there is no appearance of the Plaintiff-Respondent, there will be no order as to costs. Final Result : Allowed