MEHROTRA C. J.: -: By these two petitions giving rise to Civil Rules Nos. 8/64 and 11/64 the notices issued to the petitioners by the Committee of Privileges, Assam Legislative Assembly, Shilloug and, the proceedings pending before the said Committee are sought to be quashed. The petitioner Shri L. N. Phukan in Civil Rule No. 6 is the Chief Editor of the Assam Tribune, a daily newspaper issued from Gauhati and the petitioners in Civil Rule No. 11 are Shri Salish Chandra Kakoti. Editor, The Assam Tribune, Gauhati, Shri Kunjalal Thapa, Printer and Publisher, The Assam Tribune, Gauhati and Shri Naresh Rajkhowa, Special Representative, The Assam Tribune, Shillong. In both these petitions Shri Mohendra Mohan Choudhury, Speaker, Assam Legislative Assembly has been impleaded as opposite party No. 1 and Shri D. Hazarika, Deputy Speaker, Assam Legislative Assembly and Chairman, Com­mittee of Privileges of the Legislative Assembly, Assam as opposite party No. 2. Opposite parties Nos. 3 to 6 are the other members of the Committee of Privileges, Assam Legislative Assembly and opposite party No. 7 is the Secretary of the Assam Legislative Assembly. (2) In April 1962 the Government of Assam ap­pointed a Commission of Inquiry under S. 3 of the Commission of Enquiry Act, 1952 (Act LX of 1952) consisting of Shri Ram Labhaya, Retired Judge of the Assam High Court for the purpose of making an enquiry«iuto a definite matter of public importance as per Notification No. SOB. 197/82/1. Sometime in the month of September. 1962 the Commission after inquiry submitted its report to the Government of Assam. In the issue of the Assam Tribune dated the 5th August 1983 a news item was published regarding the findings of the Commission under the caption 'Agricultural Pipe Scandal'. This news item was based on a news from the special representative of the Assam Tribune at Shillong. In the same issue a summary of the Commission's report was published. The petitioners in both these petitions received a notice dated the 17th October 1963 from the Secretary of the Assam Legislative Assembly asking them to show cause on or before the 23rd November 1983 as to why appropriate action should not be recom­mended to the House for breach of privilege of the Assam Legislative Assembly arising out of publica­tion of the said news item in the issue of the 5th August 1963. This notice was issued by the Privileges Committee of the Assembly. The petitioner in civil rule No. 6/64 applied for time to the Secretary of the Assembly and six weeks time was granted to him from the 2lst November 1963. He applied for further time for three weeks on the 9th January 1984. Before any reply was received, on the 17th January 1984 the petition was moved by him in this Court and the proceedings before the Committee of Privileges were stayed. The other petition was moved thereafter on the 30th January 1984. (3) Two separate complaints were made, to the Secretary by Shri Dulal Chandra Barua and Shri larapada Bhattacharjee, members of the Assembly regarding these publications. The matter was discuss­ed before the Legislative Assembly of Assam and was referred to the Privileges Committee of the House by the Deputy Speaker on the 22nd August 1961. The two grounds on which the notice was issued by the Privileges Committee are-(1) that the publication of the report before it was discussed by the House con­stituted a breach of the privileges of the House and (2) that the publication in the paper scandalised the Speaker and thus the dignity of the House was lowered. (4) Though Mr. Goswami for the petitioners has covered a large ground in his argument, the main points urged by him are two fold. Firstly he has con­tended that as the Ram Labhaya Commission was appointed under the Commission of Enquiry Act, the report of the Commission cannot be treated to be a part of the proceedings of the House or the document of the House and thus the publication of the report or the comment on the report, on the face of it, does not constitute the breach of the privileges of the House. In fact his argument is that the House has no privilege to stop the publication of the report of an independent body constituted under the Commission of Inquiry Act and that this Court can determine what is the privilege of the Legislature. In fact his argument is that the House has no privilege to stop the publication of the report of an independent body constituted under the Commission of Inquiry Act and that this Court can determine what is the privilege of the Legislature. He has secondly contended that as the report itself dealt with the conduct of certain officers including the past conduct of the present Speaker of the House which he was a Minister and not his conduct as the member of the present House, the publication of such .a report cannot be regarded as lowering the dignity of the House and thus neither the publication con­travenes the privilege of the House nor does the matter come within the ambit of the recognised privi­leges of the House. (5) Mr. Lahiri who appears for the opposite party, contends that the petitioner has no right which can be said to have been affected by the issue of the impugned notice and thus he has no right to tile an application under Article 228 of the Constitution. The petitioner has no fundamental right as an Editor or Publisher of the paper, apart from the right conferred under Article 19 of the Constitution and such a right cannot be enforced in violation of the provisions of Article 194 of the Constitution. He has further urged that before the petitioner can ask for the quashing of the proceeding, he will have to get the proceedings of the House quashed which he is not entitled to do in view of the provisions of Article 194 (2). The complaint was placed before the House. After discussing the matter it was referred to the Committee of Privileges and thus the Committee of Privileges was bound by the resolution of the House and unless the resolution ot the House can be quashed by this Court, the proceedings before the Committee of Privileges cannot be quashed. Article 194 (2) of the Constitution prohibits any Court from entertaining any proceeding in respect of the pro­ceedings before the legislature. Reliance was placed on Article 212 of the Constitution which provides : "212. (1) The validity of any proceedings in the Legislature of a State shall not be called in question on the ground of any alleged irregularity of pro­cedure. Reliance was placed on Article 212 of the Constitution which provides : "212. (1) The validity of any proceedings in the Legislature of a State shall not be called in question on the ground of any alleged irregularity of pro­cedure. (2) No officer or member of the Legislature of a State in whom powers are vested by or under this Constitution for regulating procedure or the conduct of business, or for maintaining order, in the Legisla­ture shall be subject to the jurisdiction of any Court in respect of the exercise by him of those powers." As the Deputy Speaker in the exercise of his powers as the officer of the Legislature and after the House has passed the resolution, referred the matter to the Committee of Privileges, his action cannot be called in question in any Court of law. Mr. Lihiri has fur­ther contended that it cannot be denied that the House had a privilege to stop the publication of any of its proceedings and unless otherwise authorised, the proceedings of the House cannot be published. Any such publication will constitute breach of the privilege of the House and further that it is the ad­mitted privilege of the House to maintain its dignity and any publication which lowers the dignity of the House will constitute breach of the privilege. Prima facie thus in the present case the petitioners had committed breach of the privilege and the Court had no jurisdiction to go into this question. There is no ambiguity about the nature and extent of the privi­lege of the House. The only question which the petitioners are asking this court to determine is as to whether the facts alleged constitute a breach of the privilege or not. This is a matter which is not examinable by the courts. It is further urged that assuming that the court has jurisdiction, the act of the petitioners doss constitute a breach ot the privi­lege, inasmuch as the Commission was appointed on the request ot the Public Accounts Committee of the legislature and the Government after the receipt of the report was hound to submit the report to the Public Accounts Committee to be placed before the legislature. Thus after the report had been submitted to the Government it was in the possession of the Government as an agent for the Public Accounts Committee. Thus after the report had been submitted to the Government it was in the possession of the Government as an agent for the Public Accounts Committee. It was the report of the Committee and could not be published before it was discussed by the Committee. (6) It is necessary to mention at this stage that both the Speaker and the members of the Committee of Privileges who have been impleaded as opposite parties are represented through counsel before us. It has not been contended by the counsel for the Speaker that the house is the sole and exclusive judge of the punishment which should be imposed on the party whom it has found to be guilty of its contempt. Nor has it been contended that if in enforcement of its decision the House issues a general or unspeaking warrant, the High Court is not entitled to entertain a habeas corpus petition challenging the validity o£ the detention of the persons sentenced by the House. It had also to be conceded that the House has power to inquire whether its contempt has been committed by any one even outside the four walis and further has power to impose punishment of such contempt. It also cannot be denied that the House has the privilege to commit a person for its contempt and further that it has got the privilege to stop the publi­cation of its proceedings. The question thus before us lies in a very narrow compass. In effect the point raised is not one of the determination of the ambit and the scope of Article 194 of the Constitution, but whether on certain set of tacts the petitioners can be said to have committed the breach of the privilege of the House. (7) The admitted facts are that on the 15th February 1961 the Public Accounts Committee of the Assam Legislative Assembly dealt with certain audit objections relating! to the disposal of the American surplus pipes and recommended that a high-power Committee should be set up by the Government to probe into the bona fides and irregularities of the whole transaction' and that 'the report of the high-power Committee should be placed before the Public Accounts Committee within three months from the date of placing this report before the House1. On the 3rd April 1961 the report of the Public Accounts Committee was placed before the Assembly and was accepted. On the 3rd April 1961 the report of the Public Accounts Committee was placed before the Assembly and was accepted. The recommendations of the Public Ac­counts Committee and the resolution of the House were forwarded to the Government- The Government by its notification dated 27th April, 1962 appointed the Commission of Inquiry under S. 3 of the Com­mission of Inquiry ^ct, 1952. The Commission sub­mitted its report to the Government. Thereafter the Chief Secretary to the Government of Assam by his letter dated the 19th August 1963 addressed to the Secretary, Public Accounts Committee and the Assam Legislative Assembly, forwarded the report of the Inquiry Commission in original requesting him to place the report before the Public Accounts Com­mittee for consideration. Before the matter could be discussed by the Public Accounts Committee to be placed before the House the publications in question appeared in the Assam Tribune. On the 22nd August 1963 Shri Dulal Chandra Barua, a member of the Assam Legislative Assembly moved a privilege motion complaining of a breach of privilege against the Speaker Shri Mahendra Mohan Choudhury and also against the House itself by the Editors and Publishers of the newspapers-the Assam Tribune of Gauhati and the Statesman of Calcutta. Shri Tarapada Bhattacharjee, another member of the House, moved a similar resolution in the House. Thereafter the Speaker made a statement in the House pointing out that the report published in the paper was a distorted one and was done with a view to ridicule the Speaker and to bring the House to odium and lower the Speaker in the estimate of the people. Thereafter the Speaker vacated his chair and requested the Deputy Speaker to conduct the proceedings. The matter was discussed in the House and was re­ferred to the Privilege Committee under Rule 162 of the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in Assam Legislative Assembly for examination and investigation and to report before the next Session of the Assembly. In pursuance of this reference to the Privilege Committee for investigation, the impugned notice was issued by the Privilege Com­mittee. The notice issued to the petitioners has asked the petitioners to show cause as to why appropriate action should not be recommended to the House against them for the breach of the privilege. In pursuance of this reference to the Privilege Committee for investigation, the impugned notice was issued by the Privilege Com­mittee. The notice issued to the petitioners has asked the petitioners to show cause as to why appropriate action should not be recommended to the House against them for the breach of the privilege. This notice has been issued with a view to give the petitioners an opportunity to show cause so that the matter may be decided after hearing the petitioners and mere issue of a notice cannot be said to be a threat to the petitioners. (8) Rule 175 of the Rules of procedure and con­duct of business in Assam Legislative Assembly pro­vides : "Except where the breach of privilege is com­mitted in the actual view of the House or of a Committee, the House shall at some proper stage of the proceedings before the sentence is passed give an opportunity to the persons charged to be heard in explanation or exculpation of the offence complained against him : Provided that if the matter has been referred to the Privileges Committee and the person charged has been heard before the Committee, it will not be neces­sary for the House to give him that opportunity un­less the House directs otherwise." A perusal of Rules 158 to 181 of the Rules clearly shows that when a complaint is made by a member of. the House and the House after discussion refers the matter to the Privileges Committee, it is open to the Privileges Committee to go into the question not only of the punishment to be awarded but also whether the acts complained constitute the breach of privilege or not and further the Committee of Privileges has to make recommendation to the House and the matter is finalised only after the decision is taken by the House. (9) The petitioners do not contend that there was-any violation of the provisions of the rules of proce­dure in referring the matter to the Privileges Commit­tee for inquiry and report to the House. (9) The petitioners do not contend that there was-any violation of the provisions of the rules of proce­dure in referring the matter to the Privileges Commit­tee for inquiry and report to the House. The only point urged is that the notice issued by the Privileges Committee is without jurisdiction, inasmuch as the publication of the report of the Commission appoint­ed under the Commission of Inquiry Act is not a breach of any privilege of the House and secondly that the extracts from the report published by the petitioners do not amount to contempt of the House inasmuch as they do not cast any aspersions on the conduct of the Speaker as a member of the House. They only relate to his past conduct. In substance the contention is that by issuing the notice the House is claiming a new and unrecognised privilege. We do not think that the contentions raised by the peti­tioners have any substance. There is no dispute with regard to the extent of the privilege of the Assembly; nor is there any dispute about the ambit and scope of Art. 194 (3) of the Constitution. The only question is whether the publication does or does not amount to the breach of the privilege of the House and the con­tempt of the House. It cannot be doubted that the Committee of Privileges has jurisdiction to decide these matters. The question before us is not that the Courts are precluded from interfering with the punishment given by the House for its own contempt, nor are we in the present case called upon to decide-that the decision by the House is conclusive and not examinable by this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution. (10) Mr. Goswami for the petitioners has taken us through the various passages in the recent majority opinion of the Supreme Court in re under Art. 143. Constitution of India, Special Reference No. 1 of 1964 (reported in AIR 1965 S C 745). The contro­versy on which the Supreme Court had to give its opinion is disclosed in the following passage in the majority opinion : - "It will thus be seen that the main controversy disclosed by the five questions formulated by the President ultimately lies within a very narrow com­pass. The contro­versy on which the Supreme Court had to give its opinion is disclosed in the following passage in the majority opinion : - "It will thus be seen that the main controversy disclosed by the five questions formulated by the President ultimately lies within a very narrow com­pass. Is the House the sole and exclusive judge of the issue as to whether its contempt has been committed where the alleged contempt has taken place outside the four walls of the House? Is the House the sole and exclusive judge of the punishment which should be imposed on the party whom it has found to be guilty of its contempt ? And if in enforcement of its decision the House issues a general or unspeaking warrant, is the High Court entitled to entertain a habeas corpus petition challenging the validity of the detention of the person sentenced by the House." Dealing with the contention of the counsel for the High Court it was observed as follows : "It is not seriously disputed by Mr. Setalvad that the House has power to inquire whether its contempt has been committed by anyone even outside its four-walls and has the power to impose punishment for such contempt ; but his argument is that having regard to the material provisions of our Constitution, it would not be open to the House to make a claim that its general warrant should be treated as conclu­sive. In every case where a party has been sentenced by the House for contempt and detained, it would be open to him to move the High Court for appropriate relief under Art. 226 and the High Court would be entitled to examine the merits of his pleas, even though the warrant may be general or unspeaking." In another place it has been observed as follows : "We ought to make it clear that we are dealing with the question of jurisdiction and are not concer­ned with the propriety or reasonableness of the exer­cise of such jurisdiction." Dealing with the question of the impact of Chapter III of the Constitution on the provision of Art. i94 (3), it was observed as follows :- "As we have already indicated we do not propose to enter into a general discussion as to the applicabi­lity of all the fundamental rights to the cases where legislative powers and privileges can be exercised against any individual citizen of this country, and that we are dealing with this matter on the footing that Att. 19 (1) (a) does not apply and Art. 21 does. If an occasion arises, it may become necessary to consider whether Art. 22 can be contravened by the exercise of the power or privilege under Art. 194 (3)," It will thus be clear that the point which the Sup­reme Court had to answer in the said reference does not arise in the present case and no assistance can be derived in the present case from the general obser­vations made with regard to the respective powers of the House and the courts. (11) In the case of Harendra Nath Barua v. Dev Kanta Barua, reported in A I R 1958 Assam 160 this court had the occasion to consider the question of the powers of this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution to deal with a similar matter. Ac arti­cle and news item appeared in the paper known as 'Natun Assamiya' published from Gauhati. The Speaker of the Assam Legislative Assembly directed that the Editor and the Printer of the paper be asked to appear before the Privileges Committee to show cause why they should not be held guilty for the breach of the privilege of the House. This notice was challenged by means of a petition before this Court. The Speaker of the Assam Legislative Assembly directed that the Editor and the Printer of the paper be asked to appear before the Privileges Committee to show cause why they should not be held guilty for the breach of the privilege of the House. This notice was challenged by means of a petition before this Court. The points which arose for consideration in that case are set out at p. 162 of the report and are as follows :- "The questions, therefore, which arise for our determination are : (1) Whether this Court has any power to inter­fere with the action taken by the Speaker as the highest functionary of the State Legislative and purporting to do so in protection or vindication of its rights and privileges? (2) Whether under the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in the Assam Legislative Assembly the Speaker and the Secretary of the Legislative Assembly, in the absence of any resolution of the House, had authority to summon the petitioner to appear before the Privileges Committee? and (3) Whether any legal right of the petitioner has been infringed by the issue of the order in question asking him to appear before the Privileges Committee on a particular date?" It was held by this court that the House of Commons in England has certain well defined rights and privi­leges honoured and sanctified by traditions and cus­toms, one of the most important of them being the right to commit a person for contempt of its high authority and dignity and for breach of its privi­leges. This power, it was held, extends not merely to the members of the House but even to persons outside it and when the House acts in vindication of those rights and privileges, the Courts of the land have no right to interfere. The proper forum is the House itself where the person affected can claim the redress of his rights. The argument advanced mainly in that case was that the Speaker had not referred the matter to the Privileges Committee in accordance with the rules of procedure and further that the notice was in fact issued by the Speaker which he had no autho­rity to do. Both these contentions were repelled on the ground that there was do violation of the provi­sions of the rules. Both these contentions were repelled on the ground that there was do violation of the provi­sions of the rules. This court observed that the courts had no power at that stage to go into the question as to whether any breach of the privilege was or was not committed. Various authorities of the English courts and Australian courts were considered in this case and the general submissions made by the counsel were also considered. But the petition was ultimately rejected. We have already pointed out that as the Legislative Assembly has power to commit a person for contempt and for breach of its privileges, the notice issued by the Privileges Com­mittee cannot be said to be without jurisdiction and it is not for this court at this stage to go into the question as to whether the publication does or does not constitute the breach of the privilege or that the decision by the House is conclusive on these matters. (12) Reference may then be made to the case of M. S. M. Sharma v. Sri Krishna Sinha, reported in AIR 1959 SC 395 . In this case notice was issued against the Editor of the Searchlight paper issued in English from Patna, to show cause before the Privi­leges Committee of the Bihar Legislative Assembly, as to why he should, not be committed for the breach of a privilege of the House. This notice was chal­lenged by means of a petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution before the Supreme Court. One of the points taken was that the petitioner's fundamental right was affected. It was held that no such funda­mental right can be claimed by the petitioner as a journalist, apart from Art. 19 of the Constitution and that the powers and privileges of the House incor­porated under Art. 194 (3) of the Constitution were not subject to Art. 19 of the Constitution. So far as the question for determination before the House is concerned, the following passage at p. 412 of the report is apposite:- "Finally, the petitioner denies that the ex­punged portions have been published. We do not think we should express any opinion on this con­troversy, at any rate, at this stage. So far as the question for determination before the House is concerned, the following passage at p. 412 of the report is apposite:- "Finally, the petitioner denies that the ex­punged portions have been published. We do not think we should express any opinion on this con­troversy, at any rate, at this stage. If the Legis­lative Assembly of Bihar has the powers and privi­leges it claims and is entitled to take proceedings for breach thereof; as we hold it is, then it must be left to the House itself to determine whether there has, in fact, been any breach of its privilege. Thus, it will be for the House on the advice of its Com­mittee of Privileges to consider the true effect of the Speaker's directions that certain portions of the pro­ceedings be expunged and whether the publication of the speech, if it has included the portion which had been so directed to be expunged is, in the eye of the law, tantamount to publishing something which had not been said and, whether such a publica­tion cannot be claimed to be a publication of an accurate and faithful report of the speech. It will, again, be for the House to determine whether the Speaker's ruling made distinctly and audibly that a portion of the proceedings be expunged amount to a direction to the Press reporters not to publish the same, and whether the publication of the speech, if it has included the portion directed to be so expung­ed is or is not a violation of the order of the Speaker and a breach of the privilege of the House amount­ing to a contempt of the Speaker and the House." In the above case it was clearly laid down that even if the powers and privileges claimed and the immu­nities conferred by Art. 194 (3) of the Constitution are repugnant to the fundamental right, they will not be void to the extent of the repugnancy. The contention raised in this case on behalf of the peti­tioner was that he had a fundamental right under Art. 19 of the Constitution and by issuing a notice calling upon him to show cause as to why he should not be dealt with for the breach of the privilege of the House his fundamental right has been affected. This was repelled. This was repelled. Even in the majority opinion of the Supreme Court, it has been held that the observa­tions in the case of AIR 1959 S C 395 were confined to the case of a fundamental right under Art. 19 of the Constitution. Once it is found that the House has got a right to deal with its own contempt or breach of privilege, the notice issued by the Privileges Committee cannot be said to be without jurisdiction and thus the petitioners will not be entitled to any writ of prohibition. In our opinion thus the peti­tioners are not entitled lo any relief at this stage of the proceedings both on the ground that the quashing of the notice will amount to the quashing of the proceedings of the House which the courts of the land are precluded from doing in view of the pro­visions of Arts. 212 and 194 (2) of the Constitution and also on the ground that the House having the power to take action for the breach of its privileges, it must be left to the House itself to determine whether there has in fact been any breach of its privileges and the court will not at this stage inter­fere with the exercise of such a power by the Privi­leges Committee. In this view of the matter it is not necessary for us to go into the question whether the report of the Commissioner in the circumstances of the present case can or cannot be said to be a pro­ceeding or a document of the House and further whether on the face of it the publication constitutes the contempt of the House or not. (13) Regarding the question raised as to the right of the petitioners to approach this court under Art. 226 of the Constitution it is sufficient to point out that if we had held that the notice was without jurisdiction, obviously the petitioners against whom the notice was issued, had every tight to approach this court under Art. 226 of the Constitution for the quashing of the proceedings arising out of the said notice. In the result therefore, we reject these peti­tions. But in the circumstances the parties will bear their own costs. DUTTA, J.: - (14) I have had the advantage of going through the judgment prepared by my lord the Chief Justice and I agree that the petitions must be dismissed. In the result therefore, we reject these peti­tions. But in the circumstances the parties will bear their own costs. DUTTA, J.: - (14) I have had the advantage of going through the judgment prepared by my lord the Chief Justice and I agree that the petitions must be dismissed. I, however, want to say a few words of my own. (15) In Civil Rule No. 6 of 1964 the petitioner is the Chief Editor of the "Assam Tribune" and in Civil Rule No. 11 of 1964 the petitioners are the Editor, Printer and Publisher and the Special Re­presentative of the paper at Shillong respectively. The facts leading to these petitions are briefly as follows : - The "Assam Tribune" is the only English daily in this State having a large circulation. The Public Accounts Committee (hereinafter called the P. A. Committee) of the Assam Legislative Assembly (here­inafter called the House) for the year 1960-61) dealt with certain audit objections relating to the disposal of American surplus pipes in this State. The P. A, Committee entertained grave doubts about the trans­actions and recommended in its report that a High Power Committee should be appointed to probe into the whole matter and that the report of this High Power Committee should be submitted before the P. A. Committee within three months from the date on which the report of the P. A. Committee was placed before the House. The report of the P. A. Committee containing the above recommendation was placed before the House on the 3rd April, 1961 and was accepted by it. The Government was, how­ever, reluctant to appoint any High Power Committee immediately on the plea that a departmental enquiry had already been made into the matter and its report was pending before the Government. The P. A. Committee took serious exception to the non-compli­ance of its recommendation by the Government and insisted on a High Power Committee. Then the Govern­ment by its notification dated the 27th April, 1962 appointed Mr. Kara Labhaya, a retired Judge of this Court as an one-man Commission of Inquiry under S. 3 of the Commission of Enquiry Act to probe into the matter. Some extracts of the report of the Commission of Inquiry were published in the "Assam Tribune" on the 5th August 1963 and thereafter some portions of the report appeared also in two other papers viz. Some extracts of the report of the Commission of Inquiry were published in the "Assam Tribune" on the 5th August 1963 and thereafter some portions of the report appeared also in two other papers viz. "Janambhumi" and "Janasakti" on 8-8-63 and 14-8-63 respectively and in the "Statesman" of Calcutta on 7-8-63. The report of the Commission was sent to the P. A. Committee only on 19-8-63. Thus the above publications in the papers were a few days prior to the receipt of the Commission's report by the P. A. Committee. Oa 22-8-63 two members of the House moved separately privilege motions complaining of a breach of privilege against the Hon'ble Speaker of the House as well as the House itself by the Editors and Publishers of the ''Assam Tribune" and the "States­man" on the allegation that the publication of extracts of the Commission report was unauthorised. The motions were discussed in the House and the Deputy Speaker who presided on that day felt that there was a prima facie case of a breach of privilege, and there­fore the motions were referred to the Committee of Privileges for examination and investigation and to report before the next session of the House. Then the Secretary to the Legislative Assembly who is also the ex-officio Secretary of the P. A. Committee issued a notice to the petitioners informing them of the fact that the Committee of Privileges had found prima facie cases of the breach of privileges made out against them and asking them to show cause, if any, on or before the 23rd of November, 1963, why appro­priate action should not be taken against them. Along with that notice, copies of the motions as well as of the statement and ruling of the Hon'ble Speaker were sent. Similar notices were served on the editors, printers and publishers of the other papers. Two of the papers viz., the "Statesman" and the ''Janam­bhumi" offered unconditional apology whereas the "Janasakti" submitted an explanation and the "Assam Tribune" has challenged the show cause notice in this Court. The stand taken by the "Assam Tribune" is mainly that the Ram Labhaya Commission was not a Commission appointed by the Legislature but was a Commission appointed by the Government. (16) Mr. The stand taken by the "Assam Tribune" is mainly that the Ram Labhaya Commission was not a Commission appointed by the Legislature but was a Commission appointed by the Government. (16) Mr. Goswami appearing on behalf of the petitioners, has argued at length regarding the status of the Ram Labhaya Commission and the scope of the privileges of the legislature vis-a-vis the right of the press. But as observed by the Supreme Court in the opinion given by it in its Advisory Jurisdiction on Reference No. 1 of 1964, (reported in AIR1965SC745), it is hardly necessary to emphasise that in dealing with constitutional matters the court should be slow to deal with questions which do not directly arise. It is not necessary in the present case to decide whether the Ram Labhya Commission was merely executive or whether its proceedings were part of( proceedings of the House or whether its report is a "parliamenta­ry" paper. Nor is it necessary to discuss what this court should do in case a petition is filed against the issue of a warrant of commitment by.the House. In fact, no such warrant has been issued. The petitioners contend that there has been infringement of their fundamental right guaranteed by Arts. I9(l)(a) and 21 of the Constitution of India. The Supreme Court has already held in Sharma's case, AIR 1959 SC 395 that the privileges enjoyed by the legislatures in India under the latter part of Art. 194 (3) of the Constitu­tion are not subject to the fundamental right guaran­teed by Art. 19 (1) (a). The power to punish for con­tempt is one of the said privileges. There is nothing to show that the show-cause notice has violated Art. 21 which says that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law. The Privilege Com­mittee has only to make its recommendation and the ultimate decision and action rest with the House. There is no reason to assume that if the House decides to punish the petitioners, it will deprive them of their liberty except according to procedure establish­ed by law. (17) It cannot be disputed that the House has the power to inquire whether its contempt has been com­mitted by anyone even outside its four walls. There is no reason to assume that if the House decides to punish the petitioners, it will deprive them of their liberty except according to procedure establish­ed by law. (17) It cannot be disputed that the House has the power to inquire whether its contempt has been com­mitted by anyone even outside its four walls. The question whether the finding arrived at by the House as a result of the inquiry is justifiable or not is a different matter, but the right of the House to inquire whether there has been a contempt cannot be denied. In the present case the Speaker referred the question of breach of privilege to the Privilege Committee under R. 162 of the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of business in the Assam Legislative Assembly and the Privilege Committee has issued the show-cause notice in course of the inquiry. In doing so it has neither exceeded its legal authority nor violated any legal right of the petitioners. In the result, therefore, no writ can issue to quash or prohibit the show-cause notice. Petition dismissed.