Judgment.- This Second Appeal is directed against the decision of the learned Subordinate Judge of Pudukottai, decreeing the plaintiff’s suit for damages for malicious prosecution. The learned District Munsif had dismissed the suit holding that the prosecutor, that is, the defendant, had reasonable and probable cause for preferring the complaint against the plaintiff and that no improper or indirect motive could be attributed to the defendant. On a careful analysis of the evidence, the learned Subordinate Judge came to the contrary conclusion and granted the plaintiff Rs. 1,475 as damages, Rs. 375 representing the expenses incurred in defending the criminal prosecution, and Rs. 1,100 as general damages. The relevant facts may briefly be set out. The plaintiff is a rich and influential individual and of a pious and religious disposition. But there was hostility and ill-feelings between him and one Chockalingam Chettiar, the President of the local Panchayat. The defendant, the appellant in the Second Appeal, is a clerk in the Panchayat, and he instituted a complaint against the plaintiff in the Second Class Sub-Magistrate’s Court, Thirumayam, charging him with assault and use of criminal force. His case was that on 12th May, 1958, at the time of the Poochorial festival the plaintiff, who was near the Pillaiyar temple, sent for him and that, taking him to task for not clearing the grass and thorns around the temple, the plaintiff shouted against him and dragged him to the temple for swearing. He was threatened with beating if he did not swear before the deity. The plaintiff was found guilty in the Sub-Magistrate’s Court and was released on probation under section 3 of the Madras Probation of Offenders Act. On appeal, the learned District Magistrate allowed the appeal and acquitted the accused (plaintiff). The learned Subordinate Judge, on an elaborate consideration of the evidence, came to the conclusion that the complaint preferred by the defendant is nothing but a invention with the active help of Chockalingam, the avowed enemy of the plaintiff. It is needless to advert in detail to the reasoning of the learned Subordinate Judge for his conclusion which is a pure question of fact. As regards malice, there is ample evidence in the case, apart from the fact that the incident itself is an invention. It is needless to advert in detail to the reasoning of the learned Subordinate Judge for his conclusion which is a pure question of fact. As regards malice, there is ample evidence in the case, apart from the fact that the incident itself is an invention. The learned Subordinate Judge refers to the publicity in the papers which the defendant has secured for the conviction, securing certified copy of the judgment and forwarding it to the press. Again, when the plaintiff prayed for exemption from personal attendance, the defendant insisted on his presence in Court, stating that he might have to be identified by witnesses, though at the trial no question was put to any witness with reference to the identification. The learned Subordinate Judge, in the circumstances, concluded that the ambition of the defendant in dragging the plaintiff to the Criminal Court was to put him to shame. Learned Counsel appearing for the appellant, the prosecutor, contends that due weight has not been given by the lower appellate Court to the fact that the trial Court had convicted the plaintiff for the offence and that the acquittal was only in appeal. But the criminal complaint in this case is based on facts within the personal knowledge of the defendant. It is an assault on the prosecutor and he relies for the prosecution on what happened to him, and when the incident as spoken to by the prosecutor is found to be false, it is one, false to the knowledge of the prosecutor. Learned Counsel contends that the falsity of the offence must be found in the Criminal Court itself and if it was a case of acquittal giving the benefit of doubt to the accused, it could be a matter for consideration by the civil Court on the issue as to want of reasonable and probable cause. Learned Counsel, therefore, argues, that the civil Court must consider the basis of the acquittal. It is well settled law so far as this Court is concerned that the reasoning in the judgment of the Criminal Court is not relevant in a suit for damages for malicious prosecution. Learned Counsel, therefore, argues, that the civil Court must consider the basis of the acquittal. It is well settled law so far as this Court is concerned that the reasoning in the judgment of the Criminal Court is not relevant in a suit for damages for malicious prosecution. In Padda Venkatapathi v. Ganagunts Balappa1, a decision of a Division Bench it is observed thus: “Indeed, I am unable to agree that our Evidence Act justifies an examination of the judgment of the Criminal Court in order to ascertain the grounds upon which the acquittal proceeded and the views taken by the trying Magistrate of the evidence. Under section 43 of the Evidence Act it appears to me that judgment can be used only to establish the fact that an acquittal bas taken place as a fact in issue in the civil suit. I know of no provision of the Act which will justify the civil Court in taking into consideration the ground upon which that acquittal was based, and upon this point I am in agreement with Gulabchand v. Ghunilal2, and Shubrati v. Sham-ud-din3, in the view that there is no such provision. The clear and straight issue in the present case, which must be decided before we can find absence of reasonable and probable cause, is whether the respondent was deliberately making a complaint which was in substance false when he alleged that the appellant took part in the disturbance and fired the shot which injured the third witness for the defendant, and the appellant must establish the falsity of this complaint by disproving it before he can be entitled to damages.” The decision has been followed by Somasundaram, J., in Kutumba Rao v. Venkataramayya1, where he pointed out that it was the duty of the civil Court to consider, the evidence adduced and find out whether there was absence of reasonable and probable cause. The judgments of the Criminal Courts are admissible only for the purpose of showing that the prosecution terminated in favour of the plaintiff. Of course, that does not, in my view, involve a judicial determination in the criminal proceedings of the innocence of the accused. The judgments of the Criminal Courts are admissible only for the purpose of showing that the prosecution terminated in favour of the plaintiff. Of course, that does not, in my view, involve a judicial determination in the criminal proceedings of the innocence of the accused. In a case where the facts in question are professedly within the personal knowledge of the plaintiff, the mere fact that the first Criminal Court believed the prosecutor’s statement and convicted the accused would not be evidence of the existence of reasonable and probable cause, if the civil Court on a re-assessment of the evidence comes to the conclusion as to the falsity of the complaint. In my view, it would be immaterial that the Criminal Court on appeal had merely observed that the prosecutor had not established beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused. The criminal proceedings having terminated in favour of the accused, when he lauched proceedings for damages for malicious prosecution, of course, it will be for him to prove, in the first instance, that the prosecutor acted without reasonable and probable cause and that he acted malaciously. In this the fact of conviction in the first instance may have a bearing. I am unable to read Bosa Reddi v. Perumal Reddy2as laying down the rule that the Criminal Court itself must find when acquitting the plaintiff the falsity of the complaint. The true principle, according to the learned Judges, is that the suit for damages for malicious prosecution would lie if the plaintiff was ultimately acquitted on appeal by reason of the original conviction having proceeded on evidence which was known by the complainant to be false or on the wilful suppression by him of material information. The learned Judges do not say that the falsity must be found by the Criminal Court itself when acquitting the accused. When the offence is rested on facts stated to be within the knowledge of the Prosecutor and the facts are found to be false by the civil Court in the action for damages for malicious prosecution, the fact of conviction in the first instance is of little significance. When the offence is rested on facts stated to be within the knowledge of the Prosecutor and the facts are found to be false by the civil Court in the action for damages for malicious prosecution, the fact of conviction in the first instance is of little significance. The finding in this case of absence of reasonable and probable cause and malice is based on relevant and admissible evidence and this Court has consistently taken the view that these questions are questions of fact which the High Court cannot go behind in Second Appeal. On the question of damages, the learned Counsel Sri T. V. Balakrishnan appearing for the respondent, very fairly stated that he was not particular about the quantum of the general damages and left the matter to the discretion of the Court. In my view, there is no basis for awarding a sum of Rs. 1,100 as general damages, and the ends of justice would be served by limiting the general damages to a sum of Rs. 125. The plaintiff, of course, would be entitled to the sum of Rs. 375, which he has spent in defending himself in the criminal proceedings. I, therefore, modify the total damages decreed to a sum of Rs. 500. The plaintiff will, however, be entitled to the full costs as taxed for him in the Courts below, and to full costs in this Court also. The decree of the lower appellate Court is confirmed except for the modification in the quantum of damages. The Second Appeal is, in other respects, dismissed with costs as above provided. No leave. R.M. ----- Appeal dismissed.